Hong Kong Intelligence Report #165 香港對美朝貢帶來的‘安全’

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

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🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】香港對美朝貢帶來的‘安全’

▪️思想狀況：就整體而言，香港目前最顯著的敗象是思維的嚴重僵化。所謂‘本地’的輿論操縱和所謂‘圍標’類似運作。即抑制發表異論（Opinion Suppression），掩護式發表（Cover Publishing），輪流網紅炒作（KOL Rotation）等，在「搓圓仔湯」上真實，真理，獨自異論都被有系統地排除在外。

Intellectual State: The most obvious sign of Hong Kong's decline today is the severe rigidity of thought. The manipulation of so-called "local" public opinion operates similarly to bid rigging. It involves suppressing dissenting opinions, cover publishing, and rotating influencer hype, among other tactics. In this "soup of dumplings," truth, reality, and independent dissent are systematically excluded.

Wang Fuk Court is the site of Hong Kong's second-worst disaster and the world's largest residential catastrophe since 1980. The site still seems to smolder, its shadow lingering. This is Hong Kong's Chernobyl.

親眼目睹了香港史上第二大災害及1980年以來全球最大住宅災難事件的地點，宏福苑。它猶如仍然燒著，陰影不散。這就是港版切爾諾貝爾。

Wang Fuk Court is the site of Hong Kong's second-worst disaster and the world's largest residential catastrophe since 1980. The site still seems to smolder, its shadow lingering. This is Hong Kong's Chernobyl.

▪️宏福苑大火：自從李家超的北京述職（2025年12月16日）之後，‘免租直到重建’救災民的方案（2025年11月30日）被轉為暫時不收租（2025年12月18日）。甚至，四十多億捐款的一大部分預計即將消失在租金。大埔宏福苑火災援助基金總額約為 41 億港元，政府並未表示「一半消失」，而是預計約 12 億港元用於包括業主每年15 萬、為期兩年租金補助及搬遷補助在內的緊急支援措施。相關捐款將用於受影響住戶的重建家園、生活津貼及慰問金等。這是什麼啟示？ （1）宏福苑大火的後續安排，只暫不收租，但大部分被租金消失的窘境構成其他類似災害發生時的標準化處理模式；（2）超高租金吃掉社會災民捐款，這阻礙最慷慨的，最貼切的救災方案。在實際上，‘暫時不收租或補助部分租金’已經把災民趕到所謂市場經濟的砧板上了；（3）雖內地各地方政府和中央政府是專制的，但有嚴格的問責。但是港府的特色則是有專制（官政商獨裁），但不被問責。中國的政治難免把反對派當作叛徒。適合它的政治是專制，而非民主。不過，這需要有能力解決民生問題的專制和相等強力的問責機制配套來說服人民。

補充：港府在2026年2月21日發表了長遠重置方案，即買斷業權了事。這不包括收購宏志閣業權。在租金吃掉捐款前盡快買斷業權了事是個合乎香港困境的手段和判斷。

香港令人驚訝的特色就是不被問責的殭屍官僚制。再度建議應盡快廢除基本法第22條來全面實現全國統一的問責機制。

《基本法》第22條明定，中央人民政府所屬各部門、各省、自治區、直轄市均不得干預香港特別行政區自行管理的事務。

Wang Fuk Court fire: After John Lee delivered his work report in Beijing on December 16, 2025, the relief plan offering "rent-free until reconstruction" was changed to temporary rent suspension on December 18, 2025. Furthermore, a significant portion of the over HK$4 billion in donations is expected to go toward rental payments. The Tai Po Wang Fuk Court Fire Relief Fund totals approximately HK$4.1 billion. While the government hasn't stated that "half is disappearing," it anticipates allocating approximately HK$1.2 billion for emergency support measures. These measures include annual rent subsidies of HK$150,000 for two years and relocation assistance for affected homeowners. Relevant donations will fund home reconstruction, living allowances, and condolence payments for impacted households. What does this reveal?

