Hong Kong Intelligence Report #164 宏福苑大火是港府的切爾諾貝爾
- Ryota Nakanishi
- 2 days ago
- 24 min read
Updated: 13 hours ago
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
"The nuclear meltdown at Chernobyl...was perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union five years later.” - Gorbachev
Memorable lines from The Towering Inferno often highlight the skyscraper's height and the danger, like Chief O'Hallorhan's (Steve McQueen) declaration, "When there's a fire, I outrank everybody here," or the poignant exchange between Duncan and Roberts about the building's construction: "There's no sure way for us to fight a fire in anything over the seventh floor, but you guys just keep building 'em as high as you can".
🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】宏福苑大火是港府的切爾諾貝爾
▪️本篇(宏福苑大火是港府的切爾諾貝爾)針對最近中國香港境內所發生的重大事件，以筆者的中國香港永久居民身分做一番批判性分析，有關種種禁忌毫無畏懼，絕不退縮。確保言論自由的唯一方式正是發表言論。本站只注重言論見解的‘質’而已，其他一概不理會。筆者在研究和企劃案重點轉移和資料堆積如山之下，難以追蹤和消化，故此寧可減少數量，也要好的。那麼，所謂最近重大事件有哪些？第一是，高市早苗的‘台灣有事論’言論風波，第二是大埔宏福苑大火，第三則是立法會選舉。針對這三個對中國香港地區極具影響的事件做反思和簡述，以表達在民間香港市民如何依據當地生活感看待那些問題。就整體而言，從2025年11月初到12月初現在，最出色的是，自從最佳駐港京官鄭雁雄因長江出賣港口風波而被問責離任前所做的真香港改革措施，即《維護國家安全 ( 中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區維護國家安全公署 ) 規例》附屬條例 (2025年5月13日起生效) 成立後，由國家安全公署積極主導本港國安治理的體制和作為顯著。
This article presents a critical analysis of recent major events in Hong Kong, China, as perceived by the author, a permanent resident of Hong Kong, China. The text addresses various taboo subjects with a commendable degree of boldness and directness. The only method by which to guarantee freedom of speech is to exercise it. This site prioritizes the "quality" of opinions and perspectives above all else, disregarding all other considerations. Due to the author's shifts in research and project focus, in conjunction with the substantial accumulation of data, the process of tracking and digesting information has become arduous. Consequently, the emphasis is shifted towards the pursuit of quality over quantity. Therefore, it is imperative to examine these recent major events. The present study will first address the controversy surrounding Sanae Takaichi's remarks on the "Taiwan Contingency Theory." Secondly, the Tai Po Wang Fuk Court fire merits consideration. Thirdly, the Legislative Council elections. A brief overview of these three events, which have profoundly impacted the Hong Kong region of China, illuminates how Hong Kong citizens perceive these issues through the lens of their daily lives. From early November to early December of 2025, the most notable development was the initiation of genuine reform measures by Zheng Yanxiong, the most capable Beijing official stationed in Hong Kong. These measures were implemented prior to the official departure of Zheng Yanxiong from his position, which was prompted by his accountability for his role in the CK Hutchison port scandal. These measures included the establishment of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Office of the Central People's Government for Safeguarding National Security) (Subsidiary Legislation), effective May 13, 2025. Since its enactment, the National Security Office has played an instrumental role in establishing Hong Kong's national security governance system, significantly enhancing its operational capabilities.
