Hong Kong Intelligence Report #82 俄烏衝突在日本的情形綜合報告
Updated: Apr 25
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
IMPORTANT 【重要】
本文涵蓋從2022年7月8日安倍晉三被暗殺到9月27日安倍國葬舉行期間。9月29日乃中日關係建交50週年（1972年《中日聯合聲明》-2022年）。作為全球最大美國軍事基地的日本的政治動向都最終必將衝擊中國及其香港的國安（日本在野黨，反對派無法阻擋執政黨自民黨及公明黨的軍事擴張或對外制裁，就只會直接導致中日衝突。這就是為什麼中國香港也不能不關注日本國內的政治局勢）。幾乎每一件日本政治事件都是難免帶有戰後日本史（系譜）的縮圖現象。美國的隱形殖民地日本仍然擺脫不出其戰後史。
本文一律不管日本的在野黨的命運，而只管在日本的俄國外交部和俄國媒體的處境。在嚴峻的形勢之下，正確的路線尤其是更需要的。情勢愈困難愈強烈需要正確路線。萬一路線是錯誤的，甚至領導層固執其錯誤路線，而導致更多失敗和混亂的風險。此時，視而不見，默許其錯誤的只有不負責任的公務員或卑劣的野心者而已。
This article covers the period from July 8, 2022, when Shinzo Abe was assassinated, to September 27, when Abe's state funeral taken place. September 29 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan (1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration - 2022). Any political move by Japan, the world's largest U.S. military base, will eventually have an impact on China and its national security in Hong Kong (in case the opposition parties in Japan are unable to block military expansion or foreign sanctions by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Komeito Party, it will only lead to a direct conflict between China and Japan. Therefore Hong Kong, China, cannot help but pay attention to the political situation in Japan). Almost every political event in Japan is inevitably a thumbnail sketch of postwar Japanese history (genealogy). The invisible colony of the United States, Japan, still cannot escape from its postwar history.
This article is not concerned with the fate of the opposition parties in Japan, but with the situation of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian media in Japan. The need for a correct course is especially acute in this critical situation. The more difficult the situation, the stronger the need for the right line. In case the line is wrong, or even if the leadership clings to its wrong line, there is a risk of further failure and chaos. At this point, the only people who turn a blind eye and acquiesce to their mistakes are irresponsible civil servants or despicable ambitious people.
中立主義與「實現美軍的全面撤退」
那日本該如何終止殖民地的地位？ 那就是所有在野黨都畏懼的禁忌方案，「實現美軍的全面撤退」。未來革新政黨一旦掌握政權時，就首先必須廢止美日安保條約。這是日本邁向真正主權獨立，正常國家化的第一步。到目前為止，高喊對美獨立者（業者）甚多，但毫無日本在野黨將此方案定為公約。誠然，這些在野黨幾乎都淪為了CIA黨（日本的深層政府主要是幕後日本官僚和美軍國防部的勾結，並以美日合同委員會為其象徵）。真愛國者的第一目標乃禁忌中的禁忌「實現美軍的全面撤退」，是因為能否妥善和牢固地執行其他所有政策方案都取決於此。這是2009-10年民主黨鳩山由紀夫政權的教訓，也是能辨識真反對派的照妖鏡/試金石。此外，戰後美軍最厭煩的意識形態是中立主義，而不是可自動化打壓的小眾反美主義。至今，日本在野黨都沒人主張，但日本合乎日本國憲法的意識形態是中立主義，其實它本來就是中立主義的制度設計。不需要是親中或親俄或結盟，但只要秉持中立就足以解決本無必要的國際爭端。不過，只要有美軍基地，美軍隨時都可以自由出入境，運入運出核武器，化武，生化武器等，甚至隨時都可從日本攻打任何外國，如此，日本就會自動化地被捲入戰爭。顯然，日本應該成為一個真主權獨立的正常化中立主義國家。和平主義和中立主義，哪一個面是主要的？務實的？ 明確的？那就是中立主義這一面。中立主義才是和平主義。只有這樣，日本才能參與多邊主義/各國真主權獨立的新世界秩序。如上所述，為變成一個中立主義國家，「實現美軍的全面撤退」是必經之路。
Neutralism and the Realization of the Total Withdrawal of the U.S. Forces
How should Japan end its colonial status? That is the forbidden proposal that all opposition parties fear, the "complete withdrawal of U.S. troops. Once the revolutionary parties take power in the future, they must first abolish the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This is the first step towards the independence of Japan's sovereignty and the normalization of the country. Up to now, there are many people (businessmen) who shout for independence from the U.S., but no Japanese opposition party has made this proposal a convention. It is true that almost all these opposition parties have become CIA parties (Japan's deep state is mainly a collusion between Japanese bureaucrats and the U.S. Department of Defense behind the scenes, symbolized by Japan-US Joint Committee). The first goal of the True Patriots is the taboo of taboos, "achieving a full withdrawal of U.S. forces," because the proper and solid implementation of all other policy options depends on it. This is the lesson of the 2009-10 Democratic Party's Yukio Hatoyama regime, and it is also a monoscope/ touchstone to identify the true opposition. Moreover, the most annoying ideology for the post-war U.S. forces is neutralism, not the minority-led anti-Americanism that can be suppressed automatically. To date, no one in the opposition in Japan has argued that Japan's constitutional ideology is neutrality, and in fact it was originally designed as a neutralist system. It does not need to be pro-China or pro-Russian or allied with them, but neutrality is sufficient to resolve international disputes that are unnecessary. However, if there is a U.S. military base, the U.S. military can enter and leave the country at any time, transport nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and even attack any foreign country from Japan at any time, so Japan will automatically be involved in the war. Obviously, Japan should become a normalized neutralist country with independent sovereignty. Which side of the constitutional ideology is the main one? pacifism or neutrality? Pragmatic? Clearly? It is the side of neutrality. Neutralism is true pacifism. Only in this way can Japan participate in the new world order of multilateralism/independence of the sovereignty of each country. As mentioned above, to become a neutralist country, the "complete withdrawal of U.S. troops" is the way to go.
NEWS 【事實關係】
TBS 為日本國內訂做反俄假新聞-偷運和回收西方假新聞
在香港，西方假新聞是直接或透過台灣媒體後轉載和轉播，還看不到為這個地區度身訂造的反俄假新聞。不過，日本的TBS專門搞這種事（回收和重拍西方假新聞）。在2022年8月14日TBS發佈了8名烏克蘭領土防衛隊在144 Yablunska Street當場處決云云的假新聞。其實，這是紐約時報在2022年5月19日發布過的新聞翻版。有幾個重點：
1.TBS並沒有註明來源。
2.在紐約時報報導中，3月4日路上監視器片段切至3月5日144 Yablunska Street處決場景。然而，TBS報導中，當天發生這一切。其時間順序被改動了。
3.在紐約時報報導中，3月4日路上監視器片段顯示，8名人士，但在三個人身上的腕帶帶有被塗色編輯的痕跡，水窪上的隊友人影都很大，然而，TBS報導中，衣服不同，甚至水窪上的人影幾乎都沒有。明顯是假裝同一片段的不同片段。後者是重拍的。
如圖：
TBS Customizes Anti-Russian Fake News for Japan - Smuggling and Recycling Western Fake News
In Hong Kong, Western fake news is reprinted and retransmitted either directly or through Taiwanese media, and there is no custom-made anti-Russian fake news for this region. However, Japan's TBS specializes in this kind of thing (recycling and remaking of Western fake news). On August 14, 2022, TBS released a fake news story about 8 Ukrainian territorial guards executing on the spot at 144 Yablunska Street. In fact, this is a remake of the news published by the New York Times on May 19, 2022. There are several key points.
1. TBS did not identify the source.
2. In the New York Times report, the March 4 road monitor footage cuts to the March 5 144 Yablunska Street 'killing' scene. However, in the TBS report, all of this happened on one day. The chronology was altered.
3. In the New York Times report, the March 4 road monitor footage shows eight people, but in three of them, the armbands have traces of color editing and the shadows of their teammates in the puddle are large, yet in the TBS report, the clothes are different and even the shadows in the puddle are almost non-existent. Obviously, it is a different clip pretending to be the same clip. The latter is a remake.
As in the picture,
安倍暗殺事件與日本警方
正如所料，統一教及國葬議題都是議題轉移。檢察機構透露給日本記者們的消息是生命線，警方控制媒體較易。結局，在安倍晉三暗殺事件時警方離奇部署（安倍後方無人防範襲擊）的責任問題被推到後方。盡最大可能掩護日本警方的失誤，這就是他們真正要的。幾乎找不到專門分析暗殺事件真相的報導。
7月19日日刊新潮證實了自民黨安倍晉三辦公室職員是事前請求增派警務人員的。維護日本的要職人員安全的是東京，北海道，大阪府以及各縣（俗稱都道府縣）的地方警察，而不是警察廳人員。時隔一個多月，8月25日，中村格警視廳長官發表有關報告書後，辭職（所謂引咎責任/文化）。
據警視廳報告書【令和4年7月8日に奈良市内において実施された安倍晋三元内閣総理大臣に係る警護についての検証及び警護の見直しに関する報告書】（LINK），還是主因是「安倍後方無防範」。7月8日上午11點26分一名監控護欄外，即安倍後方的人員受到指示轉到護欄內並開始監控另一方向，結局安倍後方無人顧及。明顯是，警衛部署上的人為疏忽。
不幸，9月2日的文春ONLINE的報導後，幾乎不再被提及了。這則消息和統一教報導的份量不成比例。壓到極少數的消息流量了。結果，雖有反國葬示威，但是至今毫無群眾上街抗議的任何行動。日媒，電通，博報堂為警方，以炒作統一教議題來降低群眾抗議機率到最少，這是典型的議題轉移的成果。那剝削統一教議題的反對派也是幫兇。
The Abe Assassination and the Japanese Police
As expected before, the Unification Church and the state funeral issues are both issue-shifting. The information that the prosecutors' office gave to Japanese journalists is a lifeline, and it is easier for the police to control the media. In the end, the issue of responsibility for the police's bizarre security practice during the assassination of Shinzo Abe (no one was behind Abe to prevent the attack) was pushed to the back. To cover up as much as possible the failures of the Japanese police, that's what they really want. It is almost impossible to find a report that specifically analyzes the truth of the assassination.
