top of page

Hong Kong Intelligence Report #102 情報與媒體間的對比:閱讀國家情報總監辦公室ODNI的《美國情報圈的年度威脅評估》

Updated: Mar 18, 2023

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

FILE PHOTO: IC © Envato

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】


▪️ 2023年3月有兩篇有趣的報告出爐和流通了。第一是匯總美國情報圈(IC)分析的國家情報總監(DNI)在2023年2月6日定稿的《美國情報社區的年度威脅評估》(ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY);另一篇是在實際上應對前者的中共中央和國務院在2023年3月16日印發的《黨和國家機構改革方案》。 市民應該親自閱讀《美國情報圈的年度威脅評估》來體會到包括中國官媒在內的香港媒體報導和全美國情報機構見解之間存在的龐大落差(在此大部分都是中外媒體就論及的議題領域報導的內容基本上與美國情報圈在此披露的見解高度一致,顯示美國在媒體領域控制得徹底,中國官媒自己也照樣轉載的結果,但較重要的則是有落差之處)。在該報告中,美國情報機構本身也並沒有奉行與病毒共存,他們自己仍然秉持相當‘保守’的防疫概念(biocontainment)。這也是極大的認識差異和落差。這落差就是由資本的媒體及其御用評論員們攜手造成的,落差感揭示我們被資訊污染的部分。要認清情報機構和資本媒體之間的信息落差



Two interesting reports came out and circulated in March 2023. The first is the ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, finalized by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on February 6, 2023, which brings together the analysis of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC); the other is the "Reform Program of Party and State Institutions" issued by the State Council on March 16, 2023. The public should read "The U.S. Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment" for themselves to appreciate the huge discrepancy between what the Hong Kong media, including the Chinese state media, report and what the U.S. intelligence agencies across the country are saying (most of what reported here by the Chinese and foreign media on the subject areas discussed is largely consistent with what the U.S. intelligence community has again revealed, showing that the U.S. is in complete control of the global media and that the Chinese official media themselves are citing them to some extent blindly). The most results are reproduced by media, but more importantly, there are discrepancies. In the report, the U.S. intelligence agencies themselves surprisingly do not practice coexistence with the virus, but rather maintain a 'conservative' concept of biocontainment. This is also a huge difference in understanding and discrepancy. This discrepancy is created by the capitalist media and its paid commentators, and it reveals the part of us that is contaminated by information.


就整體而言,該報告中的各自篇章是美國不同情報機構撰寫各自專屬領域議題的,因此立場和政治偏見的程度不一。不過,都是由主流媒體和港媒都報導過的公開資料,也同時揭示這些媒體多麼幫美國情報機構發布它們的敘事。在此,所謂脈絡和敘事,這些跟藝術領域的所謂脈絡和敘事完全屬於同一的意思。


其中,美國穩固的領域是沒有寫進去的。譬如,娛樂,教育和金融。中共強化對國家機構,尤其是對金融機構的監督是合乎其自身國益的。《黨和國家機構改革方案》中,最重要的不是什麼港澳辦升級而直屬中共,而是中共統籌金融機構的部分。不過,摩根士丹利也根本不覺得這威脅外資或什麼。只會優化金融服務而已。操縱匯率的中國人民銀行的人事也不變。美國也沒有任何抗議。回顧自從2022年11月1日以來(當時尚未公開放棄動態清零政策)的積極讓人民幣升值/港幣貶值的炒股搭配李家超政府瘋狂撤除防疫措施的一系列反清零政策花招之後,可謂中國人民銀行對改變整個中國的防疫措施早就是個關鍵的策劃者/參與者之一。看來,開始不提動態清零一詞的10月是敲定動態清零命運的關鍵月,當時中央本身也並不統一。鍾南山承認了香港對改變內地防疫政策發揮了積極作用(鍾南山指香港經歷沙士到新冠多年間進步大 部分舉措推動內地政策改變)。


As a whole, the individual chapters in the report are written by different U.S. intelligence agencies in their own specific areas of interest, and therefore vary in their positions and levels of political bias. However, they are publicly available information that has been reported by both the mainstream and Hong Kong media, and they also reveal how much these media have helped U.S. intelligence agencies to publish their narratives. Here, the so-called contexts and narratives are exactly the same as the so-called contexts and narratives in the field of art.


