Hong Kong Intelligence Report #155 Trump 2.0 and the 2024 Commercial Space Integration Strategy
Ryota Nakanishi- Apr 28
- 13 min read
Updated: Apr 29
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
🔻 IMPORTANT - 2024 Commercial Space Integration Strategy
▪️ This article provides a concise overview of the 2024 Department of Defense (DoD) Commercial Space Integration Strategy, a pioneering initiative for the department in its approach to China. The strategy is particularly noteworthy in the context of the ongoing CK Hutcheson incident at the Panama Canal, which occurred during the ongoing trade and tariff dispute between the two nations.
(1) President Trump's determinations regarding the acquisition of the Panama Canal, Greenland, and the Suez Canal by the United States are consistent with the strategy outlined by the Department of Defense (DoD). This decision stands in contrast to the allegations made by China and Hong Kong, which are based on arbitrary notions. The strategy is predicated on several fundamental tenets, the examination of which will provide a comprehensive understanding of its underlying principles.
A. It is evident that the concept of weaponizing state-party-controlled commercial entities for political and military objectives is a practice that has been adopted by both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The United States has demonstrated a resolute commitment to the militarization of the private sector, albeit in an inconspicuous manner that does not impede commercial operations.
‘Only by proactively integrating commercial solutions can the Department be positioned to leverage them in crisis or conflict.’ (p.4)
Therefore, the transaction in which CK Hutchinson relinquished the managerial rights of the 43 port and logistics networks to Blackrock, an American multinational investment company operating in Hong Kong and globally, will serve as a strategic asset for the Department of Defense (DoD) in its political and military operations against China. This outcome is consistent with the interests of both China and the United States. Indeed, conflict is an unavoidable occurrence. According to reports, Li Ka-shing, the Hong Kong oligarch and the top-ranked individual on the list, is planning to divest his stake in the port business, which is ultimately owned by two CK Holdings. This decision is reported to be a result of his steadfast commitment to his principles. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the 1C2S does not pose any impediments. Conversely, Article 30 of the Chinese constitution stipulates the complete rights pertaining to the status of the Special Administrative Region (SAR). Article 31 stipulates that the state may establish special administrative regions when deemed necessary. The systems instituted in special administrative regions shall, in light of specific circumstances, be prescribed by laws enacted by the National People's Congress. Consequently, the SAR possesses no inherent rights; all rights are derived from the authorization granted by the NPC. The state's primary challenges are often rooted in the actions of powerful, entrenched interests within Hong Kong, as evidenced by the Panama Port scandal. Indeed, Li Ka-shing's involvement in the drafting of the Basic Law is noteworthy. The "big four" or "big five" families have been identified as the root causes of the social problems and conflicts that plague this city. In the absence of the influence of Hong Kong's vested interests, 1C2S would not function as an oppressive structure for the proletariat. It is evident that CCP has disregarded this point, whereas 1C2S is transparent as stipulated by the constitution.
B. The term "space" is not limited to its conventional meaning; it also encompasses the atmosphere above Earth. A considerable number of individuals have erroneous perceptions regarding the document, perceiving it exclusively in terms of its relevance to the space industry. Accordingly, the Panama Canal, Greenland, and the Suez Canal are all included in this category.
‘This strategy identifies four top-level priorities that the Department will pursue to maximize the benefits of integrating commercial space solutions. First, we will ensure access to commercial space solutions across the spectrum of conflict. Second, we will achieve integration prior to crisis. Third, we will establish security conditions that promote integration. Fourth, we will support the development of new commercial space solutions.’ (p.6)
This development marks a progression towards a total war structure, a militarist system that integrates the private sector in a contracted cooperative relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD). This kind of establishment is fatally absent in Hong Kong and the SARs in general, while the "business talks for business" mindset of the compradors, land tycoons, and speculators of all kinds. Therefore, it can be posited that Hong Kong functions as a financial hub (bank), Macau operates as a gambling establishment(casino), and mainland China is the sovereign state of China. For the ruling class of Hong Kong, the separation of national security and the valorization of capital are non-negotiable principles. In contrast, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) has adopted a more nuanced stance on this subject. It is evident that Hong Kong is lagging behind the United States in this regard. The prevailing sentiment is one of disquiet regarding the state of national defense. The SARs are incapable of engaging in armed conflict with the US.