On July 19, the Nikkan Shincho confirmed that the staff of LDP Shinzo Abe's office had requested additional police officers beforehand. It is the local police in Tokyo, Hokkaido, Osaka Prefecture and the prefectures (commonly known as to-dou-fu-ken) that maintain the safety of Japan's top officials, not the central police department. After a month, on August 25, the Chief of the Police Department Itaru Nakamura resigned after issuing a report on the matter.
According to the report of the Police Department [the report on the inspection of the police and the police's opinion on the police protection of ex-prime minister Shinzo Abe in Nara City on July 8, 2022] At 11:26 a.m. on July 8, an officer outside the security fence, that is, behind Abe, was instructed to move to inside of the fence and start monitoring the other direction, but no one behind Abe took care of it. Obviously, there was human negligence in the deployment of the guards.
Unfortunately, after the September 2 Bunshun ONLINE report, it was almost never mentioned again. This news is out of proportion to the weight of the Unification Church report. The news flow was reduced to a very small number. As a result, although there were demonstrations against the state funeral, there have been no mass protests in the streets so far on this police issue. The Japanese media, Dentsu, and Hakuhodo, as the media police, are using the Unification Church issue to reduce the chance of mass protests to a minimum, which is a typical result of issue shifting. The oppositionists who exploit the issue of Unification Church are also accomplices.
中情局，統一教，國際勝共聯合，自民黨清和政策研究會（清和會，安倍派），松下政經墊，富士政治大學校，民社黨，連合，經團聯
中國大陸將統一教定為邪教，邪教不是邪惡的意思，而是邪典宗教的意思，有時也就是與新興宗教的意思相符。香港境內是邪教的天堂。兩大中情局反共組織，法輪功及統一教（1954年在韓國成立；1998年10月起在港活動；香港登記名：香港世界和平統一家庭聯合會 / 香港世界和平婦女聯合會）都在，但不像法輪功，它身為慈善機構（招募捐款），沒有證據或報導顯示它從事政治活動。黑暴期間也並無統一教的陰影。看統一教曾利用2009年高中通識科滲透校園以及試圖從區議會取得撥款等的活動，當然它與反對派較近，其運作模式也與傳銷一樣是地下化的。所謂地下化的意思是指當局還沒發覺或尚未取締的所有活動範圍（含地理和網路，網路及手機改變了地下化的概念），並不等於秘密，違法或地面下的意思。其意思與眾不同，地下化的東西可以是我們日常看到的。統一教的問題是特殊性的，而不是普遍性的問題，是因為它的問題專門發生在該宗教和信徒家族之間，叫做宗教紛爭，如暗殺安倍的山上徹也的家庭。那普遍性的社會問題則是指消費稅及其增稅問題。擱置最嚴峻的各種增稅問題，而專門炒作統一教議題的意義不大。實在是本末倒置。
CIA, Unification Church, International Federation for Victory Over Communism, LDP Seiwa Policy Research Association (Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyūkai / Seiwa-kai, Abe's faction), The Matsushita Institute of Government and Management, Fuji Institute of Politics, Democratic Socialist Party, RENGO, Keidanren
In mainland China, Unification Church is defined as a cult, which does not mean evil, but rather a cultic religion, sometimes in line with the meaning of emerging religions. The territory of Hong Kong is a haven for cults. The two major CIA anti-Communist organizations, Falun Gong and Unification Church (founded in Korea in 1954; active in Hong Kong since October 1998; registered in Hong Kong as Hong Kong Family Federation for World Peace and Unification / Hong Kong Women's Federation for World Peace) are both present, which is a charitable organization (recruiting donations), but unlike Falun Gong, there is no evidence or reports that it engages in political activities. There is also no shadow of the Unification Church during the colour riots in 2019. However, Unification Church has used the 2009 High School Liberal Studies to infiltrate campuses and attempted to obtain funding from the District Council, but of course it is closer to the opposition and its mode of operation is as underground as like a network-business scheme. By underground, I mean all areas of activity (including geography and the internet, the internet and smartphones have changed the concept of underground) that have not yet been discovered or outlawed by the authorities, and do not mean clandestine, illegal or literarily below ground. The meaning is different from others, and what is underground can be what we see every day. The problem with Unification Church is specific, not universal, because its problems are specifically between the religion and the families of its followers, called religious disputes, such as the family of Tetsuya Yamakami, who assassinated Abe. The universal social problem is the consumption tax and its increase. There is little point in putting aside the most serious tax increase issues and focusing on the issue of Unification Church. It's really putting the cart before the horse.
所謂統一教議題的正面意義是歷史學上的。我們已經知道，幾十年前也有人已指摘過，中情局與自民黨，民社黨（已不存在，後續組織乃民主黨，民進黨，立憲民主黨，國民民主黨等的經濟基礎連合），統一教，國際勝共聯合，岸信介的清和會（安倍派），文鮮明，兒玉譽士夫，以及經團聯（backchannels）等的聯繫。現在統合起來也不大可能影響未來選舉。中情局扶植的反對黨民社黨 / 同盟的研習機構是富士政治大學校；其第二代董事長是松下正壽。這些都是中情局的佈局，以有系統地培養代理人，尤其在反對派陣營。在2012年為阻撓小澤一郎的生活黨的發展（取得巨額政黨交付金）而從內部瓦解民主黨政權的第三屆總理野田佳彥是類似組織松下政經墊的著名人士。松下政經墊是培養出諸多在野黨右派人士，親民社黨/ 同盟/連合政客的另一政治培訓機構。簡言之，日本的執政黨和在野黨陣營都是CIA戰後的佈局。即使在野黨抨擊統一教對自民黨/公明黨的滲透，立憲民主黨本身也受惠於統一教（主要是選舉支援）。對未來選情影響不大。雙方還是私底下靠統一教（此次沒禁止它）；選民還是會投給自民黨，是因為在野黨及其人員已徹底喪失人民的信賴。在此先概括它們的系譜。
1947年9月18日OSS戰略情報局轉身為CIA中情局。GHQ進行的戰後偉大一場革命（Government Section / GS民政局推動的民主化/帶有社會主義的改革措施）唯限於1945年到1947年的兩年。日本史上的革命家不是什麼左派人士，而是道格拉斯·麥克阿瑟 (Douglas MacArthur)。不過，這段時期從下令終止1947年2月1日總罷工開始，進入逆進程（Reverse Course）的反共要塞化的大反動時期。整個日本戰後史就是逆進程的歷史。雖然冷戰以蘇聯瓦解來結束了，但是此反動過程尚未結束。
查爾斯·威洛比（Charles Andrew Willoughby）的G2 (a section of General Staff Section)取代了GS。1948年12月24日釋放了一批甲級戰犯。其中心人物是淪為中情局代理人的三名戰犯，即岸信介，笹川良一和兒玉譽士夫。塑造了戰後日本執政黨和在野黨都服務CIA的政治生態。
1954年5月1日文鮮明在南韓設立了世界基督教統一神靈協會。它政治的目的為統一朝鮮半島，反共，但其原語教典含有顯著的反日思想。的確，在目前日本政壇最滲透所謂右翼（反韓國）的統一教（韓國宗教！）卻有反日思想。這種日本右派的思想混亂，矛盾和扭曲體現的是日本戰後史的本質。日本右派是服從美國的殖民地代理人，如此可確保美國的資金。就統一教的教義，解恨是其教義的核心。為了解除日本殖民地時代的仇恨，信徒該在日本籌款並貢獻給韓國的世界活動。在日本最大發展的統一教在籌款方面出了大問題。這原來是從1970年代到1990年代日本國內媒體大力曝光的，涉及巨額捐款的通靈行銷本身已不是什麼新議題。重點是經過了兩個月的統一教與自民黨的醜聞，岸田政權並不禁止統一教。它的存在依然是合法的。1967年朴正煕政權的庇護下與中情局正式開始合作。
The positive meaning of the so-called Unification Church issue is historiographical. We already know that decades ago there were accusations about the CIA's links with the LDP, the Democratic Socialist Party (no longer in existence, but the successor organizations are the economic base of the Democratic Party, the Democratic Progressive Party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, Democratic Party For the People, etc.), the Unification Church, International Federation for Victory Over Communism, Nobusuke Kishi's Seiwakai (Abe's faction), Sun Myung Moon, Yushio Kodama, and the backchannels, Keidanren. It is unlikely that this linkage will affect future elections positively for opposition. The CIA-founded opposition party, the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)/ Japanese Confederation of Labour DOMEI, has the Fuji Institute of Politics as its research institution; its second-generation chairman is Masatoshi Matsushita. All of these are CIA setups to systematically cultivate agents, especially in the opposition camp in Japan. The third Democrat Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, who dismantled the DPJ regime from within in 2012 to block the growth of Ichiro Ozawa's Life Party (by securing a large party deposit), is a prominent figure in a similar organization, The Matsushita Institute of Government and Management. The Matsushita Institute of Government and Management is another political training institution that has produced many right-wing members of opposition parties and pro-Democratic Socialist Party/DOMEI/RENGO-related politicians. In short, both the ruling party and the opposition camp in Japan are CIA's post-war setup. Even if the opposition parties criticize the infiltration of the LDP/Komeito by the Unification Church, the Constitutional Democratic Party itself benefits from the Unification Church (mainly in terms of election support). This will have little impact on the future of the election. Both parties are still privately relying on the Unification Church (it was not banned this time); voters will still vote for the LDP because the opposition parties and their personnel have completely lost the trust of the people. Here is a summary of their lineage.
The great post-war revolution (democratization / socialist reform measures promoted by the Government Section / GS Civil Administration) carried out by GHQ was limited to the two years from 1945 to 1947. The revolutionary in Japanese history was not a leftist, but Douglas MacArthur. However, this period began with the order to end the general strike of February 1, 1947, and entered the Reverse Course, a period of great reaction against the Communist fortress. The entire post-war history of Japan is the history of the Reverse Course. Although the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, this reactionary process has not yet ended.
