Hong Kong Intelligence Report #99 永續谷針常態化與負資產威脅論
Updated: Feb 2
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】
「容許新冠和流感等呼吸道病毒在夏季傳播,鞏固社區免疫屏障。」 - 袁國勇
"Allowing the spread of respiratory viruses such as COVID-19 and influenza in the summer and strengthening the community immune barrier."
- Yuen Kwok-yung
▪️香港市民在中港放開防疫措施的過程上目擊的其實是,本港上層集團明反中央國策的種種政治表態。香港政治的金主聯盟的主要代表是香港總商會。李家超政府及其代表的本港資本勢力原來打算在2023年1月22日前,後來2023年1月31日成功撤銷內地核酸檢測要求和通關名額,但結局不僅是它們一再炒作的股市在2023年1月31日降回到了2023年1月19日的21000點水平(主因是在人民幣對港幣匯率升值的操縱下,本來有的外圍下降壓力持續,2023年1月31日實現全免檢疫通關落空,投機者至今仍然只看到一系列公關花招,包括‘特首中東之旅’,而非任何具有實際作用的經濟政策),星期二早上行政會議前記者會上也無法發表撤掉內地核酸檢測要求和通關名額。目前,李家超搶先取消本港所有出入境都取消核酸檢測,快側以及接種疫苗等要求又是鑽空整個中國,尤其是內地防疫措施的一招。我們要看清楚的是到底誰在違抗中央政府的防疫政策。要求內地取消核酸檢測以及通關名額的官僚,立法會議員,所謂政黨(有限公司/社團),政府專家顧問,法定機構,商會,工會(社團),社團,有限公司(聯會/協會/俱樂部/結社/其他各種名義下的壓力團體)等的公關小丑都在積極明反國策。雖港府的一些列放開防疫措施背後有,巨額投資和財政虧損,但港府主要代表的是位於香港的內外貪婪資本的短視利益。此外,1月30日起撤銷隔離令及毋需上報感染個案之後,進入了全面瞞報的社會狀態。撤掉防疫措施並不等於疫情消失;不上報也並不等於感染個案存在。2023年1月16日起CT值陰性門檻調低(從40到35)後,2023年1月29日3283新增感染案件一夜間突然被扣除到1月30日358新增感染案件是個瞞報的鐵證之一(港府官僚主義露骨地操縱統計)。故此,所謂‘後疫情時代’,‘復常’是基於全面瞞報的永續谷針常態化(與病毒共存)。其實,本港跟隨美國步伐,每年將會接種輝瑞疫苗。就政治的整體而言,港府維護的正是美國(資本)的利益。有趣的是,正如反修例風波,港府拒絕了問責的獨立調查委員會的成立。有一股歪風是,不問責的獨立調查云云。建制朋黨最善於搞出混淆視聽的偽命題爭議(偷換議題,轉移焦點)來固定化既定路線。這就是為什麼市民絕不該自動化地掉入政治化的陷阱(藍黃顏色政治的自動化選邊站解讀)及整個愛國騷的敘事模式(所謂港獨分裂主義是港府用以上演愛國騷的反派角色,本港內外資本攜手並肩塑造的,欺騙中央的大幻影,以在新口號/姿態/形勢下維護既得利益)。香港政治的主要金主聯盟香港總商會及其立法會代表林健鋒集中代表內外資本的政治主張。民建聯,經民聯,中華總商會等明反中央的國策(最近,如核酸檢測以及通關名額等)是絕不可忽視的。它們代表的根本不是什麼共產黨,而是本港內外資本(內部勢力和外部勢力的聯合)的政治野心和貪欲。中央和內地何時醒過來正視它們的政治本色?它們不僅拒絕了反修例風波的獨立調查委員會,也拒絕了防疫三年的獨立調查委員會。
What the people of Hong Kong witnessed in the course of the epidemic prevention measures in Hong Kong and China was in fact a political statement by the upper echelons of the Hong Kong community that was explicitly against the state policy of the Central Government. The main representative of Hong Kong's political coalition of money masters is the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. The John Lee Ka-chiu government and the local capitalist forces it represents originally intended to successfully remove the requirement for nucleic acid testing and clearance quotas in the Mainland by January 22, 2023, and later on January 31, 2023, but the result was not only that their repeatedly speculated stock market dropped back to the January 19, 2023 level of 21,000 points on January 31, 2023 (the stock price uprising is mainly due to the manipulation of the appreciation of the Renminbi against the Hong Kong dollar). This is because the speculators still only see a series of PR gimmicks, including the 'Chief Executive's trip to the Middle East', rather than any economic policies with real effects. The withdrawal of the nucleic acid testing requirement and the quota for customs clearance could not be announced at the press conference before the Executive Council on Tuesday morning. At the moment, John Lee Ka-chiu had pre-empted the abolition of nucleic acid testing at all Hong Kong border crossings, and the fast side and vaccination requirements are another move to cancel the whole China, especially the Mainland's epidemic prevention measures. What we need to see clearly is who is defying the central government's epidemic prevention policy. Bureaucrats, legislators, so-called political parties (limited companies/societies), government expert advisors, statutory bodies, chambers of commerce, trade unions (societies), societies, limited companies (federations/associations/clubs/other pressure groups under various names), and their public relations clowns who demand the abolition of nucleic acid testing and customs clearance quotas in the Mainland side are all actively opposing the national policy. Although there are huge investments and financial losses behind some of the government's measures to liberalize the epidemic, the government mainly represents the short-sighted interests of greedy capital, both internal and external to Hong Kong. Moreover, after the lifting of the quarantine order and the non-reporting of infections on January 30, the community has entered a state of total non-reporting. After the lowering of the CT negative threshold (from 40 to 35) on January 16, 2023, the 3283 new infections on January 29, 2023 were suddenly deducted overnight to the 358 new infections on January 30, 2023, which is one of the hardest evidence of underreporting (the blatant bureaucratic manipulation of statistics by the Hong Kong government). Therefore, in the so-called 'post-epidemic era', the 'resumption of normalcy' is based on the permanent normalization of total underreporting (co-existence with the virus). In fact, Hong Kong is following the lead of the United States and will receive the Pfizer vaccine every year. In the overall political context, it is the interests of the US (capital) that the Hong Kong government is defending. Interestingly, as in the case of the anti-amendment bill fiasco, the Hong Kong government has refused to set up an independent commission of inquiry into accountability. There is a perverse trend of independent investigation without accountability. The pro-establishment cronies are very good at creating confusing pseudo-proposition controversies (changing the subject and shifting the focus) to fix the established line. This is why the public should never automatically fall into the trap of politicization (the automatic-side-selection interpretation of blue and yellow colour politics) and the whole narrative of the patriotic show (the so-called Hong Kong independence separatism is a villainous role used by the Hong Kong government to stage the patriotic show, shaped by the capital inside and outside Hong Kong, to deceive the central government in order to protect vested interests under the new slogans/postures). The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC) and its representative in the Legislative Council, Jeffrey Lam, are the main political core of Hong Kong politics, representing the political advocacy of internal and external capital collectively. The explicitly anti-Central government policies (recently, such as nucleic acid testing and customs quotas) of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL), the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce (CGCC), etc. cannot be ignored. What they represent is not the Communist Party at all, but the political ambition and greed of the local and external capital (a combination of internal and external forces). When will the Central Authorities and the Mainland wake up to realise their political nature? They have rejected not only the independent commission of inquiry into the anti-amendment bill controversy, but also the independent commission of inquiry into the three-year epidemic prevention.
