Hong Kong Intelligence Report #163 香港尼西亞的大粵語部落主義及大繁體字政治藩籬化

Ryota Nakanishi
4 days ago
25 min read

Updated: 3 days ago

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

Five people making stop gestures with serious expressions against a white background. They convey a sense of disapproval. — A diverse group of individuals stands united, each making a gesture of refusal with serious expressions, symbolizing a collective stand against something they oppose.

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】香港尼西亞的大粵語部落主義及大繁體字政治藩籬化

The Hong kong-nesia Cantonese tribalism and the political entrenchment of the Greater Traditional Chinese context

有幾點聲明：

1. 身處於中國境內（當然含中國香港在內）的所有外國人和外國機構都應當支持中國及其國策。

2. 作為英國戰利品的香港仍難以擺脫勞動者階級的民生困境是因為香港既得利益勢力壟斷和私用社會體制和資源並且以各種方式阻礙國家政策的全面貫徹所致。全面管治權和國策的全面貫徹應該都是一樣的意思。

3. 香港民怨仍被本港運作的資本閥和帝國主義主流/買辦‘獨立’/社交等媒體有系統地把本港既得利益勢力自己貪婪貪圖私利所造成的民怨轉移，轉嫁到中國及其中央政府和中共身上的。而只要受苦人民越看到國家的果斷作為，人民就越會支持國家的。所謂‘干涉’或‘干預’都是既得利益勢力，分離主義勢力的論點和用詞，香港只是個中國的地方城市之一，國家和國家政策及其國家目標應當都是其個人單位的終極目標。強國是當個人單位和國家單位的目標相一致時才能成立的。國家也就是個人權利和任何所有法定權力的真實保證者。兩者是相容的。但在香港，‘一國兩制’被誤讀為可以反國策的藩籬。這過去被叫做‘本土主義’，但最精確的名稱則是部落主義。我們面對的港獨分裂主義的別稱，同一主體也就是本港根深蒂固的部落主義（反國家主義的大本營思想）。我稱之為香港尼西亞（Hong Kong-nesia）。

4. 我支持中國和中國共產黨積極解決所有過去棘手的香港問題，也深信隨著大灣區一體化，澳琴一體化（本港媒體普遍幾乎沒積極願意報導過澳琴一體化一事，足認既得利益勢力不希望類似的深港一體化，本港既得利益勢力守護神港府改以不涉一體化的北都來劃清界線），深港一體化的具體發展，本港反國策的部落主義及其阻抗必將逐漸消失殆盡。最理想的是，先實現澳琴一體化及深港一體化，再逐步完成大灣區一體化。最後，國家實現全國統一大市場。這就是歷史進程。就政府政策方面，澳門政府今年領先一體化進程。而香港政府則以無作為拒絕一體化。

Several points to clarify:

1. All foreign individuals and entities within China's territory (including Hong Kong, of course) are obligated to support China and its national policies.

2. Hong Kong, as a British prize of war, remains unable to escape the livelihood struggles of its working class due to the monopolization and private appropriation of social systems and resources by Hong Kong's vested interests, who obstruct the full implementation of national policies in various ways. The complete exercise of sovereignty and the comprehensive implementation of national policies should be regarded as a unified entity.

3. Hong Kong's public discontent continues to be systematically diverted by local capitalists and the imperialist mainstream/comprador "independent"/social media. The Hong Kong government has been accused of allocating blame for the aforementioned grievances to China, its central government, and the Chinese Communist Party. These grievances have been attributed to the actions of Hong Kong's vested interests, which have been identified as being driven by greed and self-interest. However, as the populace bears witness to the nation's resolute actions, their support for the government is likely to grow. The terms "interference" and "intervention" are employed as arguments and terminology by vested interests and separatist forces. Hong Kong is but one local city within China. The overarching national policies and objectives should be regarded as the ultimate goals of the individual units that comprise the nation. The establishment of a robust national entity is predicated on the alignment of the objectives of constituent units with those of the national entity itself. The state is the ultimate guarantor of individual rights and all legitimate authority. The two are compatible. However, in Hong Kong, the "One Country, Two Systems" policy has been interpreted as a hindrance to national policy. This phenomenon was previously referred to as "localism," but a more accurate designation would be "tribalism." The Hong Kong independence separatism that is currently being studied can be considered a manifestation of the same entity—the deeply entrenched tribalism (the stronghold ideology of anti-nationalism) that is present within the territory in question. This phenomenon is referred to as "Hong Kong-nesia."