▪️大埔宏福苑大火（2025年11月26日發生）：國家安全公署在大埔宏福苑大火發生後，共三度出面警告三次，也制止了宏福苑大火事件被煽風點火，淪為暴動的政治演變。如果今年本港有過真改革，那就是國家安全公署從伴隨者轉為積極主導性體制的重大轉變。沒人提及，但這一國家推動的改革已經大幅度為香港市民，民間自覺份子減輕了個人單位的政治負擔，犧牲和風險。不可否認，這就是件喜事。鄭雁雄的另一優秀之處在於他寧願接受國家問責，並沒有怨恨，這就是在港根本看不到，找不到的，真公務員的令人敬佩的品格和專業態度。市民目前看到的是他面臨問責，離任前建立好的國家安全公署轉為積極主導和監督一直以來懶政，無作為，政治被動，甚至從後門放生外國代理人的本港紀律部隊。市民可能覺得所謂‘以災亂港’的標語過度，但是國家安全公署是在最早期階段看破主事者的本色，杜絕了暴動風險，結果今日實現了平靜，宏福苑的重修和援助災民的過程不受政治擾亂了。這處理得與反修例風波時期形成鮮明對比，趁早剷除了禍根。其實，11月26日下午發生宏福苑大火後，如在TVB電視上不加解釋地出現的本土主義標語（如‘來自香港人’）和弔唁展示牌等早就引起了對公共安全敏感人士和組織的注意，喚醒他們類似反修例風波時的煽動勢力蠢動起來了。就總體而言，本港所謂反對或反動勢力的缺點是，它的敘事模式，思維方式和風格都一模一樣，差不了多少，結局，即使是純粹民間的主事者也無意中跟從本地的既定敘事模式和搞事手法，容易被視為一同。我身為香港市民在此向國家安全公署和鄭雁雄表達謝意。重點是，發生了什麼樣的危機事件，有什麼風險，中國這個國家有無如何作為，怎樣採取行動了，結果怎樣。到了12月8日，本港政治風險暫時消退了，看不到騷亂的勢頭了。這一切歸功於中國這一全球最優秀國家的總指揮和跨區救援。市民要求的是針對港府的問責。這期間港府放下的重大致命錯誤是在第一時間拒絕了大灣區各地的聯合救援隊趕赴現場救火救災一事。其他大圍標的官商勾結生態問題則是深層的既得利益問題。這不能與李家超後來接受內地物資救援一事混淆。雖宏福苑3.3億元維修費是本港普遍的高價現象，但小業主難以負擔被推成高額的維修費。這早已造成了該處業主立案法團的糾紛。在宏福苑大火上，釀成更多死難者的元兇就是香港既得利益勢力。他們在第一時間拒絕國家救援大隊一事絕不可被抹滅，但是在民間也令人驚訝的是沈浸於部落主義，本土主義的所謂一般人根本不把拒絕國家救援大隊一事當作問題。足認根深蒂固的香港部落主義意識讓他們的理性痲痹大意，結局最佳解決方案並沒有落實。從死難者的角度來看，只要救得了大火受困者，救援他們的是大陸的，國家的，還是香港的，這些都不是個重點，而只要救得了，就行了。部落主義的邏輯是，‘即使是受害者死亡，救出所謂香港人（定義有問題）的也必須是所謂香港人。’這就是在宏福苑大火風波上的最令人厭惡的精神腐敗。此外，‘獅子山精神’地產霸權寡頭和奸商（資本閥）連同各類詐騙集團都以‘慈善捐款之美譽’趁機抓住了大發死人財的災後商機，這當然包括公關形象工程和網路流量生意，將會進入災後重修的大招標程序。實在是一團亂和無量商業行為猖獗，連人家的大災難也不放過。要知道的是免費讓災民無限期居住公共住宿設施直到重修的決定後面，主要推手是中央政府，而非港府。港府是起初並沒有設定讓災民無限期居住的，還是要有特定寬免期的。然而，從11月27日起，在港建立的中央港澳辦部署組建工作小組所促使的一系列深厚，人道，大方補救措施，包括了保證災民可無限期居住緊急公共房屋設施直到重修，完成樓換樓。中國政府和中共並沒有把那些災民趕往貪婪私人市場。在此次特寫讚賞中央政府的大力指導，循序看到了堅定的補救措施。結果，沒有本地市民投訴中央。
The Tai Po Wang Fuk Court Fire, which occurred on November 26, 2025, is a salient example of this phenomenon. In the aftermath of the Tai Po Wang Fuk Court fire, the National Security Agency / National Security Office / Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region disseminated three warnings, thereby averting the escalation of the incident into a politically motivated riot. If any genuine reforms have been implemented in Hong Kong this year, it is the significant transformation of the National Security Agency from a supporting role to an actively leading institution. Despite the rarity with which this state-driven reform is acknowledged, it has effectively reduced the political burdens, sacrifices, and risks borne by individual Hong Kong citizens and grassroots activists. This outcome is worthy of celebration. A noteworthy attribute of Zheng Yanxiong is his readiness to assume national responsibility without harboring resentment. This exemplifies the admirable character and professional attitude of a true civil servant—qualities that are virtually unseen and unfound in Hong Kong. The present moment is characterized by the observation of citizens, who are bearing witness to the aforementioned accountability. Prior to his resignation, he established the National Security Agency to proactively lead and oversee Hong Kong's disciplined services. These forces have long been characterized by lax governance, inaction, political passivity, and even tacitly allowing foreign agents to operate through back channels. While some citizens may find the slogan "exploiting disasters to destabilize Hong Kong" to be excessive, the National Security Office was able to identify the true nature of the instigators at the earliest stage, thereby eliminating the risk of riots. Consequently, the situation has been stabilized, allowing the reconstruction of Wang Fuk Court and the relief efforts for disaster victims to proceed without political disruption. This handling stands in stark contrast to the anti-extradition bill turmoil period, where the