▪️跟著所謂簡約公屋的公關和議題操縱,地產黨又積極主張撤除防炒樓辣椒以及‘負資產’威脅論。這有幾個重點可以反駁,第一,內外媒體普遍不願意報導平均樓價的具體數據。從2019年的964萬港幣到2022年9月的791萬港幣之間的徘徊,對一般人而言,天價降下也只降到天價水平而已。三大辣招稅:額外印花稅(Special Stamp Duty,SSD)、雙倍印花稅(Double Stamp Duty,DSD)及買家印花稅(Buyer Stamp Duty,BSD)遏止和徵稅的對象是炒樓行為。辣椒税並非高樓價的原因。地產黨的‘撤辣’政宣顛倒因果關係,移花接木。若說要撤除辣椒税,那則等於地產黨主張‘辣椒税是高樓價的原因’。這就是詭辯,是因為炒樓就是高樓價的原因;第二,特別要注意,不僅是香港,美國(花旗銀行),法國媒體(RFI)也已表態支撐地產霸權。所謂負資產威脅論是它們最大的政宣武器。不過,經濟學的基本概念足以反駁這些歪論。未實現的利潤(unrealized profit)即物業也好,股票也好,利潤得失,尤其價格是只有在購買或賣出去的時候才確定的。這包含貸款購買物業時,一直到轉售的那一刻才確定其價格/利潤的,因此負資產威脅論是炒樓投機份子的理財觀點,而非‘房住不炒’。對純粹居住的住戶毫無關係,反正其確定的價格是當購買的時候確定的;第三,簡約公屋包含了太多問題。例如:a)揭穿其公關性質的是,李家超政府5年任內僅製造3萬個所謂簡約公屋這一點。b) 簡約公屋的最多人居住面積與納米樓差不多一樣。31平方米是279平方呎(本港媒體普遍不願意以平方呎來明確解釋大小,混淆視聽)。每一個香港市民的平均居住面積為172平方呎;本港納米樓為220至260平方呎左右。誠然,連只看全港每一個人的平均居住面積處於納米樓水平也是個警示。整個香港是納米樓社會;c) 簡約公屋的成本高過真公屋。簡約公屋89萬港幣(後來稱扣減到55萬);真公屋65萬;過渡性房屋55萬。為何直接建設真公屋呢?這是不合理的;d) 刪除傢俱和過渡期津貼是敷衍預算案討論而已。如此降低本來惡劣的居住品質而已。既然刪除過渡期津貼,那就更不應該把簡約公屋的居住時間算在等上公屋的總輪候時間之內;e)在平均租金高達2萬港幣水平(20,919港元或說約2.2萬;2019)之下,港府推動總預算267.9億到259.9億的簡約公屋計劃是明顯壓縮和遏止真公屋的發展。民建聯提倡的不適切居所(分間單位)牌照制度與告別劏房背道而馳,反而合法化和鞏固既得利益勢力。若真正要告別劏房,則必須立法禁絕所有不適切居所經營。房屋局,民建聯以及整個地產黨(九龍倉梁志堅是其公關人物之一)的意在保留‘舒適’,‘有需求的’不適切居所。如此只顧慮資本單方面的利益。f) 陳茂波只提及私人樓宇空置的數據太少了。這就是其範疇和定義不夠全面。 據統計處的統計,全港有296萬個永久性居住屋宇單位(2021)這足以容納公屋申請總數234600。那全港家庭總數為267萬個住戶單位(2021年人口普查)。實際的空置單位數該包括已出售的空置單位,而非地產商自願上報的尚未出售單位數。實際的全港空置單位總量為296萬個永久性居住屋宇單位- 全港家庭總數為267萬個住戶單位=實際空置單位總量 29萬個公私空置單位。這就是空置稅的根據。打擊這個才能撼動地產霸權。這必須由中央政府正視,才能有正面變化。g) 簡約公屋是港府和地產黨之間,就短時間營運而達成同意的,因此投入運作5年後恐怕就被拆除。如此浪費巨額公帑。 這將會遏止真公屋的建設力度和損害社會物質條件,這也就是該發展真公屋的理由。若港府真有解決房屋問題的決心,則不會有簡約公屋的玩意兒。建制派小丑立法會議員楊永杰對啟德世運道選址的刁難是轉移議題的政治公關,與表面膚淺的爭議不同,其意在鞏固既定的簡約公屋路線,為此誤導和政治化民眾。總之,簡約公屋的政治目的在於遏止真公屋的發展。
Along with the so-called public relations and issue manipulation of light public housing (LPH), the real estate party of Hong Kong is actively advocating the removal of the anti-speculation 'chili pepper' tax and the 'negative equity' threat theory. First, the media, both inside and outside, are generally reluctant to report specific data on average property prices. From 9.64 million Hong Kong dollars in 2019 to September 2022 hovering between 7.91 million Hong Kong dollars, for the general public, the sky is falling only to the level of the sky. Three major 'chili' tax: Special Stamp Duty (SSD), Double Stamp Duty (DSD) and Buyer Stamp Duty (BSD) to curb and tax the target is about property speculation. 'Chili' tax is not the cause of high property prices at all. The real estate party's 'remove the pepper tax' political propaganda reverses the cause-and-effect relationship and replaces it with a new one. If we say that the pepper tax should be removed, then it is like the real estate party claiming that 'the pepper tax is the cause of high property prices'. This is sophistry, because property speculation is the reason for high property prices; secondly, it is particularly important to note that not only Hong Kong, but also the United States (Citibank) and the French media (RFI) have taken a stand in support of property hegemony(oligarchy). The so-called negative equity threat theory is their biggest political propaganda weapon. However, the basic concepts of economics are sufficient to refute these distortions. Unrealized profit is the gain or loss of profit, whether in property or stock, especially if the price is determined only at the time of purchase or sale. This includes loans to purchase property, and the price/profit is not determined until the moment of resale, so the threat of negative equity is the financial viewpoint of speculators, not for 'housing is not speculative'. It has nothing to do with purely residential tenants, whose prices are determined at the time of purchase anyway; third, there are too many problems with simple public housing. For example: a) The public relations nature of the project is revealed by the fact that the John Lee Ka-chiu government will have only produced 30,000 so-called light public housing (LPH) units during its five-year tenure. b) The maximum living area of a light public housing (LPH) unit is almost the same as that of a nanoflat. 