Hong Kong Intelligence Report #170 香港市民從紐西蘭，日本，琴澳正確理解產業改革或雙城一體化的實際意義和障礙

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】產業改革或雙城一體化的實際意義和障礙

■ 我的結論：

產業改革或雙城一體化的實際意義和障礙。在香港，往往忽視產業畸形、產業單一化（包括殖民時期的單一文化）的問題，認為只要目前的模式能達到GDP增長，真正的產業改革就不重要，最終以既得利益為一切。同時，公共民生福祉的保護網升級和普及化，通過公營企業吸收失業人口的重要性，則被視為阻礙所謂的資本運動。要真正瞭解產業改革，需要參考其他同樣面臨產業畸形問題的國家或地區，才能深刻理解其含義。在香港，一切文宣都是空洞無物的口號和姿態，一旦撕開所謂建制的表皮，就能看出其本土主義的本色。中國的產業革新運動不是中國獨有的，而是全球潮流。香港在所謂的產業改革歷史浪潮中，其驚人的特色是：一方面僵持或擴大金融化、地產化的炒樓炒股、吸乾社會財富的非生產性經濟模式，另一方面還要達到富有新質生產力的高附加價值工業群。這如同「一國兩制」，一般國家是一國一制，但香港硬要堅持在馬列主義國家內維持兩個制度、兩個主要政府（互不干涉的雙重政府）並存。就產業改革而言，其他國家和地區都在向既得利益爭取研發資源，而香港卻在總體的社會生產價值的零和遊戲下，似乎不存在資源分配問題，兩邊都充足？這不可能。只要一邊爭奪，多拿了，另一邊則以同等反比率被剝奪，少拿了。第一篇的日本和新西蘭的例子是在美日台陣營的論述，但在理解香港產業改革的意義上，可以提供概念和實感。問題是，論者扭曲了一點，即金融和所謂的「科技」（金融科技）也與地產沒有兩樣，不屬於新質生產力的範疇，而是屬於既得利益。我們討論的不是金融、地產、金融科技的既得利益三位一體（過去的金融化）。第二篇是港澳辦的引述，港媒普遍忽視和避開提及琴澳一體化進展。我讀取時就感動了，那就是香港改革要達成的方向，民心所向，即最大化國家保證的民生福祉及其平民的安全網，打破政務和行政地理邊界，一體化發展。如果民生福祉得不到保障，雙城、大灣區、國家一體化發展就無法實現，平民、勞動者階級就無法支撐國家，也就無法產生愛國心。深港一體化發展才是真正的香港改革。但上述產業改革上的兩條腿走路就是雙殺的，資源有限，還是需要取捨的。是既得利益，還是新興工業化？資源應該大力流向後方。第三篇揭示了香港媒體同時也是經營金融業和地產業的既得利益集團。第四篇在伊朗戰爭中，中東資本大量流向香港只是未經覈實的狀況，也屬於港府公關。第五篇是關於今年國民黨的概況。雖然控制立法院多數席位，但是其黨員流失得很嚴重。第六篇是有關巴拿馬與「地產霸權」李嘉誠之間的爭議後續。港媒沒有全面報道，所以誤以為李嘉誠改告丹麥公司，而反對派也散播了李嘉誠收取美方或巴拿馬方的秘密補償雲雲的傳言。但正確的是，李嘉誠告的是巴拿馬政府和丹麥公司兩者，因此收取秘密補償之說是胡說八道。

補充：一昧智能化將會大量造成失業者，就該考慮「無條件基本收入」、「全民基本收入」或「基本收入」制度來達至共同富裕國策。

In Hong Kong, issues such as industrial distortion and economic monoculture (including the cultural homogeneity of the colonial era) are frequently disregarded. The predominant perspective is that as long as the prevailing model is capable of delivering GDP growth, genuine industrial reform is considered of secondary importance, with vested interests ultimately superseding all other considerations. Concurrently, the expansion and universalisation of the social safety net for public welfare, in conjunction with the significance of public enterprises in the absorption of the unemployed, are regarded as impediments to so-called capital mobility. In order to comprehend the full significance of industrial reform, it is necessary to consider the experiences of other countries or regions facing similar issues of industrial distortion. In Hong Kong, propaganda is characterised by empty slogans and posturing. Once the superficial veneer of the so-called establishment is peeled away, its true nature of localism becomes evident. The industrial innovation movement in China is not unique to the country; rather, it is part of a global trend. Hong Kong's distinctive feature within this historical wave of industrial reform can be summarised as follows: firstly, the city adheres to or expands a non-productive economic model, characterised by financialisation and real estate speculation, resulting in the depletion of society's wealth through property and stock market speculation. Simultaneously, Hong Kong aims to achieve high-value-added industrial clusters with new productive forces. This approach is analogous to the "One Country, Two Systems" principle, whereby most nations adhere to a "One Country, One System" framework. However, Hong Kong's unique political landscape is characterised by the maintenance of two distinct systems and two parallel governments within a Marxist-Leninist state. With regard to industrial reform, other countries and regions are engaged in a competitive struggle with vested interests for R&D resources. However, in Hong Kong, the issue of resource allocation appears to be negligible, as if both sides are adequately supplied, within the context of the zero-sum game of overall social productive value. This is an impossibility. In the context of competition, one side's success is often accompanied by the other's deficit, resulting in a reciprocal distribution of resources and opportunities. The examples of Japan and New Zealand in the first article were presented within the context of the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan camp; however, they can provide conceptual frameworks and practical insights for understanding the significance of Hong Kong's industrial reform. The issue lies in the distortion of a fundamental point by commentators: finance and so-called "technology" (fintech) are indistinguishable from real estate in terms of their relationship to new productive forces. Rather, they are firmly entrenched within the domain of vested interests. The present discussion does not concern itself with the tripartite interests of finance, real estate and fintech (the financialisation of the past). The second article quotes the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, noting that Hong Kong media outlets have historically overlooked and avoided reporting on the progress of the Zhuhai-Macau integration. The sentiment expressed therein resonated profoundly with my own, as it epitomised the trajectory that Hong Kong's reform process ought to follow: namely, the maximisation of the populace's well-being, as guaranteed by the state, and the establishment of a comprehensive social safety net. The document calls for the dismantling of political and administrative geographical boundaries, and the pursuit of integrated development. The safeguarding of the populace's well-being is imperative for the realisation of the integrated development of the two cities, the Greater Bay Area, and the nation as a whole. The inability of the working class and the general populace to support the nation will result in the absence of patriotism. The true essence of Hong Kong's reform can be found in the integrated development of Shenzhen and Hong Kong. However, the "two-pronged approach" to industrial reform previously mentioned is not without its limitations; with limited resources, trade-offs are inevitable. The question arises of whether the focus should be on the interests of those who are already established in their respective fields or on the processes of industrialisation that are in their nascent stages. It is imperative that a significant proportion of resources be allocated to the hinterland. The third article reveals that Hong Kong's media is also a vested-interest group operating within the financial and real estate sectors. The fourth article addresses the situation regarding the massive influx of Middle Eastern capital into Hong Kong during the Iran War—a claim that remains unverified and is part of the Hong Kong government's public relations strategy. The fifth article provides an analysis of the current state of the Kuomintang (KMT). Despite its commanding majority in the Legislative Yuan, the party is grappling with significant attrition in its membership base. The sixth article provides a continuation of the ongoing controversy between Panama and the renowned Hong Kong-based property developer Li Ka-shing. The Hong Kong media failed to provide comprehensive coverage, leading to the mistaken belief that Li Ka-shing had switched his lawsuit to target the Danish company. In addition, rumours were spread by the opposition that Li Ka-shing had received secret compensation from the U.S. or the Panamanian side. However, it is evident that Li Ka-shing initiated legal proceedings against both the Panamanian government and the Danish company, thereby invalidating the assertion of any clandestine compensation.