One of the areas in which the U.S. is firmly entrenched is not included. For example, entertainment, education, and finance. It is in the Communist Party's interest to strengthen its oversight of state institutions, especially financial institutions. The most important part of the Party and State Institution Reform Plan is not the upgrading of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office to the CCP's direct control, but the CCP's coordination of financial institutions. However, Morgan Stanley does not see this as a threat to foreign investment or anything at all. It will just improve its financial services. The People's Bank of China, which manipulates the exchange rate, remains unchanged. The U.S. has not protested either. Looking back at the speculation since November 1, 2022 (when the dynamic zero policy was not publicly abandoned) of aggressive RMB appreciation/HKD devaluation paired with a series of the John Lee Ka-chiu government's frantic withdrawal of anti-epidemic measures, it can be said that the PBOC has been one of the key architects/participants in changing the entire Chinese anti-epidemic measures. It seems that October, when the term "dynamic zero" was first dropped, was the key month that sealed the fate of dynamic zero, and when the central government itself was not unified. As the spokesman for WITH-COVID, Zhong Nanshan admitted that Hong Kong had played an active role in changing the epidemic prevention policy in the Mainland.


該報告揭示的內容中,最重要的是美國情報機構不是鼓吹2027年中國戰爭論的,那主要是由外部的‘影響輿論的角色演員們’(influence actors)包括媒體(資本)自己鼓吹的。這就是與媒體報導之間有天壤之別的。他們也都知道中國也不想打仗,因此並無戰爭論。例如,資本煽風點火的中國的射程範圍和日本將來擴大到外國的射程範圍都不是什麼自動化的戰爭爆發點。若光是射程範圍本身是個戰爭的必要充分條件,中國與其射程內的周邊國家已經打起來了。因此,只依照導彈的射程範圍的變化來煽動戰爭威脅論則是目前主要屬於民間的,膚淺枯燥的‘好戰’或‘反戰’生意而已。




重點是,中日,兩岸之間沒有‘新納粹主義’(Transnational RMVEs) 以及‘受它們威脅的盧甘斯克和頓涅茨克人民共和國’。誠然,欠強烈牽動軍事行動的必要充分條件。擁有海外基地也根本不是中美的矛盾,是因為中國本身也在發展建設海外軍事基地。不少見解是由胡亂猜想的一般媒體御用評論家們散播的。反霸權主義在此難免遭質疑,是因為反霸權主義也並不等於反帝國主義。帝國主義是指本國資本主義對外擴張。目前地球上,只有資本主義社會,大小不同色彩的帝國主義國家而已。


The most important thing that the report reveals is that the U.S. intelligence agencies are not advocating the 2027 China War theory, which is largely promoted by external 'influence actors' including the media (capital) itself. There is a world of difference between this and the media coverage. They also know that China does not want to go to war, so there is no war theory in it. For example, the missile range of China and the missile range of Japan's future expansion to foreign countries, which capital is fanning the flames of, is not an automatic point of war. If the range alone were a necessary and sufficient condition for war, China and the neighboring countries within its missile range would already be at war. Therefore, to incite a war threat theory only according to the change in the range of missiles is a shallow and boring 'warmongering' or 'anti-war' business, mainly among the private actors.


The point is that there are no 'Transnational RMVEs' Neo-Nazis between China and Japan, or the 'threatened People's Republics of Lugansk and Donetsk'. Admittedly, there are not enough conditions necessary for strong military action. The possession of overseas bases is not at all a contradiction between the United States and China, because China itself is developing and building overseas military bases mentioned in the report. Many of these perceptions are spread by wildly speculative media propagandists. Anti-hegemonism is difficult to avoid questioning here because it is not the same as anti-imperialism. Imperialism is the expansion of capitalism in one's own country to the outside world. At present, there are only capitalist societies on earth, and there are only imperialist countries of different sizes and colors.