4. It is this author's position that the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party should take proactive measures to address all of the contentious issues that have arisen in Hong Kong. It is also believed that the integration of Macau and Zhuhai, a topic that has been largely neglected by Hong Kong media, will confirm the opposition of vested interests to similar Shenzhen-Hong Kong integration. The Hong Kong government, guardian of local vested interests, has distanced itself by promoting the northern metropolis instead. The concrete development of Shenzhen-Hong Kong integration will inevitably lead to the fading away of Hong Kong's anti-national policy tribalism and its resistance. The optimal approach entails the initial integration of Macao and Hengqin, followed by the subsequent integration of Shenzhen and Hong Kong. This sequence of integration is expected to culminate in the comprehensive implementation of the Greater Bay Area initiative. The culmination of these efforts will result in the establishment of a unified national market. This trajectory is indicative of a historical pattern. With respect to government policies, the Macao government has demonstrated a proactive stance on integration this year, while the Hong Kong government has adopted an oppositional stance through inaction.

▪️本篇就最近中國香港境內發生的幾個事件和議題毫無畏懼地破除禁忌而進行評述。

This article has the audacity to address sensitive subjects by offering insights on various recent events and issues within Hong Kong, China.

駐外外交官群體挑釁中美領導層的衝突，來謀取私利和謀害本國執政黨政權

A group of overseas diplomats has been observed inciting discord with the leadership of China and the United States, seemingly driven by self-serving agendas and seeking to subvert the prevailing political order in their respective home countries.

首先是，曾任美國駐港澳總領事館政治部‘主管’（當時本港媒體只報導她是政治部/處；港府為美國政治部隨後遮蔽了禮賓府網站的電話簿）的伊珠麗（Julie Eadeh）於2025年9月19日及22日，伊珠麗她分別會見了香港前政務司司長陳方安生和香港民主黨前主席劉慧卿一事。反修例風波時期的餘波仍繼續。第一，不能把國務院及其外交官和特朗普政權的白宮等同起來。危機來自於永久官僚體制內的官員群體另外挑釁中美矛盾，他們就隨即可製造美國民主黨重新返歸白宮的氣勢以及癱瘓特朗普政權。結局，中美成功遏止了挑釁。當本港體制內不存在任何真愛國改革勢力之下，增加了中央和中共積極管理本港的迫切性，要不然，與以往一樣放任自流，此事件就恐怕當時已成颱風，足以損害中美貿易戰談判和整個穩定性。其實，此事件持續到2025年10月10日（外交部駐澳特派員劉顯法批判伊珠麗）。伊珠麗（Julie Eadeh）依照舊的陰謀論可以被解釋為case officer，也就是反修例風波的幕後主腦，這是舊陰謀論的致命錯誤。美國外交官或以外交官為cover的情報/政治工作人員是就個別案件而言，先被當地運作的財閥，資本閥請求才會介入和支援當地政治活動的。其主次因果關係是往往被顛倒的。而且，批准伊珠麗（Julie Eadeh）到任的是中美雙方的中央/聯邦政府。雙方都不認為伊珠麗（Julie Eadeh）是‘反修例風波的主腦主事份子’。這批准是理性的判斷，也就是合乎客觀真實的。反正任何外交部隨時都可以要求撤除任何境內外國駐外使館。不過，伊珠麗（Julie Eadeh）的命運恐怕與前日本駐台交流協會台北事務所代表（相當於駐臺的大使，停職狀態的外交官身分者從事）齋藤正樹差不多？在港，此一美國民主黨地盤，伊珠麗應該不會比齋藤正樹難處事。後者因其台灣地位未定論引起了言論風波，而被馬英九政權全面被孤立和極端冷待，國民黨也明知只要不讓齋藤正樹能夠做經常性‘外交’工作，外務省就不久會被迫讓他調職的。重點是，非白宮的，一股國務院外交官群體隨時都會挑釁中美矛盾，讓中美政府首腦和頂層管治團隊難以維持溝通的局面，這才是政治目的和野心所在。此外，順便一提，所謂政治矛盾，就社會整體而言，其最大獲益者總是跨國跨境犯罪集團，這包括國際恐怖分子和走私/詐騙/人蛇集團等。這就是為何連在反修例風波期間都有黑社會群體積極參與其中的。換言之，政治化或政治矛盾過熱只會讓跨國跨境犯罪集團猖獗，永遠的最大受害者還是最普通的人民或貧民或弱勢群體。

