Hong Kong Intelligence Report #43 THE INTELLIGENCE WAR ON COVID-19: Reading COVID-19-origin Reports
Updated: Aug 30, 2021
@President Joe Biden Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
“You know, it’s sufficient just to closely monitor what’s going on in the world always and then you’ll understand the logic behind what is going on. Why ordinary people often lose touch with what is going on? Why do they consider these things complicated? Why do they think that something is concealed from their eyes? This is simply because ordinary people live their lives. On an everyday basis they go to work and earn money, and they are not following international affairs. That’s why ordinary people are so easy to manipulate, to be misled but if they were to follow what’s going on in the world on an everyday basis, then despite the fact that some part of diplomacy is always conducted behind closed doors, it’s still going to be easier to understand what’s going on and you’ll be able to grasp the logic behind world developments. And you can achieve it even without having access to secret documents.” - Vladimir Putin (1)
The three laboratories in Wuhan working with either CoVs diagnostics and/or CoVs isolation and vaccine development all had high quality biosafety level (BSL3 or 4) facilities that were well-managed, with a staff health monitoring programme with no reporting of COVID-19 compatible respiratory illness during the weeks/months prior to December 2019, and no serological evidence of infection in workers through SARS-CoV-2-specific serology-screening. The Wuhan CDC lab which moved on 2nd December 2019 reported no disruptions or incidents caused by the move. They also reported no storage nor laboratory activities on CoVs or other bat viruses preceding the outbreak. - WHO (2)
IMPORTANT
Unlike the official narrative of main stream media, the COVID-origin report 'WHO-convened global study of origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part' is as important as 'Report of the International Science Commission for the Investigation of the Facts concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China' (Beijing, 1952). It has the historical meaning for China.
The WHO report marked the Chinese victory in the intelligence war on the COVID-origin dispute by scientifically refuting conspiracy theories including the notorious Wuhan lab theory.
US intelligence agencies recently submitted the classified and inconclusive COVID-origin report to Joe Biden on August 24, 2021 without any evidence to back their either animal or lab theory against China. It means that they self-revealed their own groundlessness of those pure allegations / fabrication which including the totally meaningless 'successful' SIGINT story of August 5, 2021 by CNN. In fact, genomic sequence data from China have been publicly shared with scientists of all over the world and thoroughly analysed during the WHO probe. READ MORE: Overnight Health Care: Biden given inconclusive intel report on COVID-19 origin Key Takeaways (the IC=intelligence community)
The WHO report surprisingly proved several politically important points under the increasing US pressure and systematic distortion by mainstream media including major Hong Kong media. Unfortunately, there was no Hong Kong local media truthfully covered key points in the report while no one actually read it in detail or deliberately just transferred the western media reports without critical thinking. The WHO report is a mirror to reflect corruption of Hong Kong journalism. Such as the Alibaba-owned US media SCMP's 'unseen Wuhan research notes' is a good example. The authority of WHO research is under attack.
1. The Entry Pathway of the Virus to Wuhan: The highest possibility of the entry pathway of SARS-COV-2 pandemic in 2019 is considered to be the cold chain products to the market in Wuhan from 20 countries and regions not indigenous animals or Wuhan labs in China. Furthermore, no bats or pangolins sold in the market. The most positive cases at the market are linked to the cold chain products.
2. Declassified information on the Patient Zero: The Chinese government disclosed many state secrets to the WHO research teams unprecedentedly in order to refute conspiracy theories. For instance, the first patient of December 1, 2019 was proven to be a non-lab staff but he has been turned out to be the earliest domestic cluster case that indirectly related to the market exposure. Now it was redefined to be December 26, 2019 case when his wife was proven to be directly exposed to the market and himself was also officially tested positive to COVID-19. As a result, the date of the earliest case of China is the December 8, 2019 not December 1, 2019. This declassified information denied the possibility of the lab theory.
3. 2019 Military World Games was a real event but no pneumonia case was confirmed by WHO. There was no COVID-19 case before December 2019 in China. However the earliest case of US is now revised as December 13, 2019.