此外,該報告中,所謂馬克思主義完全成了過去,無影無蹤了。所謂‘民主對獨裁’實際上已脫離了基於資本主義和社會主義之爭的冷戰思維,更像二戰思維


閱讀的秘訣:真正重要的意義是,該報告揭示的是全美國情報機構在各別關注的國家安全議題上的視野和想像的範圍。換言之,對中方或俄方而言,該報告每一行針對敵國的主詞都可以換成美國本身的。例如, 數字/數位/數碼專制主義和惡性影響(DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND MALIGN INFLUENCE)。這正是該報告的絕妙之處。這樣有技術地閱讀該報告就有頗大的收穫。


Moreover, in the report, the so-called Marxism became a thing of the past and disappeared. The so-called 'democracy versus dictatorship' is actually a departure from the Cold War thinking based on the battle between capitalism and socialism. On the contrary, it's closer to WW2.


The real significance of the report is that it reveals the scope of the national intelligence community's vision and imagination on national security issues of institutional concern. In other words, for the Chinese or the Russians, almost each line of the report could be replaced with the United States this subject against an enemy country. For example, DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND MALIGN INFLUENCE. This is the beauty of the report. Reading the report in this technical way is quite rewarding.


美國的國家安全概念: 全面


中國/香港的國家安全概念:分裂主義


註釋:國家安全和社會安寧的二分法 (中方)


中美的,港美之間的國家安全概念在實踐上大不同。美國的國家安全範疇最發達和全面。然而,中方/香港的國家安全範疇只不過是指分裂主義而已。後者十分落後。如根本沒法防止反清零政治攻勢。 那,中國的國家安全概念在實踐上,與社會安寧的曖昧觀念相提並論的東西。前者是指分裂主義;後者則是其他一切社會問題。這跟包含所有社會領域的美國的國家安全概念顯然不同。在反修例風波起初,港府一直放任示威者無所不為,甚至屢次批准了恐變成暴動的示威申請了,其奇怪的政治藉口(之後此促成了港區國安法立法)是當時也沒有‘規管’分裂主義的法律(23條立法)。其實,眾所周知,既有的刑事條例足以處置的。換言之,香港的國家安全概念游離一般刑事概念,它專門是指分裂主義的。此古怪的觀念分離,後來等到港區國安法實施之後,國家安全(分裂主義)則與一般刑事概念結合了,而且實際上它本身只意味著反分裂主義,其處理方式也跟一般刑事範疇一模一樣,被動的。‘國家安全和社會安寧的二分法’就是中國國家安全觀,這顯然不完整的。再次強調,其國家安全範疇的內涵和外延都過度狹窄。


The concept of national security is very different in practice between the United States and China, and between Hong Kong and the United States. The United States has the most developed and comprehensive scope of national security. However, the Chinese/Hong Kong national security concept refers only to separatism (ghost created by capital and external actors ). The latter is very backward. As the process shown, there was no way to prevent an anti-ZERO political offensive in late 2022. That is, the Chinese concept of national security in practice is something that goes hand in hand with the ambiguous concept of social peace. The former refers to separatism; the latter to all other social issues. This is markedly different from the American concept of national security, which encompasses all social spheres. The strange political excuse in 2019 (which later led to the enactment of national security legislation from above in 2020) was that there was no law (Article 23 legislation) to 'regulate' separatism. In fact, as we all know, the existing criminal laws were sufficient to deal with it. In other words, the concept of national security in Hong Kong was a departure from the general concept of criminality; it referred specifically to separatism. This odd conceptual separation was later combined with the general criminal concept of national security (separatism) when the Hong Kong national security law was implemented, and in fact it still only meant anti-secessionism itself, which was dealt with in exactly the same passive manner as the general criminal area. The 'dichotomy between national security and social tranquility' is the Chinese concept of national security, which is clearly incomplete. Again, its national security scope is too narrow in both connotation and extension.


所謂情報機構的特色是本身不是國策的決策者。其作戰的主要目的是影響本國,盟國或敵國的決策(‘to shape other countries’ decisions’)。


以下,摘取了些有趣的原文部分:


The characteristic of the so-called intelligence agencies is that they are not the decision makers of national policy. Its main purpose in warfare is to influence the decisions of its own country, its allies or its enemies ('to shape other countries' decisions').


Here are some interesting excerpts from the original text:


The characteristic of the so-called intelligence agencies is that they are not the decision makers of national policy. Its main purpose in warfare is to influence the decisions of its own country, its allies or its enemies ('to shape other countries' decisions').


Here are some interesting excerpts from the original text.