First, Julie Eadeh, who previously served as the "Head" of the Political Section at the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong and Macau (local media at the time only reported her position as Political Section/Division; the Hong Kong government subsequently removed the phone directory listing for the U.S. Political Section from the Government House website). The aftershocks of the anti-extradition movement persist. Firstly, it is imperative to recognize that the State Department and its diplomats should not be equated with the Trump administration's White House. The crisis is rooted in the deliberate provocation of Sino-US tensions by officials within the permanent bureaucracy. The ability to swiftly generate momentum for the Democratic Party's return to the White House and to effectively impede the actions of the Trump administration is a distinct possibility. In the final analysis, both China and the U.S. effectively contained the provocation. The absence of authentic patriotic reform forces within Hong Kong's political structure exacerbated the urgency for the central government and the Chinese Communist Party to assume direct management of Hong Kong. Conversely, if the current state of affairs persists, there is a risk of escalation into a typhoon with the potential to undermine Sino-U.S. trade negotiations and broader stability. In fact, had this incident persisted until October 10, 2025, it would have had significant ramifications.

In the context of Macau, Foreign Ministry Commissioner Liu Xianfa offered a critique of Julie Eadeh's work. Julie Eadeh could be interpreted under old conspiracy theories as a "case officer," the mastermind behind the anti-extradition movement—a fatal flaw in those theories. In the context of U.S. foreign policy, diplomats or intelligence/political operatives utilizing diplomatic cover generally intervene in local political activities solely upon receipt of a request from regional financial or capital elites. The primary-secondary causal relationship is frequently inverted. Furthermore, the appointment of Julie Eadeh was endorsed by the central and federal governments of China and the United States, respectively. Neither side regarded Julie Eadeh as the "mastermind or principal figure behind the anti-extradition bill movement." This approval was a rational judgment, consistent with objective reality. In any event, the prerogative to demand the removal of a foreign diplomatic mission within its borders rests with the foreign ministry. However, it is plausible that Julie Eadeh's circumstances may mirror those of Masaki Saito, the former representative of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association Taipei Office (a position analogous to that of an ambassador to Taiwan, functioning in a suspended diplomatic capacity). In Hong Kong, a bastion of the U.S. Democratic Party, Julie Eadeh should not encounter more significant challenges than Masaki Saito. The latter's remarks on Taiwan's undetermined status incited controversy, culminating in his complete isolation and the Ma Ying-jeou administration's extreme cold treatment of him. The Kuomintang (KMT) was aware that by impeding Saito's ability to engage in customary "diplomatic" activities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would inevitably be compelled to reassign him. The crux of the matter lies in non-White House actors, who constitute a faction of State Department diplomats perpetually provoking Sino-American tensions. The primary objective of these actors is to disrupt communication channels between the leadership and governing elites of the two nations, thereby serving their own political ambitions. It is important to note that political conflicts of this nature frequently benefit transnational criminal syndicates, including international terrorists, smuggling rings, fraud networks, and human trafficking operations. This phenomenon elucidates the involvement of organized crime groups in the anti-extradition bill protests, despite the ongoing criminal activities. In essence, the politicization of these issues, or the escalation of political conflicts, serves only to embolden transnational criminal syndicates. The ultimate victims of these conflicts are invariably ordinary citizens, economically disadvantaged populations, and vulnerable social groups.

立法會正確削弱奸臣逆賊的壟斷和老人政治

The Legislative Council has judiciously curtailed the dominance of disloyal ministers and rebels, as well as the influence of the elderly, within the political landscape.