root of the trouble was eradicated early on. In the aftermath of the Hong Kong Court fire on the afternoon of November 26, the emergence of localist slogans (e.g., "From Hong Kongers") and condolence displays on TVB without explicit explanation had already alerted individuals and organizations sensitive to public safety. This event has served as a catalyst, igniting a resurgence of activism reminiscent of the anti-extradition movement era. A close examination of Hong Kong's so-called opposition or reactionary forces reveals a striking uniformity in their narrative patterns, thought processes, and styles. Even purely grassroots actors unconsciously adhere to established local narratives and disruptive tactics, which facilitates their facile categorization. As a Hong Kong citizen, I would like to express my profound gratitude to the National Security Agency and Zheng Yanxiong. The crux of the matter is the identification of the nature of the crisis, the risks that were present, the manner in which China as a nation responded, the actions that were taken, and the outcome that ensued. By December 8th, Hong Kong's political risks had temporarily abated, with no indications of imminent civil unrest. This outcome is largely attributable to the command and cross-regional rescue efforts of China, a nation that has demonstrated exceptional leadership in this domain. The populace of Hong Kong has expressed a demand for accountability from the Hong Kong government. The critical, fatal error committed during this period was the government's initial refusal to allow joint rescue teams from the Greater Bay Area to rush to the scene to fight fires and provide disaster relief. Other systemic issues, such as the collusion between officials and businesses in large-scale tenders, represent deep-rooted vested interests. This should not be confused with John Lee's subsequent acceptance of mainland relief supplies. The $330 million repair cost for Wang Fuk Court is indicative of Hong Kong's pervasive high-pricing phenomenon, which has led to significant challenges for small property owners in bearing such exorbitant fees. This has been a long-standing source of contention within the estate's owners' corporation. The Hong Kong Court fire, which resulted in a significant increase in casualties, was the result of entrenched vested interests in Hong Kong. The subjects' immediate rejection of the mainland rescue team is a salient point that must not be erased from memory. However, it is equally alarming that members of the general public, entrenched in tribalism and localism, do not perceive this rejection as an issue of concern. This outcome suggests that entrenched Hong Kong tribalism has impeding the rationality of the participants, leading to a lack of caution that has resulted in the implementation of the suboptimal solution. From the victims' perspective, the paramount concern was the rescue of those trapped in the conflagration. The provenance of the rescuers, whether from the mainland, the nation, or Hong Kong, was of no consequence; the paramount concern was the survival of the individuals involved. The tribalist logic that prevailed dictated the following: Despite the potential for fatalities among the affected population, the responsibility for rescue operations should, according to the given definition, fall exclusively upon a specific demographic: Hong Kongers. This incident exemplifies the most abhorrent moral degeneration exposed by the Wang Fuk Court fire. Furthermore, the "Lion Rock Spirit" real estate oligarchs and profiteers (capital tycoons), in