Charles Andrew Willoughby's G2 (a section of the General Staff Section) replaced the GS, and on December 24, 1948, a group of Class A war criminals was released. The central characters were three war criminals who had become agents of the CIA: Kishi Nobusuke, Sasakawa Ryoichi, and Kodama Yushio. This shaped the political ecology of postwar Japan, in which both the ruling party and the opposition have served the CIA since then.
On May 1, 1954, The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity was established in South Korea by Sun Myung Moon. Its political aims were to unify the Korean Peninsula and to oppose communism, but its original language canon contained significant anti-Japanese ideas. Indeed, the Unification Church (Korean religion!), which is currently the most pervasive so-called right-wing (anti-Korean) religion in Japanese politics However, it has anti-Japanese ideas simultaneously. This confusion, contradiction, and distortion of the Japanese right's thinking embodies the nature of Japan's postwar history. The Japanese Right is a colonial agent that obeys the United States so that it can secure American funds. In the doctrine of the Unification Church, the release of hatred is central to its teachings. To relieve the hatred of Japan's colonial past, believers should raise funds in Japan and contribute to world activities in Korea. The Unification Church, which has grown the most in Japan, has had a major problem with fundraising. This was originally a major media exposure in Japan from the 1970s to the 1990s, and the psychic marketing itself, which involved huge donations, was not a new issue. The point is that after two months of scandals involving the Unification Church and the LDP, the Kishida regime has not banned the Unification Church. Its existence is still legal, and cooperation with the CIA began officially in 1967 under the patronage of the Park Chung-chi regime.
1955年曾任日海軍軍務局的顧問，戰後成律師的松下正壽在1957年為將美國的核子反應爐引入日本而設立了原子能研究所。身為岸信介的英國特使。1960年由中情局滲透的日本社會黨的右派（西尾末廣，片山哲，水谷長三郎）創立了在反對派左翼陣營中的CIA黨，即民社黨。CIA資金是經由經團聯分配的。其經濟基礎是全日本勞動總同盟（同盟），即今日立憲民主黨和國民民主黨經濟基礎的連合的主要組成部分。以前與香港工聯會有過交往的連合是CIA的日本勞動聯合組織。誠然，日本在野黨的主要代表政黨也就是CIA黨的。1968年松下正壽透過民社黨當選了東京都參議院議員。
同年，國際戰勝共產主義聯合（國際勝共聯合）先在韓國成立。它其實是CIA命令下的韓國KCIA的政治組織。根本不是什麼日本組織。所有重要的CIA重量級代理人都在此結合了。即統一教的文鮮明創立了該組織。自民黨/清和會=現安倍派/安倍晉三的祖父岸信介，笹川良一，兒玉譽士夫以及松下正壽都參與了該組織（美國代理人蔣介石也是其成員）。這就是滲透整個執政黨和在野黨黨派雙方陣營的CIA組織網絡。統一教提供的是選舉支援。兒玉譽士夫的右翼暴力組織提供的則是各種非正式破壞手段。其目標是：
1.消滅共產主義。
2.發動以朝鮮半島為開端的第三次世界大戰。
3.降低日本的生活水平到3分之1。即使增稅到4倍，5倍，也得增強軍事力。
顯然，安倍晉三在2012年到2020年幾乎成功實現的是第三個目標。日本國是如此由假裝日本右派的外國代理人主宰的。
1969年CIA資助創辦了民社黨/同盟的政治培訓中心，即富士政治大學校。松下正壽本人擔任了第二屆董事長。同年，他也擔任了統一教的市民大學講座董事。然後，1974年松下正壽擔任了KCIA指揮的統一教的世界和平教授學會（Professors World Peace Academy）的會長。該反對立憲民主黨和共產黨合作的現任連合會長芳野友子是CIA民社黨富士政治大學校的培訓生。世界和平教授學會的成員包括經團聯，CIA的東京分部亞洲基金會及內閣調查室等商界寡頭，中情局和日本情報機構等。在此，日本在野黨的外皮完全被撕破了。這足以解釋了日本在野黨的本質問題。
這樣，日本政壇是從1947年起至今（2022年），由一樣特定勢力的特定人士（朋黨）一直霸佔的。日本選民的悲哀是「只有一樣這些垃圾政黨，一樣這些垃圾政客，別無他者，沒有正常的，可靠的，好的選擇！」。選民被迫從實際的外國代理人中選擇候選人。這就是為什麼抹黑掉自民黨也沒用，還是對選情毫無影響，是因為在野黨也是一群垃圾。整個戰後日本（1947年-2022年）是由外國代理人主宰的。那麼，當代日本的反俄/反華勢力也就是這樣有系統地形成的。甚至，日本的職業論客幾乎都只不過是他們其中特定政黨組織職業明星的推銷員，鼓手，啦啦隊和推薦者，而完全獨立者毫無生機。這就是所謂論客‘專家’們被中情局允許繼續搵錢的存在理由。
那看一看，統一教對日本執政黨和在野黨的滲透狀況。據最新的報導，公明黨1名，自民黨的全國會議員379名中179名有某種聯繫。自民黨派別（安倍派=清和會，麻生派，二階派，岸田派，茂木派，森山派，谷垣派及無派別）中，最大派別安倍派（清和會）97名中，37名有關係。可謂，自民黨乃統一教黨 / 國際勝共聯合黨。不過，據電通持股的共同通訊社的調查，更重要的是批判統一教的在野黨中，日本維新會11名，立憲民主黨7名，國民民主黨1名、參政黨1名、無黨派3名都與統一教有關。簡直是賊喊捉賊。日本執政黨和在野黨都被統一教滲透的。
（LINK）
In 1955, Masatoshi Matsushita, who had been an advisor to the Japanese Navy's Bureau of Military Affairs and became a lawyer after the war, set up the Atomic Energy Research Institute in 1957 to introduce American nuclear reactors to Japan. In 1960, the right wing of the Japanese Socialist Party (Suehiro Nishio, Tetsu Katayama, and Chouzaburo Mizutani), infiltrated by the CIA, founded the CIA party, Democratic Socialist Party, in the left wing of the opposition. Its economic base was DOMEI, the main component of the economic base of the present-day Constitutional Democratic Party and Democratic Party For the People. A previous affiliate with the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions was the CIA's RENGO (DOMEI is still part of it). Admittedly, the main representative party of the opposition in Japan is also the CIA, and in 1968, Masatoshi Matsushita was elected to the Tokyo Senate through the Democratic Socialist Party.
In the same year, International Federation for Victory Over Communism was first established in Korea. It was a political organization of the Korean KCIA under the orders of the CIA. It was not a Japanese organization at all. All the important CIA heavyweight agents were combined here. The organization was founded by Sun Myung Moon of the Unification Church. The LDP/Seiwakai = the grandfather of the current Abe faction/Abe Shinzo, Nobusuke Kishi, Ryoichi Sasakawa, Yushio Kodama and Masatoshi Matsushita were all involved in the organization (the American agent Chiang Kai-shek was also a member). This is the CIA network that infiltrates the entire ruling party and the opposition parties on both sides. The Unification Church provided electoral support. The right-wing violent organization of Yoshio Kodama provided a variety of informal means of sabotage. Their goals were:
1. To eliminate communism.
2. To start a third world war, starting with the Korean Peninsula conflict.
3. To lower the standard of living in Japan to one-third. Even if taxes are increased to 4 times or 5 times, military power must be increased.
Obviously, Shinzo Abe almost succeeded in achieving the third goal from 2012 to 2020. The Japanese state is so dominated by foreign agents who pretend to be the Japanese right.
In 1969, the CIA funded the creation of a political training center for Democratic Socialist Party /DOMEI, the Fuji Political Institute. Masatoshi Matsushita himself became the second chairman of the board. In the same year, he also became the director of the Unification Church's Citizens' University. Then, in 1974, Matsushita became president of the Professors World Peace Academy of the Unification Church under the direction of the KCIA. Tomoko Yoshino, the current co-president of RENGO, the opposition to the collaboration between the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Communist Party, was a trainee at the CIA's Fuji Political Institute. Members of the World Peace Academy include business oligarchs such as the Keidanren, the CIA's Tokyo branch Asia Foundation and Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, the CIA and Japanese intelligence agencies. Here, the outer skin of the Japanese opposition party has been completely torn off. This explains the nature of the opposition parties in Japan.
In this way, the Japanese political arena has been dominated by specific people (cronies) of the same specific power since 1947 until now (2022). The sad thing for Japanese voters is that "there are only the same garbage parties and the same garbage politicians, there is no one else, there is no normal, reliable, good choice! Voters are forced to choose candidates from actual foreign agents. That's why it's useless to discredit the LDP and it still has no effect on the election because the opposition parties are also a bunch of trash. The entire post-war Japan (1947-2022) was and still is heavily dominated by foreign proxies. So, this is how the anti-Russian/anti-Chinese forces in contemporary Japan are systematically formed. Even professional Japanese commentators are almost always nothing more than salesmen, drummers, cheerleaders and promoters of the professional stars of their particular party organizations, while completely independent ones have no chance of survival. This is the raison d'être of the so-called pundits 'experts' who are allowed by the CIA to continue making money.
Then look at the infiltration of the Unification Church into the ruling and opposition parties in Japan. According to the latest reports, one member of the Komeito Party and 179 of the 379 members of the LDP's National Assembly have connection. Among the LDP's factions (Abe's faction = Seiwakai, Aso's faction, Nikai's faction, Kishida's faction, Motegi's faction, Moriyama's faction, Tanigaki's faction and ''no faction''), 37 out of 97 members of the largest faction, Abe's faction (Seiwaikai), are affiliated. It can be said that the LDP is the Unification Church Party / International Federation for Victory Over Communism Party. However, according to a survey conducted by the Dentsu-owned Kyodo News, among the opposition parties that are critical of the Unification Church, 11 from the Japan Innovation Party, 7 from the Constitutional Democratic Party, 1 from the Democratic Party for the People, 1 from Sanseitō, and 3 from non-partisan parties are related to the Unification Church. It is simply a case of a thief calling out for a thief. The ruling party and the opposition parties in Japan are all infiltrated by the Unification Church.