第二個議題是，2025年11月6日今年立法會選舉的提名期結束了。據說‘立法會選舉提名期結束，共有161人報名參選，現屆89名議員，有35人放棄競逐連任，其過半數只做了一屆議員。’其中，不少死硬反動派，死硬既得利益代理人都自動退場一事，是香港改革，維新的真進展。身為香港市民絕對肯定的一事。其中，最‘忠實’的港府宗社黨，新民黨葉劉淑儀，黎棟國等，本港既得利益勢力核心的傳聲筒，香港總商會代表議員林健鋒和地產霸權界代表/VISION2047成員龍漢標的退場都是真理的顯現，真正愛國者都應當歡呼的喜事。再次強調，本港只有既得利益勢力，而沒有真改革勢力或‘主動’改革勢力，因此在‘後2019時代’必須要有中央和中共的積極管理才能確保本港順從國策前進。順便一提，整個香港既得利益勢力是一個大章魚，香港社會問題也可以比擬為一個大章魚。我們在媒體上或生活上看得到的基本上是它的各種觸手。本港媒體本身就是它的觸手。所謂建制派是既得利益勢力中的‘妥協派’，那麼所謂傳統反對派則是既得利益勢力中的‘行動/搞事派’。他們之間並沒有本質差別。背後金主們往往都是同一財閥/資本閥。因此，涉港最致命的錯誤是將港府，‘愛國愛港’壟斷資本，‘建制派’和中央和中共等同起來誤判本港政治。這就是真正反中反共政宣的模式。此次突如其來的立法會的「七字頭」自動退場機制是最溫和地削弱既得利益勢力的有力措施。騎劫在國家和人民之間的既得利益籓屏（它們朋黨大聯盟不斷如同雜草叢生膨脹）是民生問題的本體。市民十分肯定老害自動退場機制。老人統治意味著世代之間的嚴重斷層，是一種少數壟斷的敗象。這不僅是政治，也包含文化藝術領域，其中香港電影界則最顯著。

The second topic is that the nomination period for this year's Legislative Council election concluded on November 6, 2025. It has been reported that "with the nomination period for the Legislative Council election concluded, a total of 161 candidates have registered. Among the current 89 legislators, 35 have chosen not to seek re-election, with over half having served only one term." It is noteworthy that the voluntary withdrawal of numerous die-hard reactionaries and entrenched vested-interest representatives signifies genuine progress in Hong Kong's reform and renewal. This is an indisputable fact for all Hong Kong citizens. The most 'loyal' pro-establishment figures—including Regina Ip and Lai Tung-kwok of the New People's Party, the mouthpiece of Hong Kong's vested interests; Jeffrey Lam, representative of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce; and Louis Loong Hon-biu, representative of the real estate hegemony and member of VISION2047—have all stepped aside. This phenomenon can be considered a manifestation of truth and a cause for celebration among individuals who genuinely prioritize their nation's interests. To reiterate: Hong Kong's political landscape is characterized by the presence of vested interest forces, rather than genuine reform forces or "proactive" reform forces. Consequently, in the "post-2019 era," effective governance by the Central Government and the Chinese Communist Party is imperative to ensure Hong Kong's advancement in accordance with national policies. The Hong Kong vested interest force can be likened to a giant octopus, and Hong Kong's social problems can also be likened to a giant octopus. The phenomenon under scrutiny can be observed in various forms, whether in media representations or in daily life, and can be understood as comprising multiple interconnected components. Hong Kong's media apparatus functions as one of the city-state's governing bodies. The pro-establishment camp, as previously defined, can be understood as the "compromise faction" within the context of vested interests. Conversely, the traditional opposition camp can be regarded as the "action/troublemaking faction" within the aforementioned vested interests. A fundamental difference between the two is not apparent. The entities providing financial support to these organizations frequently consist of the same financial conglomerates or capital networks. Consequently, the most critical misstep in Hong Kong policy is the erroneous assumption that the Hong Kong government, characterized as "patriotic and pro-Hong Kong," and monopolistic capital, represented by the "pro-establishment camp," are synonymous with the Central Government and the Chinese Communist Party. This misapprehension leads to a flawed assessment of Hong Kong's political landscape. This constitutes a paradigmatic exemplar of anti-China and anti-Communist propaganda. The abrupt implementation of the "seven-digit" automatic exit mechanism in the Legislative Council constitutes the least extreme yet most efficacious measure to diminish the entrenched interests. The fundamental problem of livelihood challenges stems from entrenched interests that have subverted the relationship between the nation and its people, fostering a proliferation of clique alliances that resemble unchecked weeds. The citizenry has expressed significant support for the mechanism that facilitates the automatic exit of the incumbent leadership. Gerontocracy is indicative of a profound generational dissonance and the deterioration of minority dominance. This phenomenon extends beyond the political realm to encompass cultural and artistic domains, with Hong Kong's film industry serving as a prime illustration.

本港能否實現繁簡平等，全面開放使用國語是個不可辨駁的愛國指標!

絕對支持澳琴一體化！‘深港一體化’！粵港澳大灣區一體化！全國統一大市場！

The question of whether Hong Kong can achieve a state of true equality between traditional and simplified Chinese characters, and whether it can fully adopt the use of Mandarin, is an indisputable indicator of the degree of patriotism in the local population.