conjunction with various fraud syndicates, capitalized on the post-disaster opportunity to generate profits from the deceased under the pretext of "charitable donations." This encompasses public relations, image projects, and online traffic businesses, all of which are poised to engage in the major bidding process for post-disaster reconstruction. The prevailing conditions are characterized by profound disorder and pervasive commercial exploitation, extending even to the exploitation of others' misfortunes. It is important to note that the decision to provide disaster victims with free, indefinite stays in public housing until reconstruction was primarily driven by the Central Government, not the Hong Kong Government. The Hong Kong government's initial response did not include the establishment of an indefinite stay for disaster victims; rather, a specific grace period was in place. However, commencing on November 27th, a series of substantial humanitarian and remedial measures were initiated, precipitated by the Central Government's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office task force based in Hong Kong. Among these provisions was the assurance that disaster victims would be permitted to reside in emergency public housing facilities on a permanent basis until the reconstruction process was concluded and the "building-for-building" replacement was completed. The Chinese government and the Communist Party did not compel those disaster victims to enter the exploitative private market. This feature underscores the commendable, robust guidance from the central government and the consistent implementation of resolute remedial measures. Consequently, no local citizens have lodged complaints regarding the central government.
若港府在宏福苑大火第一時間趕緊請求和接受大灣區城市聯合救援大隊的入境和救援行動，159位宏福苑死難者和31位失蹤者則是曾未有過的，其中他們多數人都今日可能還在世。根深蒂固的利益固化藩籬還是在這事件上也作祟了。港府怕的是管轄權和既得利益受威脅。即使是三條水龍如狗尿般地在低處灑水24小時，導致無必要的多數困者死亡，也拒絕了所謂內地，大陸，中國的救援大隊入境趕赴現場救援。為何一定要是由所謂定義未明的香港人來救香港人？這個固執從何來？因此，針對港府的問責是必須要的。第一是，針對大圍標，包含官商勾結的，層層剝削的建築/地產生態，第二個則是拒絕大灣區聯合救援大隊的錯誤判斷。有關獨立委員會，他們跟監警會差不多，結論還是只處罰涉事建築工程公司，其顧問及涉事業主立案法團關鍵人物而已。只針對個別管理和工人失當，偽造棚網安全報告和證書，混合利用未阻燃棚網（上層）和阻燃棚網（底層，調查部分），窗邊有易燃物塗層，工人丟棄煙囪釀禍等，照樣只處罰個別違規者而已。因此，港府絕不能以‘改革’來躲避問責。放任和默認這一切腐敗的責任都在於‘第一責任人’港府。甚至，所謂改革，不能僅以禁止地盤工吸菸了事。
香港經歷了三大世紀大災難。第一是世紀大暴動（反修例風波）；第二是世紀大疫情（新冠肺炎）；第三則是世紀大人災（宏福苑大火）。筆者認為這場世紀大人災（宏福苑大火）相當於港府的切爾諾貝爾事件充分揭露了香港是什麼，港府治理無能，腐敗和貪婪資本閥的剝削生態是多麼的野蠻和極端，建築/地產的技術嚴重落後和危樓比比皆是。再加上，竹棚的爭論也涉及中港矛盾的，即中國禁止竹棚，但本港既得利益勢力釀成無數竹棚事故和宏福苑大火後，還僵持不安全的竹棚（成了分裂主義標誌）。既得利益勢力還是抗拒中國的，所以僵持竹棚使用，提出了不負責任的‘竹棚無罪論’。足認本港仍未完成所謂由亂到治。換言之，所謂媒體報導，根本漠視這重大事件的重中之重，它的最腐爛的弊端。
註解：被捕的Kenny是建制派的KOL，他發布了支持李慧瓊的短片，被捕隔日他的Youtube帳號關閉了。
In the event of the Hong Kong Wang Fuk Court fire, the prompt request and acceptance of entry and rescue operations by the Greater Bay Area Joint Rescue Team by the Hong Kong government would have prevented the 159 fatalities and 31 missing persons. It is conceivable that a significant proportion of these individuals might still be among the living at the present time. It is evident that deep-rooted barriers of entrenched interests once again played a role in this incident. The Hong Kong government expressed concerns regarding potential threats to its jurisdiction and vested interests. Despite the deployment of three fire hoses that continuously sprayed water at low elevation for a duration of 24 hours, resulting in preventable fatalities among the trapped residents, rescue teams from mainland China were unable to access the area. The necessity of Hong Kongers being saved exclusively by their fellow Hong Kongers, a group whose very definition remains ambiguous, is a matter of