Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
上一篇探討了所謂香港土地房屋問題的本質（4高：高地價，高樓價，高租費，高物價）是港府一直在政策上圍繞和躲避的空置問題。即目前空置/囤積的30多萬永久性居住單位（309,900個空置/囤積居住單位， 2022年 LINK； LINK），而縮不縮短公屋上樓時間只是個因果關係中的「結果」，也是個地產霸權透過官商勾結精心設計和灌輸的偽命題。其他有關土地房屋的種種問題都是圍繞空置問題的衍生物或次要的或局部的，因此始終不應該失去焦點和整體。這裡有些盲點，譬如，「縮不縮短公屋上樓時間」，目前開始等上公屋的等候時間（至少部分申請者的）是最久要等到預計建成360,000個單位的2032年，即10年等樓時間。這意味著李家超政府任期的未來5年內縮短等樓時間根本是在邏輯上先驗地不可能了，除非在5年內不到6年前建成所有預計的單位。建成所有預計單位的時間是最正確劃定的等樓時間，是因為多多少少部分申請者不可避免地是前面建成的單位數量所無法容納的。此外，當然要解決危樓問題，但重建/所謂「市區融合策略」的重點（致命的一點）是法定機構（官商共謀的平台），‘地產商’市建局究竟如何補償被買斷業權的業主，即受影響業主們至少應該爭取到令人滿意的樓換樓及其過渡期的賠償。這是其底線/防線，因此討論絕不應該被轉移到其他次要的表面議題上面去。
The previous article explored the nature of the so-called land and housing problem in Hong Kong (4 highs: high land price, high property price, high rent, high commodity price) is the vacancy / hoarding of more than 300,000 permanent flats (309,900 vacant / hoarded flats in 2022) that the Hong Kong government has been avoiding in its policy, and the reduction or non-reduction of public housing waiting time is only an effect. It is also a false proposition carefully designed and instilled by the real estate oligarchs through collusion between the government and business. All other issues related to land and housing are derivative or secondary or partial to the vacancy / hoarding problem and should not be lost in focus. There are some blind spots here, for example, "to shorten the waiting time for public housing", the current waiting time for public housing (at least for some applicants) is up to 2032 when 360,000 units are expected to be built, i.e., 10 years. This means that shortening the waiting time in the next five years of the Lee administration's tenure is a priori logically impossible, unless all the projected units are completed in less than six years. The time to complete all the projected flats is the most correctly defined waiting time, because the number of applicants is inevitably beyond the capacity of the number of flats completed before. In addition, of course, the problem of dangerous buildings has to be solved, but the key point (the fatal point) of the redevelopment/so-called "urban integration strategy" is how the statutory body (the platform for government-business collusion), the 'property developer' URA, will compensate the owners who have been bought out of their property, i.e., the affected owners should at least get a satisfactory compensation for the exchange of their flats and the transition period. This is the bottom line/defence line, and the discussion should not be diverted to other superficial issues of secondary importance.
最好笑的是所謂KPI（關鍵績效指標 / Key Performance Indicators），與內地官僚正相反，港府官僚基本上是有責不問的。簡言之，到時KPI不達標又怎樣？還是不會有人因此而下台的，實際上沒怎樣。甚至，在施政報告的敘事鋪路之下2027年6月30日或下一屆新政府任期內才能確定達不達標的，到時李家超政府全體已完成任期，不達標也可以走人。誠然，KPI論在制度層面早已不存在任何約束力，是因為在港府，KPI是與任免脫鉤的。這個差別待遇是因為港府官僚也是統戰對象的當地「社會勢力」，這顯然並不等於中央或內地地方政府的公務員。
The funny thing is that the so-called KPIs (Key Performance Indicators), contrary to the mainland bureaucrats, are basically not the responsibility of the Hong Kong government bureaucrats. In short, so what if the KPI does not meet the target? No one will step down because of this, in fact, nothing will happen. Even, under the narrative of the policy address to pave the way for June 30, 2027, or the next term of the new government to determine whether to meet the target, by then the John Lee Ka-chiu government has completed its term, not to meet the target can also be absolved. Admittedly, the KPI theory has long ceased to have any binding effect at the institutional level, because in the Hong Kong government, KPI is unlinked from the appointment and removal. This differential treatment is because Hong Kong government bureaucrats are also the local "social forces" that are the target of the united front strategy, which is obviously not the same as civil servants of the central government or local governments in the mainland.
One of the characteristics of "one country, two systems" is non-liberation. The Communist Party did not liberate Hong Kong and Macau because of the use of "one country, two systems''. By the same token, no one is calling for the "liberation of Taiwan" because the CCP has changed to the "one country, two systems" approach. Regarding the united front, the "Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Tibetan Work Policy" (1953) provides a more accurate concept of the united front than any Hong Kong media. Although Tibet was liberated, the economic situation and the situation of the PLA were very different, the goal and basic approach of the united front were the same.
