top of page
Log In to Connect With Members
View and follow other members, leave comments & more.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

Man driving at night, woman using binoculars beside him. Car interior, rainy city streets visible through windshield, tense mood.

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】HK Spies


▪️My Conclusion:

HK Spies

The two men involved in the high-profile UK "Hong Kong spy" case, Bill Yuen and Peter Wai, were found guilty on May 7, 2026. The most intriguing aspect pertains to the distinction between foreign interference and the provision of assistance to a foreign intelligence service. This clarification also serves as a political signal, indicating the potential for further diplomatic negotiations between China and the UK without resulting in irreversible ramifications. This is due to the fact that bilateral relations are currently in a state of normality. In the context of the definition of 'spy', the key issue is the abuse of homeland databases by Peter Wai, who was at the time an active UK Border Force officer, for the purpose of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government. Moreover, it is evident that any foreign agencies and their paid representatives or operatives are, in general, automatically defined as 'foreign agents'. Consequently, the designation of these individuals as 'Hong Kong spies' is both rational and indisputable. Moreover, the definition of 'foreign interference' remains ambiguous in Hong Kong. In the UK and the US, the concept is predominantly understood in the context of foreign governments attempting to influence domestic elections through arguably illegitimate methods. "Foreign interference" is a distinct offence that necessitates the demonstration of the defendants' utilization of coercion, threats, or deception to exert influence on UK democratic processes or the rights of individuals. This is in stark contrast to the abusive use of the term 'foreign interference' in the present day. As was outlined in the preceding discussion, Hong Kong media and the wider establishment appear to disregard the issue of crony capitalism in the city, a factor which has been identified as contributing to the abuse of national security resources in the UK. In the May 2026 "Hong Kong spy" trial, the appellation "Tina" is a reference to Tina Zou (also identified as Tina Zhou or Tina Tian Zou), a prominent Beijing-based Australian millionaire and businesswoman. Despite being apprehended by law enforcement authorities during the police raid, Zou was never formally charged with a criminal offence and subsequently departed the UK. During the trial, prosecutors asserted that at the time of the defendant's arrest, the available evidence was inadequate to substantiate charges. The incident under discussion is rooted in Tina's personal relationship with Bill Yuen, the purpose of which was to collect a ‘debt’ owed by the target (her ex-assistant was accused of fraud). It therefore cannot be considered to constitute conscious 'transnational aggression'. Subsequent integration into the political context is a notable feature of this phenomenon. From the Hong Kong perspective, the issue of accountability remains unaddressed. The question that arises is why Tina exploited national security resources and transformed the operatives into 'debt sharks'. 

 

 

▪️ The individuals referred to as "Hong Kong spies" in the UK—specifically Bill Yuen and Peter Wai—were not found guilty of foreign interference because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on that specific charge. [1, 2] 


However, both men were found guilty of a more serious charge: assisting a foreign intelligence service under the UK's National Security Act 2023. This was the first ever conviction under this new legislation. [3, 4, 5] 


Key Details of the Trial Results (May 2026)

  • Convicted of Espionage: The jury at the Old Bailey found Yuen (a manager at the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office) and Wai (a UK Border Force officer) guilty of helping Hong Kong and Chinese intelligence by surveilling pro-democracy dissidents.

  • Deadlocked on Interference: The charge of "foreign interference" specifically related to an incident where the men allegedly forced entry into a home in Yorkshire to find a woman accused of fraud in Hong Kong. After 23 hours of deliberation, the jury failed to agree on whether this act constituted illegal "interference" under the law.

  • Prosecution Dropped the Charge: Following the deadlock, prosecutors announced they would not seek a retrial for the foreign interference charge, as the men were already facing potentially long sentences for the espionage convictions.

  • Third Defendant: A third man, Matthew Trickett, was also charged but died in a park shortly after his initial court appearance in 2024, leading to the charges against him being dropped. [1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 


Why the Distinction Matters

In the UK, "assisting a foreign intelligence service" focuses on the covert support given to another country's spies. "Foreign interference" is a separate offense that requires proving the defendants used coercion, threats, or deception to influence UK democratic processes or people's rights. While the jury was convinced they were helping foreign agents (spying), they were not satisfied that the specific break-in attempt met the legal threshold for "interference". [3, 10, 11, 12, 13] 

 

 

▪️The jury split on the "foreign interference" charge because they could not reach a unanimous or majority agreement on whether the defendants' specific actions met the strict legal definition of "interference" under the UK's new National Security Act 2023. [1] 


While the jury was convinced the men were spying (assisting a foreign intelligence service), they were deadlocked on the interference charge for several specific reasons: [2, 3, 4] 


1. The Legal Threshold for "Interference"

Under the National Security Act 2023, a "foreign interference" conviction requires proving that the defendants used prohibited conduct (like coercion, threats, or deception) with the specific intent to interfere with someone's rights or a public function. [5, 6] 

  • The Defense Argument: Peter Wai claimed his use of a fake police warrant card was merely to "impress friends and family" rather than to intimidate the target.

  • Jury Uncertainty: The jury deliberated for nearly 24 hours but could not agree if the botched break-in at a home in Yorkshire was a genuine attempt to "interfere" with the victim's rights or if it was a lower-level criminal act like harassment or simple trespass. [7, 8, 9, 10] 


2. Differing Evidence for Different Charges

The jury found the evidence for the other charges much more compelling:

  • Espionage (Guilty): There was clear digital evidence—including hundreds of thousands of pounds in paymentsand messages calling activists "cockroaches"—proving they were working for Hong Kong intelligence.