31 square meters is 279 square feet (the media in Hong Kong are generally reluctant to explain the size in terms of square feet to confuse people). The average living space per person in Hong Kong is 172 square feet; in Hong Kong, it is about 220 to 260 square feet for a nanoflat. Admittedly, even looking at the average living area of every person in Hong Kong at the nano-floor level is a warning. Hong Kong as a whole is a nano-flat society; c) The cost of light public housing (LPH) is higher than that of real public housing. The cost of light public housing (LPH) is HK$890,000 (later reduced to HK$550,000); the cost of real public housing is HK$650,000; and the cost of transitional housing is HK$550,000. Why don't they build real public housing directly? This is unreasonable; d) The deletion of furniture and transitional allowances is just a perfunctory discussion of the budget. This is just a way to lower the quality of housing which is already poor. Since the transitional allowance has been removed, it is all the more unjustified to include the time spent on light public housing (LPH) in calculation of the total waiting time for public housing; e) With the average rent as high as HK$20,000 (HK$20,919 or about $22,000; 2019), the Hong Kong government's promotion of the light public housing (LPH) project with a total budget of $26.79 billion to $25.99 billion is an obvious attempt to compress and curb the development of real public housing for real-estate oligarchs. The licensing system for subdivided flats advocated by the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) runs counter to the idea of banning subdivided flats, but rather legitimizes and consolidates the power of vested interests. If we really want to end subdivided flats, we must legislate to ban all unsuitable accommodation. The intention of the Housing Bureau, DAB and the entire real estate party (Wharf Stewart Leung Chi-kin is one of their public relations figures) is to preserve the 'comfortable', 'needy' unsuitable accommodation. This is only the interest of capital alone. f) Paul Chan Mo-po only mentions too little data on private vacancies (he only includes vacancies that unsold by developers). That is, the scope and definition are not comprehensive enough. According to the Census and Statistics Department, there are 2.96 million permanent residential units in Hong Kong (2021) which is enough to accommodate a total of 234,600 applications for public housing (2022). The total number of households in Hong Kong is 2.67 million dwelling units (2021 Census). The actual number of vacant units includes the number of vacant units sold, not the number of unsold units voluntarily reported by real estate developers. The actual total number of vacant units in Hong Kong is 2.96 million permanent residential units - the total number of households in Hong Kong is 2.67 million dwelling units = the actual total number of vacant units 290,000 public and private vacant units(sold and unsold). This is the basis for the vacancy tax. The only way to shake the real estate hegemony is to fight this. This has to be addressed by the central government in order to bring about positive changes. g) The public housing agreement was agreed upon between the Hong Kong government and the real estate party for a short period of time, so it will be demolished after 5 years of operation. This is a waste of huge amounts of public money. This will deter the construction of real public housing and undermine the physical conditions of the society for that, which is the reason why real public housing should be developed. If the Hong Kong government is really determined to solve the housing problem, there will be no such thing as light public housing (LPH). Unlike the superficial controversy, the political public relations of the Kai Tak World Runway site is a diversion, and the intention is to consolidate the established line of light public housing (LPH) in order to mislead and politicize the public. In short, the political purpose of light public housing (LPH) is to stop the development of real public housing.