4. Real Limitation of the Origin Research: It is time to expand the origin research to countries of the cold chain products, host countries of SARS-COV2-related bats, minks and pangolins, especially South East Asia like Malaysia (pangolins) and Cambodia (bats) as the WHO report suggests. There is no accurate original host of the virus identified yet.
5. Truth of SARS-COV-2: No genetical modification of the virus confirmed by WHO. SARS-COV-2 fully originated in Mother Nature with still missing links to its evolution process.
FACTS
In May 2020, the World Health Assembly in resolution WHA73.1 requested the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) to continue to work closely with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and countries, as part of the One Health approach, to identify the zoonotic source of the virus and the route of introduction to the human population, including the possible role of intermediate hosts. The aim is to prevent both reinfection with the virus in animals and humans and the establishment of new zoonotic reservoirs, thereby reducing further risks of the emergence and transmission of zoonotic diseases.
The epidemiology working group closely examined the possibilities of identifying earlier cases of COVID-19 through studies from surveillance of morbidity due to respiratory diseases in and around Wuhan in late 2019. It also drew on national sentinel surveillance data; laboratory confirmations of disease; reports of retail pharmacy purchases for antipyretics, cold and cough medications; a convenience subset of stored samples of more than 4500 research project samples from the second half of 2019 stored at various hospitals in Wuhan, the rest of Hubei Province and other provinces. In none of these studies was there evidence of an impact of the causative agent of COVID-19 on morbidity in the months before the outbreak of COVID-19. Furthermore, surveillance data on all-cause mortality and pneumonia-specific mortality from Wuhan city and the rest of Hubei Province were reviewed. The documented rapid increase in all-cause mortality and pneumonia-specific deaths in the third week of 2020 indicated that virus transmission was widespread among the population of Wuhan by the first week of 2020. The steep increase in mortality that occurred one to two weeks later among the population in the Hubei Province outside Wuhan suggested that the epidemic in Wuhan preceded the spread in the rest of Hubei Province. (3)
1. The Entry Pathway of the Virus to Wuhan:
The presence of SARS-CoV-2 has not been detected through sampling and testing of bats or of wildlife across China. (4)
More than 80 000 wildlife, livestock and poultry samples were collected from 31 provinces in China and no positive result was identified for SARS-CoV-2 antibody or nucleic acid before and after the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in China. Through extensive testing of animal products in the Huanan market, no evidence of animal infections was found. (5)
Environmental sampling in Huanan market from right at the point of its closing showed out of 923 environmental samples in Huanan market, 73 samples were positive. This revealed widespread contamination of surfaces with SARS-CoV-2, compatible with introduction of the virus through infected people, infected animals or contaminated products. The supply chains to Huanan market included cold-chain products and animal products from 20 countries, including those where samples have been reported as positive for SARS-CoV-2 before the end of 2019 and those where close relatives of SARS-CoV-2 are found. SARS-CoV-2 has been found to persist in conditions found in frozen food, packaging and cold-chain products. Index cases in recent outbreaks in China have been linked to the cold chain; the virus has been found on packages and products from other countries that supply China with cold-chain products, indicating that it can be carried long distances on cold-chain products.
The joint team’s assessment of likelihood of each possible pathway was as follows: direct zoonotic spillover is considered to be a possible-to-likely pathway; introduction through an intermediate host is considered to be a likely to very likely pathway; introduction through cold/ food chain products is considered a possible pathway; introduction through a laboratory incident was considered to be an extremely unlikely pathway. (6)
The 92 cases were followed up in January 2021 and blood for SARS-CoV-2 serology collected from 67 of them (the remainder either having died, refused or were unobtainable). All 67 sera were reported to be SARS-CoV-2-specific antibody negative. No evidence for substantial SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the months preceding the outbreak in December 2019, sporadic transmission or minor clusters of SARS- CoV-2 cannot be ruled out.