  • Interference (No Verdict): This charge rested heavily on a single incident where they posed as maintenance men to enter a flat. Some jurors may have felt this specific event didn't clearly demonstrate the high-level "interference" the law was designed to target. [4, 7, 11, 12] 


3. Prosecution Strategy

Because the defendants were already convicted of the more serious espionage charge, the prosecution decided not to seek a retrial on the deadlocked interference count. Pursuing a second trial for a secondary charge was likely seen as an inefficient use of resources given that the primary goal—convicting them of being foreign agents—had already been achieved. [13, 14, 15] 

 

 

▪️The case of Bill Yuen and Peter Wai is considered unprecedented for several historic legal and diplomatic reasons: [1] 


1. First-Ever Convictions for Spying for China [2, 3] 

This case marks the first time in British history that individuals have been found guilty in a court of law of spying specifically for China. While there have been long-standing allegations of Chinese espionage, this was the first successful prosecution to reach a conviction for such activities on UK soil. [1, 2, 4] 


2. Landmark Use of the National Security Act 2023

The convictions were the first under the UK's new National Security Act 2023, which was designed to modernize espionage laws for the first time since 1911. [5, 6] 

  • Assisting a Foreign Intelligence Service: Yuen and Wai were convicted under a new provision that makes it illegal to work covertly for, or materially support, a foreign intelligence agency, even if "protected information" (like state secrets) was not stolen.

  • "Shadow Policing": The case exposed a network of "shadow policing" where the defendants allegedly carried out surveillance and intimidation of pro-democracy activists on behalf of the Hong Kong government. [7, 8, 9, 10] 


3. Involvement of an Active UK Border Force Official

One of the defendants, Peter Wai, was an active UK Border Force officer at the time of the offenses. He was found guilty of misconduct in public office for misusing government databases—such as the Home Office's computer systems—to search for information on dissidents to pass to Hong Kong authorities. [2, 10, 11, 12] 


4. Direct Link to Official Trade Offices [13] 

The case directly implicated the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office (HKETO) in London, an official representative body of the Hong Kong government. Bill Yuen was a senior manager at the HKETO, and evidence showed he funneled nearly £100,000 from the office to fund the surveillance operations. This has led to unprecedented calls for the UK to review the diplomatic privileges and immunities granted to the HKETO. [1, 4, 14, 15, 16] 


5. High-Profile Targets and Bounties

The surveillance targets included prominent figures like Nathan Law, a pro-democracy activist who has a HK$1,000,000 bounty on his head from Hong Kong police. The trial highlighted the reality of "transnational repression"—where a foreign state targets its critics living safely in another country. [4, 12, 15, 17] 

 

The sentencing for both men is expected to take place shortly, with the espionage convictions carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years in prison. [11, 18] 

 

 

 

▪️ 為什麼在英國的「香港間諜」沒有被判「境外干預」罪?

 

在英國被稱為「香港間諜」的被告(袁松彪與衛志良),其「境外干預罪」之所以未成立,是因為陪審團無法就該罪名達成一致裁決(Deadlocked)。

 

  • 間諜罪成立: 兩人被裁定**「協助外國情報機關」**罪名成立。這是英國《2023年國家安全法》實施後的首宗定罪,證明了他們確實私下協助香港/中國情報部門監視在英的民主派人士。

  • 境外干預罪分歧: 該罪名涉及他們涉嫌強行闖入一名被香港指控詐騙的女子在約克郡的寓所。陪審團在經過 23 小時的討論後,無法達成共識認為這項行為是否符合法律定義中具「脅迫、威脅或欺騙」性質的「干預」。

  • 控方放棄重審: 由於兩人的間諜罪已成,且面臨長期監禁,控方決定不再針對「境外干預」這項罪名申請重審。

 

▪️ 為什麼英國這宗案件具有「前所未有」的意義?

 

這宗案件被視為史無前例,主要有以下五個原因:

  1. 首宗中國間諜定罪: 這是英國歷史上首次在法庭上正式裁定個人為中國(及香港)政府從事間諜活動。

  2. 新國安法的首例: 這是英國《2023年國家安全法》實施後的第一宗成功檢控,測試了新法律中關於「外國情報活動」的紅線。

  3. 邊境執法人員涉案: 其中一名被告衛志良是現職的英國邊境部隊(Border Force)官員,他利用職權進入政府數據庫搜集異見人士資料,情節嚴重。

  4. 涉及官方經貿辦(HKETO): 另一名被告袁松彪是香港駐倫敦經濟貿易辦事處的行政經理。證據顯示他動用辦事處近 10 萬英鎊的資金資助監視行動,這直接衝擊了經貿辦的地位。

  5. 跨境鎮壓實體化: 案件披露了香港政府如何透過賞金(如針對羅冠聰的百萬懸紅)和海外網絡,對身在海外的批評者進行「跨境鎮壓」。

 

▪️我的結論:

涉及英國這起備受矚目的「香港間諜」案的兩名男子——袁松彪(Bill Yuen)與衛志良(Peter Wai)——於2026年5月7日被判有罪。最引人入勝之處在於「外國干預」與「向外國情報機構提供協助」之間的區別。這項澄清同時也發出了政治訊號,顯示中英兩國有望進行進一步的外交協商,且不會因此引發不可逆轉的後果。這是因為當前雙邊關係處於正常狀態。就「間諜」的定義而言,關鍵問題在於與衛志良(當時身為英國邊境部隊現役人員)為香港特別行政區(香港特區)政府之目的,濫用本國資料庫。此外,顯而易見的是,任何外國機構及其受薪代表或特工,一般而言都會自動被定義為「外國代理人」。因此,將這些人定性為「香港間諜」既合乎邏輯,亦無可爭辯。再者,「外國干預」在香港的定義仍顯模糊。在英國和美國,該概念主要被理解為外國政府試圖透過可被視為非法的方法,來影響國內選舉。「外國干預」是一項獨立罪行,必須證明被告曾利用脅迫、威脅或欺騙手段,以影響英國的民主程序或個人權利。這與當今對「外國干預」一詞的濫用形成鮮明對比。正如前文所述,香港媒體及主流建制派似乎漠視本港的裙帶資本主義問題,而此因素已被指為導致在英國濫用香港國家安全資源的成因之一。在2026年5月的「香港間諜」審判中,「蒂娜」一詞指的是鄒天(亦被稱為蒂娜或天鄒蒂娜),一位駐北京的知名澳洲百萬富翁兼女商人。儘管鄒蒂娜在警方突擊搜查期間被執法機關拘捕,但她從未被正式指控犯有刑事罪行,其後亦已離開英國。審判期間,檢方主張在被告被捕時,現有證據不足以支持起訴。本案的根源在於鄒天與袁松彪的私人關係,其目的是為了追討目標對象欠下的「債務」(她的前助理被指控詐欺)。因此,此案不能被視為構成有意識的「跨國侵略」或所謂政治干涉的事件。此現象的顯著特徵在於其後續與政治脈絡的交織。從香港的角度來看,問責問題至今仍未獲得解決。由此引發的疑問是:為何蒂娜可動用香港的國家安全資源,並將特工轉變為「討債人」?


 

Red "DECLASSIFIED" stamp with distressed texture. Below, text reads "HONG KONG INTELLIGENCE REPORT" in a black, bold font on white.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

Gavel on wooden surface with a large book and pen nearby. Black and gold theme, suggesting a law or legal setting.

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】重啟逃犯條例修訂案的必要性


▪️我的結論重啟逃犯條例修訂案的必要性。只有真愛國者才能夠重新推動逃犯條例修訂案。理由簡單明瞭,香港與內地,香港與台灣,香港與澳門之間互相仍缺乏引渡法。不能無限期不面對這個最大司法漏洞。其實,香港的‘逃犯條例修訂案’也是澳門的課題,即與香港同樣,澳門與內地也沒有引渡法架構,何況澳門與香港,澳門與台灣都沒有引渡法。因此之故,‘逃犯條例或修訂案問題’原來絕非只有香港的課題。這才是新觀點。


澳門沒有類似香港2019年引發爭議的《逃犯條例》(即允許與內地進行移交的修訂),但澳門有與部分國家簽署獨立的「移交逃犯協定」。澳門與中國內地、香港目前並未簽署專門的移交逃犯協議,主要依靠《刑事司法互助》相關規定運作。

 

My conclusion: Only true patriots can revive the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment. The reason is simple and clear: there are still no extradition treaties in place between Hong Kong and the Mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan, or Hong Kong and Macau. We cannot indefinitely avoid addressing this major loophole in our legal system. In fact, the Fugitive Offenders Bill amendment is also an issue for Macau; just as with Hong Kong, there is no extradition framework between Macau and the Mainland, let alone between Macau and Hong Kong, or between Macau and Taiwan. For this reason, the Fugitive Offenders Bill amendment is by no means solely a Hong Kong issue. This is the new perspective.

 

"In contrast to the controversies that arose in Hong Kong concerning the proposed 'Fugitive Offenders Ordinance' (the amendment that would have permitted extraditions to mainland China) in 2019, Macau did not experience similar controversies. However, Macau has signed independent "Surrender of Fugitive Offenders" agreements with several specific countries. Presently, there is no specialized extradition or fugitive transfer agreement between Macau and mainland China or Hong Kong; instead, these matters are primarily handled under the framework of "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters" (MLAs).


當時的《2019年逃犯及刑事事宜相互法律協助法例(修訂)條例草案》主要針對現行法律中的兩大限制進行了關鍵修改:

 

1. 移除「地理限制」

 

•           修訂內容:刪除原條例中移交安排不適用於「中央人民政府或中華人民共和國的任何其他部分」的條文。

•           目的:使香港能夠與中國內地、台灣及澳門進行法律上的個案移交。 [1, 2, 3, 4]


2. 建立「個案移交」機制(不需長期協議)

 

•           修訂內容:賦予行政長官簽發「證明書」的權力,以啟動單一案件的移交程序。

•           原有程序:過去若要與某地移交逃犯,通常需先與該地簽署長期的相互法律協助協定,並由立法會通過。

•           新建議:在沒有長期協議的情況下,可透過行政長官授權,再交由香港法庭進行形式審查(不涉及實體審判,僅確認是否符合罪名及相關人權保障),決定是否移交。 [1, 5, 6]


3. 限定移交罪行的類別

為了緩解商界及市民的憂慮,政府在草案提交及審議期間曾兩度進行修改:

 

•           罪行門檻:最初建議可移交判監 3 年或以上的罪行,後提高至 7 年或以上

•           罪行種類:從最初建議的 46 項罪行縮減至 37 項

•           剔除的罪行:主要與破壞環境、非法使用電腦、稅務、涉及商業秘密、版權及專利等 9 項經濟罪行。

•           保留的罪行:包括謀殺、誤殺、賄賂、詐騙、性犯罪等嚴重刑事罪行。 [1, 5, 7, 8]