It is important to note that an unchecked pursuit of automation will inevitably result in widespread unemployment. Therefore, it would be prudent to consider the implementation of a system of "unconditional basic income," "universal basic income," or "basic income" in order to achieve the national policy of common prosperity.

第一篇  引述：若過度依賴中國，年輕人將逃往鄰國……「南半球移民大國」與日本共通的「讓年輕人絕望的國家」問題

對年輕人而言，什麼樣的國家才具吸引力？評論家白川司表示：「在缺乏經濟成長前景的國家，年輕人無法規劃長期的未來藍圖。對日本而言，紐西蘭正是值得引以為戒的反面教材。」

■南半球島國正發生的異常事態　紐西蘭雖是小國，卻是美國主導的機密情報共享機制「五眼聯盟」的一員，人均GDP更超越日本，是「成功的先進國家」之一。　然而此刻，在這清廉形象的背後，紐西蘭正面臨關乎國家未來的嚴峻事態。那就是年輕人的大量外流。預計2025年的出境人數將達約12萬人，相當於總人口約530萬人的2.3%。其中約四成是18至30歲的年輕人，目的地多為鄰國澳洲。雖然紐西蘭因大量接收移民而使此現象不甚顯著，但年輕人的外流已達到嚴峻的程度。為何在表面上宛如富裕宜居典範的新西蘭，那些肩負未來的年輕人卻紛紛前往鄰國澳洲？　若深入分析其背後結構，便能清晰看見當今日本所面臨的「產業政策」危機，以及我們絕不可陷入的陷阱所在。

■「世界上最成功的農業國家」　紐西蘭的人口規模與兵庫縣或福岡縣相當。從經濟指標來看雖是「優等生」，但實際情況卻意外地失衡。主要的外匯來源是乳製品、肉類、木材等初級產品，再加上觀光業與海外留學生相關產業。雖然有時被譽為「世界上最成功的農業國家」，但這與該國幾乎不存在像日本或德國那樣強大的製造業，實為一脈相承。在現代經濟的主戰場IT與金融等高附加價值產業方面，作為先進國家也顯得相當落後。這種極度依賴「原材料與服務業」的經濟結構，正是導致經濟停滯的根本原因。

■「轉向中國」成功後便滿足於現狀　紐西蘭產業升級停滯的背景雖有多重因素，但其中一個不容忽視的契機，便是2008年作為西方先進國家首個與中國簽署的FTA（自由貿易協定）。　2000年代，隨著中國的高速成長，中國中產階級爆發性增長，導致對紐西蘭產奶粉及肉類的需求急遽增加。對中出口的激增使經濟蓬勃發展，表面上的GDP呈現持續上升的趨勢。然而，這其中存在著重大的結構性問題。出口的主體終究是加工度低的初級商品（大宗商品），原本應將這筆利潤投入研發（R&D）等尖端投資，進而朝農業科技（AgTech）或高附加價值的生物產業發展。然而，政府與企業卻判斷「既然賣得動，維持現狀即可」 ，因而選擇了維持現狀。對中國大宗商品出口的成功經驗，在結構上逐漸削弱了產業轉型所需的投資誘因。這無疑是將紐西蘭束縛於「資源開採型舊模式」的主要因素。

 ■無論賺多少，都吞噬於房貸　阻礙產業投資的另一項因素，是異常過熱的房地產市場。在新西蘭，家庭資產的大部分流向住宅，銀行融資也多用於房貸，而非具生產性的企業投資。資金集中於房產投資的結構已然固化相較於伴隨風險的初創企業投資，房產不僅能穩健增值，過去更曾具備顯著的節稅優勢。資金並非投入能開創未來的產業，而是耗費在推高現有房價上。從經濟學角度來看，這種格局是資源配置的最糟情況。房地產價格飆漲雖使「有產者」致富，但資金卻滯留在無法創造財富的非生產性資產上，結果導致國民的生活成本（住房費用）獨自飆升。在缺乏創新之際，成本卻不斷攀升。這正是將當今紐西蘭推入停滯狀態的結構性惡性循環的本質。

■與其從事專業職務，不如去鄰國當洗碗工更能賺錢　若產業趨於單一化且附加價值無法提升，薪資自然會停滯不前。另一方面，房價卻飆升至世界頂尖水準。對年輕人而言，在國內購屋成家已逐漸遠離現實目標。　因此，年輕人將目光投向了鄰國澳洲。澳洲人口約2700萬人。雖是資源大國，但在金融、基礎建設、IT、高階製造業等「產業深度」方面，與紐西蘭根本無法相提並論。　根據紐西蘭統計局及澳洲統計局的數據，截至2023年，澳洲的平均週薪比紐西蘭高出約25%至30%，且這項差距在過去10年間呈現擴大趨勢。據說在年輕人之間，一句「在澳洲洗碗比在新西蘭從事專業工作賺得更多」的說法，已帶有強烈的現實感。　由於紐西蘭人可在澳洲免簽證工作，因此許多離境者都選擇渡海前往。優秀人才不斷流失，只剩下房價飆漲與人口高齡化結構，經濟活力的喪失正持續加劇。

■連前總理都捨棄了祖國　據報導，近年曾領導紐西蘭的阿德恩前總理已將生活據點移至澳洲。這則新聞在紐西蘭並未引起意料中的轟動，反而揭示了「即便是擁有最多選擇權的人，也選擇了更大的經濟圈」這一現實。紐西蘭人民並非透過言語，而是以「移居澳洲」的行動，對國家的未來做出了判斷。閱讀本文後，或許有人會覺得「日本不也和紐西蘭差不多嗎？」然而，若冷靜分析，日本仍保有紐西蘭所不具備的「產業多樣性」。汽車、半導體材料、精密儀器，以及全球性的內容產業。這些多角化的優勢，正是紐西蘭所不具備的競爭力。雖不能說「日本與紐西蘭完全相同」，但絕不能忽視「有重蹈覆轍之虞」的警訊。　紐西蘭的歷程揭示了三項教訓。

■「讓年輕人絕望的國家」的教訓　首先，若缺乏國家層級的宏觀藍圖，產業便會趨向於簡化，朝著容易獲利的方向發展。紐西蘭的情況正是如此，表現為對大宗商品的過度集中。而且，一旦失去高度的技術基礎，重建將需耗費數十年。其次，資金滯留於住宅與不動產，將導致產業競爭力的長期自我毀損。資金未能流向次世代技術或創業，反而埋沒於不動產及現金存款的結構，會直接縮小年輕人的經濟前景。1980年代後期，日本過剩的流動性資金集中於不動產，催生出超越實體經濟的泡沫。倘若當時那筆龐大資金中哪怕只有一部分流向次世代創新，隨後的「失去的30年」景象想必會截然不同。事實上，當日本沉醉於「土地神話」之際，美國正孕育出日後發展為大型科技公司的IT產業。當時的日本也有敏銳察覺此趨勢的先驅者，那就是Recruit的江副浩正。他率先洞察到資訊數據庫化與通訊事業的潛力，試圖建構能顛覆傳統產業結構的「知識基礎設施」。