兩大政局轉折點：消費稅方案的通過及清和會政權的誕生（2000年-）
被俄羅斯制裁的小澤一郎就CIA的滲透有以下證言：
Two major political turning points: introduction of consumption tax and the birth of the Seiwakai regime (2000-)
Ichiro Ozawa, who was sanctioned by Russia, testified the following about CIA infiltration:
昭和51年（1976年）4月に入って、米国から大変な報道が二つ発信された。『ニュー•リパブリック』誌で、児玉誉士夫はCIAと関係があり、政府高官に流れた金の中にはCIA資金が含まれていた可能性があると。二つ目は、『ニューヨーク•タイムズ』で、ケネディ政権時代の高官の話で、日本の一つ以上の政党にCIAから資金が供給されていたとの報道だった。大騒ぎとなったのは、自民党と民社党である。この報道を機に、自民党は中曽根自民党幹事長を中心に、民社党との連立政権を前提に総予算を強行採決で成立させた直後に、衆議院を解散する密約を結んだ。社会党と公明党は、直ちに解散を要求した。共産党はCIA資金を問題とし、自民と民社を追求するために早期に国会を正常化すべしと主張し、前尾議長に協力する姿勢を取ることになる。
In April 1976, two very serious reports came out from the United States. The New Republic reported that Yoshio Kodama had ties to the CIA and that CIA funds may have been among the money that flowed to government officials. The second was a report in the New York Times that a senior official in the Kennedy administration said that more than one political party in Japan were funded by the CIA. The two parties that caused a fuss were the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan (DSP). In response to this report, the LDP, led by LDP Secretary General Nakasone, concluded a secret agreement to dissolve the House of Representatives immediately after forcing through a vote a total budget on the premise of a coalition government with the Democratic Socialist Party of Japan. The Socialist Party and the Komeito immediately demanded the dissolution. The Communist Party would take a cooperative stance with Speaker Maeo by raising the issue of CIA funding and insisting that the Diet should be normalized as soon as possible in order to pursue the accountabilities of LDP and DSP.
1976年（4月），從美國轉來了兩份非常嚴重的報告。 《新共和》報道說，兒玉誉士夫與中央情報局有聯繫，中央情報局的資金可能是流向政府官員的資金之一。 第二篇是《紐約時報》的報道，肯尼迪政府的一位高級官員說，日本不止一個政黨是由中央情報局資助的。 引起軒然大波的兩個政黨是自民黨和民社黨。 這份報告促使以自民黨秘書長（幹事長）中曾根為首的自民黨締結了一項秘密協議，在與民社黨組成聯合政府的前提下，通過投票強行通過總預算，隨後立即解散眾議院。 社會黨和公明黨則立即要求解散。 共產黨對前尾議長採取合作的態度，提出中央情報局的資金問題，並堅持認為國會應盡快正常化，以追究自民黨和民社黨。（平野貞夫著 『野党協力の深層：戦後共産党は、いかに大転換に至ったのか』詩想社新書，2016年，第116頁）
売上税法案の廃案で、中曽根首相は総裁・総理の任期延長の野望が潰え、昭和62年（1987年）10月に竹下幹事長を後任総裁に指名して退陣する。竹下内閣は、11月16日に発足し、大平・中曽根両内閣が失敗した税制改革、すなわち消費税導入に政治生命を賭ける事になる。竹下首相は、消費税導入にあたって、自ら懸念や問題点を指摘し、議論をリードして反発を鎮め、社会党と共産党の猛烈な反対を抑え、公明党と民社党の協力で関係法案を成立させた。この消費税導入は、戦後の税制改革で最大の抜本改革であった。その後の行財政に大きな影響を与えた。同時にこれまでの社公民体制が崩れ、自公民路線が明らかになった。
With the repeal of the sales tax bill, Prime Minister Nakasone's ambition to extend his term as LDP president and prime minister was crushed, and he resigned in October 1987, naming Secretary-General Takeshita as his successor as LDP president. The Takeshita cabinet was inaugurated on November 16, 1987, and it staked its political life on the tax reform that had failed under the Ohira and Nakasone cabinets, namely, the introduction of the consumption tax. Prime Minister Takeshita personally pointed out the concerns and problems in introducing the consumption tax, led the debate, and quelled the opposition with support from Komeito and DSP. The introduction of the consumption tax was the most drastic tax reform of the postwar era. It had a major impact on subsequent administrative and fiscal policies. At the same time, the existing Socialist Party-Komeito - LDP system collapsed, and the LDP -Komeito-DSP line became clear.
隨著銷售稅法案的廢止，中曾根首相延長其自民黨總裁和首相任期的野心被粉碎，他於1987年10月下台，任命竹下幹事長為其自民黨總裁繼任者。 竹下內閣於11月16日成立，並將其政治生命寄託在大平和中曾根內閣失敗的稅收改革上，即引入消費稅。 竹下總理親自指出開徵消費稅的顧慮和問題，引導辯論，平息反對，壓制了社會黨和共產黨的激烈反對，並在公明黨和民社黨的配合下頒布了相關法案。 消費稅的引入是戰後稅收制度的最大改革。 它對後來的行政和財政政策產生了重大影響。 同時，既有的社會黨-公民黨-自民黨體系崩潰了，自民黨-公民黨-民社黨的路線變得清晰。
（平野貞夫著 『野党協力の深層：戦後共産党は、いかに大転換に至ったのか』詩想社新書，2016年，第140-141頁）
簡言之，由中情局資助的自民黨和民社黨攜手並肩塑造了消費稅造成的失落的30年以及今日自民黨和公民黨的執政路線。
清和會政權的誕生和2000年普京政權誕生以來的親密關係不是偶然。時任自民黨清和會總理森喜朗是第一個認可普京政權的人。從此，他跟安倍晉三都深受俄羅斯的喜愛。清和會是普京俄國的日本夥伴。20世紀80年代，大平首相突然去世，中曾根內閣通過鈴木善幸掌握了大約五年半的權力。 中曾根的政策與清和會的政策非常相似，是 "鷹派、憲政、親美、反共和小政府"，但從派別上看，他不是清和會的人，而是一個獨特的中曾根派。 它也是親美國的。在中曾根之後，自民黨在1980年代末和1990年代初與細川聯合政府一起進入了反對派行列，隨後竹下、宇野、海部和宮澤也相繼成立了內閣，但沒有組成清和會內閣。 在包括羽田在內的非自民黨聯合政府的短暫時期後，出現了村山的社會黨和自民黨的聯盟，然後是橋本→小淵，從1990年代後期開始，自民黨歸入了經世會（Heiseiken）。
2000年4月，情況發生了變化，小淵突然去世，清和會森內閣成立。 森喜朗一年後因不得人心而離任，同為清和會的小泉內閣持續了五年半，推動了新自由主義。隨後是安倍晉三和福田康夫的清和會內閣，自民黨在麻生派（宏池會）內閣後進入反對派，民主黨內閣持續了三年半，第二次清和會安倍政府從2012年底到2020年底，然後是無派別的菅義偉和宏池會的岸田( 現任內閣），並一直到現在。
中情局的清和會的脈絡是美國在日本推動新自由主義政策的歷史過程，也就是普京政權（俄國外交官本身主張反對新自由主義）和自民黨清和會（安倍派）搭上友誼的進程。表面上看，意識形態顯著不一致，但進行合作的關係。
In short, the CIA-funded LDP and DSP worked together to shape the lost 30 years with the consumption tax and the LDP and Komeito line of government today.
It is no coincidence that the birth of the Seiwa-kai regime and the Putin regime since its inception in 2000 are closely related. The then LDP Seiwa-kai Prime Minister Yoshirō Mori was the first to endorse Putin's regime. Since then, he and Abe Shinzo are both well-liked by Russia. In the 1980s, when Prime Minister Ohira died suddenly, Nakasone's cabinet held the power for about five and a half years through Suzuki Yoshiyuki. Nakasone's policies were very similar to those of the Seiwa-kai, being "hawkish, constitutional, pro-American, anti-communist and small government", but factionally he was not a Seiwa-kai but a distinct Nakasone faction. After Nakasone, the LDP entered the opposition with the Hosokawa coalition government in the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by Takeshita, Uno, Kaifu and Miyazawa, but did not form the Seiwa-kai cabinet. After a short period of non-LDP coalition governments including Hata, a coalition of Murayama's Socialist Party and the LDP emerged, followed by Hashimoto → Obuchi, and from the late 1990s, the LDP was subsumed into the Keiseikai (Heiseiken).
In April 2000, the situation changed when Obuchi died suddenly and the Yoshiro Mori Cabinet was formed. Yoshiro Mori left the post a year later due to unpopularity, and Koizumi's cabinet, which was also a Seiwakai cabinet, lasted for five and a half years and promoted neo-liberalism. The second Seiwa-kai Abe government lasted from the end of 2012 to the end of 2020, followed by the non-partisan Kan and Kochikai member Kishida (the current cabinet), and continues to the present.
The context of the formation and evolution of the CIA's Seiwa-kai cabinets is the historical process of U.S. neo-liberal policy in Japan, the process of friendship between the Putin regime (Russian diplomats themselves advocate against neo-liberalism) and the LDP Seiwa-kai (Abe faction). On the surface, there is a clear ideological disagreement, but a cooperative relationship in general.