         

4. 人權保障條款

草案重申了現有條例中的保障原則:

 

•           政治不移交:不會因政治性質的罪行而移交,或因某人的政治意見、宗教、種族等原因而進行移交。

•           雙重犯罪原則:有關行為在香港及請求方兩地都必須構成刑事罪行。

•           死刑不移交:如果請求方可能判處死刑,香港可要求保證不執行死刑,否則不予移交。 [5, 7, 8, 9]

 

雖然草案最終因引發巨大的社會爭議及抗爭而於 2019 年 10 月正式撤回,但其修訂重點始終環繞在填補港台、港內地之間法律真空的嘗試上。 [10, 11]

既然您關心條文細節,是否也想了解在草案撤回後,像陳同佳這類案件目前在法律上如何處理?

 

 

在現行法律框架下,若沒有《逃犯條例》修訂,香港與中國內地、台灣及澳門之間確實無法進行法律意義上的「引渡」(移交逃犯)。 [1, 2]

以下是核心原因與現狀分析:


1. 法律上的「地理限制」 [3]

香港目前的《逃犯條例》(第503章)明確訂明,該條例不適用於香港與「中央人民政府或中華人民共和國的任何其他部分」之間的移交安排。 [2, 3, 4]

 

•           涵蓋地區:此限制直接導致香港無法將嫌犯移交至中國內地、台灣或澳門。

•           現有機制:香港目前僅與約20個國家(如英、美、加、澳等)簽有長期移交逃犯協議。 [2, 5, 6, 7]


2. 為何無法處理特定案件?

2018年發生的「陳同佳案」(潘曉穎命案)是修例的導火線。由於港台之間沒有引渡協議,且《逃犯條例》存在上述地理限制: [8, 9]

 

•           無法引渡:台灣政府無法合法要求香港將嫌犯陳同佳送回台灣受審。

•           管轄權限制:香港法院對港人在境外犯下的謀殺罪通常沒有司法管轄權,因此只能以盜竊或洗黑錢等罪名在港判刑,無法就殺人罪直接審理。 [1, 8, 10]


3. 現狀與替代做法

•           修例狀態:2019年提出的《逃犯條例》修訂草案引發社會大規模抗爭(反修例風波),最終香港政府於2019年10月正式撤回該條例草案。

•           非正式合作:在缺乏正式引渡條約的情況下,內地與香港過去曾通過不定期、非對等的「行政安排」移交部分嫌犯(通常是內地將逃往香港的疑犯交還內地,但香港極少移交逃犯至內地),但這並非正式法律程序,且不適用於台灣。 [2, 11, 12, 13, 14]

總結來說,法律漏洞依然存在,在不修改現行法律或建立新的專案司法互助機制前,香港與內地、台灣之間仍無法進行法定的逃犯移交。 [1, 6]

 

 

當然,這是 2019 年香港政界和法律界討論非常激烈的議題。在《逃犯條例》修訂草案(即「引渡法案」)引發巨大爭議後,多方曾提出替代方案,試圖在不涉及移交大陸的前提下解決當時觸發修例的「台灣殺人案」。 [1, 2]


這些法律替代方案主要包括:

•       域外司法管轄權(Extra-territorial Jurisdiction)

o       核心內容:由多位法律學者和議員(如楊岳橋、田北辰等)提出。建議修訂香港現行的《侵害人身罪條例》,賦予香港法院權力,審理香港居民在境外涉嫌謀殺、誤殺或意圖謀殺的案件。

o       政府回應:時任律政司司長鄭若驊拒絕了這一提議,認為這會從根本上改變香港法院通常只處理本地罪行的「屬地原則」(Territoriality Principle),並可能涉及追溯力等複雜的法律問題。

•       「日落條款」單次修例(Sunset Clause):

o       核心內容:泛民主派曾提議進行一次性的「日落條款」修例,僅針對當時的台灣案件進行特殊處理,一旦嫌犯陳同佳完成移交程序,該修例即告失效。

o       政府回應:政府認為這種方式無法從長遠解決「法律漏洞」,堅持要建立一套長期的個案移交機制。

•       「港人港審」(Trial in Hong Kong for Hong Kong Residents):

o       核心內容:提議修改法律,允許香港居民如果在其他司法管轄區(如中國大陸、台灣、澳門)犯罪後返回香港,可以直接在香港接受審判,而不是被引渡。

o       政府回應:政府同樣以違反屬地原則和調查取證困難(證據都在境外)為由否決了此方案。 [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]

最終,隨著法案在 2019 年 10 月 23 日被正式撤回,這些替代方案也未能進入實質的立法階段。 [1, 10]

 

 

 

自 2020 年《港區國安法》實施以來,多個西方國家先後中止或暫停了與香港的移交逃犯(引渡)協議。


目前(截至 2026 年初),香港原有的 20 份雙邊移交逃犯協定中,約有一半仍處於生效狀態,而另一半則已被暫停/中止。 [1, 2, 3] 


1. 目前仍然有效的引渡協定名單 [2] 

以下國家與香港的移交逃犯協定目前仍被視為有效運作:

  • 亞洲:新加坡、韓國、印度、印度尼西亞、馬來西亞、菲律賓、斯里蘭卡

  • 歐洲:葡萄牙、捷克

  • 非洲:南非 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] 