■日本版Google未能誕生的原因　然而，1988年曝光的「Recruit事件」，實際上扼殺了這股新生的氣息。　從筆者的觀點來看，這起事件雖被稱為「戰後最大疑案」，但其賄賂性質其實相當薄弱；與其說如此，其本質恐怕更傾向於「既得利益階層與檢察機關對異端新興勢力的社會制裁」。這起事件導致江副氏淡出公眾視野，而Recruit這家本有可能成為日本版Google或Amazon的企業，其發展之翼也隨之折斷。　這起事件對日本社會造成的負面影響，絕不僅止於單一企業的挫折。它將「出頭釘必遭徹底打壓」這般強烈的訊息深深烙印於社會，使日本社會的冒險精神文化因而萎縮。正如紐西蘭陷入「對中出口成功經驗」這道甜蜜陷阱，因而停止產業升級一般，日本同樣優先維持戰後成功模式，喪失了容納江副氏這類破壞性創新者的「度量」。這種「對新事物的戒心」，恰如紐西蘭的房地產依賴，已成為長期損害國家生產力的結構性病理。

■ 僅有高齡者會因「宜居」而感到欣喜　第三，一旦年輕人外流超過某個閾值，便極難透過政策加以遏止。　在年輕人外流日益嚴重的葡萄牙，政府於2019年針對35歲以下族群實施了大幅減免所得稅的措施（IRSJovem）。然而，根據OECD的勞動力流動統計及當地報導，此後年輕族群持續外流至歐盟境內，顯示單靠稅制優惠來促進定居的效果相當有限。　這可說是個實例，說明若缺乏薪資水準及產業深度的根本吸引力，僅靠稅制措施是無法留住年輕人的。僅憑「治安良好」、「宜居」等感性理由，是無法留住理性思考的年輕人的。因為這正是導致高齡化、並使年輕人目光投向海外的「高齡社會邏輯」本身。在缺乏經濟成長前景的國家，年輕人無法描繪長期的未來藍圖。

■「伴隨陣痛的政策」才是最佳處方　日本所缺乏的，並非原料（技術或資本），而是將這些資源進行最佳配置的意志與政策。必須打破既得利益，促進勞動力從低效率產業向高附加價值產業流動；將金融資產從房地產與儲蓄導向風險資本；更重要的是，必須轉向「回應現役世代與年輕族群經濟合理性」的投資優先型政治。紐西蘭年輕人湧向澳洲的景象，絕非與己無關。若日本無法重拾作為「能賺錢的國家」的競爭力，下一代恐怕也會同樣選擇遠渡重洋。　日本應集中資源的領域主要有三大類。第一是死守「材料・設備」產業。紐西蘭雖缺乏製造業基礎，但日本擁有佔據全球市佔率大部分的特定材料及製造設備。這些都是可能成為全球關鍵節點的重要產業。日本不應執著於終端產品（如智慧型手機或電動車本體）的競爭，而應將公共支援與稅制優惠集中於製造這些產品不可或缺的半導體材料、精密化學及工作機械等B2B領域。透過持續掌控世界離不開日本的關鍵環節，既能維持外交與經濟上的存在感，又能確保高利潤率。這正是紐西蘭所不具備的日本獨有優勢，也是應優先守護的資產。

■將「日本製」農產品推向世界　第二點是透過農業科技實現第一產業的知識密集化。紐西蘭的失敗在於將農業僅視為原料的產出。日本則應反其道而行，將農業重新定義為製造業，並培育其成為出口產業。在此過程中，與其僅止於農產品出口，更應以「自動化收穫機器人」、「環境控制系統（植物工廠）」及「功能性品種的基因編輯」等技術與智慧財產權的「套裝出口」為目標，此方向將更具成效。　若能擺脫勞動密集型農業，轉型為理科人才與工程師能從中獲利的「高附加價值產業」，農業便不再是衰退領域，反而能成為成長引擎。

■為避免重蹈紐西蘭的覆轍　第三點是，建立能促進資本回流至AI及半導體技術等智慧財產權的制度設計。　紐西蘭因資金死存於不動產而導致經濟停滯，日本為避免重蹈覆轍，必須引導資金流向「無形資產」。在透過課稅使不動產投資趨於合理化的同時，對新創投資及天使投資實施徹底的免稅措施將是有效的。此外，支援動畫、遊戲等內容產業的智慧財產權證券化，並將個人資金引導至新產業，亦可視為具體的手段。雖然像泡沫經濟後期那樣刻意終結「土地神話」是愚策，但建立能讓資金流向年輕人挑戰的風險承擔生態系卻是必要的。要執行這些策略，就必須觸及現有產業的保護措施，以及高齡族群所持資產的既得權益。一再延後承受這份痛楚的結果，正是當前紐西蘭競爭力下降與年輕人外流的現狀。日本仍保有足以與世界抗衡的種子。究竟是要讓這些種子沉睡於不動產或內部保留金等非生產性領域，還是將其打磨成下一代的武器？此刻，我們正被迫做出這個抉擇。

第二篇： 引述： 民生融合，深化琴澳一體化發展（觀滄海）

《第十五個五年規劃》綱要提出「深化琴澳一體化發展」，為橫琴粵澳深度合作區（以下簡稱「合作區」）的建設勾勒出新藍圖。在今年全國兩會上，圍繞深化琴澳一體化發展，澳門地區全國人大代表、全國政協委員熱議合作區民生融合，「民生為橋、民心相通」已成為合作區建設的共識。

2025年是合作區第二階段建設的開局之年。合作區緊扣「澳門+橫琴」的定位，以制度創新打破壁壘，在產業協同提速的同時，將民生融合置於突出位置。民生連結民心，民心凝聚合力，唯有民生相融，方能實現民心相通。

跨境便利化邁向「無感化」，通關升級賦能同城生活。通關便利是民生融合的重要一步。合作區以基礎設施的「硬連通」推動民生服務的「優連通」，橫琴與澳門之間的實體邊界正日益變得「無感」。橫琴在全國首創合作區快速通道「刷臉」免證通關模式，跨境學生專車試行免下車通關……一系列務實舉措打造了橫琴與澳門的「半小時生活圈」。2025年，橫琴口岸客流量首度突破3000萬人次，熙攘的人潮車流見證了橫琴與澳門交融的蓬勃生機，兩地正逐漸從「雙城」轉變為「同城」。

政務服務「無界化」，打破地域壁壘，連通民心。政務與民心相連，服務深化融合。過去，琴澳居民為跨境辦事往返奔波，辦理流程繁瑣。如今，琴澳攜手解決「痛點」，積極深化政務服務，推廣澳門政務24小時自助服務中心，設立琴澳遠距服務櫃檯，實現從「線下跑」轉為「線上辦」，實現「琴事澳辦」、「澳事琴辦」雙向直通。打破政務壁壘，讓琴澳居民辦事更省心、生活更安心。

醫療資源「一體化」，健康保障鞏固民生底線。健康是民生的根基，醫療融合是琴澳居民關切的要事。合作區正推動琴澳醫療一體化，目前琴澳兩地醫院已共同設立聯合專科門診，實現「點對點」跨境轉診；189名澳門醫生完成執業註冊；545種規格的澳門藥品獲准跨境使用；澳門醫療券適用範圍已擴展至合作區……越來越多的澳資醫療資源與福利進入合作區，打通跨境就醫的「最後一公里」，以更便捷、高效的服務守護健康。

