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Hong Kong Intelligence Report #117 On Basic Law Article 23-關於23條立法漏洞:基本法23條立法新草案公眾諮詢意見

Updated: Feb 3

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

Hong Kong Intelligence Report #117 On Basic Law Article 23-關於23條立法漏洞:基本法23條立法新草案公眾諮詢意見
FILE PHOTO: Serious mature officer in eyeglasses and uniform pointing at computer screen © Envato

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】Basic Law Article 23

 

目前新23條草案仍不敵五眼聯盟的結構性漏洞如下:

The structural loopholes of the current New Bill, Basic Law Article 23 legislation, which is still no match for the Five Eyes are as follows:

 

 

1.     與任何其他先進外國比起,本港在處理國安問題上的固有邏輯是,它與外交,軍事分離,而單獨面對所有範疇的國安問題。一國兩制是政治外判。它的片面性和缺點在於與外交和軍事分離,因此自然而然,其國安法制也就不會是全面性的。而在23條新草案中,並無論及如何與外交部和解放軍(國防部)合作,並未就此擬定建立機制和法律基礎。重點1)只要本港國安系統與解放軍,軍事分離,則就連世界史上最古典的危害國安案件,如1954年危地馬拉政變或1973年智利軍事政變都無能預防或處理;2)全球最大最有力的情報機構,如美國NSA是美國國防部(美軍)的情報系統,而非國務院的。即全球最強大的情報機構都是屬於軍事,軍方的,而本港國安系統與此顯著不對稱,不對等,根本無法單獨應對軍方情報機構;3)外國領事館是所謂境外勢力,尤其是‘叫人衝,自己鬆’情報機構的駐港所在地,典型堡壘,避難所,也享受外交特權。但在23條新草案中,並未提及本港如何與外交部合作應對來自外國領事館的國安威脅。何況,本港警方在國際事務上,需要依賴外國情報機構(如長期夥伴DEA;DEA以在中南美洲從事顛覆活動為著名)打擊毒品交易。這也制約本港國安系統的處理水平和執法空間,必將導致敵我混淆;4)因此,23條新草案也應該建立如何本港國安系統與海外國安系統合作也是重要的。這四項都是最根本的摡括性漏洞和缺陷。本港在與外交,軍事分離之下,單刀獨打所謂境外勢力,外國情報機構在其結構上早就存在致命缺點和弱點。

 

The inherent logic of Hong Kong's approach to national security, more than that of any other advanced foreign country, is that it is separate from diplomacy and the military, and faces all areas of national security separately. ‘One country, two systems’ is political outsourcing. Its one-sidedness and shortcomings lie in its separation from foreign affairs and military affairs, so naturally, its national security legal system will not be comprehensive. And in the current New Bill, Basic Law Article 23, there is no discussion on how to co-operate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People's Liberation Army (Ministry of National Défense), and no mechanism or legal basis for establishment has been drawn up in this regard. Key points 1) As long as the national security system of Hong Kong is separated from the PLA and the military, even the most classical cases of endangering national security in world history, such as the Guatemala Coup in 1954 or the Chilean military coup in 1973, could not be prevented or dealt with; and 2) the world's largest and most powerful intelligence agencies, such as the United States NSA, are the intelligence agencies of the United States Department of Defense (Pentagon), not the State Department. In other words, the world's most powerful intelligence agencies belong to the military, and Hong Kong's national security system is obviously asymmetric and unequal, and it is simply impossible to deal with the military intelligence agencies on its own; 3) Foreign consulates are the so-called seats of foreign powers in Hong Kong, especially those intelligence agencies that are 'telling people to rush, but relaxing on their own', which are typical forts and shelters, and they enjoy diplomatic privileges as well. However, there is no mention in the current New Bill, Basic Law Article 23 of how Hong Kong will co-operate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in dealing with national security threats from foreign consulates. Moreover, in international affairs, the Hong Kong police have to rely on foreign intelligence agencies (such as our long-term partner, the DEA, which is famous for its subversive activities in Central and South America) to combat the drug trade. This also restricts the level of sophistication of our national security system and the room for law enforcement, which will surely lead to confusion between the enemy and us; 4) Therefore, it is also important that the current New Bill, Basic Law Article 23 also establishes how our national security system can cooperate with overseas national security systems. These four items are the most fundamental loopholes and deficiencies. Under the separation of Hong Kong's diplomatic and military affairs, Hong Kong has been fighting alone against the so-called foreign forces and foreign intelligence agencies have long had fatal flaws and weaknesses in the structure.