2. 已被暫停/中止的引渡協定名單 [2] 

以下國家在 2020 年後單方面宣布暫停與香港的引渡安排,香港隨後也根據中央政府指示暫停了與這些國家的協定:

  • 「五眼聯盟」國家:英國、美國、加拿大、澳洲、紐西蘭

  • 部分歐盟及歐洲國家:德國、法國(擱置生效)、愛爾蘭、荷蘭、芬蘭 [6, 7, 8, 9] 


3. 最新動態與趨勢

  • 個案處理機制:英國政府在 2025 年提出修例,計畫雖然不恢復正式引渡條約,但允許以「個案方式」(case-by-case basis)處理引渡請求。

  • 新簽署協議:香港近年持續拓展非西方國家的法律合作,例如在 2025 年 9 月與贊比亞(Zambia)簽署了包括移交逃犯在內的司法合作協定

  • 多邊公約:除了雙邊協定外,香港仍可根據多項國際多邊公約(如打擊劫機、販毒、恐怖主義等公約)與其他成員國進行特定罪行的逃犯移交合作。 [10, 11, 12, 13] 


需注意,即使存有引渡協議,根據國際法和香港法律,政治罪行通常不在引渡範圍之內。 [14] 

 

 

Here are the English versions of the previous two responses regarding the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance(FOO) and the 2019 amendment bill.


Part 1: Current Legal Status Between Hong Kong and Mainland/Taiwan

Currently, no formal extradition mechanism exists between Hong Kong and Mainland China, Taiwan, or Macau, largely due to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 503) excluding the rest of China. This legal gap was highlighted by the 2018 Taiwan murder case, where the suspect could not be extradited. Furthermore, Hong Kong courts generally lack extraterritorial jurisdiction to try residents for crimes committed elsewhere, complicating prosecutions. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]


Part 2: Key Amendments in the 2019 Bill

The 2019 amendment bill aimed to address these issues by: [6, 7]

 

 

•           Removing Restrictions: Allowing for the surrender of fugitives to the Mainland, Taiwan, and Macau.

•           Ad-hoc Mechanism: Introducing case-based, special surrender arrangements authorized by the Chief Executive.

•           Refining Crimes: Limiting applications to 37 categories of serious crimes (e.g., murder) with a maximum sentence threshold of 7 years or more.

•           Safeguards: Including protections against political surrender, ensuring double criminality, and prohibiting extradition where the death penalty may be imposed. [2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]


Following significant public opposition, the bill was formally withdrawn in October 2019. [14, 15]

Would you like to know more about the legal alternatives proposed by various parties after the bill's withdrawal, such as "extra-territorial jurisdiction"?

 

 

The debate over legal alternatives was a pivotal moment in the 2019 unrest, as experts tried to find a way to handle the "Taiwan homicide case" (the initial trigger for the bill) without opening the door to extraditions to mainland China.


Here is a breakdown of those proposed alternatives:

1. Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction (ETJ)

  • The Idea: Proposed by lawmakers like Alvin Yeung and Michael Tien, this involved amending the Offences against the Person Ordinance. It would have granted Hong Kong courts the power to try Hong Kong residents for serious crimes (like murder) committed outside the city.

  • The Logic: This would allow the suspect in the Taiwan case to be tried in a Hong Kong court using evidence provided by Taiwanese authorities, fulfilling the goal of justice without sending him across the border.

  • The Rejection: The government argued this would violate the territoriality principle (the idea that courts only handle crimes committed on their own soil) and cited immense difficulty in gathering overseas evidence that would meet Hong Kong's high threshold for admissibility.


2. "Hong Kong People, Hong Kong Trial" (港人港审)

  • The Idea: A variation of ETJ, this specifically proposed that Hong Kong citizens who commit crimes in jurisdictions without an extradition treaty (like Mainland China, Taiwan, or Macau) should be tried at home in Hong Kong.

  • The Logic: It aimed to protect citizens from being sent to legal systems that critics argued lacked fair trial guarantees, while still ensuring they faced consequences for their actions.

  • The Rejection: Officials claimed this would turn Hong Kong into a "shelter" for criminals if overseas authorities refused to share evidence or if the crimes didn't exist in Hong Kong law.


3. "Sunset Clause" or One-Off Amendment

  • The Idea: Proponents suggested a narrow, time-limited amendment designed specifically and only for the Taiwan murder case. Once that suspect was dealt with, the law would expire.

  • The Logic: This addressed the immediate "humanitarian crisis" of the murder case without creating a permanent mechanism for extradition to the mainland.

  • The Rejection: The government insisted on a permanent solution to fix what they called a "legal loophole," arguing that a one-off fix was inefficient and didn't solve the long-term issue.


4. Special Agency or "Special Case" Handling

  • The Idea: Some legal experts suggested creating a special judicial committee to vet any extradition requests on a case-by-case basis with much higher transparency and human rights safeguards than the bill originally offered.


Why they didn't happen:The Hong Kong government, led by Carrie Lam, maintained that these alternatives were legally unfeasible or didn't address the core problem. The refusal to adopt these middle-ground solutions was one of the primary reasons the protests escalated, as many felt the government was prioritizing the political goal of mainland extradition over a practical legal solution for the Taiwan case.

 

As of May 2026, Hong Kong's network of extradition treaties (officially termed Surrender of Fugitive Offenders or SFO agreements) remains divided. While several Western nations suspended their agreements following the 2020 National Security Law, many others—primarily in Asia and Africa—remain active.


