Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】全面中港統一
▪️改革，革命，反動等三大範疇中，與中國大陸或台灣截然不同，香港能提供的並不是改革，革命的研究材料，而主要是反動的研究材料。這與大部分的一般研究聚焦於改革，革命的主流不合，是因為從古至今，香港政治事件/活動的主旋律一向都是反動。換言之，萬一對反動的研究不足，那就等於對改革和革命的研究和理解的深度也不足。這其實是它僅有的正面。
「我們沒有改革經驗。不知道怎樣改革。改革是什麼？」，此時香港政府的官僚們隨即不恰當地引述‘摸著石頭過河’來掩飾其無知無能無作為。但這充分曝光和代表他們根本沒有在學校學過改革，革命等整個歷史。連改革都不知道的無知無能之徒怎麼能擔任官僚職位？在吹起「香港改革」的北風之際，一開始，人民早就看到了狀況。本港從來沒有過改革主體，改革勢力。
改革是基於上一場革命的，其延續和優化。就中國而言，1949年的中國革命的延續和優化是改革。在中國境內的所有改革都不違背中國革命時，才算改革。不能搞錯的是，中國是無產階級專制，是個工人國家。於是，與所謂左膠不同，中國不需要另外新的社會主義革命。它的改革也是基於中國共產黨執政的前提下的舉措，本身該具有1949年中國革命的性質的。
香港既得利益勢力說，「香港需要改革，而不是改革運動」是個腦殘的空論，是因為改革就是運動。在此，香港既得利益勢力害怕的是失去公權力的壟斷和私有化。再加上，香港既得利益勢力最害怕人民關心和參與改革。香港既得利益勢力另外說，「香港不需要革命黨」。它們抽象地看待香港時就錯誤百出。
就全國整體而言，香港的執政黨則是全國執政黨的中國共產黨。香港的最高權力機構不是香港政府，而是中央人民政府。香港最重要的法律不是基本法，而是中國憲法。換言之，香港的革命黨理所當然地正是中國共產黨。沒有別的，也不需要別的。
接下來，改革的方向。改革的大方向無庸置疑是全面中港統一。這才能賦予每一個領域和部門的改革明確的藍圖，步驟和方向。只有朝著全國統一，中港統一推進所有政策，改革就不會迷失方向。這是基於一般規律，即一國內的政策，尤其是地方政治的方向只有兩個，一個是統一；另一個則是分離/分裂。那麼，大灣區一體化是全國統一的新質，高階階段的環節。首先，香港本身要以改革邁向統一。然後，香港與深圳逐漸一體化，最後整個大彎區一體化是諸環節。
一國兩制是應對1984年當時的國際情勢和中國國情的產物，也就是過渡期的妥協和安排。重點是，一國兩制還不是全面中港統一的階段。一國兩制也就不是一國兩制的終極目標。於是，香港既得利益勢力將一國兩制永續化，固化藩籬化是分裂主義。這就是所謂建制派（暗獨勢力）和反對派（明獨勢力）都僵持一國兩制，把它化為利益固化藩籬的現象。相反，基本法和一國兩制都是為了全面中港統一，而中港分治絕非終極目的。香港認識的問題之一是幾乎所有的人都忘了香港本身還沒完成全面統一的現實。
基於上述分析，當前的香港改革有幾個內涵：
1. 新國策是發展新質生產力。新質生產力（在生產力和生產手段組成生產樣式之下，新質生產力必然意味著新質生產手段，因此，同時意味著新質生產樣式，最終必然意味著新質上層建築）不僅是克服去工業化困境的措施，也就是準備未來新社會的金鑰匙。香港身為一個廣東的中國地方城市之一，理所當然地必須不折不扣地執行國策。
2. 2024年香港改革的三大環節是，2024年7月18日《中共中央關於進一步全面深化改革：推進中國式現代化的決定》，2024年10月16日《行政長官2024年施政報告》，以及2024年11月8日《2024年香港工商界人士座談會》。簡言之，從奠定新國策，香港政府接納國策新質生產力為己任，一直到中央人民政府主導香港改革的態勢形成（已不像把改革拱手委託給港府）。
3. 就地方與中央政治的關係而言，改革，尤其是地方發動的改革必然有兩大方向，即統一與分離。此次，改革必須具有自覺邁向全面中港統一的總體方向，以終結中港矛盾。從古至今，香港政治的方向始終都是只有分離，分裂，隔離，隔閡，阻擋統一的政治方向而已。香港既得利益勢力慣以基本法和兩制抵制國策，抵制一國另一制。誠然，終結中港矛盾的辦法絕非中港分治的過渡性措施的永續化（現狀）。香港問題已充分證實了一國兩制並非統獨問題的最終解決方案。換言之，全面中港統一才是全面回歸，最徹底的去殖民地化。同時，對勞動者階級而言，意味著解放。
4. 人民史觀和英雄史觀代表中港政治性質的差別。即人民史觀乃唯物史觀，英雄史觀則是唯心主義的，所謂精英史觀，極端個人主義的，原子化的主觀主義歷史觀。後者正是全面貫穿所謂香港文化，政治，經濟領域的典型意識形態。改革所要打破的就是不合乎歷史現實的，腐爛的精英史觀。歷史是人民創造的，而非所謂英雄個人獨創的。於是，基於人民史觀的改革才算是合乎中國憲法第一條的改革。
5. 破除香港典型的利益固化藩籬，如土地財政（唯一地主港府以超高地價出售土地為主要施政財源；新世界地產和恆基地產支持的前市長梁振英是個土地財政思維的傳道士，蔓延至全國各地的財政）及其導致的地產霸權，四高問題（超高地價，超高樓價，超高租金，超高物價）。在此，如今部分既得利益勢力歪曲的三高（高租金，高人工，高物價）是個欺人的詭辯，是因為高人工的合理原因是維持勞動力再生產的生活手段物價高昂所致。不能把結果當作原因來埋怨。資本顛倒了是非，主次，因果。重點是《行政長官2024年施政報告》並沒有打破土地財政思維。增加土地儲備並不等於打破土地財政的價值觀。
6. 香港沒有改革勢力，而只有既得利益勢力。香港的革命黨是中國共產黨。香港的最高權力機構不是港府，而是中央人民政府。由中央人民政府主導香港改革才是唯一可靠的路徑。有關改革勢力，在政治上難免不得不試圖將既得利益勢力分為二，即改革派和死硬反動派。
若任何侵略者或反動勢力試圖破壞憲法第一條，我則會挺身而出維護它。即使已沮喪的勞動者階級和中共官僚在未來動蕩時期不敢站起來捍衛中國革命及其一切成就，我個人也必定會站起來捍衛它。
▪️ Of the three major categories of reform, revolution, and reaction, Hong Kong, unlike Mainland China or Taiwan, does not provide research materials on reform and revolution, but mainly on reaction. This is not in line with the mainstream of most general studies focusing on reforms and revolutions, because the main theme of political events/activities in Hong Kong has always been reactionary from ancient times to the present. In other words, in case there is not enough research on reaction, it means that there is not enough depth of research and understanding on reform and revolution. This is its only positive aspect.