最後，我們要看，在野黨在所有選民（非實際投票者總數）中的得票率（LINK），以理解到底取得多少百分比才可以執政。但這取決於如何定義和劃分日本的執政黨和在野黨。就整體而言，在2016年參議院選舉當時可以說取得全選民中的25%投票率，就可以與執政黨均衡或可望取勝。然而，2019年之後，其門檻提高到35%以上了。因此，在野黨的統戰追求的所謂25%目的已過時。甚至，也得考慮所謂YU黨的定義，即作為執政黨輔助品的在野黨。這屬於執政黨。
2016年參議員選舉： 24.715%（全國選舉區非比例代表得票率35.91%自民黨/ 13.52%公民黨） / 54.70 % 總體投票率 （大約全選民人口的一半）
2022年參議院選舉：37.54%（全國選舉區非比例代表得票率38.74%自民黨/ 6.77%公民黨 / 10.41% 日本維新會/ 15.33% 立憲民主黨/3.83%國民民主黨） / 52.05 % 總體投票率 （大約全選民人口的一半）
2022年現在
日本執政黨（自民黨，公明黨）
日本在野黨（立憲民主黨，日本維新會，國民民主黨，日本共產黨，令和新選組，社會民主黨，NHK黨，參政黨，幸福實現黨，日本第一黨，新黨KUNIMORI，維新政黨•新風）
誠然，每次國會選舉只有全選民的一半參與，但越來越減少其總體投票率。相對的，YU黨（ゆ黨）的界線隨著日本國內政治局勢有所變動。結局，可執政的選舉門檻逐漸升高了。日本真反對派只有透過統戰取得35%以上投票率，才可望執政了。 看數值，飽受批判的統戰的戰術本身絕非錯誤。它仍然適合日本政治的客觀條件。換言之，YU黨（ゆ黨）的界線仍會有變數。這算是妥協，而且是正在衰退/退潮中的妥協，最理想的則是一個全新的革新政黨（救世主）出現並單獨取得35%以上投票率。看來，日本並無此土壤。
這普選的分析概念並不再適用於2021年選舉制度改革後的香港選情的分析了（香港目前絕不存在任何形式的普選）。
Finally, we need to look at the percentage of votes (https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/database/history/) that the opposition party received from all voters (not the total number of people who voted) to understand what percentage is required to be in power. However, this depends on how to define and delineate the ruling party and the opposition party in Japan. In general, in the 2016 Senate election, it could be argued that a 25% turnout among all voters would be balanced with the ruling party or would be expected to win. However, after 2019, the threshold has been raised to more than 35%. Therefore, the so-called 25% goal pursued by the opposition party's unification campaign has become obsolete. Even the definition of a so-called YU party (yutou), that is, an opposition party that acts as an adjunct to the ruling party, must be considered as part of the ruling party.
2016 Senate election: 24.715% (35.91% LDP/ 13.52% Komeito for non-proportional representation in national election districts) / 54.70 % overall turnout (about half of the entire electorate)
2022 Senate election: 37.54% (38.74% LDP / 6.77% Komeito / 10.41% Japan Innovation Party / 15.33% Constitutional Democratic Party / 3.83% Democratic Party For the People) / 52.05% overall turnout (about half of the entire electorate)
Current in 2022
Ruling parties in Japan (LDP, Komeito)
Japanese opposition parties (Constitutional Democratic Party, Japan Innovation Party, Democratic Party For the People, Communist Party of Japan, Reiwa Shinsengumi, Social Democratic Party, NHK Party, Sansei Party, Happiness Realization Party, Japan First Party, New Party KUNIMORI, The Restoration Political Party - New Wind)
It is true that only half of the entire electorate participates in each parliamentary election, but its overall turnout is decreasing. In contrast, the boundaries of the YU Party (Yutou) have changed with the political situation in Japan. As a result, the electoral threshold for being in power has gradually increased. The real opposition in Japan can only hope to come to power if they get more than 35% of the vote in the united front. The much-criticized tactic of the united front is not a mistake. It still fits the objective conditions of Japanese politics. In other words, the line of the YU party (Yutou) is still subject to change. This is a compromise, and it is a compromise during a recession/eclipse, and ideally, a new and innovative party (savior) would emerge and alone get more than 35% of the vote. It seems that Japan has no such ground.
This concept of universal suffrage is no longer applicable to the analysis of Hong Kong's electoral situation after the electoral reform in 2021 (there is no universal suffrage of any kind in Hong Kong now).
俄羅斯在日本國內政治，安倍國葬，政教分離，政經分離
就俄烏戰事上面，包括俄羅斯在內的日本國內政治勢力中，毫無勢力想試圖中立化日本國內各黨派。雖然將反俄/反中轉化為親俄/親中是極為困難的，但至少依然可望達到某種程度的中立化。
俄羅斯在日本的政治狀況是選邊站。俄羅斯的歷代大使是親自民黨/公明黨政權的。安倍晉三的暗殺和國葬充分曝光了俄羅斯統治階級對日本的看法。這算是雙重標準，是因為俄羅斯一邊批判日本軍國主義，一邊讚美安倍晉三及其自民黨試圖復甦軍國主義的‘獨立自主’改憲方案（美國殖民地的日本自衛隊將會正式變為攻打他國的美軍僱傭兵）。據俄羅斯官方一再對日本和俄國國內發佈的消息，俄羅斯統治階級和對日政策負責人都站在以安倍晉三代表的自民黨的政策立場。不過，諷刺的是，這安倍晉三的安倍派控制的自民黨就是最反俄的政治勢力。2022年9月21日這個‘真愛國者’安倍派掌控多數的自民黨/公明黨政權發表了新一輪反俄制裁了。然而，俄方還是在2022年9月27日再度稱讚這個反俄執政黨勢力中極具影響力的精神領袖為‘真愛國者’了（俄方代表在日本總共四次發表了‘真愛國者’論，即7月8日暗殺當日，7月12日安倍葬禮，8月12日衛星通訊社訪問， 9月27日國葬）。看到前後邏輯出狀況的一般民眾可以容易理解俄方立場嗎？甚至，日本國內曾來沒有人將安倍晉三視為親俄派的。這是俄方單方面的說法。既然，俄方一再稱讚安倍晉三為真的愛國者，反安倍者皆是叛徒或反俄派。這就是片面漠視日本國內情形和民心的俄方官僚的一貫敘事的邏輯結論。那麼，絕大多數挺俄羅斯的反安倍的日本民眾都尷尬。不過，冷情的俄方外交部一貫無視他們的心境。因此之故，日本反對派持有反俄情緒是理所當然的，是因為俄羅斯外交部偏重於自民黨/公明黨一邊。 譬如，敵對自民黨/公民黨政府的以日本共產黨為首的反對派敵對俄國也是合情合理的。這還不計算安倍晉三的新自由主義在內的。俄羅斯官方/統治階級大力主張反對新自由主義，但針對日本也同時稱讚安倍晉三的新自由主義政策則是自相矛盾的。雞同鴨講。俄方對日的政策立場算是意識形態嵌合體（Chimaira）。就整體而言，毫無助益改善國內反俄的情形，是因為極具爭議性的安倍晉三的旗幟無法團結全國所有跨黨派的，分散的親俄派，適得其反。反而，不但與反俄日本執政黨陣營的關係惡化，也更加疏遠反俄日本在野黨陣營。俄羅斯外交部完全不管日本民情，而一意孤行。顯然，俄方的政治勝利的指標將會是究竟多大程度能在日本全國規模成功團結跨黨派的，分散的，所有的親俄派，並且至少對俄中立化日本政府，執政黨和在野黨的核心部分。目前的俄國在日本的情形是僵局，死胡同，鑽入了牛角尖。只有一個解決方法，那就是自生自滅。僵持錯誤路線的結局會自動化地終止其錯誤路線。不過，到目前為止，俄方並無刻意誇張地擴大‘真愛國者’公關的範圍，都唯限於安倍晉三的特定日子和場合而已。
Russia in Japan's domestic politics, Abe's funeral, separation of the religion and the state, and separation of politics and the economy
Regarding the war between Russia and Ukraine, there are no forces in Japanese domestic politics, including Russia, that are trying to neutralize Japanese domestic parties. Although it is extremely difficult to turn anti-Russian/anti-China into pro-Russian/pro-China, it is still possible to achieve at least some degree of neutrality.
Russia's political situation in Japan is one of choosing sides. Russia's successive ambassadors have been pro-LDP/Komeito regimes. The assassination and state funeral of Shinzo Abe fully exposed the Russian ruling class's view of Japan. This is a double standard because Russia criticizes Japanese militarism while praising Shinzo Abe and his LDP's attempt to revive militarism with an 'independent and autonomous' constitutional reform (the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the U.S. colony would officially become U.S. mercenaries attacking other countries). According to repeated Russian official announcements to Japan and within Russia, the Russian ruling class and those in charge of policy toward Japan are siding with the policy of the LDP, represented by 'the true patriot of Japan' Shinzo Abe. On September 21, 2022, this 'true patriot' Abe's majority LDP/Komeito regime issued a new round of anti-Russian sanctions. However, on September 27, 2022, the Russian side once again praised the spiritual leader of this highly influential anti-Russian ruling party as a 'true patriot' (Russian representatives expressed the 'true patriot' theory at least three times in Japan, namely on July 8, the day of the assassination, and on July 12, when Abe was buried). (The Russian representatives made the 'true patriot' theory four times in Japan, namely on July 8, the day of the assassination, July 12, the funeral of Abe, Sputnik Japan interview of August 12, and September 27, the state funeral) Can the public, who saw the logic behind and before the situation, easily understand the Russian position? No one in Japan has ever considered Shinzo Abe to be pro-Russian. This is the Russian side's unilateral statement. Since the Russian side has repeatedly praised Abe as a true patriot, those who oppose him are traitors or anti-Russian logically and automatically. This is the logical conclusion of the usual narrative of the Russian bureaucrats who unilaterally ignore the domestic situation in Japan and the hearts of the people. Most Japanese people who are pro-Russian and anti-Abe are embarrassed. However, the cold-hearted Russian Foreign Ministry has always ignored their state of mind. Therefore, it is natural for the Japanese opposition to hold anti-Russian sentiments because the Russian Foreign Ministry is biased towards the LDP/Komeito side. For example, it makes sense that the opposition, led by the Japanese Communist Party, which is hostile to the LDP/Komeito government, is also hostile to Russia. This does not consider the neoliberalism of Shinzo Abe. It is contradictory for the Russian official/ruling class to vigorously advocate against neoliberalism and at the same time praise the neoliberal policies of Shinzo Abe against Japan. It's the same thing. Russia's policy stance toward Japan is an ideological chimaira like RT. Overall, it does not help to improve the domestic anti-Russian situation because the highly controversial banner of Shinzo Abe does not unite all the cross-party, fragmented, pro-Russian factions in the country, which is counterproductive. On the contrary, it has not only worsened relations with the anti-Russian Japanese ruling party camp but has also alienated the anti-Russian Japanese opposition camp. The Russian Foreign Ministry is completely ignoring Japanese public sentiment and is bent on having its own way. Obviously, the indicator of Russia's political success will be the extent to which it succeeds in uniting all pro-Russian parties across party lines on a national scale and neutralizing at least the core of the Japanese government, the ruling party and the opposition parties against Russia. The current Russian situation in Japan is a stalemate, a dead end, a bull's-eye. There is only one solution, and that is to destroy itself. The end of the stalemate on the wrong path will automatically put an end to its wrong path. However, so far, the Russian side has not deliberately expanded the narrative of 'Abe the True Patriot' public relations stunt to an exaggerated extent, but only limited to specific days and occasions for Shinzo Abe.