2.     誠然,與媒體表象或印象操作正相反,五眼聯盟就23條新草案中最大焦點並不在於什麼煽動或叛變或叛亂等次要的傳統國安範疇上,而其最大焦點在於本港執法機關如何或會否防範敵對勢力截取本港電信和電子通訊及截取口頭通訊。這才是重中之重,是因為危害國家安全必定總是從資訊-情報開始的。然而,在23條新草案中並未展開談論針對此特定範疇擬定任何防範措施。就《官方機密條例》,本草案「第5 章:竊取國家機密及間諜行為」而言,有一個普遍落後的前提是,仍然以特定公職人員/公務人員手動獲取特定官方紙本機密並直接交付或出售給外國情報機構人員的,此類較古老的諜報類型行為(HUMINT範疇的罪行)為前提來展開思考和執法(註解:犯案人士的原型過時。最簡單的例子是23條新草案並未處理無人機,機器狗干犯危害國安。這問題最凸現在有關國家機密的範疇,即仍然僅以人員手動地盜取,出售或交付紙本機密文件給特定外國情報人員為前提思考。這已嚴重過時)。雖然有如下部分:(ii) 取得(包括以截取通訊方式取得)、收集、記錄、製作或管有旨在對或擬對境外勢力有用處的任何資料、文件或其他物品,或將之傳達予任何其他人。(P.49)但是,與傳統諜報類型混淆,即特定公務人員在官方禁區截取或盜錄特定機密通訊並交付給外國情報機構此類型傳統行為。甚至並未反映或掌握當今的運作方式,即不是在場人員去直接親自個別截取的,而已被系統化,自動化,植入的。換言之,自動化的大量囊括式截取通訊bulk collection方式(“collect it all! ”- ex-NSA four-star general, Keith B. Alexander)(COMINT/SIGINT;我所讀取的NOFORN文件中並未用ELINT一詞,而以前兩者為主)。本港幾乎沒有HUMINT範疇的罪行,這不是因為沒有無間道,而是本港對bulk collection方式(“collect it all! ” )(COMINT/SIGINT)毫無防範,外國情報機構根本沒有需要依賴HUMINT來冒險獲取官方機密而已。這個大漏洞本身是個最大突破口,因此只要維持這大缺陷,就等於無間道。就整體而言,23條新草案並無訂明bulk collection方式上捲入的各方單位責任。第一,外國情報機構,如NSA有系統地在出口電子產品中植入後門(叫做CNE=Computer Network Exploitation;並非單靠虛擬網絡本身),以便進行盜用進口國內用戶的電子產品(如量子植入QUANTUM INSERTION: 香港,上海,北京,台北,東京,首爾也在NSA資料上顯著擔當東亞地區的‘被誤用電腦’網絡的中繼;所謂被誤用電腦或其他電子產品進一步淪為當地隱密運作的SIGINT平台),以吸收資訊(元數據metadata和內容),並透過該國的電訊/通訊/社交媒體公司不但吸取該國用戶的元數據metadata,同時也透過與該國的電商/電訊/通訊/社交媒體公司等科技企業有契約合作的本港電商/電訊/通訊/社交媒體公司等科技企業網絡吸取本港用戶的metadata。當中,必然包括所有公務人員的元數據metadata。如此,所謂官方機密也都被自動化地囊括而出去。譬如,FBI和NSA的STORMBREW網絡涵蓋香港和上海。它給NSA獲取進入中繼地區的網絡和電話流通。最後,根本不在香港的分析官或分析人員只需在元數據的資料庫中利用目標電郵進行系統查詢即可。在此過程中,沒有特定人員直接親自去截取通訊的。因此,該草案並未對當代COMINT/SIGINT方式訂出任何防範措施。甚至,23條新草案並無提及海關在國安問題上的重大角色。本港海關必須檢查進口電子產品,以杜絕後門,否則本港電子產品被用以干犯國安的行為不絕。此外,本港電訊/通訊公司與境外電訊/通訊機構的合作和聯繫(Corporate Partner Access; CPA),這不可避免地包括社交媒體公司,也是個主要自動化的擷取資訊的來源,居壓倒性的主流手段地位。該法草案完全對此投降,無防範,隻字不提。就個別人員蓄意盜取國家機密則是屬於極少數。僅應對此類傳統範疇顯然是不足的。在此議題上,所謂資訊的形態大致分為元數據和內容。資訊類型大致分為DNR(Dialled Number Recognition電話通訊)和DNI (Digital Network Intelligence網路活動,如電郵)。其實,就大量吸收元數據的方式有兩大類範疇,即UPSTREAM(其規模是全球;進入光纖管道和其他形式的基建設施)與PRISM(直接從美國九大網路科技公司的伺服器獲取元數據)。並在此兩者之下至少有15個SIGINT任務範疇都已被曝光了。以下部分,只針對破壞或干擾本港電子系統而已:第6 章:危害國家安全的破壞等活動  本章研究外國與危害國家安全的破壞活動和對電腦或電子系統作出危害國家安全的行為相關法律,並建議於建議《條例》中就有關行為和活動新增此類罪行。(p.51) 這是與上述領域不同的範疇。