"We have no experience of reform. We don't know how to reform. What is reform?" At this point, the bureaucrats in the Hong Kong government then inappropriately quote 'crossing the river by groping for stones' to cover up their ignorance and incompetence. But this fully exposes and represents the fact that they have not studied the whole history of reforms and revolutions in school. How can ignorant and incompetent people who do not even know about reforms take up bureaucratic positions? As the north wind of "Hong Kong's reform" is blowing, the people have seen the situation from the very beginning. Hong Kong has never had a reforming body, a reforming force.
Reform is based on the previous revolution, its continuation, and optimization. In the case of China, the continuation and optimization of the 1949 Chinese revolution is reform. All reforms within China are reforms when they do not contradict the Chinese Revolution. What cannot be mistaken is that China is a proletarian dictatorship, a workers' state. Therefore, unlike the so-called Left Rubber, China does not need another new socialist revolution. Its reforms are also based on the premise that the Communist Party of China (CPC) is in power, which itself should have the nature of the 1949 Chinese Revolution.
It is a brain-dead argument for the vested interests in Hong Kong to say that "Hong Kong does not need reforms, not a reform movement", because reforms are movements. Here, what the vested interests in Hong Kong fear is the loss of public monopoly and privatization of public resources. Moreover, the vested interests in Hong Kong are most afraid of the people's concern and participation in the reform. Hong Kong's vested interests also say that "Hong Kong does not need a revolutionary party". They are wrong when they look at Hong Kong in the abstract.
The ruling party in Hong Kong is the Communist Party of China (CPC), which is the ruling party of the whole country. The highest authority in Hong Kong is not the Hong Kong Government but the Central People's Government. The most important law in Hong Kong is not the Basic Law but the Chinese Constitution. In other words, the revolutionary party in Hong Kong is, as a matter of course, the Communist Party of China. There is no other party, and there is no need for any other party.
Next, the direction of reform. The general direction of reform is undoubtedly the unification of China and Hong Kong. This is the only way to give a clear blueprint, steps, and direction to the reform of every field and department. Only when all policies are taken forward in the direction of national unification and China-Hong Kong unification will the reform not lose its direction. This is based on the general rule that there are only two directions for policies within a country, especially in local politics: one is unification; the other is separation/division. In that case, the unification of the Greater Bay Area is a new quality of national unification, an advanced stage. First, Hong Kong itself must reform towards unification. Then, Hong Kong and Shenzhen will be gradually integrated, and finally, the entire Greater Bay Area will be integrated.