俄羅斯根本沒有考慮的日本民眾對安倍國葬的看法（9月25日最新民情報告）如下：
日本8大主流媒體中，讀賣新聞 （反對56%）; NHK （56.7%）；朝日新聞（56%）；時事通信（51.9%）；日經新聞/TV東京（60%）；共同通信 （60.8%）；每日新聞（62%）；產經新聞/FNN （62.3%）。連親安倍派的主流媒體都揭示了日本人民的一半以上的多數派是反對安倍國葬的。（LINK）
對俄羅斯而言，最該避免的是遭受執政黨和在野黨勢力的集中砲擊。那麼，反正遭到雙方的連日攻擊之下，參加安倍的國葬還是可望暫時減輕一方的猛烈打擊的。不過，如此踏上了日本反對派早前設下的政治踏繪，即參不參與疑違憲的安倍國葬是可以辨別敵我的試金石。在此問題上，參與的俄羅斯（Mikhail Shvydkoy總統特別代表和駐日大使賈魯金Mikhail Galuzin）是站在自民黨/公明黨一邊的。那麼，反對派繼續從事反俄也是難免的，這是俄羅斯的選擇。Mikhail Shvydkoy也特意稱呼安倍晉三‘真愛國者’了。
在安倍先生擔任首相期間，修改日本憲法在美國政府影響下制定的條款的憲法改革重新被提上日程，這可能不是巧合。 安倍先生是一個真正的愛國者，他明白日本需要一個多領域的政策。 （LINK）
依照Mikhail Shvydkoy的見解，俄方是支持自民黨改憲的，也把它認定為真正自主獨立的政策。換言之，俄方照樣接收自民黨的政治敘事的。甚至，前俄羅斯駐日大使（1996年-2003年）亞歷山大·尼古拉耶維奇·帕諾夫（Alexander Nikolayevich Panov）也就國葬發表了同樣看法：
值得注意的是，安倍先生的執政時間比日本任何其他首相都要長。 作為一名傑出的、有魅力的政治家，他制定了具體的目標，並為實現這些目標而努力工作。 安倍先生在日本相當受歡迎，在他的領導下，自由民主黨（LDP）贏得了多次選舉。 然而，不能說他們在經濟方面取得了任何顯著的成就，有些人嘲笑'安倍經濟學'，但在安倍先生的領導下，經濟確實有所增長。如果不是因為（新冠狀病毒）的大流行，經濟方面的增長會更大。 但我們在外交政策方面取得了很多成就，我們與幾乎所有國家的關係都或多或少地穩定下來。 我們沒有在所有事情上取得成功，但我們沒有偷工減料，我們一直在前進。而我們知道，道路是由行走的人創造的。日本政府希望向世界表明，日本有一位值得如此殊榮的英雄。特別是，安倍晉三的死是非常悲慘的。 這就是為什麼日本政府邀請了世界政治的'上層人士'。
（LINK）
The views of the Japanese public on Abe's funeral (latest public opinion report on September 25), which Russia has not considered at all, are as follows.
Among the 8 major mainstream media in Japan, Yomiuri Shimbun (56% opposed); NHK (56.7%); Asahi Shimbun (56%); Jiji Press Ltd. (51.9%); Nikkei Shimbun/TV Tokyo (60%); Kyodo News (60.8%); Mainichi Shimbun (62%); Sankei Shimbun/FNN (62.3%). Even the pro-Abe mainstream media reveal that more than half of most of the Japanese people are opposed to Abe's state funeral.
The views of the Japanese public on Abe's funeral (latest public opinion report on September 25), which Russia has not considered at all, are as follows.
Among the 8 major mainstream media in Japan, Yomiuri Shimbun (56% opposed); NHK (56.7%); Asahi Shimbun (56%); Jiji Press Ltd. (51.9%); Nikkei Shimbun/TV Tokyo (60%); Kyodo News (60.8%); Mainichi Shimbun (62%); Sankei Shimbun/FNN (62.3%). Even the pro-Abe mainstream media reveal that more than half of most of the Japanese people are opposed to Abe's state funeral.
For Russia, the most important thing to avoid is a concentrated barrage from both the ruling party and the opposition forces. The first thing you can do is to look at the situation and see how it works. However, this is the political treadmill set by the Japanese opposition earlier, that is, whether to participate in the suspected unconstitutional Abe's state funeral is a litmus test to distinguish the enemy from them. On this issue, the participating Russians (Mikhail Shvydkoy, Special Representative of the President and Ambassador to Japan Mikhail Galuzin) are on the side of the LDP/Komeito. Mikhail Shvydkoy also made a point of calling Shinzo Abe a 'true patriot'.
It is probably not a coincidence that during Mr. Abe's tenure as prime minister, constitutional reform to revise the terms of the Japanese constitution, which was enacted under the influence of the U.S. government, was put back on the agenda. Mr. Abe was a true patriot who understands that Japan needs a multi-disciplinary policy.
According to Mikhail Shvydkoy, the Russian side supports the LDP's constitutional reform and considers it a truly autonomous and independent policy. In other words, the Russians accept the LDP's political narrative as it is. Even Alexander Nikolayevich Panov, the former Russian ambassador to Japan (1996-2003), said the same thing about the state funeral recently.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Abe had been in power longer than any other prime minister of Japan. As an outstanding and charismatic politician, he set specific goals and worked hard to achieve them. Mr. Abe is quite popular in Japan, and under his leadership the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has won many elections. However, it cannot be said that they have achieved anything significant in terms of the economy, which some deride as 'Abe economics', but the economy has indeed grown under Mr. Abe's leadership. If it were not for the (coronavirus) pandemic, the growth in the economy would have been even greater. But we have achieved a lot in terms of foreign policy, and our relations with almost all countries have stabilized. We haven't succeeded in everything, but we haven't cut corners; we've kept moving forward. And we know that the road is made by the people who walk it. The Japanese government wants to show the world that Japan has a hero who deserves such a great honor. In particular, the death of Shinzo Abe was very tragic. Therefore, the Japanese government invited the 'upper echelon' of world politics.
統一教的議題和國葬的議題是統一的，是因為這問題是政教分離的問題。不過，這兩大問題都尚未上升到政教分離的討論。這就是媒體議題轉移的證據。日本國憲法第20條規定：
第20條：
應保證人人享有宗教自由。
(一) 任何宗教團體不得從國家獲得特權或行使政治權力。
(二) 不得強迫任何人參加宗教行為、慶祝活動、儀式或事件。
(三) 國家及其機關不得從事宗教教育或任何其他宗教活動。
為何只有統一教滲透政壇是問題，而新興宗教創價學會的公明黨執政則是沒問題的呢？ 光是這一點完全揭穿統一教及國葬議題的虛偽。日本國憲法（光是第20條）是被此兩件事徹底架空的。此外，內閣府設置法只是程序法，而本身並無賦予內閣獨斷獨行的任何權利。（LINK）反國葬的最主要的法律疑慮就是這兩點。
因此，凡是國葬出席者都是違反日本國憲法的幫兇。除了野田佳彥外，立憲民主黨，日本共產黨，令和新選組，社民黨拒絕出席是正確的政治判斷。不過，就民生而言，反國葬示威（政治騷亂）喪失的是阻止2022年10月起實施的僱傭保險金負擔率增加0.2%一事。這才是真正衝擊所有日本勞動者階級的真議題。政治化多過民生。這就是錯誤的，迷失的政治。這就是為何國葬議題是議題轉移的證據。
The issue of Unification Church and the issue of state funeral are unified because the issue is separation of religion and state. However, neither of these two major issues has yet been elevated to the discussion of the separation of religion and state. This is evidence of the shift in the media. Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution states:
Article 20.
Freedom of religion shall be guaranteed to all.
(1) No religious group shall receive privileges or exercise political power from the state.
(2) No one shall be compelled to participate in religious acts, celebrations, ceremonies or events.
(3) The State and its organs shall not engage in religious education or any other religious activities.
Why is the infiltration of the Unification Church into the political arena the only problem, while the ruling Komeito of the Soka Gakkai, the religion is not a problem? This point alone completely exposes the hypocrisy behind the Unification Church issue and the issue of state funeral. The Constitution of Japan (Article 20 alone) is completely hollowed out by these two events. Moreover, the Law on the Establishment of the Cabinet Office is only a procedural law and does not in itself give the Cabinet any right to act alone. The main legal concerns against state funeral are these two points above mentioned.
Therefore, anyone who attends a state funeral is an accomplice to the violation of the Japanese Constitution. Except for Yoshihiko Noda, the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Japan, the Reiwa Shinsengumi, and the Social Democratic Party have made the right political judgment by refusing to attend. However, as far as people's livelihood is concerned, what was lost in the anti-state funeral demonstration (political disturbance) was to prevent the 0.2% increase in the contribution rate of employment insurance from October 2022. This is the real issue that really affects all working-class people in Japan. It is more about politicization than livelihood. This is the wrong, lost politics. This is the evidence why the state funeral issue is an issue diversion.