It is imperative to provide unwavering support for the integration of Macao and Zhuhai. The concept of "Shenzhen-Hong Kong integration" is a salient example of this phenomenon. The integration of Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao is a subject of significant interest. The establishment of a unified national market is imperative.

第三個議題(香港尼西亞的大粵語部落主義及大繁體字政治藩籬化)是重新被炒作的繁簡字體的本港部落主義爭吵，但此次特色是由所謂‘建制派’‘愛國愛港政協’梁振英當任主角了。幸好，第一個議題和第二個議題都已獲得妥善處理。接下來，第三個議題就是最近十一月剛爆發的社會問題。那就是FCC摯友，由新世界地產和恆基地產支持的‘全國土地財政傳道士’‘前測量師’‘前香港籓市長’梁振英討伐兩所愛國官校開放考生使用簡體字一事。實際上，就整體而言，這個議題還是不可避免地涉及語言身分問題和本地人定義問題。簡言之，香港排外主義地使用粵語和繁體字是沒有法律依據的。法律訂明的中文只是中文。而國家政策制定的法定官方中文是普通話/國語，唯一官方法定字體是簡體字。這問題的背景是，國家還沒在港實施官方語言政策（如《國家通用語言文字法》）而已。最糟糕的是既得利益勢力守護者‘愛國’港府教育局的‘鵺’至今無意接受國家的語言政策。就語言領域而言，香港仍然是化外之地。

換言之，並無法律基礎強制所有市民使用粵語和繁體字，同時毫無法律基礎禁止或系統地排斥普通話和簡體字。

反之亦然。使用粵語是英國殖民者設計的中港分離之舉，使用繁體字也就是高度政治化的。本來簡體字是國民政府的語言政策，但國共內戰敗北之後，國民黨政府改把本來優化繁體字的簡體字政策視為反共政策的攻擊目標之一，如此導致了如今本港和台灣使用繁體字的極端政治化。就理想而言，本港也應推動蔣介石國民黨成功的國語政策，但客觀而言，最理性和務實的解決方式則是所有社會機構運作全面開放繁簡體字以及在社會所有層面上使用普通話和粵語達致平等。先突破大粵語部落主義之後，其他少數族裔就會得到本港部落主義的結構性歧視緩和或開始瓦解。關鍵之一在於國家實現繁簡並用，粵語和國語平等開放的政策來化解本港大粵語部落主義。同時，兩面人梁振英搏取反中亂港勢力Like的反國語反簡體字的機會主義言行充分證實了所謂‘建制派’不可信，市民根本不能夠盲目地跟從它們。只不過是本港既得利益勢力自己的宗社黨，多面人而已。

順便一提，香港基本法第九條（香港特區的行. 政、立法和司法機關除使用中文外，還可以英文為正式語文）規定的是，最優先的官方語言是必須用的中文，但沒有明文規定是繁體粵語還是簡體國語，但必須用‘中文’而已。然而，英文的地位是可用，可不用，並沒有像中文的至高地位。那麼，最根深蒂固的大粵語部落主義的組織是所謂自稱愛國的本港紀律部隊。他們‘愛國’兩面人有偏見地指定粵語，而禁止內部使用簡體字。這是沒有法律基礎的。這需要修改基本法第九條而明文規定繁簡，國語粵語平等和全面開放。

本港大粵語土人部落毫無法律基礎強制人家特定使用繁體字和粵語！

本港大粵語土人部落毫無法律基礎排斥和歧視使用國家法定字體簡體字和國語！

無論是壟斷港府建制的奸臣逆賊或本港冷血資本閥，都毫無法律基礎排斥繁簡平等，全面開放使用簡體字和國語！

而且也毫無法律基礎設計種種排斥普通話和簡體字的結構和程序。這一切都是香港尼西亞土人部落的歧視和偏見！那麼，本港內地人和所有少數族群應當以超然主義的態度秉持全球通用的簡體國語也是合情合理合法的。香港尼西亞乃語言的化外之地。一點都不需要屈服於大香港土人部落主義的歧視。國家語言政策為何要屈服於香港尼西亞毫無法律基礎的大粵語部落主義歧視？至今令人不解。是時候徹底清算部落主義藩籬了。怕什麼？

哪有‘愛國者’抵制國家法定官方語言和法定字體？愛國者真地在治港嗎？

此次，我高度贊賞的是勇敢地為弱勢群體推動開放簡體字的兩所學校，沙田官立小學和港島區西營盤的李陞小學。這兩所並未屈服於香港尼西亞的部落主義及其既得利益勢力的網路媒體暴力。我肯定投票支持這兩所學校，是因為這是香港改革的重大舉措，突破大粵語部落主義的利益固化藩籬！今年我又看到了社會曙光，十分高興！