1. Active Extradition Agreements

The following countries currently have operational extradition treaties with Hong Kong: [1] 

  • Asia: Singapore, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka

  • Europe: Portugal, Czech Republic

  • Africa: South Africa [2, 3, 4, 5] 


2. Suspended or Shelved Agreements

Since 2020, approximately 10 jurisdictions have suspended their extradition arrangements with Hong Kong. These suspensions are mutual, as Hong Kong subsequently suspended cooperation with these nations at the instruction of the Central People’s Government: [1, 6] 

  • Five Eyes Alliance: United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand

  • European Nations: Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland

  • Shelved (Signed but not in force): France [2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] 


3. Recent Developments (2025–2026)

  • New Agreements: In September 2025, Hong Kong signed a new SFO agreement with Zambia to enhance legal cooperation in combating transnational crime. Other agreements with RussiaVietnam, and Argentina have been signed but are awaiting full entry into force.

  • UK "Case-by-Case" Shift: In late 2025, the United Kingdom amended its laws to redesignate Hong Kong as a "non-treaty state." This allows the UK to consider extradition requests from Hong Kong on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis under higher judicial scrutiny, rather than through a permanent treaty mechanism.

  • Multilateral Cooperation: Beyond bilateral treaties, Hong Kong continues to cooperate on specific international crimes (e.g., terrorism, drug trafficking) through various multilateral conventions that include extradition clauses. [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] 


For official updates and the latest legal statuses, you can consult the HKSAR Department of Justice (DoJ) or the Security Bureau.


Would you like to explore the specific legal safeguards (such as the "political offense" exception) that apply even when an extradition treaty is active?

 

 

Red "DECLASSIFIED" stamp with weathered texture on white background. Below, black text reads "HONG KONG INTELLIGENCE REPORT."

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

Smiling woman with curly hair holds several 50 bills on city street. Wears a beige coat, blurred colorful lights in background.

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】Hong Kong has imposed sanctions on Chinese state allies

▪️ My conclusion: Hong Kong has imposed sanctions on Chinese state allies


Hong Kong has imposed sanctions on China's allies, despite the fact that the two parties are operating under the same UN sanctions rhetoric. The most salient contrast that elucidates the distinction between Hong Kong and the Chinese central government is the disparity in their respective handling of North Korea and Guinea-Bissau. In essence, this accurately reflects the reality that Hong Kong's political landscape is shaped by localist vested interests who exercise independent oversight over the state partner. This phenomenon transpired even in circumstances where the diplomatic apparatus was overseen by the central government. This is the true aspect of Hong Kong politics. 

 

 

▪️ Hong Kong does not possess an autonomous sanctions regime; it merely enforces sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). These sanctions are implemented at the local level through the United Nations Sanctions Ordinance (Cap. 537). 

 

List of Countries Subject to Sanctions in Hong Kong

 

As of late 2025/early 2026, the following countries were subject to UN-mandated sanctions implemented in Hong Kong: 

 

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

The Central African Republic is a country in the heart of the African continent.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a country in Africa.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau are two nations that have been identified as participants in the global political landscape.

 

* Haiti

* Libya

* Somalia

* South Sudan

* Sudan

* Yemen 

 

It is important to note that sanctions also apply to non-state entities, such as ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qaida. 

 

The list includes countries that are often considered Chinese allies, most notably North Korea. However, given that the imposition of any new UN sanctions necessitates the approval of the five permanent members of the Security Council (including China), Hong Kong refrains from implementing unilateral sanctions against major Chinese partners if such measures have been vetoed at the UN level. 

 

The following text is intended to provide a brief overview of the subject matter.

 

It does not enforce the unilateral sanctions imposed by Western nations (the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom) following the conflict in Ukraine.

 

The following text is intended to provide a brief overview of the subject matter.

 

Iran

 

The Legal Status of Foreign Sanctions

 

Sanctions that are imposed unilaterally by foreign governments (e.g., the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control) are not accorded legal status in Hong Kong law. According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), local banks are not legally obligated to comply with foreign unilateral sanctions; however, they may choose to do so based on their own commercial risk assessments.

 

 

 

With respect to the business environment in Hong Kong involving countries such as Russia and Iran, the situation can be categorized into two distinct aspects: legal obligations and commercial risk management.

 

1. Legal Level: The Implementation of United Nations Sanctions

In accordance with Hong Kong's legal framework, sanctions that have been authorized by the United Nations Security Council are the only ones that carry legal weight.

Russia: Given Russia's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, with the authority to exercise the veto, the UN has not imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against the nation. Consequently, under Hong Kong law, there is no explicit legal prohibition against general business dealings with Russian entities. In contrast, Iran has taken a different legislative approach. According to Hong Kong law (Cap. 537), certain UN-mandated restrictions against Iran are enforced, primarily with regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the freezing of specific assets.

 

2. Financial Practice: The Impact of "Secondary Sanctions" In the legal framework of Hong Kong, there is a lack of recognition of unilateral foreign sanctions, such as those imposed by the United States or the European Union. However, in practice, businesses and banks in Hong Kong are significantly impacted by these sanctions. Bank Due Diligence: The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) mandates that banking institutions implement and maintain comprehensive screening mechanisms. While not legally obligated to enforce foreign sanctions, most banks adopt an extremely cautious stance toward Russia- or Iran-related transactions to maintain their access to the global financial system (especially US dollar clearing). In the event that a payment is refused or an account is closed, the associated region may be identified as a potential source of secondary sanctions risk. The US Secondary Sanctions Risk: The US Treasury (OFAC) issues frequent warnings regarding the potential consequences of providing "significant support" to sanctioned Russian or Iranian entities, particularly in the domains of oil, military technology, or "shadow banking" networks. This support could result in the isolation of the institution from the US financial system. Blacklist Risks: In recent developments, several Hong Kong-based shell companies and shipping entities have been added to the US SDN List (Specially Designated Nationals) for their alleged assistance in Iran's efforts to evade sanctions or transport oil.