concern. The etiology of this obstinacy remains to be elucidated. Consequently, it is imperative to hold the Hong Kong government accountable for its actions and inactions. First, the large-scale bid rigging, including collusion between officials and businesses, and the multi-layered exploitation within the construction/land development ecosystem. Secondly, the decision to reject the Greater Bay Area joint rescue team was erroneous. With regard to the independent commission, its conclusions are likely to penalize the construction companies involved, their consultants, and key figures from the owners' corporations. The investigation's primary focus was on individual management and worker misconduct, including the falsification of scaffolding safety reports and certificates, the mixing of non-fire-retardant netting (upper levels) with fire-retardant netting (lower levels, investigated sections), the presence of flammable coatings near windows, and the discarding of cigarette butts by workers, which contributed to the incident. However, the investigation's conclusions were limited to the penalization of individual offenders, neglecting to address broader systemic issues. Consequently, the Hong Kong government must not circumvent its obligations by employing the pretext of "reform." The Hong Kong government must be held accountable for its role in perpetuating these corrupt practices. Furthermore, the implementation of these so-called reforms must extend beyond the mere prohibition of smoking on construction sites.
Hong Kong has experienced three major disasters that have profoundly impacted the 21st century. The first was the century's major riot (the anti-extradition bill protests); the second was the century's major pandemic (the global spread of the novel Coronavirus, officially known as SARS-CoV-2, which causes the disease known as "Covid-19"); and the third was the century's major disaster (the Hong Kong Wang Fuk Court fire). The most significant disaster of this century, the Wang Fuk Court fire, has been likened to Hong Kong's Chernobyl incident. This event exposed the underlying issues in Hong Kong, including the government's perceived incompetence, the severe exploitation by unscrupulous capitalists, and the technological lag in the construction and real estate sectors, leading to a substantial number of dilapidated buildings. Additionally, the bamboo scaffolding controversy is intertwined with the ongoing tensions between China and Hong Kong. Despite China's prohibition on bamboo scaffolding, Hong Kong's entrenched interests have been implicated in numerous accidents involving this material, including the Hong Kong Wang Fuk Court fire. However, these interests persist in their use of bamboo scaffolding, which has come to symbolize separatism. These vested interests have demonstrated a persistent resistance to China, as evidenced by their insistence on the utilization of bamboo scaffolding and their controversial assertion that bamboo scaffolding is not culpable for the resulting issues. This outcome serves to demonstrate that Hong Kong has yet to achieve the so-called transition from chaos to governance. In essence, the prevailing media discourse has conspicuously overlooked the most critical dimension of this significant event: its fundamental defect.
It is noteworthy that the individual apprehended, identified as Kenny, occupies a prominent position within the pro-establishment KOL landscape. He subsequently published a video expressing support for Starry Lee, which led to the suspension of his YouTube account the day after his arrest.