 

It is true that, contrary to media appearances or impressions, the Five Eyes Coalition's biggest focus on the current New Bill, Basic Law Article 23 is not so much on the secondary, traditional national security aspects of sedition or mutiny or insurrection, but rather on how our law enforcement agencies can or can't guard against the interception of our telecommunications and electronic communications and the interception of verbal communications by hostile forces. This is the top priority because jeopardizing national security always starts with information - with intelligence. However, the current New Bill, Basic Law Article 23 do not begin to address any precautions to be taken in this particular area. In the case of the Official Secrets Ordinance, the Bill's "Chapter 5: Theft of State Secrets and Espionage", there is a generally outdated premise that it is still thinking and enforcing on the basis of the older espionage-type behavior (the HUMINT category of offenses) in which a particular public servant/public official manually obtains a particular official paper secret and delivers it directly to, or sells it to, a member of a foreign intelligence agency (Note: the prototype of the offender is outdated): The simplest example of this is that the current New Bill, Basic Law Article 23 does not deal with drones, robotic dogs, or non-human actors endangering national security. The problem is most pronounced in the area of state secrets, which is still thought of only in terms of officers manually stealing, selling or delivering classified paper documents to specific foreign intelligence agents. (This is grossly out of date). Although there is a component of (ii) obtaining (including by means of interception of communications), collecting, recording, making or possessing any information, document or other thing which is intended or calculated to be of use to a foreign power, or communicating it to any other person. (P.49) However, it is confused with the traditional espionage type, i.e. the traditional conduct of specific public servants intercepting or surreptitiously recording specific classified communications in officially restricted areas and delivering them to foreign intelligence agencies. It does not even reflect or capture the current modus operandi, i.e., it is not intercepted by the officers on the ground directly and personally, but is systematized, automated, and implanted. In other words, the automated bulk collection approach to intercepting communications ("collect it all!" - ex-NSA four-star general, Keith B. Alexander) (COMINT/SIGINT; I). The term ELINT is not used in the NOFORN documents I read, but is predominantly used in the former two). There are virtually no crimes in the HUMINT area in Hong Kong, not because of the absence of nefarious means, but because Hong Kong is defenseless against the bulk collection approach ("collect it all!") (COMINT/SIGINT), and there is no need for foreign intelligence agencies to rely on HUMINT to risk obtaining official secrets. This major loophole itself is the biggest breakthrough, so as long as this major flaw is maintained, it is tantamount to a no-holds-barred approach. As a whole, the current New Bill, Basic Law Article 23 does not specify the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the bulk collection method. First, foreign intelligence agencies such as the NSA systematically implant backdoors in exported electronics (called CNE = Computer Network Exploitation; not just the virtual network itself) in order to carry out the theft of electronics imported to domestic users (e.g., QUANTUM INSERTION: Hong Kong, Shanghai, Beijing, Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul are also prominently featured on NSA data as relays for 'misused computer' networks in East Asia; the so-called misused computers or other electronic products are further degraded to SIGINT platforms that operate in secrecy in the region), to absorb information (metadata and content), and to use it through the country's telecom/communication/social media companies to not only absorb the country's users, but also to steal the content of those users' computers. Social media companies not only absorb the metadata of the users in that country, but also the metadata of the users in Hong Kong through the network of local ecommerce/telecommunication/communications/social media companies and other technology enterprises which have contractual cooperation with the e-commerce/telecommunication/social media companies and other technology enterprises in that country, which will definitely include the metadata of all public servants.  In this way, the so-called official secrets are automatically included. For example, the FBI and NSA's STORMBREW network covers Hong Kong and Shanghai. It gives the NSA access to the networks and telephone circuits in the middle of the region. Finally, analysts who are not even in Hong Kong can simply make systematic inquiries using targeted emails in the metadata database. In this process, no specific officer is directly involved in the interception of communications in person. Therefore, the Bill does not provide any safeguards against the contemporary COMINT/SIGINT approach. Even the new Bill makes no mention of the significant role of the Customs and Excise Department in national security matters. Hong Kong's Customs must inspect imported electronic products to eliminate backdoors, or else there will be no end to the use of Hong Kong's electronic products to commit national security violations. In addition, the cooperation and association (Corporate Partner Access; CPA) of Hong Kong's telecommunication/communication companies with foreign telecommunication/communication organizations, which inevitably includes social media companies, is also a major automated source of extracted information, and is the dominant means of overpowering the mainstream. The draft law completely surrenders to this, with no defense and no mention of it. The intentional theft of state secrets by an individual is a rare occurrence. It is clearly not enough to deal with this area. In this context, the form of information is broadly categorized into metadata and content. Information types are broadly categorized as DNR (Dialled Number Recognition) and DNI (Digital Network Intelligence). In fact, there are two broad categories of mass metadata uptake, UPSTREAM (which is global in scale; access to fiber optic conduits and other forms of infrastructure) and PRISM (which obtains metadata directly from the servers of the nine largest U.S. network technology companies). Under both, at least 15 SIGINT mission areas have been exposed. The following section focuses only on sabotage or interference with electronic systems in Hong Kong: Chapter 6: Sabotage, etc. Against National Security This chapter examines foreign laws relating to sabotage against national security and acts against computers or electronic systems that are prejudicial to national security and proposes to create a new offense of such acts and activities in the proposed Ordinance. (p.51) This is a different area from the above.