接下來，這個語言身分問題還有與本地人定義的問題牽連的。我最近調查了本港勞工界最熱門議題，即假招聘問題。其重點是所謂本地人的定義。簡言之，大粵語部落主義的結構性歧視涵蓋所謂本地人和外地人定義。就法律而言，所謂本地人或本地員工就是永久居民和透過簽證合法居留者或合法居留工作者，本來不限於國籍和種族。所謂外地人或外勞或外地員工則是指透過各種輸入計畫輸入的工作人員。不過，問題在於用人單位的系統性歧視，即將香港人和外國人分別對待。人事存在過濾系統，劃分香港人/本地人和外國人。糟糕的是連永久居民的外籍人士，外族人士都往往被劃歸於本地人和本地員工的範疇外。更糟糕的一點是，香港居民擁有不少雙重國籍或多重國籍者，這些大粵語部落主義人員本身同時也是外國人，但自然被視為本地人，自己人和本地員工，如此反過來歧視法律上屬於本地人和本地員工的居港外國人和外族人士。這就是混亂，自相矛盾，結構性歧視問題所在。這也就是香港尼西亞的不文明亂象。

The third issue pertains to the resurgence of local tribalism disputes concerning traditional and simplified Chinese characters. Notably, this dispute has garnered the involvement of Leung Chun-ying, a prominent figure within the pro-establishment and patriotic factions of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). It is fortunate, therefore, that the initial and secondary issues have been appropriately addressed. The third issue pertains to the social problem that emerged in November of the previous year. The individual in question is Leung Chun-ying, a close associate of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club (FCC). Leung's professional background includes roles such as "national land finance evangelist," "former surveyor," and "former Hong Kong fiefdom mayor." Notably, Leung is supported by prominent entities such as New World Development and Henderson Land. In a recent development, Leung voiced his concerns regarding the practices of two patriotic official schools. These schools have adopted a policy that allows examinees to utilize simplified Chinese characters in their academic endeavors. In essence, this issue inherently encompasses broader inquiries concerning linguistic identity and the conceptualization of "local."

In summary, Hong Kong's exclusive utilization of Cantonese and traditional Chinese characters does not have a legal foundation.

The legal code stipulates the use of "Chinese" as the official language. According to the national policy, Mandarin/Putonghua is designated as the official Chinese language, with simplified characters as the sole official script. The state has yet to implement an official language policy in Hong Kong, such as the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Common Language and Script. Notably, the Hong Kong government's Education Bureau, which is entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding the interests of various groups, has demonstrated a reluctance to embrace the nation's linguistic policies. From a linguistic perspective, Hong Kong continues to function as a lawless frontier.

Consequently, there exists no legal foundation for the mandatory use of Cantonese and traditional Chinese characters, nor for the prohibition or systematic exclusion of Mandarin and simplified Chinese characters.

Conversely, the reverse is also true. The employment of Cantonese was a stratagem conceived by British colonizers to disassociate Hong Kong from mainland China, thereby rendering its usage profoundly politicized. The implementation of simplified Chinese characters as an integral component of the Nationalist government's linguistic policy was a pivotal development in the evolution of Chinese characters. However, following their defeat in the Chinese Civil War, the Nationalist government rebranded the simplification policy—which had initially aimed to optimize traditional characters—as a tool for anti-communist campaigns. This phenomenon has contributed to the pronounced politicization of traditional character usage in contemporary Hong Kong and Taiwan. Ideally, Hong Kong should also advance the Nationalist Party's successful Mandarin policy. A dispassionate and pragmatic approach would entail the complete opening of all social institutions to both simplified and traditional characters. This would be accompanied by the establishment of linguistic equality, namely the equal use of Mandarin and Cantonese, across all societal levels. The mitigation or dissolution of structural discrimination against other ethnic minorities in Hong Kong is contingent upon the dissolution of the prevailing Cantonese tribalism. A pivotal factor in this dynamic is the nation's implementation of a policy that ensures equal accessibility for both traditional and simplified Chinese characters, in conjunction with Cantonese and Mandarin, with the objective of resolving Hong Kong's prevailing Cantonese tribalism. Concurrently, Leung Chun-ying's opportunistic rhetoric—employing a dualistic stance to gain favor with anti-China, pro-chaos forces by opposing Mandarin and simplified Chinese—exposes the untrustworthiness of self-proclaimed "pro-establishment" figures. It is imperative that citizens do not unquestioningly adhere to these directives. These entities represent the multifaceted factions of Hong Kong's vested interest groups, their own tribal parties.