養老服務「標準化」，讓銀髮歲月樂享幸福安康。養老安，則家庭安。讓澳門長者「老有所養、老有所安」，是珠海與澳門民生融合的重要課題。合作區以「珠澳融合居家社區養老服務標準化試點」為切入點，完善跨境養老保障鏈條，建成4個居家養老服務中心、7個長者食堂，引進澳門社團提供服務，並落實「粵澳養老通」以實現養老金跨境轉帳，解決澳門長者的「後顧之憂」。溫情服務銜接養老需求，讓銀髮生活更具質感，彰顯琴澳融合的民生厚度與人文溫度。

民生無小事，枝葉皆關情。合作區的建設不僅是發展空間的拓展延伸，更承載著琴澳居民殷切的期盼，更關乎民生福祉的提升與民心的凝聚。今年是「十五五」規劃的開局之年，也是合作區第二階段建設的關鍵之年。站在新的起點上，期待合作區能寫下更具溫度、更富成效的民生答卷，打造澳門居民安居樂業的幸福家園，為粵港澳大灣區融合發展貢獻鮮活的「橫琴經驗」。

第三篇 引述：香港媒體同時也是金融公司和地產商的既得利益集團

在香港，「媒體」與「商業」的界線往往模糊不清，因為該市許多大型媒體機構皆由在房地產和金融領域擁有重大利益的多元化企業集團所擁有。

雖然沒有官方統計數據顯示同時經營這兩項業務的公司數量，但這股趨勢源於傳統媒體收入萎縮，促使這些集團依賴其房地產和金融部門以維持穩定。

擁有房地產或金融部門的主要媒體集團

香港數家知名的媒體相關集團在這些領域均有業務：

• 英皇集團：跨產業經營的典範。旗下擁有《東方週日報》及《新星期一報》，同時經營英皇國際控股（房地產）與英皇金融服務。

• 九龍倉（控股）：歷來在兩大領域均佔有重要地位。雖然該集團近期已退出其主要媒體及娛樂業務（包括有線電視），但在房地產領域（九龍倉置業）仍屬巨擘，並持續持有多元化的投資資產。

• 麗新集團：該集團業務涵蓋媒體與娛樂（亞洲傳媒集團）、物業開發與投資（麗新發展）以及酒店營運。

• 星島新聞集團：雖主要為媒體公司，但歷史上曾從事房地產交易，目前在將軍澳經營其自有的大型工業地產資產。

• TVB（電視廣播有限公司）：雖以媒體業務見長，但近年逐步進軍電子商務領域，並持有大量土地及攝影棚資產，常與金融及科技巨頭合作以多元化其收入來源。

• 香港經濟日報（HKET）控股：主要為財經媒體集團，旗下營運的AASTOCKS除新聞發布外，亦作為財經服務及數據平台運作。

產業背景

• 產業重疊：在香港交易所（HKEX）中，許多被歸類為「金融」或「房地產」板塊的公司，實際上作為「複合企業」模式的一部分，持有媒體資產。

• 金融媒體集中化：市場上存在大量本質上屬於「金融企業」的新聞供應商，例如 AASTOCKS、Quamnet 和 ET Net，這些公司將經紀或數據服務與新聞報導相結合。

• 電子商務轉型：許多數位媒體公司，如HK01，正繞過傳統房地產領域，直接進軍金融科技（FinTech）與電子商務（例如提供票務及購物服務的「01 Space」），以彌補媒體業務的虧損。

截至2026年4月上旬，香港主要媒體相關企業集團的股價表現反映了當地房地產及媒體行業的整體波動。在應對高利率環境的挑戰之際，多數企業股價徘徊在52週低點附近。

📊 財務快照（2026年4月）

公司（股票代碼）	收盤價（港幣）	當日變動	市值	主要非媒體行業
九龍倉房地產投資信託基金 (1997)	$22.28	📉 -1.42%	676.5億美元	商業地產
TVB (0511)	$2.72	📉 -2.50%	12.6億美元	電子商務／科技
英皇國際(0163)	$0.185	📈 +1.09%	10.2億美元	地產開發
麗新發展 (0488)	$0.60	📉 -3.23%	0.87億美元	酒店及地產
HKET Holdings(0423)	$0.76	➖ 0.00%	~3.3億美元	金融服務

✅ 關鍵績效驅動因素

• 房地產拖累：像帝國（Emperor）和麗新（LaiSun）這類綜合企業，深受香港住宅及商業地產市場疲軟的影響，這往往會掩蓋其媒體業務的收益。

• 股息收益率：九龍倉置業（WharfREIC）仍是收益型投資者的首選，儘管近期股價下跌，目前仍提供約5.92%的高股息收益率。

• 媒體轉型：無綫電視（TVB）正積極轉型至直播及與中國內地合作，以彌補傳統廣告收入的損失，其市值已壓縮至約12.6億港元。

• 金融整合：香港經濟日報集團（《香港經濟日報》母公司）因與 ET Net 等金融數據服務整合，維持了較為穩定的「利基市場」地位，相較於一般新聞業務，此類服務能帶來更穩定的 B2B 營收。

第四篇  引述：伊朗戰爭帶來中東資金至香港的傳言

自2026年初中東局勢爆發及伊朗戰爭以來，香港確實出現了中東資金湧入的現象。根據港府官員及多方媒體報導，投資者將香港視為避險港。

以下是相關發展的重點整理：

• 避風港效應與資金湧入：

  • 財政司司長陳茂波表示，在中東局勢陰霾下，投資者將香港視為資金避風港。

  • 行政長官李家超亦預測，中東衝突將推動資金流入香港尋求安全。

  • 報導指出，沙烏地阿拉伯、阿拉伯聯合大公國等海灣國家的富豪在戰火波及下，開始意識到資產配置的多元化，部分資金正流向香港。

• 市場數據與查詢活動：

  • IPO 市場活躍：2026 年第一季香港 IPO 募資額突破 1,000 億港元，反映在全球局勢不明朗之際，企業與資金視香港為重要的融資窗口。

  • 成交量增加：儘管港股首季出現回調，但 3 月日均成交額超過 3,000 億港元，顯示資金配置趨於活躍。

  • 主權基金諮詢：證券業界透露已收到大量中東主權基金來港投資的諮詢。

• 核查難度與變數：

  • 儘管各界觀察到資本湧向香港的跡象，但有調查指出，關於具體「3,000 億港元」中東資本的傳聞，其實際流向較難查證。

  • 當前局勢亦為亞洲及香港帶來挑戰，市場仍需警惕戰爭長期化所帶來的風險。

總而言之，市場普遍認同中東資金正因避險需求而流向香港，但在確切規模與流向方面，仍存在統計與核實的挑戰。

第五篇 引述：國民黨的現況

截至2026年4月，國民黨（KMT）正處於一個關鍵時期，此階段的特徵在於新的領導方向以及為即將到來的地方選舉所做的準備。

相較於2020年代初期，該黨黨員人數已顯著減少，目前估計約有331,000名合格黨員。此數字較2022年通報的逾450,000名黨員有所下降。

當前政治局勢 (2026年4月)

•  新領導層： 鄭麗文 現任國民黨主席，於2025年11月1日當選，在黨內主席選舉中以50.15%的得票率勝出。她是該黨史上第二位女性領導人。

•  兩岸「和平使命」： 鄭麗文主席目前正進行一場備受矚目的為期六天的訪中行程（2026年4月7日至12日），預計將造訪上海、江蘇及北京。預計將與中國國家主席習近平會晤。