1. 「爭取達賴及其上層集團的大多數，孤立少數壞份子，達到不流血地在多年內逐步地改革西藏經濟政治的目的。」（《毛澤東選集第五卷》，1977年，62頁）據此，港府官僚及包括地產寡頭，商會在內的整個香港統治階級的大多數是統戰對象，主要集中體現在選委會（據2022年10月31日選民登記數字，1446/ 1500名；LINK）。孤立的則是反對派。但是，實踐證實了這個劃分本身是簡單二分法的，不精確，仍不適於香港的朋黨（官商共謀，兩面人）政治的生態環境，是因為，就整體而言，所謂反對派只不過是角色分配的產物（反派角色）而已。它的政治功能是在所謂選舉改革上面終極完成的，即蜥蜴斷尾（代罪羔羊）。金主們犧牲反對派一翼，而完全保留了另一翼，所謂建制派，反而實現的是更經濟的政壇壟斷。2021年3月選舉改革並沒有排除反對派的金主們，是因為一樣的金主們本來控制兩派，所謂改革拿掉的絕不是金主們自己。
2. 「暫時一切仍舊，拖下去，以待一年或兩年後我軍確能生產自給並獲得群眾擁載的時候，再談這些問題。在這一年至兩年內可能發生兩種情況：一種是我們團結多數孤立少數的上層統戰發生了效力，西藏群眾也逐步靠攏我們，因而使壞份子及藏軍不敢舉行暴亂，我軍在自衛鬥爭中舉行反攻，給以打擊。」（同上，62頁） 光是2019年反修例風波證明了針對香港的上層統戰不但沒有起作用，也是徹底失敗的。主因是過度重視上層集團，而欠缺群眾基礎。2021年12月19日立法會地方選區選舉結果顯示了所有香港選民（4,472,863人）中的4分之3仍支持民主派，而只有4分之1則支持建制派（全選民中僅有1,232,555票支持）。 重點是所謂建制派代表的是統戰對象的上層集團，而不是中共本身。換言之，香港當地的上層集團本身是在政治上缺乏群眾基礎的，因此針對他們的統戰根本不可能會自動化地建立群眾基礎的。 這跟西藏統戰有極大的不同。
1. ‘To win over the majority of Dalai and his upper class and to isolate a few bad elements for the purpose of bloodlessly and gradually reforming Tibet's economy and politics over a period of years.’ (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, 1977, p. 62) Accordingly, the majority of the Hong Kong government bureaucrats and the entire ruling class of Hong Kong, including the property oligarchy and the Chamber of Commerce, are the targets of the united front, mainly concentrated in the EC (1446/1500 according to the October 31, 2022 voter registration figures). Those who are isolated are the opposition. However, practice proves that this division is inherently dichotomous, imprecise, and still inappropriate for Hong Kong's crony (government-business conspiracy, two-faced) political ecology, because, as a whole, the so-called opposition is merely a product of role distribution (the role of the villain). Its political function is ultimately accomplished in the so-called electoral reform, i.e., the lizard cuts its tail (scapegoat). The March 2021 election reform did not exclude the opposition's owners because the same owners originally controlled both warring parties, and the so-called reform did not take away the owners themselves.
2. "For the time being, everything should remain the same, and we should delay until a year or two later when our army is really able to produce and support itself and has the support of the masses, then we can talk about these problems. In this year or two, two scenarios may happen: one is that our united front on the upper-layer of the society, which unites the majority and isolates the minority, will be effective, and the Tibetan masses will gradually draw closer to us, thus deterring the bad elements and the Tibetan army from holding riots, and our army will counterattack and strike in self-defence struggles." (ibid., p. 62) The 2019 anti-extradition law amendment bill movement alone proves that the united front against the upper echelons of Hong Kong not only did not work, but was also a complete failure. The results of the December 19, 2021 Legislative Council Geographical Constituency election show that 3 out of 4 of 4,472,863 voters in Hong Kong still support the democratic camp, while only 1 out of 4 support the pro-establishment camp (1,232,555 votes from all voters). The point is that the so-called pro-establishment camp represents the upper echelon of the united front, not the Chinese Communist Party itself. In other words, the local upper class in Hong Kong lacks a political mass base, so the united front against them would not be able to build a mass base automatically. This is very different from the Tibetan united front.