One country, two systems is a product of the international situation and China's national conditions in 1984, that is, a compromise and arrangement during the transition period. The point is that "one country, two systems" is not yet a stage of full China-Hong Kong unification. One country, two systems is not the goal of one country, two systems. Therefore, the forces with vested interests in Hong Kong are trying to perpetuate "one country, two systems", and the curing of the fence is secessionism. This is the so-called phenomenon that both the pro-establishment camp (the forces of dark independence) and the opposition camp (the forces of open independence) are rigidly insisting on the principle of "one country, two systems" and turning it into a fence of solidified interests. On the contrary, both the Basic Law and "one country, two systems" are for the full unification of China and Hong Kong, and the separation of China and Hong Kong is by no means the goal. One of the problems with Hong Kong's understanding is that almost everyone forgets that Hong Kong itself is not yet fully unified.
Based on the above analysis, the current reform of Hong Kong has several connotations:
1. The new national policy is to develop new quality productive forces (productivity). The new productive forces (productivity) (under the production mode consisting of production force and means of production, new quality of productivity necessarily implies new quality of means of production, and therefore, at the same time, new quality of production mode, and ultimately, new quality of superstructure) is not only a measure to overcome the dilemma of de-industrialization, but also a golden key to prepare for a new society in the future. Hong Kong, as one of the local Chinese cities in Guangdong, must, as a matter of course, carry out this national policy without fail.
2. The three major components of Hong Kong's reform in 2024 are the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform in a Comprehensive Manner and Promoting Chinese-style Modernization" of 18 July 2024, the "Chief Executive's Policy Address 2024" of 16 October 2024, and the "Hong Kong Business Seminar 2024" of 8 November 2024. In short, from the laying down of the new national policy and the Hong Kong government's acceptance of the new quality productive forces of the national policy as its responsibility, all the way to the formation of the CPC-led reforms in Hong Kong (which is no longer like entrusting the reforms to the Hong Kong government in a hand-to-mouth manner).
3. As far as the relationship between local and central politics is concerned, reforms, especially those initiated at the local level, are bound to have two major directions, namely, unification and separation. In this case, the reform must have the overall direction of consciously moving towards full unification between China and Hong Kong, to end the conflict between China and Hong Kong. From time immemorial, the political direction of Hong Kong has been nothing but secession, division, isolation, and blockage of the political direction of unification. The forces with vested interests in Hong Kong are accustomed to using the Basic Law and the two systems as a means of resisting the national policy, resisting one country and another system. Admittedly, the way to end the conflict between China and Hong Kong is not the sustainability (status quo) of the transitional measures for the separation of China and Hong Kong. The Hong Kong issue has fully proved that "one country, two systems" is not the ultimate solution to the issue of unification and independence. In other words, the full unification of China and Hong Kong is the complete reunification and the most thorough decolonization. At the same time, it meant liberation for the working class.
4. The people's view of history and the heroic view of history represent the difference in political nature between China and Hong Kong. That is to say, the people's view of history is a materialistic view of history, whereas the heroic view of history is idealistic, the so-called elite view of history, an extremely individualistic and atomized subjectivist view of history. The latter is the typical ideology that permeates the so-called cultural, political, and economic spheres of Hong Kong. What the reform aims to break is the historically unrealistic and rotten elite view of history. History is created by the people, not by the so-called heroes. Therefore, reforms based on the people's view of history can only be considered as reforms in line with Article 1 of the Chinese Constitution.
5. Breaking down the barriers of the consolidation of interests typical of Hong Kong, such as land finance (the Hong Kong government, the only landlord, sells land at super-high land prices as its main source of governance; the former mayor Leung Chun-Ying, supported by New World Properties and Henderson Land, is a preacher of land finance thinking, which spreads to the finances of the whole country) and its resultant hegemony of the real estate sector, and the problem of the four-highs (super-high land prices, super-high property prices, super-high rents, and super-high prices). Here, the three highs (high rents, high wages, high prices) that some vested interests are distorting today is a deceptive sophistry, because the rational reason for high wages is due to the high prices of the means of living that sustains the reproduction of the labor force. You cannot blame the result as the cause. Capital has reversed right and wrong, priority and cause and effect. The key point is that the Chief Executive's Policy Address 2024 has not broken the mindset of land finance. Increasing the land reserve is not the same as breaking the value of land finance.
6. There are no reformist forces in Hong Kong, only vested interests. The revolutionary party in Hong Kong is the Chinese Communist Party. The highest authority in Hong Kong is not the Hong Kong Government but the Central People's Government. The only reliable path for Hong Kong's reforms is to be led by the Central People's Government. Regarding the forces of reform, it is politically inevitable to try to divide the forces of vested interests into two, namely, the reformists and the die-hard reactionaries.
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