Hong Kong Intelligence Report #81 俄烏戰事在中國香港的情形綜合報告
Updated: Oct 24, 2022
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
俄烏戰事在香港，進入2022年7月以後香港媒體發布俄烏衝突消息方面有所顯著改善。就國際上，這標誌是7月3日盧甘斯克人民共和國的完全解放。就國內及境內而言，是7月6日俄國駐華大使傑尼索夫代表俄羅斯總統普京向中國全國政協副主席、中國國務院港澳事務辦公室主任夏寶龍頒發了「友誼勳章」一事。之後一直到8月26日，由中國中央廣播電視總台和俄羅斯駐華使館聯合主辦的「中俄影像交流展播活動」啟動儀式在京舉行，並於俄羅斯駐華使館舉行授勛儀式，中共中央宣傳部副部長、中央廣播電視總台台長兼總編輯慎海雄接受俄方授予的俄羅斯「友誼勳章」為止。就是尤其在此期間，本港地產黨兩大‘有限公司’派別（他們的經濟基礎乃本港地產霸權，炒樓投機份子群體及金融寡頭，而不是中共國企。他們都是政治獨立於中共的特定利益集團。本港無正式的政黨政治，由港府官僚組成政府，故此無執政黨和在野黨之別，所謂立法會議員的目的是自身加入政府以及同時霸佔最多的法定機構頭銜），即所謂建制派（兩面人）及反對派（含所謂「中間派」，自稱「溫和建制派」和在維基百科上隱藏著以往反對派身分的地產商媒體NOWTV等）的香港媒體均有了一定程度的自我抑制（當然，離理想深遠，但這明顯只是某種程度外力和考量保身的結果，如台灣TVBS - 龍頭TVB的子公司 - 或日本TBS般的誇張的積極反俄報導最終會自動導致頻果日報和立場新聞的命運，自掘墳墓）。
The Russian-Ukrainian war in Hong Kong has seen a significant improvement in the dissemination of news about the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in the Hong Kong media since July 2022. Internationally, this was marked by the complete liberation of the Lugansk People's Republic on July 3. Domestically, it was the awarding of the Medal of Friendship by Russian Ambassador Denisov on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Xia Baolong, Vice Chairman of the Chinese National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, on July 6. The ceremony was held at the Russian Embassy in China, where Vice Minister of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Director General and Editor-in-Chief of the Central Broadcasting Station, Mr. Shen Haixiong, received the Russian "Medal of Friendship" from the Russian side. It is especially during this period that the two 'Limited companies' factions of the local real estate party (whose economic base is the local real estate hegemony, speculators and financial oligarchs, rather than the Chinese Communist Party's state-owned enterprises. They are specific interest groups that are politically independent from the Chinese Communist Party. There is no formal party politics in Hong Kong, the government is formed by Hong Kong government bureaucrats, so there is no difference between the ruling party and the opposition party, the purpose of the so-called Legislative Council members is to join the government themselves and to occupy the most statutory titles at the same time), that is, the so-called pro-establishment (two-faced people) and opposition (including the so-called "centrists", the self-proclaimed "moderate pro-establishment" and the real estate media NOWTV, which hides its previous opposition status on Wikipedia) Of course, it's far from the ideal, but this is obviously only the result of some degree of external pressures and business considerations, such as the exaggeratedly aggressive anti-Russian reporting style of Taiwan's TVBS - a subsidiary of the leading TVB - or Japan's TBS, which will eventually and automatically lead to the fate of the Apple Daily and Stand News, digging their own graves).