Date: March 8, 2023

This annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 116-260). This report reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world. (p.2)


First, great powers, rising regional powers, as well as an evolving array of non-state actors, will vie for dominance in the global order, as well as compete to set the emerging conditions and the rules that will shape that order for decades to come. Strategic competition between the United States and its allies, China, and Russia over what kind of world will emerge makes the next few years critical to determining who and what will shape the narrative perhaps most immediately in the context of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, which threaten to escalate into a broader conflict between Russia and the West. (p.3)


…to examine the spectrum of threats and highlight the most likely and impactful near-term risks in the context of the longer-term, overarching threat environment. (p.5)


China’s Communist Party (CCP) will continue efforts to achieve President Xi Jinping’s vision of making China the preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage. As Xi begins his third term as China’s leader, the CCP will work to press Taiwan on unification, undercut U.S. influence, drive wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system. At the same time, China’s leaders probably will seek opportunities to reduce tensions with Washington when they believe it suits their interests. China’s leaders probably will maintain their statist economic policies because they see state direction as necessary to reduce dependence on foreign technologies, enable military modernization, and sustain growth—ensuring CCP rule and the realization of its vision for national rejuvenation—even as the same policies risk undermining China’s private sector and inhibiting greater growth in household incomes. (p.6)


The Government of China is capable of leveraging its dominant positions in key global supply chains in an attempt to accomplish its goals, although probably not without significant cost to itself. (p.6)


However, China faces myriad—and in some cases growing—domestic and international challenges that probably will hinder CCP leaders’ ambitions. These include an aging population, high levels of corporate debt, economic inequality, and growing resistance to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) heavyhanded tactics in Taiwan and other countries. (p.6)


Beijing will try to expand its influence abroad and its efforts to be viewed as a champion of global development via several initiatives––including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Xi’s new flagship policies—the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative. Beijing has attempted to use these programs and initiatives to promote a China-led alternative to often U.S. and Western-dominated international development and security forums and frameworks. The IC assesses that the Government of China will use these programs and initiatives to promote modifications to international norms to favor state sovereignty and political stability over individual rights. (p.7)


Beijing is working to meet its goal of fielding a military by 2027 designed to deter U.S. intervention in a future cross-Strait crisis. The PLA Navy and Air Force already are the largest in the region and continue to field advanced platforms that improve China’s ability to try to establish air superiority and project power beyond the first island chain. The PLA Rocket Force’s (PLARF) short-, medium-, and intermediate-range conventional systems probably already can hold U.S. forces and bases in the region at risk. (p.7)


The PLA will continue to pursue the establishment of overseas military installations and access agreements in an attempt to project power and protect China’s interests abroad. While the PLA is making uneven progress toward establishing overseas military facilities, the PLA probably will continue to use tailored approaches to address local concerns as it seeks to improve relations with amenable countries and advance its overseas basing goals. In addition to continuing to develop its existing military base in Djibouti, Beijing reportedly is pursuing potential bases in Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, and the UAE. (p.7)


Some Chinese commercial space companies will attempt to compete by providing services in niche markets with little or no global competition, such as hyperspectral imaging, and also will continue attempts to undercut the price of Western firms in more competitive markets. (p.8)


The PLA is fielding new destructive and nondestructive ground- and space-based antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. (p.8)


China already has fielded ground-based counterspace capabilities including electronic warfare systems, directed energy weapons, and ASAT missiles intended to disrupt, damage, and destroy target satellites. China also has conducted orbital technology demonstrations, which while not counterspace weapons tests, prove China’s ability to operate future space-based counterspace weapons. (p.8)


The Government of China is doubling down on efforts to boost indigenous innovation and to become self-sufficient. (p.8)


China is central to global supply chains in a range of technology sectors, including semiconductors, critical minerals, batteries, solar panels, and pharmaceuticals. (p.9)


In a speech in April 2020, Xi noted his intentions to increase global supply chain dependencies on China, with an aim of controlling key supply chains and being able to use those supply chain dependencies to threaten and cut off foreign countries during a crisis. China’s dominance in these markets could pose a significant risk to U.S. and Western manufacturing and consumer sectors if the Government of China was able to adeptly leverage its dominance for political or economic gain. (p.9)


If Beijing feared that a major conflict with the United States were imminent, it almost certainly would consider undertaking aggressive cyber operations against U.S. homeland critical infrastructure and military assets worldwide. Such a strike would be designed to deter U.S. military action by impeding U.S. decisionmaking, inducing societal panic, and interfering with the deployment of U.S. forces. (p.10)