(1) The follow-up arrangements for the Hung Fuk Court fire—merely suspending rent collection while the majority of funds are consumed by rent—establish a standardized response pattern for similar disasters.

(2) Exorbitant rents consume donations intended for disaster victims, hindering the most generous and appropriate relief solutions. In practice, "temporary rent waivers or partial subsidies" effectively place disaster victims at the mercy of market economics.

(3) While mainland local and central governments act with authority, they are held accountable. Hong Kong's distinctive feature, however, is authoritarianism (an official-business-political oligarchy) without accountability.

Supplement: On February 21, 2026, the Hong Kong government announced a long-term relocation plan, which involves outright purchasing property rights to resolve the matter. This does not include acquiring the property rights of Wang Chi House. Given Hong Kong's predicament, the approach of swiftly purchasing property rights before rental costs erode donations represents a pragmatic strategy and sound judgment.

China's political system treats dissenters as traitors. Authoritarianism, not democracy, suits its governance. However, this requires an authoritarian regime capable of solving people's livelihood issues, coupled with robust accountability mechanisms to persuade the populace. Hong Kong's peculiarity is its zombie bureaucracy that evades accountability. Once again, I urge the swift repeal of Article 22 of the Basic Law to implement a unified national accountability system.

2025年11月下旬發生的香港大埔宏福苑大火，是一宗死傷極為慘重的住宅火災。該火災造成至少168人死亡（含1名消防員）及大量傷亡，是香港自1948年以來最致命的火災，被視為「港殤」。雖然這場火災在香港歷史上死傷僅次於1918年跑馬地馬場大火，但其在單一住宅項目中造成的傷亡人數已位居香港史上最嚴重的住宅火災之一，並引起全球對高層建築安全的高度關注。

The Wang Fu Court fire in Tai Po, Hong Kong, which occurred in late November 2025, was an exceptionally devastating residential fire. The blaze claimed at least 168 lives, including one firefighter, and resulted in numerous casualties. It is the deadliest fire in Hong Kong since 1948. It has been described as a "tragedy for Hong Kong." Although this fire ranks second only to the 1918 Happy Valley Racecourse fire in terms of total casualties in Hong Kong's history, the number of deaths and injuries within a single residential complex makes it one of the most severe residential fires in the city's history. The fire has also drawn significant global attention to high-rise building safety.

▪️香港所謂‘科技’：在香港政治上目前仍成功的敘事騙局是，它們把既有的金融科技與國家基於新型製造業的‘高科技’刻意混淆起來。我們所謂新質生產力或再工業化或新型工業並非傳統範疇的既有金融科技。此兩者的混淆並不有利於市民和國家。金融企業佔主導地位，財務公司增多中的香港並未在邁向所謂再工業化。欺人太甚。換言之，香港是金融帝國主義的樞紐。本世紀仍然屬於基於壟斷金融資本的帝國主義時代。輸出金融資本是個帝國主義的本質特色。本港歷史教育令人質疑。帝國主義的本色並不需要被掩飾。那麼，地產和所謂科技也其實是金融業的一部分。甚至，本港金融是美國金融政策不可分割的一部分。資本主義如此是全球性的，而非民族性的經濟模式。因此，所謂香港特色資本主義是錯誤的觀念。這種概念錯誤導致判斷不准。

Hong Kong's so-called “technology”: The politically successful narrative scam in Hong Kong today deliberately confuses existing financial technology (fintech) with the nation's “high-tech” based on new manufacturing. New-quality productive forces, reindustrialization, and new industries are not traditional fintech. This conflation benefits neither citizens nor the nation. Hong Kong, dominated by financial enterprises and proliferating finance companies, is not advancing toward reindustrialization. This is an outrage. In other words, Hong Kong serves as a hub for financial imperialism. The current century remains an era of imperialism rooted in monopolistic financial capital. Exporting financial capital is a defining characteristic of imperialism. Hong Kong's historical education is questionable. The true nature of imperialism requires no concealment. Thus, real estate and technology are fundamentally components of the financial sector. Furthermore, Hong Kong's financial sector is an integral part of U.S. financial policy. Therefore, capitalism is a global economic model, not a national one. Therefore, the notion of "Hong Kong–style capitalism" is flawed. This conceptual error leads to misguided judgments.