The salient issue is that the HKNSL and SNSO exhibit an utter absence of the capacity to weaponize commercial entities in the interest of national security and the deterrence of threats. Two of these entities are distinct from the PLA and its defense infrastructure. Consequently, Hong Kong is susceptible to involvement in armed conflict with foreign nations. The municipal NSLs have been developed exclusively for the purpose of containing insurrection within the city limits.
C. The previously obtained access to commercial entities will subsequently facilitate the establishment of cross-agency, cross-ally, and cross-partner commercial solutions as part of the initiative initiated by the Department of Defense (DoD).
‘To seamlessly utilize integrated commercial space solutions during crisis and conflict, the Department will integrate solutions during peacetime. This integration of commercial space solutions will extend to planning and training activities and support day-to-day operations. The Department will continue to work with the Intelligence Community, allies, and partners to integrate commercial solutions into shared architectures.’ (p.8)
Therefore, upon the completion of Li Ka-shing's divestiture of the management of the 43 ports to the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) will be in a position to initiate the implementation of the shared architecture, as outlined in the document, with the involvement of both state and non-state actors from its network of allies and partners. The consequences of this will extend beyond the financial implications of navigating the US-controlled canal, which will be substantial for China. The Hong Kong "professional" scholars and "professional" journalists have yet to fully comprehend the ramifications of their actions. This phenomenon, however, should not be interpreted as detrimental to Americans. This rationale further substantiates the hypothesis that Li Ka-shing should divest the 43 ports to Blackrock. As previously mentioned, the suspension of 1C2S is not necessary to prevent this issue. However, it should be noted that China does have a suspension mechanism in place. The HKSARG's approach to this matter entails the utilization of international public opinion warfare, a strategy initially implemented by Yuan Shikai in 1915 during his confrontation with Japan. This strategy places significant reliance on Western partners operating within Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the paradoxical nature of this political weaponry is its efficacy specifically against mainland China, as opposed to the United States. This British enclave in China is also falling behind in this area. The channel's primary function is to disseminate information, and its design is intended to serve Western interests, rather than engage in a direct confrontation.
D. DoD has identified 13 “mission areas for national security space” where commercial products, data and services could be utilized to a greater extent than currently. Those mission areas are identified as: “Combat Power Projection; Command and Control (C2); Cyberspace Operations; Electromagnetic Warfare (EW); Environmental Monitoring (EM); Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); Missile Warning (MW); Nuclear Detonation Detection (NUDET); Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT); Space Access, Mobility, and Logistics (SAML); Satellite Communications (SATCOM); Space Domain Awareness (SDA); and Spacecraft Operations.” That said, the strategy explains that the depth of reliance on commercial solutions will vary from mission to mission.
Thus, strategy lays out three general “categories” for organizing use of commercial capabilities by mission area:
Government Primary Mission Areas, where “a preponderance of functions must be performed by the government, while a select few could be performed by the commercial sector.” These missions currently include: “combat power projection; C2 (to include NC3); EW; NUDET; MW; and PNT.”
Hybrid Mission Areas, currently including: “cyberspace operations; SATCOM; spacecraft operations; ISR; SDA; and EM.”
Commercial Primary Mission Areas, where “the preponderance of functions within these mission areas could be performed by the commercial sector, while a limited number of functions must be performed by the government.” At the moment, the only mission area included in this category is SAML, with the document noting that “emerging commercially developed mission areas, such as in-space servicing, assembly, and manufacturing (ISAM), may provide additional opportunities in the future to support the warfighter.” (p.10)
It should be noted that NC3 is designated for nuclear command, control, and communications.
E. The Hong Kong oligarchy is a term used to describe a select group of individuals who wield significant influence and control over the city-state's political, economic, and social spheres. This paper will examine the life and accomplishments of Li Ka-shing. The present study seeks to examine the conflict between CCP and Hong Kong capitalists. It is imperative to identify the primary actors representing these vested interests. The following responses are concise in nature.
(1) The initial inquiry concerns the definition of the Hong Kong oligarchy. According to Allan Zeman, a prominent businessman and economic adviser to Hong Kong's Beijing-backed leader, Carrie Lam, Chinese officials have come to believe that the city's concentration of wealth is a significant source of discontent. According to Zeman, a system of land auctions that predates British rule enabled a select group to dominate the market, driving prices to a point where competitors were unable to compete. This dynamic contributes to housing costs that are so high that familiesare compelled to reside in compact dwellings, thereby impeding their potential for upward mobility.