最後，政經分離的問題。對任何外交官而言，確保對本國的投資才是最主要的數據，成績表。日本戰後，自民黨政權對華和對俄積極推動含有政權更替的滲透圖謀的政經分離，即在國內搞反華反俄，但積極發展和同時霸佔對華/對俄貿易。至今，中俄都配合日方，主要由CIA經團聯大企業群推動的政經分離。俄方在日本國內甘受反俄政策的同時，卻可以確保對俄投資。這就是目前被視為日俄關係樞紐，也就是日俄對峙後可望軟著陸的一貫方式。所以，俄方邀請甲級戰犯，中情局代理人之一笹川良一的笹川平和財団作為backchannel之一也是可以理解的。譬如，2022年9月8日受邀的笹川平和財団・海洋政策研究所阪口秀，幡谷咲子，以及畔蒜泰助等人發表了有關北極圈的經濟開發和薩哈林2議題演講。
我們笹川和平基金會一直在從私人智囊團的角度推動與北極有關的活動。 幾年來，我們一直與俄羅斯遠東發展部保持對話，討論在各種北極問題上可以採取哪些共同的方法，以及日本和俄羅斯的每個國家應該如何處理這些問題。 我們訪問的目的是使這一管道更加厚實。 我們的使命是共同解決俄羅斯、日本和整個世界的共同問題，我們願意盡我們所能為此作出貢獻。（LINK）
與政經大致一致的歐洲不同，日本還是秉持政經分離，俄羅斯也無意用經濟槓桿來迫使日本停止反俄，以利對俄投資。薩哈林2就是其最佳例證。日本採取的政經分離（國內搞反俄，同時霸佔對俄貿易）長期化的一方政治責任在於俄羅斯自己。有三個重點：
1. 在2022年2月當時在俄羅斯運作的日本上市大企業168家中，到7月22日為止，只有74家限制，終止交易，或撤退。之後脫俄的經團聯企業的動作停止了，至今總共只有40%有配合反俄制裁，60%的日本上市大企業則都決定維持政經分離，繼續運作。
2. 在2022年8月的日本從俄羅斯進口的貿易額比去年大幅增長了67.4%，達1641億日圓。政經分離下，貿易額不減反增。
3. 就LNG的薩哈林2，在日本公司中，東京電力燃料及電力株式會社和中部電力公司的合資企業JERA、東京燃氣公司、廣島燃氣公司和九州電力公司已經簽署了重簽協議。反俄制裁浪潮之下，還是國內搞反俄，而同時霸佔對俄權益的政經分離。
Lastly, the issue of separation of politics and economy. For any diplomat, ensuring investment from the hosting country is the main score. After the war, the LDP regime in Japan actively promoted separation of politics and economy against China and Russia with the intention of regime-change infiltration, i.e., anti-China and anti-Russia at home, but actively developing and dominating trade with China/Russia at the same time. To date, both Russia and China have cooperated with the Japanese side in separation of politics and economy promoted mainly by the CIA's large corporate lobbying group, KEIDANREN. The Russian side has been able to secure Japanese investment in Russia while suffering from anti-Russian policies in Japan. This is what is currently seen as the pivot of Japan-Russia relations and is the usual way to achieve a soft landing after the confrontation between Japan and Russia. It is therefore understandable that the Russian side has invited the backchannel of one of the CIA's agents, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation which founded by Ryoichi Sasakawa, a Class A war criminal. For example, on September 8, 2022, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation was invited to give a speech on the economic development of the Arctic and Sakhalin 2 by Hide Sakaguchi, Sakiko Hatagaya, and Taisuke Abiri of the Institute for Marine Policy.
We at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation have been promoting activities related to the Arctic from the perspective of a private think tank. For several years, we have maintained a dialogue with the Russian Ministry of Far Eastern Development to discuss what common approaches can be taken on various Arctic issues and how each country, Japan and Russia, should approach them. The purpose of our visits is to thicken this pipeline(channel). Our mission is to work together to solve common problems in Russia, Japan and the world as a whole, and we are ready to contribute to this in any way we can.
Unlike Europe, which is largely politically and economically aligned, Japan still maintains separation of politics and economy, and Russia has no intention of using economic leverage to force Japan to stop being anti-Russian to facilitate Japanese investment in Russia. Sakhalin2 is the best example of this. The political responsibility for Japan's long-term separation of politics and economy (domestic anti-Russian efforts while dominating trade with Russia) lies with Russia itself. There are three main points:
1. Out of 168 large Japanese listed companies operating in Russia at the time in February 2022, only 74 had restricted, terminated or withdrawn from trading as of July 22. Only 40% of the listed companies have cooperated with the anti-Russian sanctions, while 60% of the listed companies have decided to maintain their separation of politics and economy and continue their operations.
2. In August 2022, Japan's imports from Russia increased by 67.4% compared to last year, reaching 164.1 billion yen. Under the separation of politics and economy, the trade volume significantly increased rather than decreased.
3. Among Japanese companies, JERA, a joint venture between Tokyo Electric Power Fuel & Electricity Co. and Chubu Electric Power, Tokyo Gas, Hiroshima Gas and Kyushu Electric Power have signed a re-signing agreement for LNG Sakhalin2. Under the wave of anti-Russian sanctions, it is still engaged in domestic anti-Russian, while at the same time dominating the interests of Russia.
最後一件有趣的現象是，日本主流媒體事前一直發放了反國葬論點來煽動群眾，但一旦國葬結束了紛紛讚賞了國葬。意思是說，國葬議題從頭到尾純然都是日本主流媒體操縱的，即挺國葬和反國葬都並不在公眾利益。
讀賣新聞："菅先生悲痛欲絕，而昭恵夫人聽著他的話，抹著眼淚......當他在最後介紹一首'歌曲'時，葬禮上出現了不尋常的掌聲。"
"我不遺憾，安倍先生是一位真正的領導人......'朋友代表'，前首相菅義偉表示哀悼。"
"莫迪總理被對安倍晉三的回憶所感動，幾乎要哭了......與岸田首相的會面"
"一橋大學教授中北，關於國葬當天的示威：我們需要表達我們的意願，但要安靜一點。"
"菅義偉在國葬上的悼詞，他對山縣有朋的想法......菅義偉渴望安倍先生，安倍先生羨慕菅義偉。"
產經新聞： "美國大使：'安倍的一生值得載入史冊'"
"沒有人像晉三一樣熱衷於和平"
"特朗普在安倍的國葬上慰問"
"澳大利亞總理'受到巨大尊重'，三位前總理加入"
"抗議者也在銀座，外國遊客'不知道為什麼反對'"
"仙台的反國葬示威有300人，路人冷靜"
FNN 快報："前首相安倍的'國葬'，有一萬多人向公眾獻花。"
時事通信： "哽咽的盟友、妻子和其他人流淚：首相呼籲 "最後的感謝，安倍的國葬"。
每日體育報（神戶新聞社）"菅義偉'在串燒店的3小時'悼念演講作為'最大的終身成就'排名第一"。
新聞報刊7（小學館）"前首相菅義偉的悼詞讓現場的媒體為'銀座串燒店'事件唏噓不已"
日經新聞：自民黨秘書長（幹事長）茂木告訴村上誠一郎 "重視文明"
中日體育：針對"多數人反對"的情況，和田現子對前首相安倍晉三的國葬表達了自己的看法，"我認為這是對死者及其家屬的不尊重"。
The last interesting phenomenon is that the Japanese mainstream media had been releasing anti-state funeral arguments to incite the public beforehand, but once the state funeral is over, they all praised the state funeral. This means that the issue of the state funeral was purely manipulated by the Japanese mainstream media from the beginning to the end, i.e., neither pro-state funeral nor anti-state funeral was in the public interest.
Yomiuri Shimbun: "Mr. Suga was overcome with grief, while Mrs. Akie listened to him and wiped her tears ...... The funeral was marked by unusual applause when he introduced a 'song' at the end."
"I don't regret that Mr. Abe was a true leader ......' On behalf of friends', former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga expressed his condolences."
"PM Modi was so moved by memories of Shinzo Abe that he almost cried ...... Meeting with Prime Minister Kishida"
"Hitotsubashi University professor Nakakita, on the demonstration on the day of the state funeral: we need to express our wishes but be quiet."
"Suga Yoshihide's eulogy at the state funeral, his thoughts on Yamagata Aritomo ...... Suga envies Mr. Abe, Mr. Abe envied Suga."
Sankei Shimbun: "U.S. Ambassador: 'Abe's life deserves to be in the history books'"
"No one is as passionate about peace as Shinzo"
"Trump offers condolences at Abe's state funeral"
"Australia's prime minister: Abe's 'tremendously respected' as three former premiers join him"
"Protesters also in Ginza, foreign visitors 'don't know why they oppose it'"
"Anti-state funeral protest in Sendai has 300 people, passersby calm"
FNN Express: "More than 10,000 people lay flowers to the public at former Prime Minister Abe's 'state funeral'"
Jiji Tsūshinsha: "Choking allies, wife and others in tears: Prime Minister calls for 'final thanks, Abe's state funeral'"
Mainichi Sports Daily (Kobe Shimbun) "Suga's '3 hours at a yakitori store' tribute speech ranks first as 'greatest lifetime achievement'."
News Post 7 ((Shogakukan) "Former Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide's eulogy saddened the media on the scene over the 'Ginza Yakitori Shop' incident."
Nikkei Shimbun: LDP Secretary General Motegi tells Seiichiro Murakami to "take civilization seriously"
THE CHUNICHI SPORTS: In response to the "majority opposition," Akiko Wada expressed her opinion on former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's state funeral, "I think it's disrespectful to the deceased and his family.
（LINK）
NOTE：
2022年5月4日俄國對日統治階級的第一輪個人制裁（共63名）名單 / List of the first round of individual sanctions against the Japanese ruling class by Russia (63 individuals in total) May 4, 2022.