新自由主義的特色之一是在整個所謂產業結構和GDP中，金融公司佔的比率很高。香港輸出的所謂‘服務’含金融資本的輸出。

金融服務業在香港經濟中確實占據主導地位，2022年約占GDP的 22.4%，是全球第三大金融中心。該行業提供超過 26 萬個就業機會，是「四個傳統支柱行業」之首。香港擁有極強的資產管理、銀行及新興金融科技實力，作為國際金融樞紐的地位持續鞏固。2026年香港財務公司（俗稱「財仔」）市場呈現兩極化發展，儘管有部分傳統小型公司因經營困境結業，但整體持牌公司仍維持在約2,300-2,400間的穩定高位。 FinTech推動的一線財仔及具資金優勢的業者在私人貸款市場（年增長約5-8%）中活躍，主要因銀行貸款門檻提高，個人對靈活貸款需求增加。香港輸出的「服務」並非僅指金融資本輸出。根據香港政府統計處數據，香港的服務輸出（Service Export）涵蓋廣泛，包括金融、運輸、貿易、專業服務及旅遊等十二大類。金融服務雖是四大支柱之首（如金融、貿易、旅遊、專業服務），但金融資本輸出僅是龐大服務貿易中的重要組成部分，並非全部。

Indeed, the financial services sector dominates Hong Kong's economy. It accounted for approximately 22.4% of the GDP in 2022, ranking Hong Kong as the world's third-largest financial center. The industry provides over 260,000 jobs and leads the "four traditional pillar industries." Hong Kong has significant strengths in asset management, banking, and emerging fintech, which continuously solidifies its position as an international financial hub. However, by 2026, the market for licensed consumer finance companies (commonly known as "loan sharks") in Hong Kong exhibits polarized development. While some traditional small firms cease operations due to business difficulties, the total number of licensed companies remains stable at approximately 2,300–2,400. First-tier FFCs driven by FinTech and capital-advantaged players remain active in the private loan market, which is growing at an annual rate of approximately 5-8%. This growth is primarily driven by higher bank lending thresholds and increased demand for flexible personal loans. Hong Kong's "service exports" extend far beyond the export of financial capital. According to data from the Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, these exports encompass a broad range of sectors, including twelve major categories such as finance, transportation, trade, professional services, and tourism. Although financial services are the top pillar, the export of financial capital is only one significant component of the vast service trade landscape.

The world's largest financial centres are primarily decided by their competitiveness, measured through the Global Financial Centres Index (GFCI), which evaluates factors like business environment, financial sector development, infrastructure, human capital, and reputation. These hubs thrive on high concentrations of financial activity, strong regulatory frameworks, and rapid adoption of technology.