▪️高市早苗的‘台灣有事論’言論風波（2025年11月7日發生）： 筆者直接目擊了台灣地位未定論和台灣有事論的兩大風波，一個發生在台灣，另一個發生在中國及其中國香港。高市早苗‘台灣有事論’言論風波的種種分析都錯過了英國的動向（英國隨時敲定了首相訪華以及一度趁勢批准了歐洲最大中國大使館的開設等，討好中國的一系列外交攻勢，孤立的不是中國，而唯一是日本）。簡言之，它的重點是英國和美國，甚至中國都利用日本政府甘願承擔的反派角色來迅速改善外交關係的一大政治行動。其背景不是什麼冷戰，而是確認了聯合國五大常任理事國的絕對共同國益和底下維護的秩序仍是二戰戰勝帶來的國際地位和力量平衡。美蘇冷戰也並沒有打破二戰秩序。二戰和聯合國的秩序意味著日本的絕對孤立，它一國面對五大國的結構仍在。被冷戰敘事誤導的日本朝野不理解的是，世界開始進入了多極化，所謂多極化並不分是否已發達國家，連英美都開始調整自身與中國合作，這其實是前部的特朗普政權發表的國家安全戰略上也看得到。美國目前處於過渡期，就如何處理既得利益，霸權未來如何演變開始軟化了。因此，被冷戰敘事胡搞的日本，南韓，台灣進入多極化的新世界體系應該比英美更晚的。此次，2010年釣魚台撞船事件，2012年釣魚台島嶼國有化等的同一前民主黨角色跟主張集體自衛權的安倍晉三的手足高市早苗釀成言論風波是官僚的劇本。只是，種種日方的分析不是抹黑習近平的政宣，就是為了日本官僚解困的言論遊戲，而非傳達真實的。大半都是日方一廂情願的冀望的表達（希望中國怎樣想），而非真分析。在經團聯企業群控制朝野和官僚之下，中國繼續追求以往的政經分離，還是要求政經一致？ 筆者希望後者。有些香港賣文者認為中國該扶植日本反對勢力。但這建議則是嚴重過時的，那是毛澤東/華國鋒時代終結時結束的國際工作。從這個言論風波也可看出，中國早就決定不靠所謂日本國內的正式反對派的，是因為它們都同屬於同一經團聯企業群的經濟基礎。簡單說，高市自民黨的經濟基礎是經團聯企業，鳩山反對派，立憲民主黨的經濟基礎也是經團聯企業及其工會。日本政治勢力的同質性極高是因為基於同一經濟基礎。其實，中俄的個別日本聯絡人，公眾人物的言論公關如何，他們所屬的生態是與公然反中俄的勢力一樣的。只要中國對付得了整個日本，就沒有什麼問題。此外，應該沒有人提及日本還是在美日同盟下扮演與英日同盟時期同樣的角色，寧可為主子擔任壞蛋，吃虧的是自己，而非中英美。高市言論風波凸顯的是牢不可破的二戰秩序和五大國底線，甚至日本為中英美改善外交關係扮演了積極角色。因此，這次言論風波的背景與以往類似事件截然不同。有趣的是，一直以來想要讓美國捲入東亞戰爭的自民黨政權與特朗普政權的國家安全戰略有牴觸。美國絕對寧願與中俄一起維護二戰秩序的底線是不可改變的，連冷戰也沒法改變這點。日本看錯了國際形勢。那麼，日本的唯一活路跟一百年前一樣，搞好與中美的關係。中日戰爭必然意味著英美日戰爭，日本的國際孤立，日本仍處於國家經濟失落的三十年（如今仍看似九十年代的世界）和殖民地，整個日本就是美軍基地，它的政策還是要向中立主義靠攏的，以便達成中美日三國的友好關係。反中勢力最要看清楚的是如今中國強到不在乎日本國內的反華輿論了，而且在日本島內喧譁大鬧的極樂反華論者們連同其官僚都根本忽視處於中國境內的日本人民和日本機構的安全和權益。
The Controversy Surrounding Sanae Takaichi's "Taiwan Contingency Theory" Remarks (November 7, 2025): The author's direct observation of two major controversies, the "Taiwan Status Undecided Theory" and the "Taiwan Contingency Theory," provides a unique perspective. These theories manifested in distinct geographical regions, with the former unfolding in Taiwan and the latter in China and its Hong Kong region. All analyses of the controversy surrounding Sanae Takaichi's "Taiwan Contingency Theory" remarks have overlooked Britain's maneuvers. Britain promptly finalized the Prime Minister's visit to China and even capitalized on the momentum to approve the opening of Europe's largest Chinese embassy, among other diplomatic overtures to appease China. The result was the isolation of Japan, not China. In essence, the crux of the matter pertains to a significant political maneuver in which Britain, the United States, and even China took advantage of Japan's readiness to adopt a villainous role, thereby expediting the enhancement of diplomatic relations. This occurred in the context of the Cold War, yet it should be noted that the primary concern was the reaffirmation of the collective national interests of the five permanent UN Security Council members and the order they uphold. This order is rooted in the international status and power balance that were established by the victors of World War II. The US-Soviet Cold War did not disrupt the post-WWII order. The post-World War II and UN-established order signified Japan's continued absolute isolation, as the nation found itself confronted by five major powers. Japan's political establishment was misled by Cold War narratives, leading to a failure to recognize the shift toward multipolarity in the global landscape. This shift extended beyond the scope of developed-nation status, as evidenced by the adoption of cooperative approaches by the United States and the United Kingdom. This trend was evident in the National Security Strategy of the Trump administration. The United States is currently undergoing a period of transition, marked by a shift in its approach to the management of vested interests and the future trajectory of its global influence. Consequently, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—all of which have been influenced by Cold War narratives—are likely to enter this new multipolar world system after the United States and the United Kingdom. The controversy surrounding former Democratic Party figures, associated with the 2010 Senkaku collision incident and the 2012 nationalization of the islands, along with Sanae Takaichi, a close ally of Shinzo Abe who advocates for collective self-defense rights, is a deliberate tactic orchestrated by bureaucrats. However, the majority of Japanese analyses tend to either portray Xi Jinping in a negative light as propaganda or employ rhetorical strategies to extricate Japanese bureaucrats from challenging situations, rather than accurately reflecting