岸田文雄 首相
松野博一 官房長官
林芳正 外相
鈴木俊一 財務相
岸信夫 防衛相
古川禎久 法相
二之湯智 国家公安委員長
西銘恒三郎 沖縄北方担当相
秋葉剛男 国家安全保障局長
山東昭子 参院議長
細田博之 衆院議長
高市早苗 自民党政調会長
佐藤正久 自民党外交部会長
松川るい 自民党国防部会長代理
森英介 自民党衆院議員、日本・ウクライナ友好議員連盟会長
志位和夫 共産党委員長
石井苗子 日本維新の会参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会委員
熊野正士 公明党参院議員
森裕子 立憲民主党参院議員
阿部知子 立憲民主党衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会委員長
秋葉賢也 自民党衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会理事
国場幸之助 自民党衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会理事
鈴木隼人 自民党衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会理事
堀井学 自民党衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会理事
石川香織 立憲民主党衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会理事
大島敦 立憲民主党衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会理事
杉本和巳 日本維新の会衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会理事
稲津久 公明党衆院議員、衆院沖縄北方特別委員会理事
青木一彦 自民党参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会委員長
青山繁晴 自民党参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会理事
今井絵理子 自民党参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会理事
北村経夫 自民党参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会理事
勝部賢志 立憲民主党参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会理事
高瀬弘美 公明党参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会理事
大塚耕平 国民民主党参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会理事
清水貴之 日本維新の会参院議員、参院政府開発援助・沖縄北方特別委員会理事
諸星衛 北方領土問題対策協会理事長
佐伯浩 北方領土復帰期成同盟会長
脇紀美夫 千島歯舞諸島居住者連盟理事長
桜田謙悟 経済同友会代表幹事
鬼木誠 防衛副大臣
岩本剛人 防衛政務官
中曽根康隆 防衛政務官
山崎幸二 防衛省統合幕僚長
おのひらひこ （ロシア発表文のまま。小野日子・外務報道官と思われる）
飯塚浩彦 産経新聞社長
近藤哲司 産経新聞社専務取締役
斎藤勉 産経新聞社論説顧問
遠藤良介 産経新聞社外信部次長兼論説委員
山口寿一 読売新聞グループ本社社長
渡辺恒雄 読売新聞グループ本社代表取締役主筆
二宮清純 スポーツジャーナリスト
岡田直敏 日本経済新聞社会長
長谷部剛 日本経済新聞社社長
井口哲也 日本経済新聞社常務取締役編集局長
湯浅次郎 選択出版代表取締役
加藤晃彦 「週刊文春」編集長
袴田茂樹 青山学院大名誉教授
神谷万丈 防衛大教授
桜田淳 東洋学園大教授
鈴木一人 東大院教授
岡部芳彦 神戸学院大教授、ウクライナ研究会会長
中村逸郎 筑波学院大教授
Fumio Kishida, Prime Minister
Hirokazu Matsuno, Chief Cabinet Secretary
Yoshimasa Hayashi, Foreign Minister
Shunichi Suzuki, Minister of Finance
Nobuo Kishi, Defense Minister
Sadahisa Furukawa, Minister of Justice
Satoshi Ninoyu, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission
Kosaburo Nishime, Minister of State for Northern Okinawa
Takeo Akiba, Director General of the National Security Bureau
Akiko Santo, Speaker of the House of Councillors
Hiroyuki Hosoda, Speaker of the House of Representatives
Sanae Takaichi, Chairperson of the LDP Policy Research Council
Masahisa Sato, Chairperson of the LDP Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
Rui Matsukawa, LDP Deputy Chairman of the National Defense Subcommittee
Eisuke Mori, LDP member of the House of Representatives, Chairman of the Japan-Ukraine Parliamentary Friendship League
Kazuo Shii, Chairman of the Communist Party of Japan
Naeko Ishii, Member of the House of Councillors, Japan Restoration Association; Member of the House of Councillors Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Japan
Masashi Kumano, Member of the House of Councillors, Komeito Party
Yuko Mori, Member of the House of Councillors, Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan
Tomoko Abe, Member of the House of Representatives, Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Chairperson of the House of Representatives Okinawa-Northern Special Committee
Kenya Akiba, Member of the House of Representatives, Liberal Democratic Party; Director, Okinawa-Northern Special Committee, House of Representatives
Konosuke Kuniba, Member of the House of Representatives, LDP; Director, Okinawa-Northern Special Committee, House of Representatives
Hayato Suzuki, LDP member of the House of Representatives, Director of the Okinawa-Northern Special Committee, House of Representatives
Manabu Horii, Member of the House of Representatives, LDP; Director, Okinawa-Northern Special Committee, House of Representatives
Kaori Ishikawa, Member of the House of Representatives, Democratic Party of Japan, Director, Okinawa North Special Committee, House of Representatives
Atsushi Oshima, Member of the House of Representatives, Democratic Party of Japan, Director, Okinawa Northern Special Committee, House of Representatives
Kazumi Sugimoto, Member of the House of Representatives, Japan Restoration Association; Director, Okinawa-Northern Special Committee, House of Representatives
Hisashi Inatsu, Member of the House of Representatives, New Komeito Party; Director, Okinawa-Northern Special Committee, House of Representatives
Kazuhiko Aoki, Member of the House of Councillors, LDP; Chairman, Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Region, House of Councillors
Shigeharu Aoyama, LDP member of the House of Councillors, Director of the Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Region of the House of Councillors
Eriko Imai, LDP member of the House of Councillors, Director of the Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Region of the House of Councillors
Tsuneo Kitamura, LDP member of the House of Councillors, Director of the Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Region of the House of Councillors
Katsube Kenji, Member of the House of Councillors, Member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Director of the Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Region of the House of Councillors
Hiromi Takase, Member of the House of Councillors, New Komeito Party, Director of the Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Region of the House of Councillors
Kohei Otsuka, Member of the House of Councillors, Democratic Party of Japan, Director of the Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Region of the House of Councillors
Takayuki Shimizu, Member of the House of Councillors, Japan Restoration Association; Director, Special Committee on Official Development Assistance and Okinawa-Northern Territories, House of Councillors
Mamoru Morohoshi, Chairman of the Northern Territories Issues Association
Hiroshi Saeki, Chairman of the Alliance for the Restoration of the Northern Territories
Kimio Waki, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Federation of Residents of the Kuril Islands
Kengo Sakurada, Representative Director, Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives)
Makoto Oniki, Vice Minister of Defense
Tsuyohito Iwamoto, Parliamentary Defense Secretary
Yasutaka Nakasone, Parliamentary Defense Secretary
Koji Yamazaki, Chief of the Joint Staff, Ministry of Defense
Hirahiko Ono (As in the text of the Russian announcement. Presumed to be Hikariko Ono, Foreign Ministry Spokesman)
Hirohiko Iizuka, President, Sankei Shimbun
Tetsuji Kondo, Senior Managing Director, Sankei Shimbun
Tsutomu Saito, Editorial Advisor, Sankei Shimbun
Ryosuke Endo, Deputy Director and Editorial Writer, Foreign Affairs Department, The Sankei Shimbun
Toshikazu Yamaguchi, President, Yomiuri Shimbun Group
Tsuneo Watanabe, President and Chief Writer, Yomiuri Shimbun Group Inc.
Seijyun Ninomiya, Sports Journalist
Naotoshi Okada, Chairman, Nikkei Inc.
Tsuyoshi Hasebe, President, Nikkei Inc.
Tetsuya Iguchi, Managing Director and Editorial Director, Nikkei Inc.
Jiro Yuasa, Representative Director, Choice Publishing
Akihiko Kato, Editor-in-Chief, Weekly Bunshun
Shigeki Hakamada, Professor Emeritus, Aoyama Gakuin University
Matake Kamiya, Professor, National Defense Academy
Jun Sakurada, Professor, Toyo Gakuen Univ.
Kazuto Suzuki, Professor, The University of Tokyo
Yoshihiko Okabe, Professor, Kobe Gakuin Univ.
Itsuro Nakamura, Professor, Gakuin Univ. of Tsukuba
COMMENT 【評語】
一言以蔽之，即使經歷俄烏衝突，反俄制裁，俄羅斯和日本自民黨/公明黨勢力的關係也是基於經團聯的政經分離下絕不會導致全面日俄關係斷絕的。至少確保對俄投資，這總是俄方軟著陸的方式。俄方如此對日本國內政治採取雙重標準，因此統一教，國際勝共聯合等中情局黨的問題也不算什麼實際問題。甚至，日本本身的國內問題也不在俄羅斯官方的眼裏。其犧牲就是俄方需要甘受政經分離的負面，即日本國內的反俄政策及其造成的政治孤立。目前看來，俄羅斯在日本無意打破此一長年的政治僵局。這正是俄方在日本的政治選擇。日本反對派中，親俄或中立的部分人士自覺上述落差之後，還是該繼續抵制反動勢力繼續剝削俄烏衝突並抵制反俄。另外，就俄方，較能夠期待的是俄羅斯媒體彌補日俄之間各種問題的認識落差，以準備日本政局發生正面變化的條件。
In a nutshell, even after the Russia-Ukraine conflict and anti-Russian sanctions, the relationship between Russia and the LDP/Komeito forces in Japan will never be terminated due to KEIDANREN's separation of politics and economy. At least to ensure Japanese investment in Russia, which is always the Russian side's way of soft landing. The Russian side has adopted such a double standard for Japanese domestic politics that the problems of the Unification Church, International Federation for Victory Over Communism and other CIA parties are no real problem for them. Even Japan's own domestic problems are not in the eyes of Russian officials. The sacrifice is the inevitable need for the Russian side to suffer the negative effects of separation of politics and economy, namely the anti-Russian policy in Japan and the resulting political isolation. At the moment, it seems that Russia has no intention to break this long-standing political deadlock in Japan. This is precisely the political choice of the Russian side in Japan. The pro-Russian or neutral part of the Japanese opposition feels that after the aforementioned gap, it should continue to resist the reactionary forces that continue to exploit the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and resist anti-Russianism. On the Russian side, what we can expect is for the Russian media to make up for the gap in understanding between Japan and Russia on various issues, in order to prepare for positive political changes in Japan.
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