It is worth noting that Article 9 of the Hong Kong Basic Law (the executive, legislative, and judicial organs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may use English as an official language in addition to Chinese) stipulates that the primary official language must be Chinese. However, it does not explicitly specify whether traditional Cantonese or simplified Mandarin should be used; it only requires the use of 'Chinese'. English, however, occupies a position of optional use, devoid of the paramount status attributed to Chinese. The most entrenched Cantonese tribalist organizations are the so-called patriotic local disciplined services. These "patriotic" double agents have exhibited bias in their decision to designate Cantonese as the official language while simultaneously prohibiting the use of simplified characters within the organization. This practice lacks any legal foundation. To that end, it is imperative to amend Article 9 of the Basic Law to explicitly stipulate equality between traditional and simplified characters, Mandarin and Cantonese, and full openness.

The Cantonese tribal faction in Hong Kong lacks a legal foundation to mandate the exclusive use of traditional characters and Cantonese.

The dominant Cantonese-speaking indigenous tribe in Hong Kong possesses no legal foundation to exclude and discriminate against the use of the national legal script—simplified Chinese characters—and Mandarin.

There is no legal foundation for the mandatory use of Cantonese and traditional Chinese characters, nor is there any legal basis for prohibiting or systematically excluding Mandarin and simplified Chinese characters. This rejection is evident in the actions of the treacherous traitors who monopolize the Hong Kong government establishment and the cold-blooded capitalists in Hong Kong.

Furthermore, there is no legal foundation to support the development of structures and procedures that systematically exclude Mandarin and Simplified Chinese. The aforementioned factors are rooted in the historical and social context of Hong Kong, where indigenous Cantonese tribalism has historically been a prominent feature of the region's social structure. Consequently, it is both reasonable and justifiable for mainlanders and all minority groups in Hong Kong to adopt a transcendent stance and uphold the globally universal Simplified Chinese and Mandarin. Hong Kong is a linguistic no-man's-land. It is imperative to resist the discriminatory tribalism exhibited by the Greater Hong Kong indigenous tribes. It is imperative to examine the rationale behind national language policy capitulating to Hong Kong's legally baseless Cantonese tribalism. This phenomenon remains enigmatic to this day. The present moment necessitates the dismantling of these tribal barriers in a definitive manner. It is imperative to examine the underlying reasons for this apprehension.

It is imperative to examine the rationale behind the reluctance of individuals identified as "patriots" to adhere to the nation's legally mandated official language and font. The question arises as to whether the individuals identified as "patriots" are effectively governing Hong Kong.

In this instance, I would like to commend the two schools that have demonstrated exceptional leadership in promoting simplified Chinese as an educational tool for disadvantaged populations. Two primary schools in Hong Kong are under consideration: Sha Tin Government Primary School and Li Sing Primary School, located in the district of Sai Ying Pun on Hong Kong Island. It is evident that neither party capitulated to the tribalism exhibited by ‘Hong Kong-nesia’ nor to the cyberbullying perpetrated by its networks of vested interests. It is evident that the endorsement of these two schools will signify a substantial advancement in Hong Kong's reform efforts, effectively overcoming the deeply entrenched barriers of Greater Cantonese tribalism. In the present year, a glimmer of hope has been perceived by the author for society, and this has elicited a profound sense of delight.

Subsequently, the issue of linguistic identity is inextricably linked to the question of defining "local residents." A recent investigation focused on Hong Kong's most pressing labor issue: the prevalence of fraudulent recruitment schemes. The fundamental issue pertains to the delineation of the term "local residents." In essence, the structural discrimination of Greater Cantonese tribalism is characterized by the delineation of "locals" and "outsiders." In legal discourse, the terms "local residents" and "local employees" denote individuals who are either permanent residents or legally permitted to reside or work within the country, irrespective of their nationality or ethnic origin. The term "non-locals" refers to foreign workers or employees who are brought into the country through various labor importation schemes. The crux of the issue, however, lies in the pervasive systemic discrimination that permeates various facets of employment, manifesting in distinct treatment of Hong Kong residents and foreign nationals. Personnel systems function as filters, categorizing individuals as Hong Kongers/locals versus foreigners. Furthermore, foreign permanent residents and ethnic minorities are frequently excluded from the categories of locals and local employees. A particularly salient issue is the prevalence of Hong Kong residents who possess dual or multiple nationalities. Individuals belonging to these groups, who are themselves foreign nationals, are regarded as locals and native employees. This phenomenon, in turn, engenders discrimination against foreign and ethnic minority residents who are legally classified as locals and native employees. This is the crux of the perplexity, inconsistency, and systemic bias that are at play. This unbridled chaos is emblematic of ‘Hong Kong-nesia’.