reality. The prevailing sentiment among the majority is one of unilateral Japanese wishful thinking, or the projection of Japan's aspirations onto China, rather than a thorough and objective analysis. In the context of China's ongoing pursuit of a policy of separation of politics and economics, a pertinent question arises: should the nation's corporate bloc, Keidanren which wields considerable influence over both ruling and opposition parties as well as bureaucrats, maintain its current stance of control? Alternatively, should China consider demanding a more aligned relationship between these two pivotal sectors? The author of this text posits that the latter outcome is preferable. A number of Hong Kong-based commentators have proposed that China should provide support to Japanese opposition forces. However, this counsel is profoundly outdated, as it reflects international work that transpired at the conclusion of the Mao Zedong/Hua Guofeng era. This verbal clash also reveals China's long-standing decision not to rely on so-called formal opposition factions within Japan, as they all share the same Keidanren corporate economic foundation. In essence, the economic foundation of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is composed of Keidanren corporations, while the economic underpinnings of the Hatoyama opposition and the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) are likewise supported by Keidanren corporations and their affiliated unions. The extreme homogeneity of Japan's political forces is rooted in the common economic foundation shared by these forces. In reality, the public relations tactics employed by Japanese liaisons of China and Russia, as well as by public figures, function within the same ecosystem as openly anti-China/Russia forces. Provided that China is able to effectively manage the entirety of Japan, there will be no substantial problems. Furthermore, it has been observed that Japan, under the terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance, adopts a role analogous to that which it assumed during the Anglo-Japanese Alliance era. In this context, Japan assumes the role of the "master's villain," with the associated losses being shouldered by Japan itself rather than by China, Britain, or the United States. The Takaichi controversy underscores the enduring nature of the post-World War II order and the strategic interests of the five major powers. Notably, Japan plays an active role in fostering diplomatic relations between China, Britain, and the United States, thereby demonstrating a commitment to maintaining positive international relations. This context of the Takaichi controversy differs fundamentally from previous incidents. A notable aspect of the LDP regime's foreign policy is its persistent attempts to involve the U.S. in East Asian conflicts, which stands in contrast to the national security strategy of the Trump administration. The United States' steadfast commitment to safeguarding the post-World War II order, in conjunction with China and Russia, remains unshakable. This unwavering stance has persisted throughout the Cold War era and continues to be a fundamental tenet of U.S. foreign policy. Japan's foreign policy has been characterized by a misreading of the international landscape. Consequently, Japan's strategic outlook, unchanged since the previous century, is to cultivate harmonious relations with both China and the United States. In the event of a Sino-Japanese conflict, it is inevitable that the situation would escalate into a war involving Britain, the United States, and Japan. This, in turn, would result in Japan's international isolation. Japan, still mired in its three decades of economic stagnation (where the world still seems like the 1990s) and effectively functioning as a colony—with its entire territory serving as a U.S. military base—must inevitably gravitate toward neutralist policies to foster friendly relations among China, the United States, and Japan. It is imperative for those in opposition to China to acknowledge that the nation has attained sufficient strength to disregard domestic anti-China rhetoric in Japan. Furthermore, the extreme anti-China voices within Japan, in conjunction with their bureaucratic supporters, exhibit a flagrant disregard for the safety and rights of Japanese citizens and institutions residing in China.