•  立法聯盟： 國民黨目前與台灣人民黨（TPP）共同掌握立法院多數席次，在113席中佔有62席。 

即將到來的2026年地方選舉

國民黨正聚焦於預定於2026年11月28日舉行的全國地方選舉。主要動態包括： 

•  聯合提名：在部分地區，國民黨與台灣人民黨正聯合支持共同候選人，例如嘉義市長候選人張志凱。

•  主要候選人：該黨已宣布數名南部票倉的關鍵提名人選，包括高雄市長候選人柯志恩及台南市長候選人謝龍傑。

•  策略顧問： 前立法院長王金平已獲任命為該黨首席顧問，協助制定2026年選戰策略。 

黨員人口結構

該黨持續面臨重大的人口結構挑戰： 

•  支持者高齡化： 傳統支持者正逐漸高齡化；據2025年底報導，40歲以下的黨員僅佔3%。

•  青年拓展： 在鄭的領導下，該黨正重新推動提名年輕候選人，並在2028年總統選舉週期前提升對台灣青年的吸引力。

第六篇 引述：李嘉誠的長江實業改告了丹麥公司馬士基？

根據2026年4月的最新報導，李嘉誠旗下的和記黃埔（透過其子公司巴拿馬港口公司（PPC））已實際對巴拿馬政府及航運巨頭馬士基（常音譯為「馬士基」，發音類似「Marquis」）兩者提起法律訴訟。

這場法律糾紛源於巴拿馬最高法院於2026年1月裁定PPC的港口特許經營權違憲，導致政府接管港口並將臨時管理權移交給馬士基。

1. 針對巴拿馬政府的訴訟

和記黃埔並未放過巴拿馬政府。他們已啟動一項重大的國際仲裁案件：

•  仲裁申訴：PPC 向 國際商會（ICC） 對巴拿馬共和國提起訴訟。

•  損害賠償：該索賠金額於 2026 年 3 月下旬擴大至 逾 20 億美元（157 億港元），理由是巴拿馬政府所謂「非法接管」巴爾博亞港與克里斯托瓦爾港。

•  指控：該公司指控巴拿馬官員無視仲裁程序，並非法扣押私有財產及文件。 

2. 針對馬士基（Maersk）的訴訟

用戶提及的「Marquis」很可能是指丹麥航運巨頭馬士基。和記黃埔亦已將其列為目標：

•  另一起仲裁： 據報導，2026年4月8日，PPC已正式針對馬士基啟動另一項仲裁程序。

•  理由：和記黃埔指控馬士基與巴拿馬政府「串通」以促成接管，並違反了PPC在該地區現有的長期獨家營運協議。

法律行動摘要

目標 法律行動主要理由

巴拿馬政府國際商會（ICC）國際仲裁非法終止合約及扣押資產。

馬士基（Maersk）國際商會（ICC）國際仲裁涉嫌與政府串通及違反獨家合約。

此雙管齊下的法律策略，被視為旨在保護其對巴拿馬運河戰略港口近30年的投資。

1. If Japan Becomes Dependent on China, Young People Will Flee to Neighboring Countries… The Problems Shared by Japan and "The Southern Hemisphere’s Major Immigration Destination" as "Countries Where Young People Feel Hopeless"

What kind of country is attractive to young people? Commentator Tsukasa Shirakawa states, “Young people cannot plan for the long-term future in a country with no prospects for economic growth. New Zealand serves as a cautionary tale for Japan.”

■ The Abnormal Situation Unfolding in a Southern Hemisphere Island Nation: Although New Zealand is a small country, it is a member of the “Five Eyes”—a U.S.-led intelligence-sharing alliance—and is one of the “successful developed nations” that surpasses Japan in terms of GDP per capita. However, behind this image of integrity, New Zealand is currently facing a serious crisis that threatens the nation’s future: a massive exodus of young people. 　The number of people leaving the country in 2025 is expected to reach approximately 120,000, equivalent to about 2.3% of the total population of roughly 5.3 million. About 40% of these are young people aged 18 to 30, with neighboring Australia being the most common destination. While this may not be immediately apparent because New Zealand accepts a large number of immigrants, the exodus of young people has reached a critical level. 　Why are the young people who represent the future leaving New Zealand—a country that, at first glance, seems like a model of prosperity and livability—for neighboring Australia? Analyzing this phenomenon clearly reveals the precariousness of the “industrial policy” currently facing Japan and the pitfalls we must avoid.

■“The World’s Most Successful Agricultural Nation” New Zealand’s population is roughly the same size as that of Hyogo or Fukuoka Prefectures. While its economic indicators make it appear to be a “model student,” the reality is surprisingly skewed. Its primary sources of foreign exchange are primary products such as dairy, meat, and timber, supplemented by tourism and the international student business. 　It is sometimes called “the world’s most successful agricultural nation,” but this is inextricably linked to the fact that it has virtually no strong manufacturing sector like Japan or Germany. It also lags significantly behind other developed nations in high-value-added industries such as IT and finance, which are the main battlegrounds of the modern economy. It is precisely this economic structure, which is extremely dependent on “raw materials and the service sector,” that is the root cause of its stagnation.

■“Business as Usual” Following a Successful Shift Toward China: While there are multiple factors behind the stagnation of New Zealand’s industrial upgrading, one pivotal trigger that cannot be overlooked is the FTA (Free Trade Agreement) it signed with China in 2008—the first such agreement concluded by a Western developed nation. In the 2000s, as China’s rapid economic growth led to an explosive increase in its middle class, demand for New Zealand-produced powdered milk and meat surged. 　The surge in exports to China boosted the economy, and GDP appeared to be on an upward trajectory. However, there was a major structural problem here. The mainstay of exports was, after all, low-value-added commodities. Ideally, the profits from these exports should have been reinvested in cutting-edge areas such as R&D (research and development) to evolve into agritech (agricultural technology) and high-value-added bio-industries. 　Instead, the government and businesses concluded, “Since sales are strong, the status quo is fine” and chose to maintain the status quo. The success of commodity exports to China structurally eroded the incentive to invest in industrial transformation. There is no doubt that this was a major factor that kept New Zealand tied to the “old, resource-extraction-based model.”

■ No Matter How Much You Earn, It Disappears into Mortgage Payments: Another factor that hindered investment in industry was the abnormally overheated real estate market. In New Zealand, the majority of household assets are tied up in housing, and much of the bank lending has been directed toward mortgages rather than productive corporate investment. A structure has taken root in which funds are concentrated on housing investment—which is certain to appreciate in value and once offered significant tax benefits—rather than on risky startup investments. 　Funds are spent not on new industries that create the future, but on driving up existing housing prices. From an economic perspective, this structure represents the worst possible allocation of resources. 　Soaring real estate prices enrich the “haves,” but money remains stagnant in unproductive assets that do not generate wealth, resulting in a sharp rise in the cost of living (housing costs) for the public. Costs rise while innovation stagnates. This is the true nature of the structural vicious cycle that is keeping New Zealand mired in stagnation.

■ It Pays Better to Wash Dishes in a Neighboring Country Than to Work in a Professional Field  If industries become simplified and value-added does not increase, wages will naturally stagnate. Meanwhile, housing prices have skyrocketed to among the highest levels in the world. For young people, buying a home and starting a family in their own country is becoming an increasingly distant, unrealistic goal.  Consequently, young people have turned their attention to neighboring Australia. Australia has a population of approximately 27 million. Although it is a resource-rich country, the “depth of its industries”—including finance, infrastructure, IT, and high-tech manufacturing—is incomparable to New Zealand’s. According to data from Statistics New Zealand and the Australian Bureau of Statistics, as of 2023, the average weekly wage in Australia was approximately 25–30% higher than in New Zealand, and this gap has been widening over the past decade. 　Among young people, the saying that “you can earn more washing dishes in Australia than working in a professional job in New Zealand” is spoken with a sense of reality. Since New Zealanders can work in Australia without a visa, many of those leaving the country cross the sea. The brain drain of talented individuals is leading to a loss of economic vitality, leaving behind only skyrocketing real estate prices and an aging population.