▪️香港對美朝貢帶來的‘安全’：香港的所謂‘安全’概念和一般國安概念刻意被重疊和混淆。其實，本港的所謂安全實際上則屬於朝貢關係上的‘安全’。最佳例子是向美國的朝貢。美國在香港擁有龐大且實質的經濟利益，主要體現在高額貿易順差、大量駐港企業及金融投資。過去10年，美國對港享有高達2,715億美元的貿易順差，為其全球夥伴中最高。香港是美國重要的貿易樞紐與金融中心，擁有超過1,200間美國公司，涉及金融、科技及商業服務。如此，向美朝貢維持了本港的所謂安全。這使得美國並不需要像馬杜羅一樣綁架李家超。這樣朝貢帶來的所謂‘安全’才是本港所謂安全涵蓋的實質。委內瑞拉馬杜羅被捕一事對港的啟示，（1）極端貪腐腐敗帶來的犯罪般的怠工失職才是敵軍最大的武器“擾亂器” (Discombobulator)，中俄防空系統被貪腐份子關掉或裝置錯配或疏忽； （2）隔夜（2026年1月5日）：委內瑞拉政府部門指，警方向「未經許可飛行」的無人機開火。聲明並未說明由誰操控無人機，只表示沒有發生衝突，「全國一片平靜。」。但民眾搞不清楚，發生了什麼，而流傳政變的消息。換言之，一旦被癱瘓，民眾則被掉入完全無法正確識辨到底在發生什麼的狀況。這就是最恐怖的，也就是香港到時的狀況將會類似委內瑞拉的；（3）最完整的，完美的，最先進的顛覆行動過程莫過於馬杜羅被逮捕一事，與1989年的巴拿馬事件不同，美軍精準和快速結束了戰爭。幾個小時的戰爭也是戰爭，只斬首的戰爭也就是戰爭。本港不用擔心的主要原因是長年的朝貢關係。

Hong Kong's so-called “security” concept is deliberately conflated with general national security concepts. In reality, Hong Kong's security concerns are actually related to the security inherent in a tributary relationship. A prime example is its relationship with the United States. The U.S. has substantial and tangible economic interests in Hong Kong, which are primarily manifested by its massive trade surplus, the numerous U.S.-based enterprises operating there, and its significant financial investments. Over the past decade, the U.S. has enjoyed a trade surplus with Hong Kong reaching $271.5 billion—the highest among its global partners. Hong Kong serves as a vital U.S. trade hub and financial center, hosting over 1,200 American companies in finance, technology, and business services. Thus, this tributary relationship with the U.S. sustains Hong Kong's so-called security. This arrangement means that the U.S. does not need to kidnap John Lee the way it did with Maduro. This tribute-based "security" is the substantive reality underlying Hong Kong's security framework. The implications for Hong Kong from Maduro's arrest in Venezuela are:

(1) The enemy's most potent weapon is criminal-level dereliction of duty (criminal negligence) stemming from extreme corruption, a "discombobulator." Chinese and Russian air defense systems were either shut down, misconfigured, or neglected by corrupt officials.

(2) Overnight (January 5, 2026): Venezuelan government agencies stated that police had fired upon "unauthorized drones." The statement did not identify the drone operators and only noted that "no clashes occurred" and "the nation remains calm." . Yet, citizens remained confused about the events, fueling rumors of a coup. In other words, once paralyzed, the populace is plunged into complete disorientation about what is actually happening. The most terrifying aspect is that Hong Kong's future situation will resemble Venezuela's.

(3) The most complete, perfect, and advanced subversion operation was undoubtedly Maduro's arrest. Unlike the 1989 Panama incident, the U.S. military ended the conflict with precision and speed. A war lasting mere hours is still a war, as is a war focused solely on decapitation. Hong Kong need not worry primarily due to its longstanding tributary relationship.

在理論和經濟實際上，香港是美國最大貿易順差來源地，換言之，對美國而言，香港是全球最親美的地方，港府是全球最親美的政府。美國最不可能想破壞的地方就是香港。我們可以簡單地把香港金融比喻為一個巨大的美國‘礦物提取器’。‘提取’（吸取）的就是以中國為主的其他國家地區所產生的總生產價值。因此，香港最不適合虛假‘反美’的政治。這同時可解釋為何金融機構在雨傘革命和反修例風波上面完全有自信‘沒事’。他們只不過想要通過有限的政治騷動逼使中國妥協而已。最不可能有意圖推翻‘最親美’的港府和本港建制。本港目前的反美敘事是個大騙局。

 In both theory and economic reality, Hong Kong is the largest source of the U.S. trade surplus. In other words, Hong Kong is the most pro-American place and government in the world. The last place the U.S. would want to undermine is Hong Kong. Hong Kong's financial system can be likened to a massive American "extractor." It absorbs the total production value generated by other countries and regions, primarily China. Therefore, Hong Kong is the least suitable place for fake "anti-American" politics. This explains why financial institutions were confident that "nothing would happen" during the Umbrella Revolution and the anti-extradition bill protests. The protesters merely sought to coerce China into compromise through limited political unrest. They had no intention of overthrowing the "most pro-American" Hong Kong government and local establishment. The current anti-American narrative in Hong Kong is a grand deception.