▪️2025年 立法會選舉（2025年12月7日發生）：筆者沒有登記為選民，也沒有投票，是因為我寧願投給中國共產黨，也不願意肯定港府及任何香港既得利益勢力。香港民意的唯一可靠指標是地方直選的投票率。結果，在登記選民人數: 4,131,298中，僅有1,317,682名投票了，其投票率為31.90%。官商的團體都總動員了，還是大約四分之一的民意基礎而已。換言之，港府的民意基礎是薄弱的，僅有全選民的四分之一多而已。民意基礎是與上次立法會選舉大同小異的。上次為2021年立法會選舉。登記選民人數 : 4,472,863，其中1,350,680名投票了，其投票率為30.20%。在選民減少的趨勢下，30%和31%並沒有結構性的分別。大致上，民心所向未變，對港府施政的民眾評價也與2021年差不多。甚至，客觀而言，實際選民人數和實際投票人數都下降導致了投票率略升而已。因此，只有政治騙徒才會自誇‘成功’，誇獎和樂觀這個香港嚴峻情況（僵局）和投票結果。港府欠缺民意基礎，應該儘早以優秀的深圳市政府取而代之。
The 2025 Legislative Council Election was held on December 7, 2025. I did not register as a voter or cast a ballot because I would rather vote for the Chinese Communist Party than endorse the Hong Kong government or any vested interests in Hong Kong. The sole reliable indicator of public sentiment in Hong Kong is the voter turnout rate in local direct elections. The results of the election demonstrated a turnout rate of 31.90%, with 1,317,682 of the 4,131,298 registered voters casting their ballots. Despite the mobilization of pro-government and business groups, this still amounts to only approximately a quarter of the public's support base. In essence, the Hong Kong government's popular mandate is tenuous, encompassing a mere quarter of the eligible electorate. This voter base bears a strong resemblance to that of the previous Legislative Council election. The most recent election was the 2021 Legislative Council election. Registered voters: The total number of registered voters was 4,472,863, and 1,350,680 of them cast a ballot, resulting in a voter turnout rate of 30.20%. In light of the observed decline in voter turnout, the observed differences in voter numbers, at 30% and 31%, do not signify a fundamental shift in the overall trend. In general, public sentiment has remained constant, and citizens' assessments of the Hong Kong government's performance are comparable to those in 2021. From an objective perspective, the slight increase in the turnout rate can be attributed to two factors: the actual number of eligible voters and the actual number of voters who cast a ballot. Both metrics demonstrated a decline from their levels observed in the previous election cycle. Consequently, only political charlatans would boast of "success," praising and expressing optimism about Hong Kong's severe situation (deadlock) and the election results. The Hong Kong government is currently operating without a popular mandate, a situation that should be remedied by the appointment of the capable Shenzhen municipal government.
華記11月27日報導：大埔宏福苑通天大火災「痛心疾首」香港消防署拒絕內地消防救援隊入境香港協助救援！救火無人機不能即時發揮作用，高官必須問責…
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q. 地方選區投票率增長情況