China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems. (p.10)


China leads the world in applying surveillance and censorship to monitor its population and repress dissent. Beijing conducts cyber intrusions that are targeted to affect U.S. and non-U.S. citizens beyond its borders—including journalists, dissidents, and individuals it views as threats—to counter views it considers critical of CCP narratives, policies, and actions. (p.10)


China’s cyber espionage operations have included compromising telecommunications firms, providers of managed services and broadly used software, and other targets potentially rich in follow-on opportunities for intelligence collection, attack, or influence operations. (p.10)


PRC leaders probably believe that a U.S. bipartisan consensus against China is impeding their efforts to directly influence U.S. national-level policy regarding China. (p.10)


Beijing’s growing efforts to actively exploit perceived U.S. societal divisions using its online personas move it closer to Moscow’s playbook for influence operations. (p.10)


There is real potential for Russia’s military failures in the war to hurt Russian President Vladimir Putin’s domestic standing and thereby trigger additional escalatory actions by Russia in an effort to win back public support. (p.12)


In the post–Soviet states, Moscow is less capable of intervening in Belarus, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus than it was in 2020 in Belarus and in 2022 in Kazakhstan––in both cases to prevent expressions of popular dissatisfaction with the government from leading to regime change. Russia’s deployment of much of its ground forces and associated security personnel to Ukraine this past year probably has reduced the likelihood of Russian military intervention in other post–Soviet states. (p.12)


Russia is particularly focused on improving its ability to target critical infrastructure, including underwater cables and industrial control systems, in the United States as well as in allied and partner countries, because compromising such infrastructure improves and demonstrates its ability to damage infrastructure during a crisis. (p.15)


Russia and its influence actors are adept at capitalizing on current events in the United States to push Moscow-friendly positions to Western audiences. Russian officials, including Putin himself, and influence actors routinely inject themselves into contentious U.S. issues, even if that causes the Kremlin to take a public stand on U.S. domestic political matters. (p.15)


It will try to strengthen ties to U.S. persons in the media and politics in hopes of developing vectors for future influence operations. (p.15)


Russia’s influence actors have adapted their efforts to increasingly hide their hand, laundering their preferred messaging through a vast ecosystem of Russian proxy websites, individuals, and organizations that appear to be independent news sources. Moscow seeds original stories or amplifies preexisting popular or divisive discourse using a network of state media, proxy, and social media influence actors and then intensifies that content to further penetrate the Western information environment. These activities can include disseminating false content and amplifying information perceived as beneficial to Russian influence efforts or conspiracy theories. (p.15)


In late 2022 and early 2023, the Iranian regime faced some of the most widespread and prolonged protests since the 1979 revolution. These protests were sparked by a cultural issue—rather than an economic or political one—but have since grown to encompass overall grievances with the Islamic Republic and have included a wide swath of society. (p.17)


Even if Iran has contained this round of protests through violence and intimidation, compounding crises in the coming year probably will further challenge the regime’s legitimacy and staying power. With Iran’s depreciating currency and annual inflation rates of almost 50 percent in late 2022, Tehran probably faces an economic downturn that the IC assesses could prolong or reignite unrest and result in greater instability. (p.17)


North Korea’s COVID-19 restrictions and reliance on the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to enforce and execute some pandemic countermeasures probably have caused overall KPA combat readiness to decline in the near term, but key units probably will remain capable of executing their wartime missions. (p.20)


As temperatures rise and more extreme climate effects manifest, there is a growing risk of conflict over resources associated with water, arable land, and the Arctic. Additional factors, such as migration, some of which will be exacerbated by climate and weather events, will heighten these risks. Contested economic and military activities in the Arctic have the potential to increase the risk of miscalculation, particularly while there are military tensions between Russia and the other seven Arctic countries following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. (p.22)


Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices, globally, are contributing to the decline of marine fisheries—eroding food and economic security in coastal areas, particularly in Africa and Asia. (p.23)


Now entering its fourth year, the COVID-19 pandemic remains one of the most significant threats to global public health, at a cost of more than 6.5 million lives lost and trillions of dollars in lost economic output to date. (p.24)