3. "If they don't want to do it, then fine, let's not do it now and delay it for a while. The longer we delay, the more reasons we will have and the less reasons they will have. It will not do us much harm to delay, but it will be more beneficial. Let them do all kinds of bad things that are cruel and harmful to the people, while we only do good things such as production, trade, road construction, medicine, and unification / united front (uniting the majority and patient education) to win over the masses, and wait for the right time to discuss the implementation of all the agreements. If they think it is not appropriate to open elementary school, they can also close them down.'' (ibid., p. 63) This explains that the "one country, two systems" is the institutionalization of the united front (everything remains the same, delay, unite the upper majority, and educate patiently). The whole concept of "one country, two systems" itself is the evolution and embodiment of the united front. So, why is Hong Kong in such a mess? Why is the united front against Hong Kong ruling class ineffective? The reason is that the local upper echelons of the united front group itself is seriously lacking in popular base.
4. "The recent demonstrations in Lhasa should not be seen as the work of the bad guys like the two Si-Luns, but rather as a gesture from the Dalai majority to us. The petition is very tactful and does not indicate a break, but only asks us to give in. The one that implies the restoration of the former Qing dynasty method without the PLA is not their real intention. They know full well that this cannot be done, but they are trying to exchange this article for other articles. In the petition, they criticized the 14th Dalai so that the Dalai could not be held politically responsible for the demonstration. They are presenting themselves as protecting the interests of the Tibetan nation, knowing that they are weaker than us in terms of military power, but stronger than us in terms of social power. We should accept this petition in fact (not in form) and delay the implementation of the agreement in its entirety. They chose to hold this Russian demonstration at a time when Panchen had not yet arrived, and they did so after careful consideration.'' (ibid., p. 63) The demonstration here can be viewed in the context of the anti-extradition law amendment bill movement. The anti-extradition law amendment bill movement should be seen as a gesture by the majority of the upper class in Hong Kong to the CCP. What they are asking for is clearly a concession, that is, "let the state be the cause and effect, let Hong Kong rule itself, and let the people be righteous and angry". What the anti-amendment controversy is trying to prove is that the upper echelons of Hong Kong are certainly weaker than the CCP in terms of military and police power, but stronger than the CCP in terms of social power. In the end, the post-anti-amendment reforms stopped at the aspect of the electoral system, but not at the level of the bloated statutory bodies that decentralize government functions; the anti-monopoly and the common wealth are few and far between in Hong Kong; the amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance were permanently cut off; and other concessions.
5. "The fact that they are stronger than us in terms of social power will not change at any time, and therefore the Dalai Group's reluctance to implement the agreement in its entirety will not change at any time. We are now formally going on the offensive, rebuking the demonstrations and petitions for being unreasonable (breaking the agreement), but in reality we must be prepared to give in and wait for the conditions to be ripe for a future offensive (i.e., implementing the agreement).'' (ibid., p. 64) Accordingly, the Hong Kong national security law was a notable achievement of the CCP's political offensive, but the soft resistance of the Hong Kong government bureaucrats before its implementation was mainly embodied in the issue of the National Security Office's enforcement in Hong Kong. Even the fact that Article 23 has not yet been legislated and does not have a timetable is a concession by the Chinese Communist Party. It is clear from this that, contrary to the ambiguous notion of the public, even the Hong Kong government and its bureaucracy belong to the so-called "social forces" in terms of the united front.
On Friday, November 4, 2022, dissident Zeng Guang, former chief scientist for epidemiology at the CCDC, told an internal seminar at Citigroup that quarantine-free customs clearance between the mainland and Hong Kong could come as early as the first half of next year.
On Saturday, Nov. 5, 2022, NHC said at a press conference that China will adhere to the general policy of dynamic ZEROCOVID as the epidemic situation becomes more serious and complex.
國家疾病預防控制局明確否定了中國在疫情惡化中放棄清零政策的可能性。換言之，中國不會改採與病毒共存的。不過，路透社及香港媒體聯合發放的未經證實的消息已十分成功地炒股了。11月4日，以恆指HSI 16, 161.14點來收市，大漲5.36%；有關消息被證實為虛假之後的11月7日，也仍然以恆指16, 595.91點來收市，漲了2.69%。就地產股，從10月31日的18623.56點，等到11月4日大漲到20162.12點，11月7日也仍持續漲到20456.43點了（LINK）。誠然，這跟11月1日至3日舉辦的一系列金融峰會活動（公關 LINK）並沒有直接的關聯。
關於與病毒共存，變種病毒毒性逐步弱化導致重症和死亡個案減少了。香港從2022年疫情高峰的3月30日（1,051,725 現有病例/活躍個案 active cases）一度在2022年5月30日降到最低位（10357 active cases LINK）， 不過，之後三度進一步放寬了防疫措施（10月6日，10月20日，11月3日 LINK）。結局，過了今年第二高峰（9月22日紀錄了298,019 active cases）之後，11月7日又開始進入新一波（180,008 active cases）了。10月6日的一日個案增數為3993 （LINK）；10月20日的一日個案增數為5433； 11月3日的一日個案增數為5245。 若是真正的動態清零，記錄到大陸嚴緊防疫措施的5,436例水平，則絕不會放寬防疫措施的。然而，香港政府做的卻是疫情愈惡化，愈放寬，結局越來越遠離與內地全面免檢疫通關的可能性而已。清零是最起碼的國家要求。在疫情高企下，逐步放寬防疫措施乃與病毒共存。至少要誠懇的承認與病毒共存。在2022年9月24日衞生防護中心傳染病處主任張竹君承認了：
National Administration of Disease Control and Prevention has explicitly denied the possibility of China abandoning its zero policy in the event of a worsening outbreak. In other words, China will not switch to co-existing with the virus (WITHCOVID). However, the unconfirmed news released jointly by Reuters and Hong Kong media has been very successful in speculating the stock market: on November 4, the market closed at 16,161.14 points on the Hang Seng Index (HSI), up 5.36%; and on November 7, even after the news was confirmed to be false, the market still closed at 16,595.91 points on the HSI, up 2.69%. For real estate stocks, from 18,623.56 points on October 31, it rose to 20,162.12 points on November 4, and continued to rise to 20,456.43 points on November 7. Admittedly, this is not directly related to the series of financial summit events held from November 1 to 3.