 

3.     本港統治階級的兩大特色/社會關係是買辦和外判。本港統治階級不可避免地做政治買辦。即往往同時代表境內外勢力。這也就是本港政治的固有邏輯。重點是,至今本港發生的所有國安事件中,沒有一項是境外勢力直接在本港做事的,而都是由本港統治階級中的買辦人士做代理的。因此,23條新草案過於片面的僅以境外勢力為對手,但境內勢力才是本港國安單位的主要對手。必須以境內勢力和境外勢力定為對象。所謂境外勢力的片面觀點本身是個極大的漏洞之一,即境內勢力也確實是有問題的,甚至,本港統治階級是以買辦階級為最大特色。換言之,只針對境外勢力,而忽視境內勢力此一概念是其極大盲點之一。因此,必須針對境內勢力和境外勢力全面立法。只要沒有定義境內勢力,就根本無法有效定義境外勢力。這已經就是被埋下的陷阱。為什麼只有所謂境外勢力呢?難道,境內勢力沒問題?

 

The two main characteristics/social relations of the ruling class in Hong Kong are compradorism and outsourcing. Inevitably, the ruling class in Hong Kong is a political comprador. That is, they often represent both internal and external forces. This is the inherent logic of Hong Kong politics. The point is that none of the national security incidents that have occurred in Hong Kong so far have been the result of foreign forces working directly in Hong Kong, but have been represented by compradors in the ruling class. Therefore, the new Bill is too lopsided in that it only targets foreign forces, whereas domestic forces are the main targets of Hong Kong's national security units. It is necessary to target both internal and external forces. The one-sided view of the so-called foreign forces is itself one of the biggest loopholes. That is, the internal forces are also problematic, and even the ruling class in Hong Kong is characterized by a bought-and-paid-for class. In other words, it is one of the major blind spots of the government to focus only on forces outside Hong Kong and ignore the concept of forces inside Hong Kong. Therefore, comprehensive legislation must be enacted to deal with both internal and external forces. As long as there is no definition of internal forces, there is no way to effectively define external forces. This is already a trap that has been laid. Why is there only the so-called "external forces"? Does it mean that there is no problem with internal forces?

 