🔻 NEWS / FACTs 【事實關係】
本報告分析針對的期間內,本港市民該知曉的新聞和公告(論據):
▪️ 防疫政策
本報早在通關初期,已報道南下關口不嚴查核酸報告,內地關口義工教導申報人亂報入境日期,而內地海關人員亦未仔細核對核測報告的真偽,隨時成為新冠個案輸入的漏洞,所謂核酸檢查形同虛設,已淪為形式主義,有專家指應檢討是否仍然有需要維持。現在外國人來港入境都不需要交核酸檢測報告,但港人從內地回港卻要呈交,而內地人亦受同樣限制,難怪通關後不見內地遊客踴躍來港,規定核檢無疑令人卻步,本港零售業盼北水救市,看來還要多捱一段時間,待取消核檢要求才有轉機。
反國策的未經證實消息(本來單方面發布了農曆新年前全撤通關防疫措施的猜想):
新冠疫情纏港逾三載,政府仍維持口罩令及隔離令。有消息指,港府擬於農曆新年後,撤銷確診患者的強制隔離要求,屆時會考慮處理現有隔離設施,兼暫停指定診所及遙距診症服務,並於3至4月取消口罩令。
另外,中港兩地已恢復免檢疫通關,過關市民要持有48小時核酸無染疫證明。惟因內地部分核酸檢測站數量大減,且臨近農曆新年,包括醫院等不少地方停止核酸服務,令部分香港市民未能成功取得核酸無確診紀錄。據了解,港府考慮撤銷來港核酸檢測要求;另有消息指,當局有可能於農曆新年前,宣布「南上北下」毋須再作核酸檢測。
有日前從內地回港的港人表示,在當地難找到核酸檢測點,過程繁複頻撲,回港過關時亦無人檢測核酸檢測證明。 有立法會議員認為,相關措施多此一舉,希望盡快取消以便利兩地人員往來。
議員陳恆鑌指他剛從深圳回港,過程相當順利。他指出現時兩地疫情趨向穩定,當局有必要考慮改用快速抗源測試代替核酸檢測,尤其面對新春假期,不少內地檢測機構停工,港人在內地未必找到可檢測地點,希望當局與內地進一步協商。
香港與內地恢復通關,近來有聲音要求放寬兩地核酸檢測安排。政務司長陳國基今日接受電台訪問時透露,明日開始3歲或以下的幼童,進入內地前不用先接受核酸檢測,與入境香港的做法看齊。陳國基稱,港府與內地當局差不多每天就通關安排通電話聯繫,知道不少家長認為幼童要先做核酸檢測才能過關不方便,因此與內地當局商討,取消幼童檢測的安排。
中港終於恢復免檢疫通關,惟本港仍有約3萬名跨境學童,在疫情3年間未能來港上學。當局早前表示,要等待農曆新年後,跨境學童才可每日回港上面授課,屆時不需經網上預約過關,也不納入通關配額。教育局今日(18日)向傳媒透露,爭取在下月1日讓跨境學童來港上學,至於檢測及隨行人員等安排則仍在商討階段。當局期望可讓跨境生以快測取代核酸檢測要求;同時爭取開放更多口岸予他們過境。
政務司長陳國基指,本地疫情走勢向下,有條件推行免核酸檢測過關,但要視乎中央取態,未能承諾在過年前推出,強調若中央同意,隨時可以推出。陳國基接受《經濟日報》專訪時指,通關初期要求港人赴內地前須核酸陰性,是要力求穩妥,不會出現跨境交叉感染,但長遠越多人過關,核酸檢測能力受考驗,將來目標是用快測代替,終極目標是完全毋須檢測。陳國基不認同政府「擠牙膏式放寬」,認為是逐步有序。