The stock market reflects the internal economy of the 2580 Hong Kong listed companies, not the actual economic situation of the community as a whole. The victims of short term speculation on unconfirmed news will be the investors themselves. The point is that, with the tacit approval of Hong Kong government bureaucrats, it has become the norm for the media to release unconfirmed news for stock speculation that undermines national policy, and investors have lopsidedly accepted the unconfirmed news. Even after the Central Government confirmed that the news was untrue, investors continued to speculate on the stock market based on the untrue news. This financial manipulation does not represent any economic prosperity, but is essentially 'unconfirmed' disinformation, a castle in the air, not supported by any objective material conditions.
Regarding coexistence with the virus, the virulence of the variant has gradually weakened leading to a decrease in severe illnesses and deaths. In Hong Kong, from the peak of the epidemic in 2022 on March 30 (1,051,725 existing cases/active cases) to the lowest level on May 30, 2022 (10,357 active cases), but further relaxation of precautionary measures was introduced three times afterwards (October 6, October 20, November 3). In the end, after the second peak of the year (298,019 active cases on September 22), a new wave (180,008 active cases) started on November 7. The one-day increase on October 6 was 3993; the one-day increase on October 20 was 5433; and the one-day increase on November 3 was 5245;. If it were a true dynamic ZEROCOVID, recording 5,436 cases at the level of the Mainland's strict epidemic prevention measures, the epidemic prevention measures would never have been relaxed. However, what the Hong Kong government is doing is that the more the epidemic worsens, the more it is relaxed, ending up further and further away from the possibility of full quarantine free customs clearance with the mainland. Zero is the minimum national requirement. With the epidemic at a high level, the gradual relaxation of quarantine measures is a way to coexist with the virus. At the very least, a sincere acknowledgement of coexistence with the virus is required. On September 24, 2022, Cheung Chuk-kwan, Director of the Infectious Disease Branch of the Centre for Health Protection (CHP), admitted that:
Hong Kong is an external place, for the time being, there are still thousands of cases per day, and it is considered less likely to "go to zero" unless the world clears all cases, which currently seems likely to coexist with the new coronary disease.
This statement sets in motion a series of follow-up actions to relax vaccination measures. Hong Kong is currently taking a coexistence approach with the virus.
SHANGHAI, Nov 4 (Reuters) - China will make substantial changes to its "dynamic-zero" COVID-19 policy in coming months, a former Chinese disease control official told a conference hosted by Citi on Friday, according to a recording of the session heard by Reuters.
Separately, three sources familiar with the matter said China may soon further shorten quarantine requirements for inbound travellers.
Zeng Guang, former chief epidemiologist at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention who has remained outspoken on China's COVID fight, said the conditions for China opening up were "accumulating", citing new vaccines and progress the country had made in antiviral drug research. […]
This week's optimism defies news of rising infections and widespread COVID-related disruptions in China, including the postponement on Friday of the Guangzhou auto show that had been planned for later this month.
Chinese health authorities will hold a press conference at 3 p.m. (0700 GMT) on Saturday on COVID-19 prevention, according to a notice that said officials from the National Bureau of Disease Control and Prevention would attend. No other details were immediately available.
China Covid Cases Jump to Six-Month High as Outbreaks Flare 【彭博】-- 隨著全國各地爆發疫情，中國單日新增感染病例升至六個多月來最高水平，而衛生官員表示中國將堅持嚴格的防疫措施。
In a nutshell, Hong Kong, which has apparently changed its approach to WITHCOVID since September 24, 2022, is a bad place to speculate on stocks shortsightedly. Not only does it undermine national policy, it is also worrying that investors are still blindly believing unsubstantiated news even after the state has proven it to be untrue.
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