4.     的確,本港組織形態並不限於社團。這也是個極大的盲點之一。因此,該法必須‘明列’所有本港組織形態,而不該用‘任何’一詞。尤其是,情報機構的最佳避難所,如領事館和商會都不例外。再加上,加註在條例下並未或尚未登記的任何實際組織此一灰色地帶。此外,因涉及領事館,外交官,故該法必須建立港府和外交部的防諜合作機制。港府從外交部孤立地面對涉外領事館及其情報機構問題也就是空談的。因上述原因,應該刪除政治性組織一詞,是因為任何本港組織形態都可帶有政治性。《社團條例》界定“政治性團體”為 :(a) 政黨或宣稱是政黨的組織;或 (b) 其主要功能或宗旨是為參加選舉的候選人宣傳或作準備的組織。(P.59)顯然,政治或政治性本身的內涵是整個統治行為和包括企圖影響政治的活動,並不限於自稱政黨或選舉。因此,這個政治性的定義本身有缺陷。此外,參與香港政治的組織形態是所有本港組織形態。如《防止賄賂條例》下的法定機構,《社團條例》下的社團(在沒有政黨法下含所謂‘政黨’),非政府組織(NGO),《公司條例》下,公司一般,名為有限公司的結社,非牟利組織(NPO),《稅務條例》下的慈善機構,慈善信託,《職工會條例》下的商會,工會,工會聯合會等等,所有本港組織形態範疇都參與過本港政治事件。然而,23條新草案尚未列明以有效管制它們。

 

It is true that the form of organization in Hong Kong is not limited to societies. This is also one of the major blind spots. The Act must therefore 'expressly list' all forms of organization in Hong Kong, rather than using the word 'any'. In particular, the best havens for intelligence organizations, such as consulates and chambers of commerce, are not exempted. Add to this the gray area of any current organization which is not, or has not been, registered under the Ordinance. In addition, because it involves consulates and diplomats, the Act must establish a mechanism for cooperation between the Hong Kong Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the prevention of espionage. It would be futile for the Hong Kong Government to face the issue of consulates and their intelligence agencies in isolation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the above reasons, the term "political organization" should be deleted because any form of organization in Hong Kong can be political in nature. The Societies Ordinance defines a "political body" as: (a) a political party or an organization purporting to be a political party; or (b) an organization the principal function or purpose of which is to promote or prepare candidates for election. (P.59) It is clear that politics or politicalness per se connotes the whole act of governing and includes the activity of attempting to influence politics, and is not confined to claiming to be a political party or an election. Therefore, this definition of ‘political’ is inherently flawed. Moreover, the form of organization involved in politics in Hong Kong is the form of all organizations in Hong Kong. For example, statutory bodies under the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, societies under the Societies Ordinance (including the so-called 'political parties' in the absence of political parties law), non-government organizations (NGOs), companies in general, associations called limited companies, non-profit-making organizations (NPOs) in the Companies Ordinance, charitable institutions, charitable trusts, and so on under the Inland Revenue Ordinance. All the local organizations have been involved in political events in Hong Kong, including chambers of commerce, trade unions, federations of trade unions under the Trade Unions Ordinance, and so on. However, the new Bill has not been set out to control them effectively.

 

5.   中港體制內仍在所謂《總體國家安全觀》(2014年國家主席習近平論述)的全面國安概念定義和反國安泛化之間未統一。因此,國安定義在立法上仍然僅以‘主權領土完整’的狹窄過時內涵上思考和擬定,甚至有些條例(如社團條例)的國安定義與《總體國家安全觀》(2014年國家主席習近平論述)之間確實有落差。此兩者的矛盾需要解決。到底採取全面國安概念,還是繼續唾棄所謂國安泛化?只處理主權領土完整?23條新草案尚未擺脫此類國安定義之爭和混亂。需全面修訂諸多條例的國安定義為《總體國家安全觀》的全面國安定義。

 

Within the Hong Kong and Chinese systems, there is still a lack of unification between the so-called "Comprehensive National Security Concept" (discussed by President Xi Jinping in 2014), which is a comprehensive definition of the concept of national security, and the anti-national security generalization. As a result, the definition of national security in legislation is still only thought of and formulated in terms of the narrow and outdated connotation of 'territorial integrity of sovereignty', and there is even a discrepancy between the definition of national security in some ordinances (e.g., the Societies Ordinance) and the "Comprehensive Concept of National Security" (2014 President Xi Jinping's Discussions). The contradiction between the two needs to be resolved. Should we adopt the concept of comprehensive national security or continue to reject the so-called generalization of national security? The new Bill is not yet free from such national security disputes and confusion. There is a need to overhaul the definition of national security in many ordinances into a comprehensive definition of national security in the Comprehensive Concept of National Security.