雖然反俄社運無路，但是信息戰在國安法的外力之下，仍然進行的。 這蜜月期間還不能忘記，7月11日在港無法剝削俄烏戰事而未成功分裂中港輿論的美國駐港總領事史默客（Michael Hanscom Smith）的離任，8月2日美國國會眾議院議長佩洛西（Nancy Pelosi）的訪台極大幫助了在中國的俄羅斯外交部。從此之後，中俄關係更加緊密結合，此形勢已達不可逆轉的程度了。反正，香港毫無搞外交政治的權利，本港媒體一昧轉載和轉播西方主流媒體和台灣媒體報導的假新聞，未經證實的傳聞等，這些信息戰的二手貨都與中國中央的國家政策的決策過程徹底隔離，也不可能有所影響。這些騙己騙人的劣質香港假新聞的主要洗腦/心理衝擊目標其實是掌控社會權力的立法/執法/司法/執政單位及其周邊人物關係，以影響局勢。其實，消息和情報是需要選對人的，傳達給有象無象的任何人也沒用的，不起作用的。該傳達的情報是要精確地傳達給相關負責單位的，與眾不同，這跟商業化的價值觀正相反的。本港媒體乃隨時都可收買的廣告公司。媒體和廣告公司的差別在於如何處理傳聞，未經證實的東西。即真媒體的工作是對傳聞進行核實。只有經過核實，傳聞才能變成新聞。然而，廣告公司對製作廣告上的核實不算核實，僅多都是電話問廣告主（Advertiser），反正廣告主自己說了算而已。它主要對行銷負責，而不是對所推銷品的品質和內涵負責的。這就是本質差異。因此在本港最代表媒體工作的單位是消委會，即消費者委員會做的品質報告是真媒體該做的工作典範。
Although the anti-Russian social movement has no way out, the information war is still going on under the external pressure of the National Security Law. During this honeymoon period, we should not forget the departure of Michael Hanscom Smith, the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong, who failed to divide public opinion in China and Hong Kong by failing to exploit the Russian-Ukrainian war in Hong Kong on July 11, and the visit of Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress, to Taiwan on August 2, which greatly helped the Russian Foreign Ministry in China. Since then, Russian-Chinese relations have become more closely integrated and the situation has reached an irreversible level. In any case, Hong Kong has no right to engage in foreign politics, and the local media is the only one that reproduces and rebroadcasts fake news and unsubstantiated rumors reported by the mainstream Western and Taiwanese media. The main brainwashing/psychological impact of these deceitful Hong Kong fake news is in fact on the legislative/law enforcement/judicial/ruling class and their surrounding social relationships that control social power in order to influence the entire situation. In fact, the information and intelligence need to be chosen by the right person, it is useless to convey to anyone who is part of a rabble, it does not work. The intelligence that should be conveyed to the relevant responsible units precisely, unlike others, which is the opposite of commercial values. The local media is an advertising agency that can be bought and sold at any time. The difference between the media and advertising agencies is how they deal with hearsay, the unconfirmed stuff. That is, the job of the real media is to verify the rumors. Only after verification can a rumor become news. However, an advertising agency does not verify the product quality for advertisements, it just calls the advertiser and asks him or her to do so formalistically. It is mainly responsible for the marketing, not for the quality and content of the product being marketed. This is the essence of the difference. Therefore, the most preferable representative of the media in Hong Kong is the Consumer Council, that is, the Consumer Council's quality report is a model of what the real media should do.
從本港首次反俄示威集會發生在2月25日中環的烏克蘭和部分俄國人社區參與的示威，一直到最後可確認的4月11日尖沙咀天星碼頭美國之音全力配合的社民連反俄示威為止，即使香港媒體及外媒連日進行的反俄報導，也無法繼續發動社運了。2月到4月正好是國內外反俄信息戰的高峰期。從「發動社運成功與否」的角度來看，它們都是徹底失敗的，是因為在本港爆發之前已遭到控制了，這不像黑暴前戲的2018年後半的情形。每一則假新聞是政治病毒，社會總體上累積到一定程度時就會轉化為社運，種族仇恨/歧視或喪屍化的暴動或恐怖主義行為。這也就是說，俄烏衝突仍然是反動勢力繼續在本港地下招募未來示威者及建立其組織網絡上的助燃劑，推動力。換言之，據香港民意研究所原定於3月11日舉行而取消的有關「俄烏戰爭」的調查發布會草稿內容，在3月初已有2千到5千的未來隨時都可動員的潛在示威者群體。在社交媒體群組，這些炮灰人數藉由俄烏戰事繼續會增加，然後必定會被集中動員在未來台灣問題的政治騷動上面，而直接針對俄烏戰事的動員機率越來越變低了。9月16日抵港的新任美國總領事梅儒瑞（Gregory May）虎視眈眈，還看不出挑起新一輪分裂圖謀的態勢。在本港社會整體仍然不夠資格和能力擔當防衛中國大陸的第一外牆的積極角色之下，依然處於全中國國安最脆弱的外部勢力對華前進基地。這只要看香港媒體和駐港外媒的反俄/反華/擾華報導傾向就夠理解了。從外部勢力滲透內地的前進基地轉化為防衛中國內地的第一道外牆是香港國安應有的積極目標。9月2日大陸國務委員兼外長王毅會見即將9月底離任的優秀俄羅斯駐華大使傑尼索夫（Andrey Denisov）一事體現了俄中關係在俄烏衝突中已取得勝利，意味著中俄牢牢穩住了此兩大國面對和克服分化中俄圖謀的局面。內地官僚的言辭和儀式整體都是象徵，它的官腔是為了防止文本分析（它一律不透露以通常語言講話的密室討論內容），但其整體作為一種事件過程中的象徵，從此可以解讀。
