Hong Kong Intelligence Report #157 A Sudden Proposal to strengthen the Local National Security Law
- Ryota Nakanishi
- May 13
- 7 min read
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
🔻 IMPORTANT - Local National Security Law
▪️ This brief analysis pertains to the sudden announcement of the planned amendment for the Subsidiary Law of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance on May 12, 2025. A review of the original document (CB(2)881/2025(01)) reveals several issues that merit attention.
(1) The initiative has been initiated by the PRCCG, not the HKSARG. The purpose of this initiative is to improve the efficacy and security of the Office for Safeguarding National Security in terms of governmental jurisdiction. The focal point of the amendment under scrutiny is the assertion that the preceding Article 111 of the SNSO has been undermining the PRCCG's comprehensive governance. This assertion is predicated on the premise that the Office for Safeguarding National Security's assistance from the HKSARG is subject to the discretion of the Chief Executive of the HKSARG.
111.
Administrative instructions in connection with safeguarding national security
(1)
The Chief Executive may issue an administrative instruction to any department or agency of the Government or any public servant to give directions in relation to any of the following matters—
(a)
the implementation of any instruction given by the Central People’s Government in relation to safeguarding national security;
(b)
the work on safeguarding national security;
(c)
the provision of rights, exemptions, facilitation and support that are necessary for the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in performing its mandate under Chapter V of the HK National Security Law in accordance with the law;
(d)
any other matter that the Chief Executive considers conducive to safeguarding national security.
(2)
Any department or agency of the Government or any public servant must comply with an administrative instruction mentioned in subsection (1).
Therefore, the proposed amendment articulates the aforementioned matter as follows:
15. In order to implement the relevant provisions of the aforementioned Hong Kong National Security Law in a more effective manner, to elucidate the pertinent responsibilities of the HKSAR Government and its personnel, the HKSAR Government proposes to stipulate in subsidiary legislation that, in order for the Office to efficaciously perform its duties in handling cases under the circumstances specified in Article 55 of the Hong Kong National Security Law, any department, agency, or public official of the HKSAR Government shall, upon the request of the Office, provide all necessary and reasonable assistance, facilitation, cooperation, support, and protection in accordance with the law and in a timely manner. (p.7)
The article clearly demonstrates that the proposal is the central government's initiative to substitute the "may(可)" with "shall(須)" in the context of national security emergencies. This substitution signifies the removal of the Chief Executive's discretion, as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government's support for the central government is no longer a prerequisite for this course of action. Subsequent to the aforementioned amendment, it is incumbent upon any department, agency, or public official of the HKSAR Government—including the Chief Executive of the HKSARG—to provide assistance to the central government. Therefore, this is the pivotal thesis that delineates and impacts any other articles concerning the jurisdiction and obligation. However, there remains a degree of discretion for the Chief Executive of the HKSARG at the surface level.
Furthermore, the occurrence was temporally coincident with the ease of the trade war with the U.S. On the same day, the Joint Statement on U.S.-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Geneva was also announced. Moreover, the promulgation of the amendment to the local national security law is intended as a message to CK Hutcheson. The "retired" Li Ka-shing is the preeminent capitalist and the most prominent oligarch in Hong Kong. This message is related to the treacherous port deal. The Panama Port Deal Scandal is a paradigmatic example of the political nature of Hong Kong capitalists. The scandal revealed the unreliability, opportunism, and deception of these capitalists towards China, despite the implementation of PR stunts such as the "Love the Country, Love Hong Kong" campaign and ‘pro-establishment’ rhetoric, the public's perception of these capitalists remained unfavorable. The political climate of Hong Kong is characterized by a pervasive sense of deception.
The company has issued a statement asserting that the transaction will not be executed under any circumstances that would be deemed illegal or non-compliant. CK Hutchison has stated that the decision to release the aforementioned statement on Monday was precipitated by sustained inquiries from shareholders and media outlets. Initially, the company had intended to address the transaction during its annual shareholder meeting, scheduled for May 22.
Amidst mounting pressure from the United States, specifically from President Donald Trump, to mitigate China's regional influence, Hong Kong's CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd (0001.HK) has consented to divest its holdings in a pivotal Panama Canal port operator to a consortium that is backed by BlackRock Inc. It is believed that the CK still wants to sell out the operative rights of 43 ports to the U.S. It is only a matter of time. The announcement of May 12 is a response to Xia Baolong’s remarks in Macau on the same day.
The highest-ranking official in Beijing responsible for overseeing Macao and Hong Kong affairs met with representatives from the city's business sector who occupy senior positions. During this meeting, the official made an appeal to these representatives, urging them to align with the mainland in the face of the ongoing trade war between China and the United States. The aforementioned remarks were relayed by Tai Kin Ip, the Secretary for Economy and Finance, and subsequently reported in the Macau Post Daily.
There are some points in the White House statement:
The United States will (i) modify the application of the additional ad valorem rate of duty on articles of China (including articles of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region) set forth in Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025, by suspending 24 percentage points of that rate for an initial period of 90 days, while retaining the remaining ad valorem rate of 10 percent on those articles pursuant to the terms of said Order; and (ii) removing the modified additional ad valorem rates of duty on those articles imposed by Executive Order 14259 of April 8, 2025 and Executive Order 14266 of April 9, 2025.
China will (i) modify accordingly the application of the additional ad valorem rate of duty on articles of the United States set forth in Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 4 of 2025, by suspending 24 percentage points of that rate for an initial period of 90 days, while retaining the remaining additional ad valorem rate of 10 percent on those articles, and removing the modified additional ad valorem rates of duty on those articles imposed by Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 5 of 2025 and Announcement of the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council No. 6 of 2025; and (ii) adopt all necessary administrative measures to suspend or remove the non-tariff countermeasures taken against the United States since April 2, 2025.
A. In April, Hong Kong media outlets erroneously reported that Macau was not included in the Trump 2.0 tariff. However, subsequent analysis revealed that Macau was, in fact, a target of the tariff. The inaccuracy and incompleteness of the "professional" Hong Kong media have not been previously noted.
B. It is noteworthy that China has been the sole nation to retaliate effectively against the U.S. The current status is anticipated to revert to the pre-April phase. This temporal de-escalation strategy is advantageous for both parties involved. Furthermore, there is no indication of a clandestine agreement. Following April 2, 2025, the politically motivated tariff and non-tariff measures were uniformly relaxed, despite the prevailing suspicion among the ruling circles of speculative insider activities in the stock market.
(3)The proposed amendment, which is based on Article 26 of the proposal document, is subject to the restrictions and influences of Article 15, provided that the core amendment is successfully preserved.
26. It is imperative that the premises utilized by the the Office for Safeguarding National Security to fulfill its responsibilities be subject to the requisite legal protections.
In order to impede unauthorized access or entry into such premises, thereby mitigating national security risks, particularly those related to espionage activities. In this regard, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government proposes that the Chief Executive issue an order in the Government Gazette designating the premises where the Office performs its duties as restricted areas. The proposed restricted areas exclude private residences and are expected to cause minimal disruption to surrounding communities. (p.11)
The most vulnerable aspect of the amendment pertains to its potential for espionage, as it still contains provisions that could be interpreted as allowing such activities. It is recommended that the Office for Safeguarding National Security consider integrating its operations into the crime scene, rather than confining them to the workplace. In summary, the concept of a restricted area must encompass both the office and the crime scene.
Nevertheless, Article 26 of the proposal is not only vague but also permits substantial scope for espionage. It is important to note that the remaining sections of the proposal are of a secondary nature and, as such, are of lesser significance when compared with Articles 15 and 26.
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