No appreciable signals of clusters of fever or severe respiratory disease-requiring hospitalisation were identified in association with mass gatherings during September to December 2019. (7)
The global haplotype network analysis included 348 early SAR-CoV-2 sequences with high quality and clear sampling location information from China and 142 early high-quality sequences published abroad. (8)
The sequence data also showed that some diversity of viruses was already present in the early phase of the pandemic in Wuhan, suggesting unsampled chains of transmission beyond the Huanan market cluster. (9)
Three recent COVID-19 outbreaks in China have been linked to exposure to imported refrigerated or frozen seafood products. An outbreak in Beijing linked to the Xinfadi market was first identified on 11 June 2020 after 56 days without a single known community case of COVID-19 in Beijing. Full genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of publicly available genomes suggests that the virus was from the L lineage European branch 1 with specific mutations characteristic to the market outbreak. However, it is not possible to fully infer the source of contamination from this work yet. In October 2020, an outbreak occurred in Qingdao. The index cases for the cluster were two dock workers from the city’s port with no history of travel or recognized contact with anyone with confirmed COVID- 19; the only epidemiological link which could be established between the cases was exposure to SARS- CoV-2 on the surface of cold-chain packaging. In addition, SARS-CoV-2 viruses were isolated from swabs of the outside surfaces of imported cold-chain packages in Qingdao. Based on these observations, China has launched a programme for systematic screening of packaged frozen imported food. Although re-introduction of a pandemic virus to epidemic-free areas can occur via various transmission routes including imported goods during a pandemic, the similarities between the outbreaks in the Beijing Xinfadi market and Qingdao, leading to the consideration of potential introduction of the virus through frozen products into the Huanan market in late 2019. For research focusing on the origin of SARS-CoV-2, this will need to be aligned with sources of those products.
Some vendors sold more than one product type, leading to differences in the denominators: 16/87 (18.4%) of vendors selling cold-chain products were positive (95% CI: 10.9- 28.1%) while five did not; 13/73 (17.8%) of the vendors selling aquatic products were positive (95% CI: 9.8-28.5); six of the vendors selling seafood products were positive (11%, 6/56: 95% CI: 4-21.9%), eight of the vendors selling poultry were positive (22%, 8/37: 95% CI: 9.8-38.2%), five of the vendors selling livestock were positive (14%, 5/36: 95% CI: 4.7-29.5%), one vendor selling wildlife products was positive (11%, 1/9: 95% CI: 0.3-48.2%) and two vendors who sold vegetables were positive (25%, 2/8: 95% CI: 3.2-65%) (See Figure 1). (10)
According to sales records, in late December 2019, 10 animal stalls sold animals or products from snakes, avian species (chickens, ducks, gooses, pheasants and doves), Sika deer, badgers, rabbits, bamboo rats, porcupines, hedgehogs, salamanders, giant salamanders, bay crocodiles and Siamese crocodiles, among which snakes, salamanders and crocodiles were traded as live animals (Annex F, Table 3). Other products sold were frozen goods or bai tiao (remaining parts of poultry or livestock after removal of hair and viscera). Snakes and salamanders were slaughtered before being sold, but crocodiles were alive when sold. No living or dead animals of foreign origin were identified from the sales records in late December 2019. (11)
Tests on samples of more than 1000 bats from Hubei Province showed that none was positive for viruses related to SARS-CoV-2 (see Annex F, Table 4). (12)
Through tracking and inquiry of these 26 wholesalers, partial information was obtained about 17 upstream wholesalers from nine provinces and cities in China who imported cold-chain products into the Huanan market. Further trace-back showed that in addition to China, there were altogether 20 imported cold-chain product source countries and regions, and 29 kinds of imported cold-chain products. Information, including product name, import custom, source province (domestic) or country (international) and product quantity, was collected. Information about all imported cold-chain products in Wuhan from September to December 2019 was also collected and reviewed, involving a total of 440 kinds of cold-chain products from 37 import source countries or regions (Table 11). Information about the farms supplying the 10 vendors of farmed wild animal products were also collected (Annex F, Table 3).
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Spain, Thailand, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Viet Nam. (13)
The proportion of cases in stalls with cold-chain goods (5.6%) is significantly higher than those without cold-chain goods (1.7%), and the relative risk of cases in stalls with cold-chain goods is 3.3 times higher than those without cold-chain goods (relative risk = 3.3, 95% CI:1.2-8.6), and the morbidity rate of vendors of cold-chain products is higher than others (3.3% compared with 1.4%), but there is no statistically significant difference.