From the first anti-Russian demonstration in Hong Kong, which took place on February 25 in Central with the participation of the Ukrainian and some Russian communities, until the last identifiable anti-Russian demonstration by the League of Social Democrats at Tsim Sha Tsui Star Ferry Pier on April 11 with the full support of the Voice of America, it was impossible to continue the social movement even with days of anti-Russian coverage by the Hong Kong media and foreign media, which coincided with the peak of the anti-Russian information war at home and abroad from February to April. In terms of the "success or failure of the social movement", they were a complete failure because they were contained before they broke out in Hong Kong, unlike the second half of 2018 in the pre-riot drama theatre. Every piece of fake news is a political virus that accumulates in society at large and transforms into a social movement, racial hatred/discrimination or mourning riots or acts of terrorism. That is to say, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is still the fuel, the driving force for reactionary forces to continue to recruit future protesters and build their organizational network underground in Hong Kong. In other words, according to the draft of the "Russia-Ukraine War" survey released by the Hong Kong Institute of Public Opinion Research, which was scheduled to be yet cancelled on March 11, there were already 2,000 to 5,000 potential groups of future protesters ready to mobilize in early March. The new U.S. Consul General Gregory May, who arrived in Hong Kong on September 16, is not yet in a position to provoke a new round of secessionist attempts. With the Hong Kong community as a whole still not qualified and capable of playing an active role as the first outer wall of defense for mainland China, it remains the most useful base for external forces to advance against China in all of China's national security. This can be understood by looking at the tendency of the Hong Kong media and the foreign media in Hong Kong to report anti-Russian/anti-Chinese news. The meeting on September 2 with the outstanding Russian Ambassador to China, Andrey Denisov, who will be leaving at the end of September, is an example of the victory of Russian-Chinese relations in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which means that China and Russia are firmly anchored in this area. The two powers are facing and overcoming attempts to divide Russia and China. The rhetoric and rituals of the mainland bureaucrats as a whole are symbolic, its bureaucratic tone is designed to prevent textual analysis (it does not reveal the contents of the backroom discussions, which are spoken in ordinary language), but as a whole it can be interpreted as a symbol of the course of events.
Most importantly, on August 14, the excellent Secretary for Security, Mr. Tang Ping-keung, made a clear accusation on the television that after the "black violence incident"(colour riot) in 2019, it is known that a "color revolution" may happen in Hong Kong, so the government will be prepared to prevent people from taking advantage of international events to create chaos in Hong Kong, and to prevent "homegrown terrorism" and "anti-government groups". This shows that Hong Kong's national security system is already aware of the attempts of internal and external reactionary forces to divide Hong Kong and China through the war between Russia and Ukraine. This makes the author very satisfied and relieved. As long as the national security units really realize the existence of the problem, they will mobilize to control the situation. Incidentally, the connotation and extension of the so-called "secession" in Hong Kong are broader than those in other countries and regions. The so-called "division"(separatism) refers first of all to the division of public opinion between Hong Kong and China and within Hong Kong itself. This differs from the meaning of the so called different opinion. The word "division" means that internal and external forces intend to create political disturbances. The common forms of this are "news" and "dissent"(different opinions). The Security Bureau distinguishes between these. Unfortunately, the majority of our citizens are still opposition supporters who find this difficult to understand. Moreover, the impression of our national security system is that it is still an extension of ordinary police affairs. That is its shortcoming, unlike the intelligence unit. Why is this a shortcoming? Because the enemy knows it and uses it.