■ Even a Former Prime Minister Has Abandoned Her Homeland In recent years, it has been reported that former Prime Minister Ardern, who once led New Zealand, has moved her base of operations to Australia. This news has not caused as much of a stir in New Zealand as one might expect, illustrating the reality that “even someone in a position with the most options chooses a larger economic sphere.” 　The people of New Zealand are passing judgment on their nation’s future not with words, but through the action of “moving to Australia.” Some readers may have felt, after reading this article, that “Japan is in a similar situation to New Zealand.” However, upon calm analysis, Japan still possesses “industrial diversity”—a strength that New Zealand never had. Automobiles, semiconductor materials, precision equipment, and a global content industry. These multifaceted strengths represent advantages that New Zealand lacks. While we cannot say that “Japan is exactly the same as New Zealand,” we must remain vigilant against the risk of “following in its footsteps.” There are three lessons to be learned from New Zealand’s history.

■ Lessons from “The Country That Left Its Youth in Despair”  First, without a national grand design, industries will simplify themselves in the direction that yields the easiest profits. In New Zealand’s case, this meant a concentration on commodities. And once an advanced technological foundation is lost, it takes decades to rebuild it.  Second, the stagnation of capital in housing and real estate leads to long-term self-destruction of industrial competitiveness. A structure where capital is buried in real estate and cash reserves rather than being channeled into next-generation technologies and startups directly narrows young people’s economic prospects. In the late 1980s, excess liquidity in Japan concentrated in real estate, creating a bubble that outpaced the real economy. Had even a fraction of that massive capital been directed toward next-generation innovation, the landscape of the subsequent “Lost 30 Years” would have been different. 　In fact, while Japan was intoxicated by the “land myth,” the IT industry—which would later give rise to Big Tech—was taking its first steps in the United States. Even in Japan at the time, there were pioneers who keenly sensed this trend. One such figure was Hiromasa Ezoe of Recruit. He was quick to recognize the potential of database-driven information and telecommunications, and sought to build a “knowledge infrastructure” that would disrupt the traditional industrial structure.

■ Why a Japanese Version of Google Never Emerged However, the “Recruit Scandal,” which came to light in 1988, effectively nipped that bud in the bud. From the author’s perspective, this incident—often dubbed “the biggest corruption scandal of the postwar era”—had little substance in terms of bribery; rather, its essence likely lay more in the “social sanction imposed by vested interests and the prosecution against a heretical emerging force.”As a result of this scandal, Mr. Ezoe was forced off the public stage, and the wings of Recruit—a company that could have become Japan’s version of Google or Amazon—were clipped. The negative impact this event had on Japanese society went far beyond the failure of a single company. It burned into the collective consciousness the stark message that “the nail that sticks out gets hammered down,” effectively stifling Japan’s culture of risk-taking. 　Just as New Zealand fell into the sweet trap of its “success in exports to China” and halted the advancement of its industries, Japan, too, prioritized maintaining its postwar success model and lost the “forbearance” to tolerate disruptive innovators like Mr. Ezoe. This “wariness of the new” became a structural pathology that, much like New Zealand’s dependence on real estate, has undermined the nation’s productivity over the long term.

■ Only the Elderly Rejoice in a “Liveable” Society Third, once the outflow of young people exceeds a certain threshold, it becomes extremely difficult to halt through policy alone. In Portugal, where the outflow of young people is becoming severe, the government introduced a significant income tax reduction measure (IRS Jovem) in 2019 targeting those under 35. However, according to OECD labor mobility statistics and local media reports, the outflow of young people to other EU countries has continued since then, and tax incentives alone are considered to have only a limited effect in encouraging them to settle down. This serves as an example demonstrating that tax measures alone cannot retain young people without fundamental attractions such as wage levels and industrial depth. 　Emotional reasons such as “good public safety” or “livability” alone cannot retain rational young people. This is because such reasoning embodies the very “logic of an aging society” that drives population aging and causes young people to look abroad. Young people cannot envision a long-term future in a country that offers no prospects for economic growth.

■“Painful Policies” Are the Best Prescription: What Japan lacks is not the raw materials (technology or capital), but the will and policies to deploy them optimally. 　We must break down vested interests and encourage labor mobility from inefficient industries to high-value-added sectors. We must redirect financial assets from real estate and savings toward risk capital. Above all, we must shift toward a politics that prioritizes investment to “meet the economic rationality of the working-age population and the younger generation.” The sight of New Zealand’s youth heading to Australia is by no means a distant problem. If Japan cannot regain its competitiveness as a “country where people can earn a living,” the next generation will likely cross the sea in the same way. There are three major areas where Japan should concentrate its resources. First is the staunch defense of the “materials and devices” industry. While New Zealand lacked a manufacturing base, Japan possesses specific components and manufacturing equipment that hold a large share of the global market. These are critical industries that could become global chokepoints. 　Rather than clinging to competition in finished products (such as smartphones and electric vehicles themselves), Japan should concentrate public support and tax incentives on B2B sectors—such as semiconductor materials, fine chemicals, and machine tools—that are indispensable for manufacturing those products. 　By continuing to control the vital points that the world cannot function without, Japan can secure high profit margins while maintaining its diplomatic and economic presence. This is a strength unique to Japan that New Zealand could not possess, and it is an asset that must be protected as a top priority.

■ Marketing “Made in Japan” Agricultural Products to the World  Second is the intellectual intensification of primary industries through agritech. New Zealand’s failure lay in treating agriculture merely as a source of raw materials. Japan, on the other hand, should redefine agriculture as a manufacturing sector and cultivate it as an export industry. 　In doing so, rather than simply exporting agricultural products, it would be effective to aim for the export of technology and intellectual property packages, such as automated harvesting robots, environmental control systems (plant factories), and genome-edited functional crop varieties. If we can break away from labor-intensive agriculture and transform it into a high-value-added industry where science graduates and engineers can enter and earn a living, agriculture can become a growth engine rather than a declining sector.

■ To Avoid Repeating New Zealand’s Mistake: Third, we must establish institutional frameworks that encourage capital to flow back into intellectual property, such as AI and semiconductor technologies. In New Zealand, capital became trapped in real estate, leading to stagnation; to avoid this, Japan needs to redirect capital toward “intangible assets.” 　While using taxation to regulate real estate investment, it would be effective to implement thorough tax exemptions for startup and angel investments. Furthermore, supporting the securitization of intellectual property in content industries such as anime and games to channel private capital into new industries is a concrete measure worth considering. While it would be a foolish strategy to consciously try to end the “land myth” as was done in the late bubble era, it is necessary to build a risk-taking ecosystem where funds flow to young people’s ventures. 　To implement these strategies, we must cut into the vested interests of existing industrial protection and the assets held by the elderly. The result of continually postponing this pain is New Zealand’s current decline in competitiveness and the exodus of young people. Japan still possesses the seeds capable of competing on the global stage. Will we leave them dormant in unproductive places like real estate and retained earnings, or will we polish them into weapons for the next generation? We are being forced to make that choice right now.