(2) An investigation into the identity of Li Ka-shing is warranted. Li's life has been shaped by the historical events that have transpired in Hong Kong and the imminent political developments in mainland China. He was born in 1928 in the river city of Chaozhou, a locale distinguished by its rich tradition of Chinese opera and embroidery. During his childhood, the southern Chinese city was subjected to a series of Japanese bombing runs. He withdrew from formal education at the age of 12, and his family relocated southward along the coast to Hong Kong, which was then a British colony. In 1941, Hong Kong was conquered by Japan. During this period, the occupation was characterized by food shortages, malnutrition, and disease. The father of Li passed away from tuberculosis shortly after their arrival. According to the company biography, the following transpired subsequently: Prior to reaching the age of 15, Li was compelled to assume the onus of providing for his family, securing employment in a plastics trading company where he was subjected to a demanding work schedule of 16 hours per day. During a 1998 interview with the public broadcaster Radio Television Hong Kong, Li articulated a complex set of sentiments regarding his initial return to the mainland in 1978 after a prolonged absence. He had accumulated a substantial fortune in Hong Kong, transitioning from the manufacturing sector to real estate and subsequently to the financial industry. In the subsequent year, he acquired a position of leadership as the inaugural Hong Kong Chinese investor to assume control of one of the British "hongs," the prominent trading houses that accompanied colonial rule from the 19th century.
(3) The present study seeks to examine the conflict between CCP and Hong Kong capitalists. At the time, Li's influence in China was considerable. In September of 1997, approximately two months following the transfer of Hong Kong to China, the nation was on the verge of its most significant stock offering to date. A state-owned telecommunications company was preparing to list on the Hong Kong and New York exchanges. At the eleventh hour, a group of Hong Kong tycoons who were in favor of the listing of China Telecom became alarmed by a financial crisis that was engulfing the region. The parties involved have indicated a desire to renegotiate the agreement, which stipulates that they must maintain their holdings for a period of one year, or opt to withdraw entirely. This occurred in the final weeks preceding the listing's market debut. Li invited a group of Chinese bureaucrats and bankers to his Hong Kong office. According to a banking professional present during the meeting, the subject indicated that he had signed a contract and would adhere to its terms. Subsequently, the Chinese banker stated that the billionaire proceeded to take additional action. He proposed the acquisition of a more substantial ownership interest, contingent upon the necessity of such a transaction. Li's efforts contributed to the successful resolution of the deal, which subsequently established a precedent for a significant influx of state-owned Chinese companies securing billions of dollars through public listings. This event solidified Li's status as Hong Kong's preeminent businessman, a reputation further bolstered by his distinctive large black-framed glasses. The spokesperson for the billionaire has stated that Li is not one to readily violate agreements. However, within China, Li encountered challenges related to the opaque nature of conducting business, as evidenced by his own public remarks and those of individuals who have collaborated with him. In the interview with the public broadcaster, Li expounded on his frustrations with the construction of Oriental Plaza. A substantial development project in the central district of Beijing encountered political deliberation and considerable public contention regarding its dimensions during the 1990s. According to the aforementioned source, the Chinese partners were granted a 40% share of the project, representing a substantial increase from their initial 10% or so. Li indicated that he had gained a new understanding from the experience. "In a political and cultural center such as Beijing, it is necessary to prioritize other considerations over business and economics," he stated. "Despite encountering numerous challenges, I have gained a more profound comprehension of China." Following Xi's ascension to power, the Beijing government adopted a more stringent approach toward Hong Kong. In a 2014 white paper, Beijing asserted that the autonomy the city currently enjoys is not an inherent right, but rather is subject to the approval of the central leadership. Consequently, Li encountered criticism from Chinese state media outlets. The following figure illustrates the acquisitions abroad by Li's empire since 2015. During that period, investments in mainland China and Hong Kong amounted to less than $1 billion. During the latter part of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, Li proceded with the incorporation of two corporations in the Cayman Islands (The geographical entity referred to as the "Cayman Islands" constitutes a British Overseas Territory, comprising three islands in the Western Caribbean Sea), thereby amalgamating his Hong Kong-registered Hutchison Whampoa and another company. Li's team asserts that the modifications were a component of a "streamlining and succession plan." In September 2015, following reports of these actions, Li was heavily criticized by mainland media outlets for what they perceived as a lack of patriotism. The People's Daily, the primary vehicle through which the Communist Party disseminates its message, published a commentary on social media that stated Li's satisfaction with the current state of affairs, characterized by the enjoyment of material benefits, yet cautioned against his reliability during challenging periods. Private bankers have expressed concerns that the extradition bill has resulted in a new challenge. As the head of a private banking operation in the city noted, the majority of Hong Kong's prominent families have been engaging in the international diversification of their personal wealth for an extended period. The executive in question is employed by one of the five largest private banks in the Asia-Pacific region, which administers assets in excess of $200 billion. In early September of 2019, China's State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) convened a meeting of executives from the nation's largest state-owned enterprises in the nearby mainland city of Shenzhen. According to an executive with firsthand knowledge of the meeting, SASAC officials issued explicit directives to Chinese managers, instructing them to assert greater control over Hong Kong firms and to pursue decision-making authority within these entities. SASAC declined to provide responses to inquiries posed by Reuters. One financial advisor disclosed to Reuters his involvement in a transaction in which a Hong Kong tycoon transferred assets amounting to over $100 million between June and August 2019 from a local Citibank account to one in Singapore.