最後，香港和俄國關係的發展階段是以香港與俄羅斯簽署刑事事宜相互法律協助協定和移交被判刑人協定劃定的。其實，俄烏衝突前已經開始有本港反俄政治活動的。瞄準的是這個協定，但它並沒有變成與逃犯條例一樣的政治催化劑（最強烈反對2019年逃犯條例修訂案的是暗助黑暴的本港商界，因他們最害怕商業犯罪範疇而閹割了該條例修訂案，甚至，即使2019年版順利成立，台灣也不會接受的。重點是，只要台灣一方拒絕，就不會成事的）。在2021年9月21日保安局局長鄧炳強與俄羅斯聯邦（俄羅斯）司法部長Konstantin Chuychenko分別代表香港特別行政區（香港特區）政府及俄羅斯政府，透過視像會議簽署刑事事宜相互法律協助和移交被判刑人的雙邊協定。 目前本港反俄社運（2021年1月7日黑暴熄滅後死灰復燃的地下運動，並與六四結合，社民連擔任公關角色）的活躍期間是從2021年9月21日到2022年4月11日，2021年12月27日的俄國駐港領事館炸彈恐嚇‘恐俄症’事件（上午10時52分，警方接獲一名男子報案，指灣仔港灣道30號新鴻基中心21樓俄羅斯駐香港總領事館被人放置炸彈）是其判斷的根據。不過，在各方壓力和限制之下反俄信息戰依然繼續。本港需要居安思危，不宜解除各種武裝。最遺憾的是自稱愛國愛港的建制派（兩面派）明星們都共謀一律避開俄烏戰事議題，並且對目前本港進展的反俄/反華分裂運動視而不見。這選擇性盲目也表明了所謂建制派是根本不可靠的，真是忠誠廢物。
Finally, the stage of development of relations between Hong Kong and Russia is defined by the signing of the agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and the agreement on transfer of sentenced persons between Hong Kong and Russia. In fact, anti-Russian political activities in Hong Kong had already started before the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The agreement was aimed at, but it did not become the same political catalyst as the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (the strongest opposition to the 2019 Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment was from the business community in Hong Kong, which was implicitly aiding the mob violence and castrating the Ordinance amendment by lobbying because they were most afraid of the commercial crime aspect, and even if the 2019 version was successfully established, Taiwan would have not accepted it. (The point is, as long as the Taiwanese side rejects it, it won't happen). On September 21, 2021, Secretary for Security Chris Tang Ping-keung and the Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation (Russia) Konstantin Chuychenko, representing the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and the Russian Government respectively, signed a bilateral agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and transfer of sentenced persons via video conference. The current anti-Russian social movement in Hong Kong (an underground movement resurrected after the end of the color riot on January 7, 2021 and combined with June 4 protestors, with the League of Social Democrats playing a public relations role) is overtly active from September 21, 2021 to April 11, 2022, and the 'Russophobia' bomb threat at the Russian Consulate in Hong Kong on December 27, 2021 (at 10:52 a.m., the police received a report from a man that a bomb had been placed at the Russian Consulate General in Hong Kong on the 21st floor of Sun Hung Kai Centre, 30 Harbour Road, Wan Chai) was the basis for this judgment. However, the anti-Russian information war continues under pressure and restrictions from all sides. Hong Kong needs to be prepared for possible danger and it is not advisable to disarm all kinds of weapons. It is most unfortunate that the so called 'pro-establishment' (two-faced) stars who claim to be 'patriotic and love Hong Kong' have conspired to avoid the issue of the war between Russia and Ukraine and have turned a blind eye to the anti-Russian/anti-Chinese separatist movement that is currently developing in Hong Kong. This selective blindness also shows that the so-called pro-establishment camp is fundamentally unreliable and really 'loyal waste'.
In general, from July to September, the anti-Russian campaign on the war between Russia and Ukraine gradually declined and became even less popular in Hong Kong. Even though there was a lot of provocative Russia-Ukraine conflict news during this period, it still did not change the situation of unity between China and Russia. For the sake of Hong Kong, the following are some of the incidents/fake news from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that are worthy of our reference during this period.
On July 1, Ukraine accused Russian missiles of hitting a building in Odessa early in the morning, partially destroying it and killing at least 21 people. Russia and its Defense Ministry did not respond to this Ukrainian message at the time. The result is that the public can only receive news from the Ukrainian side. If there is an official response, there will be news. The local media deliberately left out key details to safely mislead the public and did not do any independent verification at all. The United Nations OHCHR report on Ukraine casualties is a typical example (although it covers both Donbass Republics, the Hong Kong media, TVB, deliberately does not report the details on the 24th of each month).