2. Integrating People’s Livelihoods, Deepening the Integrated Development of Hengqin and Macau (Viewing the Vast Sea)

 The 15th Five-Year Plan outlines the goal of “deepening the integrated development of Hengqin and Macao,” charting a new blueprint for the construction of the Hengqin Guangdong-Macao In-depth Cooperation Zone (hereinafter referred to as the “Cooperation Zone”). At this year’s National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference sessions, Macao-based deputies to the National People’s Congress and members of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference engaged in lively discussions on the integration of people’s livelihoods within the Cooperation Zone. The principle of “people’s livelihoods as a bridge, hearts and minds connected” has become a consensus in the zone’s development.

 2025 marks the beginning of the second phase of the Cooperation Zone’s development. Staying true to its “Macao + Hengqin” positioning, the Cooperation Zone is breaking down barriers through institutional innovation. While accelerating industrial synergy, it places the integration of people’s livelihoods at the forefront. People’s livelihoods connect with their hearts; when hearts are united, they generate collective strength. Only through the integration of people’s livelihoods can we achieve a connection of hearts.

 Cross-border convenience has become “seamless,” with upgraded customs clearance empowering a “same-city” lifestyle. Convenient customs clearance is a crucial step toward the integration of people’s livelihoods. The Cooperation Zone is using “hard connectivity” in infrastructure to drive “optimal connectivity” in public services, making the physical border between Hengqin and Macao increasingly “seamless.” Hengqin pioneered the nation’s first “facial recognition” ID-free clearance model for the Cooperative Express Channel, and piloted “no-stop” clearance for cross-border student shuttle buses… A series of practical measures has created a “30-minute living circle” between Hengqin and Macau. In 2025, passenger traffic at the Hengqin Port of Entry exceeded 30 million for the first time; the bustling crowds and traffic flow bear witness to the vibrant vitality of the Hengqin-Macau integration, as the two cities gradually transform from “twin cities” into “one city.”

 "Borderless" government services have broken down geographical barriers and connected the hearts of the people. Government services connect with the people, deepening integration. In the past, Hengqin and Macao residents had to travel back and forth across the border to handle administrative matters, facing cumbersome procedures. Today, Hengqin and Macao have joined forces to address these “pain points,” actively deepening government services. They have promoted the 24-hour self-service centers for Macao government affairs and established remote service counters for Hengqin and Macao, shifting from “running around in person” to “handling matters online,” and achieving two-way direct access for “Hengqin matters handled in Macao” and “Macao matters handled in Hengqin.”By breaking down administrative barriers, we make it easier for residents of Zhuhai and Macau to handle affairs and live with greater peace of mind.

 The “integration” of medical resources has solidified the foundation of people’s livelihoods through enhanced health security. Health is the cornerstone of people’s livelihoods, and the integration of medical services is a matter of great concern to residents of Zhuhai and Macau. The Cooperation Zone is advancing the integration of Zhuhai and Macao’s healthcare systems. Currently, hospitals in both regions have established joint specialty clinics, implemented “point-to-point” cross-border patient transfers, registered 189 Macao doctors to practice, permitted the cross-border use of 545 types of Macao medications, and extended Macao medical vouchers to the Cooperation Zone… An increasing number of Macao-funded medical resources and benefits are entering the Cooperation Zone, bridging the “last mile” of cross-border medical care and safeguarding health through more convenient and efficient services.

 Standardized elderly care services ensure a happy and healthy life in one’s golden years. When the elderly are secure, families are secure. Ensuring that Macao’s elderly are cared for and live in peace is a key priority in the integration of people’s livelihoods between Zhuhai and Macao. The Cooperation Zone has taken the pilot project for standardizing home-based and community-based elderly care services as a starting point to improve the cross-border elderly care support system. It has established four home-based elderly care service centers and seven senior dining halls, introduced Macao-based organizations to provide services, and implemented the “Guangdong-Macao Elderly Care Pass” to enable the cross-border transfer of pensions, thereby alleviating the “worries about the future” for Macao’s elderly. Warm and caring services meet the needs of the elderly, enriching their lives and highlighting the depth of people’s livelihoods and the human warmth of the Zhuhai-Macau integration.

 No matter how small, issues concerning people’s livelihoods are of great importance. The development of the Cooperation Zone is not merely an expansion of development space; it also carries the earnest expectations of residents in Zhuhai and Macao, and is closely tied to improving people’s well-being and uniting public sentiment. This year marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan and is a pivotal year for the second phase of the Cooperation Zone’s development. Standing at this new starting point, we look forward to the Cooperation Zone delivering even more heartfelt and fruitful outcomes for people’s livelihoods, creating a happy home where Macao residents can live and work in peace and contentment, and contributing the vibrant “Hengqin experience” to the integrated development of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.

3. In Hong Kong, the distinction between “media” and “business” is often blurred because many of the city’s largest media outlets are owned by diversified conglomerates with significant interests in real estate and finance.

While there is no single official count of companies engaged in both sectors, this trend is driven by the fact that traditional media revenue is shrinking, leading these groups to rely on their property and financial arms for stability.

 Major Media Players with Real Estate or Financial Divisions

 Several prominent media-linked groups in Hong Kong operate across these sectors:

•  Emperor Group: A prime example of cross-industry operations. It owns Oriental Sunday and New Monday, while also operating Emperor International Holdings (real estate) and Emperor Financial Services.

•  The Wharf (Holdings): Historically a major player in both sectors. While it recently exited its primary media and entertainment segment (which included i-Cable), it remains a titan in real estate (Wharf REIC) and maintains diversified investment holdings.

•  Lai Sun Group: This group operates in media and entertainment (Media Asia Group) as well as property development and investment (Lai Sun Development) and hotel operations.

•  Sing Tao News Corporation: Although primarily a media company, it has historically been involved in real estate transactions and currently operates from its own large-scale industrial real estate assets in Tseung Kwan O.

•  TVB (Television Broadcasts Limited): Although it specializes in media, it has increasingly expanded into e-commerce and holds significant land and studio assets, often partnering with financial and tech giants to diversify its revenue streams.

•  Hong Kong Economic Times (HKET) Holdings: Primarily a financial media group, it operates AASTOCKS, which functions as a financial services and data platform in addition to its news output.

 Industry Context

•  Sector Overlap: On the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX), many companies classified under the "Finance" or "Real Estate" sectors actually hold media assets as part of a "conglomerate" model.

• Concentration in Financial Media: There is a high concentration of companies that are essentially "financial businesses" providing news, such as AASTOCKS, Quamnet, and ET Net, which integrate brokerage or data services with news reporting.

•  E-Commerce Pivot: Many digital media companies, such as HK01, are bypassing traditional real estate to move directly into financial technology (FinTech) and e-commerce (e.g., "01 Space" for ticketing and shopping) to offset losses in the media sector.

 As of early April 2026, the stock performance of major Hong Kong media-linked conglomerates reflects the broader volatility in the local real estate and media sectors. Most are trading near 52-week lows as they navigate a challenging high-interest-rate environment.

 📊 Financial Snapshot (April 2026)

Company (Ticker)	Last Price (HKD)	Daily Change	Market Cap	Primary Non-Media Sector
Wharf REIC (1997)	$22.28	📉 -1.42%	$67.65B	Commercial Real Estate
TVB (0511)	$2.72	📉 -2.50%	$1.26B	E-commerce / Tech
Emperor Int'l (0163)	$0.185	📈 +1.09%	$1.02B	Property Development
Lai Sun Dev (0488)	$0.60	📉 -3.23%	$0.87B	Hotels & Real Estate
HKET Holdings (0423)	$0.76	➖ 0.00%	~$0.33B	Financial Services

 ✅ Key Performance Drivers

•  Real Estate Drag:  Conglomerates like Emperor and Lai Sun are heavily influenced by the sluggish Hong Kong residential and commercial property markets, which often overshadow their media earnings.