▪️巴拿馬運河的長江賣港事件：巴拿馬最高法院彰顯了巴拿馬的主權獨立。巴拿馬運河本來應該獨自經營，而非該外判的。目前的重點是，國家會否繼續管制長江的其他賣港交易。2025年3月，長江和記實業計劃將其全球43個港口（包括巴拿馬的巴爾博亞和克里斯多福港）的80%股權賣給「貝萊德—TiL財團」，以降低地緣政治風險及獲取現金。此交易並不包含中國大陸和香港的港口資產。一帶一路的發展中國家群在看中國的反應，因此不能那樣激動搞壞對巴拿馬的關係。其實，長江事件帶來的國安危機並未結束。反正長江在中國的政治價值和比重進一步降低了。巴拿馬最高法院於2026年1月底裁定，長江和記實業（CK Hutchison）子公司—巴拿馬港口公司（PPC）—持有的巴拿馬運河兩端港口（巴爾博亞港和克里斯托瓦爾港）經營特許權合約「違憲」且無效。此判決終止了長和在該地運營逾20年的港口業務，被視為美國試圖排除中國在拉丁美洲影響力的地緣政治勝利。

The CK Hutchison Port Sale Incident at the Panama Canal: The Panama Canal is an important symbol of Panama's sovereign independence. Rather than outsourcing, the Panama Canal should have been operated independently. The current focus is on whether the state will continue to regulate other port sales involving the CK Hutchison. Cheung Kong Holdings planned to sell an 80% stake in its 43 global ports, including Panama's Balboa and Cristóbal ports, to the “BlackRock-TiL Consortium” in March 2025 to mitigate geopolitical risks and secure cash. This transaction excludes port assets in mainland China and Hong Kong. Developing nations participating in the Belt and Road Initiative are watching China's response, so China cannot afford to jeopardize relations with Panama through impulsive actions. In reality, the national security crisis triggered by the CK Hutchison incident remains unresolved. Nevertheless, CK Hutchison's political value and influence within China have further diminished. In late January 2026, Panama's Supreme Court ruled that the concession contracts held by Panama Ports Company (PPC)—a CK Hutchison Holdings subsidiary—for the ports at both ends of the Panama Canal (Balboa and Cristóbal) were unconstitutional and invalid. After over two decades, this ruling terminated CK Hutchison's port operations in the region, which is viewed as a geopolitical victory for the United States in its efforts to counter China's influence in Latin America.

▪️格陵蘭島事件：格陵蘭島（Greenland）目前不出售。雖然美國（特別是川普政府）曾多次表達購買意願，試圖收購這塊丹麥的自治領地以擴大北極影響力，但丹麥和格陵蘭政府都明確表示，該島是非賣品。這是一個基於主權和當地居民自決權的問題。其實，它的特點是揭示了同盟國之間開戰的可能性。這對所謂同盟或軍事聯盟懷有嚴重幻想的人們給了重大衝擊。

The Greenland Incident: Greenland is not currently for sale. Although the United States, particularly the Trump administration, has repeatedly expressed interest in buying this Danish autonomous territory to increase its influence in the Arctic, the Danish and Greenlandic governments have explicitly stated that Greenland is not for sale. This is fundamentally a matter of sovereignty and the self-determination rights of the local inhabitants. The incident reveals the potential for conflict among allies. It has delivered a major blow to those harboring illusions about so-called alliances or military blocs.