Epidemiological analysis showed that the first three cases in Huanan market all had a history of exposure to cold chain.
Analyses show that 60% (44/73) of the positive samples are related to 21 stalls, 19 of which were located in the western part of the Huanan market, and the remaining two stalls were located in the eastern part. 16 stalls were dealing with cold-chain product. (14)
Here, it is important to distinguish between contamination of cold chain products leading to secondary outbreaks in 2020 and the potential for cold chain acting as the entry pathway for the origin of the pandemic in 2019. While there is some evidence for possible reintroduction of SARS-CoV-2 through handling of imported contaminated frozen products in China since the initial pandemic wave, this would be extraordinary in 2019 where the virus was not widely circulating. (15)
2. Declassified information on the Patient Zero:
For those cases where the information was available, 55.4% had a history of recent exposure to a market:28.0% to the Huanan market only, 22.6% to other markets only, and 4.8% to both. 44.6% had no history of market exposure (see Fig. 24 and Annex E4). Cases with market exposure were more evident among the early cases but exposure to other markets occurred in the earliest cases as much as exposure to the Huanan market. The case reported with the earliest onset date (8 December) had no history of exposure to the Huanan market. (16)
Other exposures reported by patients included “dead animals”, which included meat and fish (26.4%), live animals (11.8%), cold-chain products (26.4% - with a greater proportion among clinically diagnosed cases), and travel outside Wuhan (8.9%) including one case with international travel (to Thailand). (17)
Three possible cases with disease onset on 1, 2 and 7 December 2019, respectively, were initially identified as potential cases in the retrospective case search and have been included in some published papers. Clinical review of these three cases by the Chinese expert team led to their exclusion as possible cases on the basis of the clinical features of their illness.
In the case with onset on 1 December, a 62-year-old man with past history of cerebrovascular disease was judged to have had a minor respiratory illness in early December, which responded to antibiotics. He developed a further illness with onset on 26 December 2019, which was later laboratory-confirmed to be COVID-19. This patient had no reported contact to the Huanan market, whereas his wife, who was admitted on 26 December with a COVID-19 compatible illness, reported close contact with the Huanan market. She was also later laboratory-confirmed to have COVID-19. This couple, together with their son, became part of the first recognised family cluster of COVID-19. (18)
On 10 January 2020, the first SARS-CoV-2 genomes were made publicly available on GenBank and Virological.org and on GISAID. To date (6 February 2021), GISAID has recorded a total of 487 487 SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences from 238 countries and regions, as well as the metadata information corresponding to the sequences. The 2019nCoVR database has integrated 2089 non-redundant sequences (by 3 February 2021) from 17 provinces and regions of China (see Fig. 3). Of these, 2028 sequences were collected from human cases (Table 2), 28 sequences were collected from the environment (Table 3), and 33 sequences were from possible animal hosts (pangolin and bat), from pets (cats and dogs) or from animal experiments (mouse and hamster). All these sequences are publicly accessible. (19)
3. 2019 Military World Games:
The NNDRS was notified of 174 COVID-19 cases with onset of symptoms in December 2019. In an extensive exercise by 233 health institutions in Wuhan, some 76,253 records of cases of respiratory conditions in the two months of October and November before the outbreak in late 2019 were scrutinized clinically. Although 92 cases were considered to be compatible with SARS-CoV-2 infection after review, subsequent testing and further external multidisciplinary clinical review determined that none was in fact due to SARS-CoV-2 infection. Based on the analysis of this and other surveillance data, it is considered unlikely that any substantial transmission of SARS-CoV-2 infection was occurring in Wuhan during those two months. (20)
The Chinese Epidemiology Group provided information on of international gatherings held in Wuhan from September-December 2019 (Table 2). These included the 7th World Military Games held from 18 to 27 October 2019 (9308 participants listed as attending), and the 44th World Bridge Team Championships in September 2019. In the Military Games, four African participants were diagnosed and treated for malaria, and one U.S. citizen presented with gastroenteritis. The Jinyintan Hospital provided medical support for the games, including on-site clinics (data from these clinics have not yet been evaluated by the joint team). From the Bridge Championships an Italian was admitted with acute gastroenteritis. No appreciable signals of clusters of fever or severe respiratory disease requiring hospitalization were identified during review of these events. (21)