U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly said he wants to take back the Panama Canal and has hailed the deal as a "reclaiming" of the waterway. Chinese state media, however, have criticised the planned sale as a betrayal of China's interests.
Trump said on Saturday that American military and commercial ships should be allowed to travel through the Panama Canal and Suez Canal free of charge.
Tycoon Li Ka-shing's CK Hutchison announced last month it would sell its 80% holding in the ports business which encompasses 43 ports in 23 countries. The business has an enterprise value, which includes debt, of $22.8 billion.
Singapore's PSA International, which owns the other 20%, is also exploring a sale of its holding, sources have said.
Overall the Hong Kong conglomerate has interests in 53 ports. Ports in Hong Kong and mainland China were not included in the deal.
(4) It is noteworthy that the Hong Kong tycoons did not appear to be concerned about the protests that occurred during 2019. Concurrently, they embarked on a rapid diversification of their wealth abroad. However, concerns regarding potential responses from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were expressed. This finding corroborates the hypothesis that the protests they endorsed from behind were not problematic, as their primary concern pertains to the actions of the CCP.
(5) It is imperative to ascertain the primary actors representing the vested interests of Hong Kong. The individuals in question have been identified as key figures within the Hong Kong oligarchy. The members of Lee Shau-kee's funeral committee, also known as the ‘Bereavement’ Committee, are believed to belong to this specific social stratum, although it should be noted that this list does not encompass all individuals from this group. In addition to the aforementioned individuals, the French and British consulate generals have also established close ties with the Henderson Land Group. Despite the fact that HKG Pao and its associated media outlets have been disparaging Western imperialism (i.e., the United States, France, Britain, and NATO) on the surface, the consulate generals continue to maintain close ties with them. This incongruity is a matter of particular interest. This observation lends further credence to the assertion that the political theater in Hong Kong is, in essence, a literal theater. It is imperative to bear in mind the appellations of those individuals who have become prominent in the context of political events in Hong Kong. In any event, it should, in essence, serve as an exemplar of the Hong Kong ruling class and Western collaborators operating in a manner devoid of political theatrics.
榮譽主任: | 董建華 | 梁振英 |
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主 任: | 李家超 | 鄭雁雄 |
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副 主 任: | 陳國基 | 陳茂波 | 林定國 | 尹宗華 | 梁君彥 | 葉劉淑儀 | |
委 員: | 王冬勝 | 方文雄 | 石禮謙 | 朱葉玉如 | 伍淑清 | 李王佩玲 | |
李國寶 | 李業廣 | 李慧琼 | 吳光正 | 吳良好 | 何廷錫 | ||
何厚鏘 | 何順文 | 呂耀東 | 邱達昌 | 邱達強 | 林建岳 | ||
冼雅恩 | 林健鋒 | 范徐麗泰 | 胡經昌 | 胡寶星 | 施榮懷 | ||
徐立之 | 高秉強 | 唐英年 | 孫 煜 | 郭孔丞 | 郭炳江 | ||
陳克勤 | 陳健波 | 陳國鉅 | 梅彥昌 | 莊紹綏 | 許正宇 | ||
許君恕 | 梁志堅 | 梁祥彪 | 梁愛詩 | 張 翔 | 馮永祥 | ||
馮鈺斌 | 楊秉樑 | 蔡冠深 | 鄭家安 | 鄭家純 | 鄭慕智 | ||
滕錦光 | 劉國勳 | 劉業強 | 潘宗光 | 鄧日燊 | 盧文端 | ||
盧偉國 | 盧彩雲 | 盧煜明 | 霍震霆 | 霍震寰 | 龍漢標 | ||
鄺志強 | 鍾瑞明 | 蘇澤光 | 龔俊龍 |
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