 

🔻 NEWS / FACTs 【事實關係】

 

以下,我引述該新草案中一些重要的部分:

 

▪️ (i) 危害國家安全的組織:現行《社團條例》不適用於該條例附表所列的組織,但如果這些組織實質上是在香港特區從事危害國家安全活動(例如打着“人道支援”、“援助基金”等旗號,但實際上從事危害國家安全活動),甚至在境外成立或由香港特區移師到境外,《社團條例》無法對其有效規管,變相助長有關組織在境內境外培育反中亂港勢力,從而危害國家安全。 (p.16)

 

▪️2.14 全國人大於1990年通過《基本法》,並透過《基本法》第二十三條,授權及要求香港特區自行立法禁止危害國家安全的行為。眾所周知,《基本法》是一部憲制性法律,當中很多原則性規範需要透過本地立法具體落實。《基本法》第二十三條原則性和概括性規定了七類危害國家安全的行為,但絕不意味只有七類危害國家安全的行為,也絕不意味香港特區只能夠立法防範、制止和懲治這七類行為。《基本法》第二十三條的根本要旨是要求香港特區自行立法維護國家主權、安全、發展利益。因此,香港特區的維護國家安全立法,應隨着時代發展變化,妥善應對國家面對及將來可能面對的傳統和非傳統國家安全風險。(p.18)

 

▪️2.23 《香港國安法》第五條明確訂明防範、制止和懲治危害國家安全犯罪時,應當堅持法治原則,包括罪刑法定、無罪推定、一事不再審等原則,並保障犯罪嫌疑人、被告人和其他訴訟參與人依法享有辯護權和其他訴訟權利。(p.22)

 

▪️2.28 經考慮,我們認為應訂立一條全新的《維護國家安全條例》(建議《條例》),以全面應對香港特區現在和未來可能出現的國家安全風險,以及全面落實《5.28決定》及《香港國安法》所規定的憲制責任及義務。這可讓公眾更清楚掌握立法的範圍及內容,亦可令香港特區的本地維護國家安全的法律更加歸一。建議《條例》將包含是次立法建議訂立或完善的罪行,新增或完善相關的執法權力,在《香港國安法》的基礎上對涉及國家安全的案件的訴訟程序作出補充規定,建立若干維護國家安全的機制和提供保障,也會對一些現行法例作出修訂,從整體上强化香港特區維護國家安全的制度體系。考慮到《香港國安法》已訂立罪行,就分裂國

家和顛覆國家政權這兩類行為作出規定,我們建議香港特區無需再就分裂國家罪及顛覆國家政權罪重複立法。(p.23)

 

▪️ 3.11 澳洲的法律則訂有針對涉及外國政府委託人(foreign government principal)或外國政治性組織(foreign political organisation)的軍事操練的罪行。就此,建議應完善「非法操練」罪,以特別針對危害國家安全分子接受或參與涉及境外勢力的、或配合境外勢力提供的武器使用訓練、或軍事練習或變陣演習。該罪行針對以下行為:

未經保安局局長或警務處處長准許 –

(a) 向其他人提供指明操練(包括就使用武器、進行軍事練習及進行變陣演習的訓練或操練);

(b) 接受指明操練;

(c) 接受或參與由境外勢力策劃或以其他方式主導進行的指明操練;或

(d) 配合境外勢力提供指明操練。(p.28)

 

▪️ 4.2 現行法律中並沒有名為「叛亂」的罪行。 2019 年「黑暴」期間發生的大規模暴亂,實際上已經危害香港特區整體的公共安全,對國家安全構成威脅,但以《公安條例》(第245 章)下的「暴動」罪處理,無論是罪名或罰則都未能充分反映該等暴亂危害國家安全的本質。(p.31)

 

▪️ 4.5 現行《刑事罪行條例》已訂明針對煽惑警務人員、政府飛行服務隊成員及輔助警察隊成員放棄職責或放棄效忠的「煽惑離叛」罪,但並未涵蓋負責制訂及執行政策、維持公共秩序、管理公共財政、維護司法公正,以及具有針對政府部門的法定調查權力的公職人員等,以及除香港駐軍以外的中央駐港機構的人員。這些人員與香港特區政權機關依法履行職能有密切關係,他們如被煽惑離叛,很有可能會引致危害國家安全的情況。建議以現行的「煽惑離叛」罪作為藍本,針對以下行為:

明知而 –

(a) 煽惑公職人員放棄擁護《基本法》或放棄向香港特區效忠;或

(b) 煽惑香港駐軍以外的中央駐港機構人員放棄職責或放棄向中華人民共和國效忠。(p.32)

 

▪️4.9 建議的「叛國」罪所指的“鼓動外國人以武力入侵中華人民共和國或其任何領土”、“與中華人民共和國交戰的敵方”等概念,總體上只涉及國家與“外敵”之間的武裝衝突的背叛國家行為,在憲制上和法理上是否合適用於處理屬一個中國內的嚴重內亂甚至武裝衝突,存有疑問。此外,上述行為在性質及程度上比一般“暴動”行為更加嚴重。因此,建議訂立「叛亂」罪,針對以下行為:

(a) 加入與中國武裝力量進行武裝衝突的武裝力量,

或作為其中一分子;

(b) 意圖損害中國武裝力量在武裝衝突中的形勢,而協助正在與中國武裝力量進行武裝衝突的武裝力量;

(c) 意圖(或罔顧是否會)危害中華人民共和國的主權、統一或領土完整或香港特區整體的公共安全,而在香港特區作出暴力作為。(p.35)

 

▪️需修訂: 禁止公職人員意圖危害國家安全而:

 非法披露看來屬機密事項的資料等的行(為);及

 非法在離開香港特區時管有國家秘密。(p.37)

 

▪️5.3 香港特區有責任保護國家秘密,免其被竊取或非法披露。但是,現行《官方機密條例》未有採用“國家秘密”一詞,且《官方機密條例》只是保護幾類特定的機密資料,例如“防務資料”及“關乎國際關係的資料”等,未能廣泛涵蓋屬國家秘密的資料。因此有需要完善相關條文以有效地保護國家秘密。(p.39)

 

▪️ (A)(I)“國家秘密”的定義

5.3 香港特區有責任保護國家秘密,免其被竊取或非法披露。但是,現行《官方機密條例》未有採用“國家秘密”一詞,且《官方機密條例》只是保護幾類特定的機密資料,例如“防務資料”及“關乎國際關係的資料”等,未能廣泛涵蓋屬國家秘密的資料。因此有需要完善相關條文以有效地保護國家秘密。(p.39)

 

▪️5.5 《香港國安法》的條文中多次提及“國家秘密”一詞。《基本法》第二十三條則使用“國家機密”的表述:竊取國家機密行為是《基本法》第二十三條要求香港特區立法禁止的行為之一。根據《中華人民共和國保守國家秘密法》第十條,國家秘密的密級分為“絕密”、“機密”及“秘密”三級,當中“絕密級”國家秘密是最重要的國家秘密,泄露會使國家安全和利益遭受特別嚴重的損害;“機密級”國家秘密是重要的國家秘密,泄露會使國家安全和利益遭受嚴重的損害;而“秘密級”國家秘密是一般的國家秘密,泄露會使國家安全和利益遭受損害。換言之,即使是最低級“秘密級”的國家秘密,泄露後也會危害國家安全。

 

5.6 考慮到上述背景,香港特區應自行立法禁止竊取所有密級的“國家秘密”。有見及此,本章統一採用“國家秘密”的提述(直接引用《基本法》第二十三條的提述除外)。(pp.40-41)

 

▪️ (a) 現行《官方機密條例》的罪行着重禁止「非法披露」受保護資料,而沒有直接針對竊取國家秘密行為本身(例如刺探、收買國家秘密)。《香港國安法》第二十九條訂明的「勾結外國或者境外勢力危害國家安全」罪亦只涵蓋為外國或境外勢力竊取、刺探、收買,或非法提供涉及國家安全的國家秘密的行為,並未把竊取國家秘密行為本身(即不論涉及外國或境外勢力與否)訂為罪行。(p.43)

 

▪️ (b) 在《官方機密條例》第III 部(第13 至20 條)中的「非法披露受保護資料」的相關罪行,均針對屬特定類別的資料(例如“防務資料”、“關乎國際關係的資料”等),未能全面涵蓋所有屬國家秘密的資料,例如涉及國家和香港特區的重大決策、經濟等其他領域的國家秘密。(p.43)

 

▪️ (c) 除了干犯竊取國家秘密及非法披露國家秘密的人外,亦需處理其他涉事的犯罪分子,例如負責由竊取者傳遞國家秘密至披露者,因而管有國家秘密的中間人。事實上,鑒於間諜活動和竊取國家秘密的行為的性質複雜且隱蔽,未必在每宗案件都能夠確定誰人在未經授權的情況下取得國家秘密或非法披露國家秘密。此外,必須在國家秘密被非法

披露前,採取有效措施,以防止披露發生。(p.43)

 

▪️ (i) 現行《官方機密條例》使用的部分字眼過時,例如“圖片、圖則、模型或紀錄”/“機密的官方代碼或通行碼、任何圖片、圖則、模型或紀錄”的字眼,建議將該等字眼改為“資料、文件或其他物品”,以涵蓋較先進的資料儲存模式(例如指紋、影片等)以應對現今的間諜行為風險;及