4. Real Limitation of the Origin Research:
The molecular epidemiology and bioinformatics working group examined the genomic data of viruses collected from animals. Evidence from surveys and targeted studies so far have shown that the coronaviruses most highly related to SARS-CoV-2 are found in bats and pangolins, suggesting that these mammals may be the reservoir of the virus that causes COVID-19. However, neither of the viruses identified so far from these mammalian species is sufficiently similar to SARS-CoV-2 to serve as its direct progenitor. In addition to these findings, the high susceptibility of mink and cats to SARS-CoV- 2 suggests that additional species of animals may act as a potential reservoir. In addition, the time to the most recent common ancestor of the SARS-CoV-2 sequences in the final data set was estimated and compared with results from previous studies. Such analyses can be considered estimates but do not provide definitive proof of time of origins. Based on molecular sequence data, the results suggested that the outbreak may have started some time in the months before the middle of December 2019. The point estimates for the time to the most recent ancestor ranged from late September to early December, but most estimates were between mid-November and early December. (22)
Although the role of civets as intermediate hosts in the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002-2004 had been favoured and a role for pangolins in the outbreak of COVID-19 was initially posited, subsequent epidemiological and epizootic studies have not substantiated the contribution of these animals in transmission to humans. The possible intermediate host of SARS-CoV- 2 remains elusive. SARS-CoV-2 also shares a 96.2% homology with a sequence of a strain of coronavirus (RaTG13) previously identified by genetic sequencing from a horseshoe bat sample (Rhinolophus species) and to a lesser extent with a strain isolated from pangolins. The RaTG13 virus sequence is the closest known sequence to SARS-CoV-2. (23)
In summary, the tMRCA analysis based on molecular sequence data suggested that the pandemic onset occurred before the end of December 2019. The tMRCA analyses can be considered a statistical inference but do not provide definitive proof of time of origins. (24)
A few studies suggest that cases may have occurred before December 2019, the time when circulation of SARS-CoV-2 was thought to have started in Hubei Province. In a retrospective survey, sewage samples collected on 12 March 2019 in Barcelona, Spain, were positive for SARS-CoV- 2 RNA, but other samples collected between January 2018 and December 2019 were all negative. The PCR signals has not been confirmed by sequencing and could be false-positive signals.
In Italy, the first known COVID-19 case was reported in the town of Codogno in the Lombardy region on 21 February 2020. Since then, a few studies have suggested evidence for earlier circulation. La Rosa and others found the first positive sewage sample in northern Italy mid-December 2019, using a sewage testing protocol with nested PCR. In the same region, SARS-CoV-2 was detected by PCR in a throat swab from a child with suspected measles early in December. Gianotti et al. reported reactivity by in situ hybridization with a range of probes for SARS-CoV-2 in skin biopsies from a 25- year-old woman sampled in November 2019. She tested negative by PCR but in June 2020 was serologically positive. A serological survey among participants in a lung cancer screening programme described finding a few persons with neutralizing antibodies as early as October 2019. A serological survey among participants in a lung cancer screening programme described finding a few persons with neutralizing antibodies as early as October 2019.
In France, an oropharyngeal sample from a haemoptysis patient who was admitted to hospital on 27 December 2019 was identified positive by RT-PCR for SARS-CoV-2 RNA. In France, an oropharyngeal sample from a haemoptysis patient who was admitted to hospital on 27 December 2019 was identified positive by RT-PCR for SARS-CoV-2 RNA. A separate, serological study found evidence for a significant increase in prevalence of neutralizing antibodies in mid-December, suggesting considerable earlier circulation of the virus.
In Brazil, testing of sewage by RT-PCR yielded SARS-CoV-2-positive results in samples collected on 27 November 2019, much earlier than the first reported case in the Americas.