During the next year, pandemic-related higher debt burdens, constrained government spending, and ongoing employment disruptions and insecurity are expected to heighten the risk of financial instability and poverty, particularly in low-income countries and those recovering from the most severe economic effects of COVID-19. (p.24)


Countries globally remain vulnerable to the emergence or introduction of a novel pathogen that could cause a devastating new pandemic. (p.24)


Transnational threats interact in a complex system along with more traditional threats such as strategic competition, often reinforcing each other and creating compounding and cascading risks to U.S. national security. Increasing interconnections among countries—ranging from supply chains to social media—also have created new opportunities for transnational interference and conflict. (p.26)


Large-scale simulation and the accumulation and analysis of massive amounts of data are revolutionizing many areas of science and engineering research with the potential to influence the future battlefield and shape political discourse through disinformation operations. (p.26)


As of June 2022, China had 173 of the world’s most powerful supercomputers, a third more than the United States, which accounted for 128 supercomputers. (p.27)


Authoritarian governments usually are the principal offenders of digital repression, but some democratic states have engaged in similar approaches, contributing to democratic backsliding and erosion. (p.27)


Digital repression is occurring against the backdrop of broader digital influence operations that many autocrats are conducting globally to try to shape how foreign publics view their regimes, create social and political upheaval in some democracies, shift policies, and sway voters’ perspectives and preferences. (p.27)


The commercial spyware industry—which makes tools that allow users to hack digital devices such as mobile telephones to surveil users—grew rapidly during the past decade and is now estimated to be worth $12 billion. While some states use such spyware tools and lawful intercept programs to target criminals and terrorists, governments also are increasingly using spyware to target political opposition and dissidents. (p.28)


China and Russia are seeking to ensure strategic stability with the United States through the growth and development of a range of weapons capabilities, including nontraditional weapons intended to defeat or evade U.S. missile defenses. Consequently, these new technologies probably will challenge the way states think about arms control, and we expect it will be difficult to achieve agreement on new weapon definitions or verification measures, particularly at the multilateral level. (p.28)


Factors including high-crime rates, violence, political repression, corruption, weak job markets, and poor living conditions remain among the primary push factors for U.S.-bound migration from Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Venezuela because origin countries lack the resources or willingness to address these challenges. (p.29)


Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) exploit migrants through extortion, kidnapping, and human trafficking—including sex trafficking and forced labor. (p.30)


Worldwide, the number of people displaced by conflict, violence, and natural disasters within their own national borders and into other countries continues to increase, straining governments’ abilities to care for domestic populations and mitigate any associated public discontent. Meanwhile, a growing gap between humanitarian needs and the provision of international financial assistance has the potential to exacerbate migration flows. (p.30)


Mexican TCOs obtain the majority of precursor chemicals needed to produce fentanyl from China through mostly Chinese and Mexican chemical brokers and are able to circumvent international controls through mislabeled shipments and buying unregulated dual-use chemicals. (p.30)


TCOs regularly use shell companies to disguise their identity and may rely on professional money launderers or gatekeepers, such as accountants, lawyers, notaries, and real estate brokers, to gain access to the legitimate financial systems. TCOs move and launder illicit proceeds through bulk cash smuggling, exploitation of legitimate remittance channels, purchase of U.S. real estate, structured deposits, trade-based money laundering, and wire transfers. (p.31)


While ISIS and al-Qa‘ida suffered major leadership losses in 2022, degrading external operations and capabilities, both organizations’ offshoots continue to exploit local conflicts and broader political instability to make territorial and operational gains. (p.31)


Transnational RMVEs continue to pose the most lethal threat to U.S. persons and interests, and a significant threat to a number of U.S. allies and partners through attacks and propaganda that espouses violence. Transnational RMVEs are largely a decentralized movement of adherents to an ideology that espouses the use of violence to advance white supremacy, neo-Nazism, and other exclusionary cultural-nationalist beliefs. These actors increasingly seek to sow social divisions, support fascist-style governments, and attack government institutions. The transnational and loose structure of RMVE organizations challenges local security services and creates a resilience against disruptions. (p.33)


Domestic unrest—whether grounded in social divisions, competitive political ideologies, or an inability of the state to deliver on basic human services—can fuel cycles of violence, insurgencies, and internal conflict. (p.35)




 


Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favour of fair use.

コメント


bottom of page