一言以蔽之，面對本港大粵語部落主義歧視和大繁體字政治藩籬化，市民毫無法律義務屈服於根本毫無法律基礎的歧視性要求。‘入境隨俗’？這裡是中國！所謂入境是指進入了中國國內，隨俗？那應該是指要跟隨中國全國的法律權威之意！

因此，本港大粵語土人部落主義的視野過於狹窄。所有內地人和少數民族都根本不需要屈服於香港尼西亞的種種歧視，而應以原來的身分突破本港藩籬，堅持到底，寧死不屈，讓自古封閉的土人部落尊重國家和不同文化和民權才是正道。

In essence, confronted with the discriminatory practices stemming from Hong Kong's Cantonese-centric tribalism and the political barriers erected by the prevalence of traditional Chinese characters, citizens are not legally obligated to acquiesce to discriminatory demands that lack any legal foundation. The maxim "When in Rome, do as the Romans do" is a well-known idiom that captures this sentiment. This is China! ‘When in Rome’ refers to entering the territory of China. The question of whether to emulate the actions of the Romans is a complex one. This would imply adherence to the legal jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China.

Consequently, the narrow-minded tribalism exhibited by Hong Kong's Cantonese-dominated community is excessively limited in scope. It is imperative that individuals from both the mainland and ethnic minority groups reject the pervasive forms of discrimination that have become entrenched in Hong Kong society. Instead, the subjects should break through these local barriers with their original identities, persevere to the end, and stand firm—even at the cost of their lives—forcing this historically insular tribal community to respect the nation, diverse cultures, and civil rights. This approach is the most efficacious.

Appendix

勞工處：

如你希望查詢「補充勞工優化計劃」（優化計劃）下僱主須持續符合全職本地僱員與輸入勞工的人手比例的有關規定，請參閱以下資料。

在確保本地工人優先就業的前提下，僱主如確實未能在本港聘得合適人手，可向優化計劃申請輸入屬技術員級別或以下的勞工。為保障本地工人的就業機會，優化計劃的僱主須持續符合全職本地僱員與輸入勞工二比一的人手比例要求，即僱主須聘用兩名全職本地僱員，方可獲准輸入一名勞工。優化計劃下的全職僱員是指僱主直接僱用而每周總工作時數不少於35小時以經營相關業務的所有本地僱員，不包括兼職僱員、向僱主提供服務的外判商員工或自僱人士。

為進一步保障本地工人就業機會及針對性打擊濫用優化計劃，行政長官於《施政報告》宣布，由9月18日起僱主在申請輸入侍應生及初級廚師時，會實行更嚴格的人手比例，由原來以每名申請僱主的所有職位計算，改為以申請職位計算。換言之，僱主申請輸入侍應生及初級廚師各一名，便須已聘用本地全職侍應生及初級廚師各兩名，讓本地工人優先就業。

一般而言，優化計劃下的本地僱員是指可在香港合法受僱的人士（即持有香港永久性居民身份證的人士，或持有非香港永久性居民身份證及有效旅行證件，而不受逗留條件限制或只受仍有效的逗留日期限制的人士）。而根據其他入境計劃（包括經一般就業政策及輸入內地人才計劃來港工作的非本地僱員）來港工作的非本地僱員人數（不論合約期長短）並不會用以計算全職本地僱員與輸入勞工人手的比例。

入境處：

香港特別行政區（香港特區）居民，簡稱香港居民，包括永久性居民和非永久性居民。香港特區永久性居民享有居留權和有資格依照香港特區法律取得載明其居留權的永久性居民身份證；而香港特區非永久性居民則為有資格依照香港特區法律取得香港居民身份證，但沒有居留權的人。

根據香港法例第115章《入境條例》，有六項類別的人士合資格享有香港特區居留權。此外，任何人士如符合該條例的過渡性安排，也有資格享有居留權。詳情可參閱網址(https://www.immd.gov.hk/hkt/services/roa/eligible.html)。

如擁有香港特區居留權，即擁有以下的權利：