Basically, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict news disseminated by Hong Kong media is 1) translated, reprinted and relayed from mainstream Western media (so-called "media reported"); 2) slightly localized and translated, reprinted and relayed from Taiwanese media (Taiwanese media reports are themselves plagiarized from Western media reports); 3) indirect smuggling of information from anti-China and anti-Russian think tanks/NGOs/UK Ministry of Defence/other foreign intelligence agencies through 1 and 2. On the whole, this is a kind of laundering of anti-Russian and anti-Chinese fake news. The local media is more like a re-broadcasting station for the purification of information released by anti-Russian and anti-Chinese outside forces. The worst is the use of "patriotic" titles, as in the case of Sing Tao Daily, to disseminate fake news spread by Western enemies. Patriotism is judged by behavior alone, not by the apparent title of patriotic "political commissar", membership in patriotic clubs and patriotic slogans.
7月14日 俄羅斯發射導彈轟炸烏克蘭中部城市文尼察(Vinnytsia)：7月14日發生了該市中心辦公大樓被擊中，烏克蘭媒體第一時間傳出俄方蓄意瞄準平民云云的敘事，本港媒體隨即轉載和轉播了。他們都明知俄國國防部的每日回應（英語）通常是要等到香港時間下午六點到七點多的，在此之前它們都可以只傳播烏方訊息。其實，今日俄羅斯RT也十分自覺這個回應速度的問題。本港報導已有某種程度的原則了。 1）報導雙方的消息可以抵銷假新聞的效果；2）在一方回應之前，只能報導另一方已發佈的新聞；3）東方日報可以辯解說他們分開不同國家的範疇發布各別發佈的消息；4）TVB在一則新聞內匯總俄烏雙方的消息，但有時只報導烏方/歐美一方的消息，此時仍然能辯解說當時俄方沒有正式回應。基本上，引用的是雙方或第三方政府官方的正式消息，網民/網紅的不算數。這是合理的。對俄方不利的是俄方自己沒有回應或回應得太晚了。這點，俄方需要做好。假新聞的重點是釐清的問題。即「俄方有否蓄意攻擊平民及其設施，而不是軍人和軍用設施？」俄國防部釐清了他們擊毀的是被用來當軍職務官舍的會所（注意：軍用的民用設施是軍用設施了）。抓到了重點，就不會動搖。
On July 14, Russian missile bombing of the central Ukrainian city of Vinnytsia: On July 14, when the city's central office building was hit, the Ukrainian media were the first to spread the story that the Russians had deliberately targeted civilians, which was immediately picked up and broadcast by the local media. They all knew that the Russian Defense Ministry's daily response (in English) usually waited until after 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. Hong Kong time, until then they could just spread the Ukrainian message. In fact, RT is also very conscious of this speed of response problem. There is already a certain degree of principle in local reporting. 1) reporting news from both sides can offset the effect of fake news; 2) before one side responds, only news from the other side can be reported; 3) Oriental Daily News can argue that they publish separate news from different countries; 4) TVB aggregates news from Russia and Ukraine in one story, but sometimes only news from the Ukrainian/European and American sides are reported, and then it can still argue that the Russian side had no official response. Basically, the official news from both sides or third-party governments is quoted, and the news from netizens/influencers does not count. This is reasonable. What is not good for the Russian side is that the Russian side itself did not respond or responded too late. This is something that the Russians need to do better. The point of fake news is to clarify the issue. That is, "Did the Russians deliberately attack civilians and their facilities, rather than military personnel and facilities? The Russian Defense Ministry clarified that they destroyed a clubhouse that was being used as a military official residence (note: a military civilian facility is now a military facility). If you get the point, you won't be swayed.
Also, special mention should be made of the fact that RT, which feels that the Russian response is always too late, immediately clarified the details of the attack. The Russian military would not immediately comment on the incident, and RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonovna Simonyan confirmed the attack, citing a Russian Defense Ministry official who said the house was a pre-determined target. The source said Ukraine was using it as a temporary shelter for its "Nazi" fighters. However, local and foreign media usually cite only the Ministry of Defense or the Russian government, not the official media itself.