(ii) 建議在現行《官方機密條例》禁止的間諜行為以外,新增一類關於意圖(或罔顧是否會)危害國家安全而勾結“境外勢力”向公眾發布虛假或誤導的事實陳述的罪行,以應對境外勢力透過該行為干預香港特區的事務。

(pp.47-48)

 

▪️6.4 按此,為應對上文第6.2 段所述的情況,建議在是次立法新增「危害國家安全的破壞活動」罪,針對以下行為:

(a) 損壞或削弱公共基礎設施,而有關行為意圖(或罔顧是否會)危害國家安全。

(b) 受保障的公共基礎設施可包括中央或特區政府設施、公共交通設施及提供公共服務,如供水、排污、能源、燃料或通訊等的任何公共設施。

(c) “削弱”可包括對公共基礎設施(包括組成該設施的東西或軟件)造成以下效果(不論在何時造成)的行為 -

(i) 容易遭濫用或損壞;

(ii) 使無權接達或改動該設施的人,變得容易接達或改動該設施;

(iii) 無法發揮其完整或部分應有功能;或

(iv) 並非如其擁有人(或該擁有人的代表)對其所設

定的運作方式運作。(pp.52-53)

 

▪️ (b) 規管機制的適用範圍:現行《社團條例》的規管機制只適用於本地社團,而並不適用於該條例附表所列的本地組織(例如公司、合作社、法團校董會、法團等)。《社團條例》也未能有效處理已被禁止運作的本地組織在境外成立“影子組織”,繼續針對香港特區進行危害國家安全的活動。

 

(c) 「非法社團」相關罪行:包括 –

(i) 作為幹事或以該身分行事;

(ii) 作為成員或以該身分行事;

(iii) 容許非法社團在處所內集會;

(iv) 煽惑他人成為成員;及

(v) 牟取社團費或援助。

 

這些本地組織種類繁多,受不同法例規管(包括《公司(清盤及雜項條文)條例》(第32章)、《教育條例》(第279章)等),但整體而言,現行機制未能充分維護國家安全,特別是大部分法例沒有就危害國家安全的組織的解散或取消註冊的機制作出針對性的規定。

 

7.10 儘管部分《社團條例》附表所列的組織受其他法例規管,但有關規管機制普遍未有訂明基於維護國家安全所需而禁止該等組織運作的條文。因此,為更好防範和制止境外勢力或危害國家安全的分子,透過成立例如法團校董會、業主立案法團等不受現行《社團條例》規管的組織危害國家安全,以及為確保所有基於維護國家安全所需而禁止的組織可被統一視為同一類受禁組織,建議把所有基於維護國家安全而禁止組織運作、解散組織等事宜透過建議《條例》下的機制統一處理。建議由保安局局長基於以下理由禁止有關組織在香港特區運作:

(a) 如保安局局長合理地相信,禁止任何本地組織在香港特區運作或繼續運作,是維護國家安全所需要者,則保安局局長可藉在憲報刊登的命令,禁止該組織在香港特區運作或繼續運作。

(b) 如某本地組織是政治性團體,並與境外政治性組織有聯繫,則保安局局長可藉在憲報刊登的命令,禁止該本地組織在香港特區運作或繼續運作。

 

(pp.60-61)

 

▪️3. 考慮了文件中所引述的外國相關法律、現行適用於香港特區的法律,以及香港特區實際情況,我們建議引入新罪行充分保護公共基礎設施,免受惡意破壞或削弱,以及打擊對電腦或電子系統作出危害國家安全的行為,包括:

(a) 禁止危害國家安全的破壞活動;

(b) 禁止在沒有合法權限下就電腦或電子系統進行危害國家安全的作為。

 

(p.79)


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🔻 COMMENT 【評語】

 

一言以蔽之,將公共利益和國家安全對立的觀點是歪論。真正的國家安全和真正的公共利益都是一致的。23條新草案仍含有致命的缺陷和漏洞。對五眼聯盟而言,仍然無阻。

 

In a nutshell, it is sophistry to pit public interest against national security. Both genuine national security and genuine public interest don't coincide (I mean both don't contradict each other). Basic Law Article 23 legislation, the new Bill still contains fatal flaws and loopholes. For the Five Eyes, it remains unimpeded.

 


 

Hong Kong Intelligence Report #117 On Basic Law Article 23-關於23條立法漏洞:基本法23條立法新草案公眾諮詢意見

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