 

3. Recent Developments (May 2026) Oil Trade Blocks: In May 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce prohibited recognizing or implementing unilateral U.S. sanctions after several Chinese firms were targeted for Iranian oil trades.

 

Financial Security Warnings: In early May 2026, the HKMA noted that, while Middle Eastern tensions persist, Hong Kong’s foreign exchange market remains stable. However, they advised firms to be mindful of exchange rate volatility and potential settlement delays caused by geopolitical shifts.

 

Summary advice

If you plan to conduct trade with entities in these countries, the primary challenge is usually not "legality" but banking and payment processing. It is highly recommended that you consult your bank before signing any contracts to confirm whether they will accept or process funds from these sources.

 

As of May 2026, the relationship between China and these two countries regarding sanctions is as follows:

 

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereinafter "North Korea") is subject to sanctions imposed by China, but China does not impose unilateral "China-only" sanctions on North Korea. Instead, its actions are defined by a complex balance of enforcement and diplomatic protection. 

 

The implementation of United Nations sanctions is a subject that merits close examination. China, in its capacity as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has consistently demonstrated its commitment to the implementation of UN-mandated sanctions, casting its vote in favor of such measures and ensuring their official execution. These restrictions encompass limitations on the importation of coal, iron, and seafood, in addition to the imposition of export quotas on petroleum.

 

Recent Protections: In recent years, particularly in May 2026, China has taken measures to increase its protection of North Korea. The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation have utilized their veto power to block new United States-led proposals for more stringent sanctions at the United Nations, asserting that current measures are counterproductive.

 

* Bilateral Support: China continues to be North Korea's primary trading partner, and it has recently augmented its economic ties. For instance, China has implemented zero-tariff treatment for certain goods to promote regional stability and avert regime collapse. The sequence in question is expressed as follows:

 

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is not subject to any unilateral sanctions imposed by China. Indeed, the two countries have cultivated a robust strategic partnership:

 

The subject of trade incentives is of particular relevance in this context. As of May 1, 2026, China has expanded its zero-tariff treatment to include 53 African countries, including Guinea-Bissau. The objective of this policy is to enhance the export of Guinea-Bissau's primary products, including cashew nuts, fishery items, and sesame, to the Chinese market.

 

* UN Context: Although there have been limited UN-mandated sanctions related to past political instability in Guinea-Bissau (which Hong Kong and China are technically required to observe), China's foreign policy has historically prioritized development aid and infrastructure, rather than the implementation of punitive economic measures against the country. 

 

The following is a summary comparison of the two subjects.

 

Feature: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereinafter "North Korea") and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.

Legal Basis: Strictly UN-mandated only. There are no active economic sanctions in place.

China's Stance: China advocates for the easing of sanctions. It is a strong trade partner, offering zero tariffs.

Current Status: Officially restricted, but China "enables" trade. It is fully open for trade.

 

 

 

As of May 2026Guinea-Bissau is considered a close strategic partner and key political ally of China. The relationship was formally upgraded to a Strategic Partnership in July 2024 during a state visit by President Umaro Sissoco Embaló to Beijing.

 

Key Aspects of the Relationship

 

  • Political Support: Guinea-Bissau consistently supports China's core interests in international forums like the United Nations. It adheres to the "One China" policy and was one of 53 countries that backed the Hong Kong National Security Law at the UN in 2020.

  • Economic Ties: China is Guinea-Bissau's most significant partner in infrastructure and development. Major Chinese-funded projects include the National Parliament building, the Presidential Palace, the National Stadium, and various hospitals and roads.

  • Zero-Tariff Treatment: Starting May 1, 2026, China expanded its zero-tariff policy to include 53 African nations with which it has diplomatic ties. Guinea-Bissau, as a strategic partner, benefits from this, allowing it to export agricultural and fishery products (such as cashew nuts and peanuts) to the Chinese market duty-free.

  • Geostrategic Value: While Guinea-Bissau is a small nation, it serves as an important gateway for China into West Africa and the Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) world through platforms like Forum Macao.

 

Hong Kong currently enforces targeted sanctions relating to Guinea-Bissau, but these are limited to individual travel bans imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 

 

Chinese Version (中文版)

截至2026年5月,幾內亞比紹被視為中國在西非的重要戰略夥伴和政治盟友。兩國關係於 2024 年 7 月正式提升為戰略夥伴關係

  • 政治支持: 幾內亞比紹在國際場合(如聯合國)一貫支持中國的核心利益。該國堅定奉行**「一個中國」原則**,並曾在聯合國支持香港國安法。

  • 經濟合作: 中國是該國最重要的基礎設施合作夥伴,援建了國民議會大樓總統府國家體育場以及多所醫院和道路。

  • 零關稅政策: 自 2026 年 5 月 1 日起,中國對包括幾內亞比紹在內的 53 個建交非洲國家實施全面零關稅待遇。這極大地促進了該國腰果、漁產品等特色商品對華出口。