In the United States of America, a serological survey of 7389 archived donated blood samples collected between 13 December 2019 and 17 January 2020 from nine states identified 106 positive samples, suggesting that SARS-CoV-2 might have been introduced into United States of America before the first identified case in the country.
Collectively, these studies from different countries suggest that SARS-CoV-2 circulation preceded the initial detection of cases by several weeks. Some of the suspected positive samples were detected even earlier than the first case in Wuhan, suggesting that circulation of the virus in other regions had been missed. So far, however, the study findings were not confirmed, methods used were not standardized, and serological assays may suffer from non-specific signals. Nonetheless, it is important to investigate these potential early events. (25)
5. Truth of SARS-COV-2:
SARS-CoV-2 is thought to have had a zoonotic origin. Genome analysis reveals that bats may be the source of SARS-CoV-2 (Fig.8). However, the specific route of transmission from natural reservoirs to humans remains unclear. Initial analysis revealed that the SARS-CoV-2 genome (WH-Human 1) was closely related to SARS-like coronaviruses previously found in bats,(10) and the whole-genome sequence identity of the novel virus has 96.2% similarity to a bat SARS-related coronavirus (SARSr-CoV; RaTG13).
In contrast, the SARS-CoV-2 genome is less similar to the genomes of SARS-CoV (about 79%) or MERS-CoV (about 50%).
Notably, a novel bat-derived coronavirus, denoted RmYN02, shares 93.3% nucleotide identity with SARS-CoV-2 at the genomic scale.
Besides RaTG13 and RmYN02, very recently SARS-CoV-2-related coronaviruses were isolated from two Rhinolophus shameli bats (RshSTT200 and RshSTT182). These animals were sampled in Cambodia in 2010, and samples were processed for sequencing recently. The whole genome comparisons indicated that these viruses overall shared the nucleotide identity of 92.6% with SARS- CoV-2. The results suggest that the geographical distribution of SARS-CoV-2 related viruses is much wider than previously expected. Another study found related viruses in Thailand, in Rhinolophus acuminatus bats, where near identical viruses were found in five animals from a single colony, suggesting a colony-specific sequence signature. The above-mentioned bat viruses differ in their ability to bind to the human ACE2 receptor from RmYN02, but both RmYN02 and RshSTT200/182 share part of the furin-cleavage site unique to SARS-CoV-2. There is evidence of recombination in the evolutionary history of these Thailand bat coronaviruses. These findings do show that the ongoing search for the origins of SARS-CoV-2 should consider wider geographical ranges, multiple potentially susceptible species, and a sampling design that includes knowledge on number and densities of colonies.
Current studies have demonstrated that Malayan pangolins (Manis javanica) hosted two sub-lineages of SARS-CoV-2-related coronaviruses (see Fig.8). In the first study, animals (including four Chinese pangolins (M. pentadactyla) and 25 Malayan pangolins (M. javanica)) had been obtained during anti- smuggling operations by the Guangdong customs in March and August 2019. The viruses from the animals (termed pangolin-CoV-GDC) shared a genomic similarity of 90.1% to SARS-CoV-2.
Five of the six critical amino acid residues in the receptor-binding domain differ between SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV, and structural analysis revealed that the spike of SARS- CoV-2 has a higher binding affinity to ACE2 than SARS-CoV. (26)
Regarding plausible zoonotic reservoir hosts: surveys of the bat virome conducted following the SARS epidemic in 2003 have found SARSr-CoV in various bats, particularly Rhinolophus bats, and viruses with the high genetic similarity to SARS-CoV-2 have been found in Rhinolophus bats sampled in China in 2013, Japan in 2013, Thailand in 2020 and Cambodia in 2010. Recently, two distinct types of SARSr-CoV were detected in Malayan pangolin (M. Javanica sampled in rescue centres in China for smuggled imported wildlife). The RaTG13 and pangolin coronaviruses do bind to hACE2, although the fit is not optimal. Seeding of SARS-CoV-2 in mink populations has shown that these animals are highly susceptible as well and the current evidence available cannot rule out the possibility for minks as the primary source of SARS- CoV-2. (27)
Despite consumption of bat and other wild animal meat in some countries, there is no evidence for transmission of coronaviruses from such encounters, and the trace-back investigation found no evidence for presence of bats or pangolins (or their products) in the market.