On July 23, the Ukrainian military said the Russian army attacked the port of Odessa with cruise missiles, two of which were shot down by air defense forces and two hit the port infrastructure. The day before, Russia and Ukraine signed an agreement with the United Nations and Turkey to resume food exports from Black Sea ports to alleviate the global food crisis. The attack came a day after a U.N.-brokered agreement to lift food exports from Ukrainian ports was signed. Later, the Defense Ministry said a warship and a shipment of harpoon missiles were hit in Saturday's attack. The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that it attacked targets in Ukraine's main port of Odessa on Saturday, claiming that its missiles hit military infrastructure and weapons stockpiles. This is also a matter of speed of response and clarity of targeting (reasonable justification). As long as these two points are addressed, we'll be fine.
7月27日 頓巴斯官員敦促居民對被禁爆炸裝置保持警惕。市長Aleksey Kulemzin說，烏克蘭軍隊週三晚上在頓涅茨克人民共和國首都空投了被禁止的PFM-1殺傷人員地雷。市長在其Telegram頻道上寫道，在該市西北部的幾條街道上發現了地雷。
On July 27, Donbass officials urge residents to be vigilant about banned explosive devices. Ukrainian troops air-dropped banned PFM-1 anti-personnel mines in the capital of the Donetsk People's Republic on Wednesday night, Mayor Aleksey Kulemzin said. The mines were found in several streets in the northwestern part of the city, the mayor wrote on his Telegram channel.
"A bomb disposal team and rescue workers have been working on the site since early morning. A vehicle equipped with a loudspeaker is alerting local residents," Kulemzin said, urging people to be vigilant and stay away from the mines. The small butterfly-shaped PFM-1 mines are banned under the 1997 Ottawa Convention, of which Ukraine is a part. Even though they do not kill their victims when stepped on, they often rip people's feet off. These cluster bombs, also known as petals or butterfly bombs, are not used by the Russians. Nor is there any motive to use them to harm one's own people (pro-Russian residents). A criminal offense requires no suspicious motive to be established. When people see unconfirmed second-hand 'news' published by the Hong Kong media, they have to ask what the motive is. Is it valid?
7月29日 奧列尼夫卡（Yelenovka）監獄大屠殺：據頓涅茨克人民共和國新聞部副部長Daniil Bezsonov稱，烏克蘭軍隊週五清晨炮擊了郊區Yelenovka定居點的一所關押戰俘的監獄。據頓涅茨克人民共和國稱，週五上午對奧列尼夫卡村附近監獄的襲擊造成53人死亡，另有75人受傷。俄羅斯國防部證實，該設施曾關押過烏克蘭亞速營的成員，亞速營的戰士在圍攻馬里烏波爾的亞速鋼鐵廠時向俄羅斯和頓巴斯部隊投降。基輔政府指責俄羅斯在其頓巴斯盟友的領土上實施了攻擊。然而，頓涅茨克人民共和國當局展示了他們所說的HIMARS（美國提供給烏克蘭軍隊的火箭炮）使用的火箭彈碎片。 連香港媒體都報導了該重要證據，HIMARS發射的火箭彈碎片。物據說明一切。 7月之間，本港龍頭媒體TVB何東方日報都基本上報導了雙方的消息。其他較小本港媒體都跟隨龍頭，彼此參照報導內容，甚至來源都是西方主流媒體，因此國際新聞報導內容大同小異。
July 29 - Yelenovka prison massacre: Ukrainian troops shelled a prison for prisoners of war in the suburban settlement of Yelenovka early Friday morning, according to Donetsk People's Republic Deputy Minister of Information Daniil Bezsonov, 53 people were killed and 75 others were wounded in the Friday morning attack on the prison near the village of Oleynivka. The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that the facility had held members of the Ukrainian Azov battalion, whose fighters surrendered to Russian and Donbass forces during the siege of the Azov steel plant in Mariupol. The Kiev government has accused Russia of carrying out attacks on the territory of its Donbass allies. However, the Donetsk People's Republic authorities showed fragments of the rockets they say were used in HIMARS, the rocket artillery provided by the U.S. to the Ukrainian army. Even the Hong Kong media reported the important evidence, the fragments of rockets fired by HIMARS. The evidence speaks for itself. Between July, Hong Kong's leading media, TVB and Oriental Daily News, largely reported the news from both sides. Other smaller Hong Kong media followed the lead, referencing each other's stories, even from Western mainstream media, so international news coverage was similar.