  • 地緣戰略: 對中國而言,幾內亞比紹是進入西非及葡語國家共同體(CPLP)的重要門戶。

 

 

 

香港不實施自主的單邊制裁,僅執行由**聯合國安全理事會(UNSC)**強制實施的制裁。這些制裁透過香港法例第537章《聯合國制裁條例》在本地實施。

 

香港目前實施制裁的國家名單

 

根據商務及經濟發展局工業貿易署的最新資料(截至2026年),受到聯合國制裁並在香港執行的國家包括:

 

  • 阿富汗 (Afghanistan)

  • 中非共和國 (Central African Republic)

  • 剛果民主共和國 (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

  • 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國 (North Korea)

  • 幾內亞比紹 (Guinea-Bissau)

  • 海地 (Haiti)

  • 利比亞 (Libya)

  • 索馬里 (Somalia)

  • 南蘇丹 (South Sudan)

  • 蘇丹 (Sudan)

  • 也門 (Yemen) 

 

此外,制裁對象也包括伊黎伊斯蘭國 (Da'esh) 及 基地組織 (Al-Qaida) 等非國家實體。 

 

關於中國盟友

 

該名單確實包含了一些通常被視為中國盟友或夥伴的國家,最顯著的是北韓。然而,由於任何新的聯合國制裁都必須經過安全理事會五個常任理事國(包括中國)一致通過,因此香港不會對在聯合國層面被中國否決的國家實施單邊制裁。

 

  • 俄羅斯與伊朗: 儘管美國、歐盟和英國對這些國家實施了廣泛的單邊制裁,但由於這些措施並未獲得聯合國安理會授權,香港並無法律義務執行這些制裁。

  • 外國單邊制裁的地位: 香港金融管理局曾明確表示,美國等外國政府實施的單邊制裁在香港法律上並無效力,儘管個別金融機構可能基於自身商業風險評估而選擇遵守。

 

針對俄羅斯及伊朗等特定國家的營商限制,在香港主要分為法律義務與商業實務風險兩個層次:

 

1. 法律層面:僅執行聯合國制裁

在香港法律框架下,只有聯合國安理會授權的制裁才具有法律效力。 

  • 俄羅斯: 由於俄羅斯是聯合國安理會常任理事國並擁有否決權,因此聯合國並未對其施加廣泛經濟制裁。香港法律目前並無禁止與俄羅斯實體進行一般商業往來。

  • 伊朗: 香港法例第537章及其附屬規例僅執行聯合國針對伊朗的特定限制(如核不擴散相關的禁運項目、特定資產凍結)。 

 

2. 金融實務層面:二級制裁的「連帶影響」

雖然香港法律不承認外國(如美、歐)的單邊制裁,但在實務操作中,香港企業與銀行仍受以下限制影響:

  • 銀行盡職審查 (Due Diligence): 香港金融管理局(HKMA)要求銀行具備有效的制裁篩查系統。雖然銀行沒有法律義務執行外國制裁,但為了維持全球金融系統(特別是美元結算系統)的連接,多數銀行會對涉及俄羅斯或伊朗的交易採取極為審慎的態度,甚至可能拒絕處理相關結算。

  • 美國二級制裁風險: 美國財政部(OFAC)多次警告,若外國金融機構為受制裁的俄羅斯或伊朗實體(特別是涉及石油、軍事技術或影子銀行網絡)提供重大金融支持,可能面臨被切斷與美元系統聯繫的「二級制裁」。

  • 黑名單風險: 多家香港空殼公司及航運實體因被指控協助伊朗規避制裁或運送石油,已被列入美國的 SDN 清單。 


3. 最新動態(2026年5月)

  • 石油交易阻斷: 中國商務部於 2026 年 5 月對美國因伊朗石油交易而制裁 5 家中國企業的行為發布禁令,要求不得承認或執行此類單邊制裁措施

  • 資金安全提醒: 香港金管局在 2026 年 5 月初指出,雖然中東局勢動盪,但香港外匯市場保持穩定。企業應留意地緣政治引發的匯率波動及結算延遲風險。 

 

總結和建議:如果您打算與這些國家的實體開展貿易,最大的挑戰通常不在於「違法」,而是在於銀行開戶與收付款。建議在簽署合同前,先諮詢您的往來銀行是否接受相關來源的資金。

 

截至 2026 年 5 月,中國對北韓採取執行聯合國義務與外交保護並行的政策,強調維持地區穩定;而對幾內亞比紹則採取深化合作的貿易優惠政策,並無單邊制裁。整體而言,兩國在中國外交與經濟版圖中處於完全不同的定位,前者受限於聯合國制裁,後者為免關稅貿易夥伴。

 

我的結論是:儘管雙方都以聯合國制裁的論調為依據,香港卻對中國的盟友實施了制裁。最能闡明香港與中國中央政府之間差異的鮮明對比,在於雙方處理北韓與幾內亞比索問題時的迥異做法。本質上,這準確反映了香港政治格局是由地方既得利益集團所塑造的現實,這些集團對國家夥伴行使獨立監督權。即使在外交體系由中央政府監督的情況下,這種現象依然存在。這才是香港政治的真實面貌。

 

Red "DECLASSIFIED" stamp, distressed texture, above text "Hong Kong Intelligence Report" in black on a white background.

  • i-love-israel-jewish-star-of-david-suppo
  • WZO: Support World Zionism!

© 2023 by EK. Proudly created with Wix.com

bottom of page