Although the closest related viruses have been found in bats, the evolutionary distance between these bat viruses and SARS-CoV-2 is estimated to be several decades, suggesting a missing link (either a missing progenitor virus, or evolution of a progenitor virus in an intermediate host). SARS-CoV-2 has been identified in an increasing number of animal species, but genetic and epidemiological studies have suggested that these were infections introduced from humans, rather than enzootic virus circulation.
Based on epidemiological analysis and genetic sequencing of viruses from new cases throughout 2020, there is no evidence of repeated introduction of early SARS-CoV-2 strains of potential animal origins into humans in China. (28)
SARS-CoV-2 is introduced through a laboratory incident, reflecting an accidental infection of staff from laboratory activities involving the relevant viruses. We did not consider the hypothesis of deliberate release or deliberate bioengineering of SARS-CoV-2 for release, the latter has been ruled out by other scientists following analyses of the genome.
THE CLOSEST RELATIVES OF SARS-COV-2 FROM BATS AND PANGOLIN ARE EVOLUTIONARILY DISTANT FROM SARS- COV-2.
The closest relatives of SARS-CoV-2 from bats and pangolin are evolutionarily distant from SARS-CoV-2. There has been speculation regarding the presence of human ACE2 receptor binding and a furin-cleavage site in SARS-CoV-2, but both have been found in animal viruses as well, and elements of the furin-cleavage site are present in RmYN02 and the new Thailand bat SARSr-CoV.
There is no record of viruses closely related to SARS-CoV-2 in any laboratory before December 2019, or genomes that in combination could provide a SARS-CoV-2 genome. (29)
COMMENT
In conclusion, it is quite difficult to frame China as the origin of SARS-COV2. The official narrative THE RESIDENT EVIL (ZOMBIE APOCALYPSE?) by the western intelligence agencies and their private mainstream media (including Hong Kong 'professional' media) is totally false. Yes, the story was actually made in their fake news LABORATORIES. Indeed, the imperialists tend to downplay the scientific values of the WHO report. Stupid conspiracy theorists of both sides also must be condemned. According to the result of the phased WHO research, it is highly possible that SARS-COV-2 was not originated in China but it was imported to Wuhan from outside of China via the cold products supply chain during mid-November and early December 2019. Thus, fruit bats with ''coronavirus'' directly flying from Yunnan to Wuhan like fall armyworms is pure imagination of amateurs while SARS-COV-2 itself was still not exactly confirmed in them (Also it cannot explain the geographical jump). Read the WHO report by yourself. Moreover, you cannot only do research in China ''politically'' if you really want to find the origin of the pandemic.
READ MORE:
WHO-convened global study of origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part
NOTES
1. Oliver Stone, Skyhorse Publishing, Inc. (New York, 2017) 'THE PUTIN INTERVIEWS', pp.22-23.
2. https://www.who.int, WHO, (March 30, 2021) 'WHO-convened global study of origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part', p.119. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-convened-global-study-of-origins-of-sars-cov-2-china-part
3. Ibid., pp.6-7.
4. Ibid., p.8.
5. Ibid., p.8.
6. Ibid., p.9.
7. Ibid., p.54.
8. Ibid., p.67.
9. Ibid., p.78.
10. Ibid., p.96.
11. Ibid., p.98.
12. Ibid., p.106.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p.107.
15. Ibid., p.116.
16. Ibid., p.44.
17. Ibid., p.45.
18. Ibid., p.46.
19. Ibid., p.61.
20. Ibid., p.7.
21. Ibid., p.29.
22. Ibid., p.7.
23. Ibid., p.9.
24. Ibid., p.81.
25. Ibid., p.82.
26. Ibid., p.83.
27. Ibid., p.113.
28. Ibid., p.116.
29. Ibid., p.119.
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