本港疫情在2023年1月30日結束了?後疫情時代的假象是如此塑造的:
行政長官李家超宣佈,本月30日起取消針對新冠病情的隔離令。李家超在立法會答問會表示,本港的混合免疫屏障已十分牢固,已完成接種疫苗的人士一旦感染Omicron病毒,也多屬輕症;而且3年來疫情和病毒都有演變,本地醫療系統的防治能力亦有提升,疫情對公共衛生的風險已明顯減低。李家超指,與內地通關十多日,並無增加疫情風險,本港疫情亦一直向低走,由最高位的3萬宗回落至3000多宗,下跌9成。他指,社會對疫情的認知和處力能力已大大提升,因此疫情管理須邁向新階段、新模式,由一刀切強制措施,改為由市民自行負責,逐步建立新的常態系統,將新冠病毒病視為其中一種上呼吸道疾病。
醫務衛生局局長盧寵茂教授和勞工及福利局局長孫玉菡等今午(19日)見傳媒,交代政府撤銷隔離令的詳細安排。盧寵茂表示,政府已決定在1月30日起對感染人士撤銷隔離令安排,當中不再向確診者發隔離令,確診者毋須呈報,改為發出健康措施建議。但他強調取消隔離令,不代表疫情消失,所以政府維持疫情緊急應變級別,直至別行通知。
新冠肺炎變普通感冒後,有關感染者的上班安排並沒有針對性立法,而只有建議而已。資本可強迫感染者上班了:
勞工及福利局局長孫玉菡表示,隨著政府本月30日起取消新冠確診者隔離令,若僱員感染新冠病毒,相關病假安排將與其他疾病相同,員工可視乎個人需要求醫,並取得病假紙,僱主需按僱傭條例給予病假、疾病津貼等。他說一般情況下,如果員工自我檢測陽性,但未有不適,可繼續上班,他們可個別與僱主商討工作安排,但強調僱主若要求確診員工不要上班,需要如常支薪。
鄧家彪指,不少僱員如果無病徵,可能都會選擇上班,但如果遭到僱主放取無薪病假,或會引起是否觸犯《殘疾歧視條例》的爭議。他又指,根據《僱傭條例》,員工要有醫生證明書而需要4天或以上病假,才可享有有薪病假,如果僱員只有1至2天病假,僱主有權不支薪,對打工仔造成額外負擔。
本月30日起新冠確診者毋須強制隔離後,確診僱員如果無特別病徵可如常上班。有飲食業界代表指,會讓檢測陽性,而又無病徵的員工,因應自己身體情況,決定是否返工,若他們需要請假,公司亦會酌情處理,但相信在人手短缺下,公司不會主動要求員工放假。
政府更新預約檢測網頁版面,可查看即日及第二日早、午、晚三個時段的預約情況,今日亦有7個檢測站提早運作。 行政長官李家超指,檢測容量充裕,會做好資訊發放,民政事務處亦會在各區協助,他重申香港正逐步走向復常,會盡量爭取取消核酸檢測。
教育局宣布,本月30日起,全體學校教職員,包括中小學、幼稚園和特殊學校所有人員、校巴及保姆車司機和隨車人員,將毋須在每天回校前進行快速抗原測試,但如果教職員自行檢測結果呈陽性,需即時通知校方,如果有明顯病徵,例如發燒和咳嗽等,則不應回校上班,並盡快求醫。