•  Dividend Yields:  Wharf REIC remains a staple for income investors, currently offering a high dividend yield of approximately 5.92% despite the recent price dip.

•  Media Pivot:  TVB  has seen its market cap shrink to roughly  HK$1.26B as it aggressively pivots toward live-streaming and collaborations with mainland China to offset losses from traditional advertising.

•  Financial Integration: HKET Holdings (owner of the Hong Kong Economic Times) maintains a more stable "niche" due to its integration with financial data services like ET Net, which provides steadier B2B revenue compared to general news.

4. Since the outbreak of the Middle East crisis and the war in Iran in early 2026, there has indeed been a surge of capital from the Middle East flowing into Hong Kong.

According to Hong Kong government officials and various media reports, investors view Hong Kong as a safe haven.

 The following is a summary of key developments:

•  Safe-haven effect and capital inflows:

  •  Financial Secretary Paul Chan stated that, amid the turmoil in the Middle East, investors view Hong Kong as a safe haven for their funds.

  •  Chief Executive John Lee also anticipates that the Middle East conflict will drive capital inflows into Hong Kong in search of safety.

  •  Reports indicate that wealthy individuals from Gulf nations such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, facing the spread of conflict, are beginning to recognize the importance of diversifying their asset allocations, with some funds flowing into Hong Kong.

•  Market Data and Enquiry Activity:

  •  Active IPO Market: In the first quarter of 2026, Hong Kong’s IPO fundraising exceeded HK$100 billion, reflecting that, amid global uncertainty, companies and capital view Hong Kong as a key financing hub.

  •  Increased Trading Volume: Although the Hong Kong stock market experienced a correction in the first quarter, the average daily trading volume in March exceeded HK$300 billion, indicating increased activity in capital allocation.

  •  Inquiries from Sovereign Wealth Funds: Sources in the securities industry report receiving a large number of inquiries from Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds regarding investment opportunities in Hong Kong.

•  Verification Challenges and Variables:

  •  Although various observers have noted signs of capital flowing into Hong Kong, a survey indicates that the actual flow of the rumored “HK$300 billion” in Middle Eastern capital is difficult to verify.

  •  The current situation also poses challenges for Asia and Hong Kong, and the market must remain vigilant regarding the risks associated with a prolonged conflict.

In summary, the market generally agrees that Middle Eastern capital is flowing into Hong Kong due to safe-haven demand, but challenges remain in accurately quantifying and verifying the exact scale and flow of these funds.

5. As of April 2026, the Kuomintang (KMT) is navigating a high-stakes period defined by a new leadership direction and preparations for the upcoming local elections.

The party’s membership has seen a notable decline compared to the early 2020s, with current figures estimated at approximately 331,000 eligible members. This is down from over 450,000 members reported in 2022.

Current Political Landscape (April 2026)

•   New Leadership: Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) is currently serving as the KMT Chairperson, having assumed the role on November 1, 2025, after winning the party's chairmanship election with 50.15% of the vote. She is the second woman to lead the party.

•   Cross-Strait "Peace Mission": Chairperson Cheng is currently on a high-profile six-day visit to mainland China (April 7–12, 2026), with planned stops in Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Beijing. A meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected.

•   Legislative Alliance: The KMT currently maintains a combined legislative majority with the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), controlling 62 of the 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan.

Upcoming 2026 Local Elections

The KMT is focused on the nationwide local elections scheduled for November 28, 2026. Key developments include:

•   Joint Nominations: In some regions, the KMT and TPP are backing joint candidates, such as Chang Chi-kai for Chiayi Mayor.

•   Major Candidates: The party has already announced several key nominees for southern strongholds, including Ko Chih-en for Kaohsiung and Hsieh Lung-chieh for Tainan.

•   Strategic Advisories: Former Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-ping has been appointed as the party's chief advisor to assist with the 2026 campaign strategy.

Membership Demographics

The party continues to face a significant demographic challenge:

•   Aging Base: Traditional supporters are aging; as of late 2025, it was reported that only 3% of members were under the age of 40.

•   Youth Outreach: Under Cheng's leadership, there is a renewed push to nominate younger candidates and improve the party's appeal to Taiwanese youth ahead of the 2028 presidential cycle. 

6. According to the latest reports in April 2026, Li Ka-shing's CK Hutchison(through its subsidiary Panama Ports Company, PPC) has actually taken legal action against both the Panamanian government and the shipping giant Maersk (often transliterated as 馬士基, which sounds like "Marquis").

The legal dispute stems from the Panamanian Supreme Court's January 2026 ruling that PPC's port concession was unconstitutional, leading to the government seizing the ports and handing temporary management to Maersk.

1. Lawsuit Against the Panama Government

CK Hutchison has not spared the government. They have initiated a major international arbitration case:

•   Arbitration Claim: PPC filed a lawsuit at the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) against the Republic of Panama.

•   Damages: The claim was recently expanded in late March 2026 to over US$2 billion (HK$15.7 billion) for what they call the "unlawful takeover" of the Balboa and Cristobal ports.

•   Accusations: The company accuses Panamanian officials of ignoring arbitration proceedings and unlawfully seizing private property and documents.

2. Lawsuit Against Maersk (馬士基)

The user's mention of "Marquis" likely refers to Maersk, the Danish shipping giant. CK Hutchison has also targeted them:

•   Separate Arbitration: On April 8, 2026, reports confirmed that PPC officially launched a separate arbitration process against Maersk.

•   Reasoning: CK Hutchison alleges that Maersk "schemed" with the Panamanian government to facilitate the takeover and breached existing long-term exclusive operational agreements PPC had in the region.

Summary of Legal Action

Target	Legal Action	Main Reason
Panama Government	ICC International Arbitration	Unlawful contract cancellation and asset seizure.
Maersk (馬士基)	ICC International Arbitration	Alleged collusion with the state and breach of exclusive contracts.

This double-pronged legal strategy is seen as an attempt to protect its nearly 30-year investment in the Panama Canal's strategic ports.

附錄：「全民國家安全教育日」？ 我推薦看以下兩部電影。

重點：應該進行根本性的對比，我上述真實社會脈絡和主體都被異形附身（所謂媒體敘事的職業反派角色）完全抽離出去（連同觀者時間）。這才是所謂敘事的力量和功能。

Appendix: “National Security Education Day”? I recommend watching the following two films.

Key point: We should make a fundamental comparison: the real-world context and subjects I described above have been completely detached from the narrative—along with the viewer’s sense of time—by the alien entity (the so-called professional villain in the media narrative). This is the true power and function of narrative.

In Hong Kong, the 1987 sci-fi cult classic The Hidden and its 1993 sequel The Hidden II were released with titles that translated roughly to "Alien Possession" or "Hidden Killer."

The Hidden (1987)

• Chinese Title: 《異形附身》 (Jyutping: ji6 jing4 fu6 san1)

• Literal Meaning: Alien Possession

• This title capitalized on the popularity of the "Alien" (異形) franchise in Hong Kong.

The Hidden II (1993)

• Chinese Title: 《隱藏殺手 2》 (Jyutping: jan2 cong4 saat3 sau2 ji6)

• Literal Meaning: Hidden Killer 2

• In some regions and on certain databases, this sequel is also referred to as a continuation of the "Alien Possession" title (異形附身 2).

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