▪️港府在提高貧富差距還是在一路降低它？：港府成功的敘事之一是所謂附設私人銀行家服務的家族辦公室。大家不自覺‘家族辦公室增加’的意思。即貧富差距加大。全球及香港的家族辦公室（Family Office）數量正在迅速增加。受惠於財富世代傳承、投資需求多樣化及稅務優惠政策，截至2025年底，香港的單一家族辦公室數量已突破3,380間，較兩年前增加超過25%，反映香港已成為全球頂級財富管理樞紐。香港政府推出稅務優惠、加快牌照審批，並致力打造完善的生態圈，目標在2026-2028年吸引更多家辦落戶。預計全球單一家族辦公室數量將從2019年的6,130間增加到2030年的10,720間。香港貧富差距極為懸殊且持續擴大。根據樂施會2024年10月發佈的報告，2024年第一季香港最富裕與最貧窮家庭的每月收入中位數差距已擴大至 81.9倍，顯示高低收入戶經濟狀況兩極化，逾139萬人處於貧窮狀態。簡言之，港府並不在減少貧富差距，反而一路擴大貧富差距。貧富差距是民生問題的核心所在。香港所謂金融業並不本身產生價值，而只是寄生於其他國家地區的製造業和其總體剩餘價值。香港金融業如何吸血？以下是金融業「寄生」於其他國家地區的生產價值結構：

·       跨境貸款與融資： 金融機構（如香港）向中國內地及全球其他地區提供貸款，銀行體系中的境外分行及子公司會帶來高額的淨利息收入。

·       資金與資產管理： 香港作為離岸人民幣樞紐和國際資產管理中心，為境外企業及個人提供財富管理服務，吸引龐大資金，帶來佣金及服務收入。

·       金融服務出口： 跨國銀行和金融機構在特定地區設立分支機構，透過提供專業金融服務（如投資銀行、風險管理），將服務「出口」至其他地區。

·       投資與資本增值： 透過對其他國家的企業進行投資，金融機構不僅獲得利息，還能分享被投資國的經濟增長收益（如高額的企業分紅和股票增值）。 

這些剝削結構被解釋成這些活動通常在高收入、低稅率、法治健全且資本流動自由的金融中心進行，創造的高增加價值在統計上歸屬於該金融中心的GDP，而非生產活動實際發生的地區。換言之，本港金融業及其所謂投資依賴的則是其他國家地區的生產力。香港金融業高度依賴外部生產力。香港金融業（銀行、資本市場、資產管理）主要服務內地企業的融資需求及國際投資者進入中國的資金需求。特別是中國內地的經濟增長，作為國際金融中心，香港主要擔任資金調配、財富管理及融資平台角色，連結全球資金與內地實體經濟，2023年底內地投資佔香港外來直接投資總存量約31.1%，是核心動力來源。

具體依賴關係如下：

·       內地實體經濟需求： 香港金融業（銀行、資本市場、資產管理）主要服務內地企業的融資需求及國際投資者進入中國的資金需求。

·       資金與生產力連接： 2023年底，中國內地投資佔香港外來直接投資總存量達 51,676 億港元。

·       財富管理基礎： 隨着內地經濟發展，香港的管理資產總值持續增長，2024年底達 35.1 萬億港元。

·       地理優勢： 香港作為連接中國與世界的中介，結合法治與金融制度，使得外地資金能高效利用內地生產力帶來的增值。

所謂金融是不勞所得，即沒有任何其他地區如此小看勞動者階級，尤其是本地勞動者。基於上述實際畸形產業結構，它本身自然而然地產生本港的政治及其敘事。本港地產和所謂（金融）科技的本色只不過是這個大金融的脈絡裡面才看得清楚，也並不與此脫離關係。在此，所謂民生問題及其核心的貧富差距只有系統地會惡化。金融業越發展，貧富差距（民生問題）就越惡化。這必定需要國家的介入和修正。金融業的快速發展若缺乏適當分配政策，容易加劇貧富差距。持有資本者透過投資獲得高回報，而僅靠勞動收入者資產成長緩慢，加上低息環境與財富集中化，導致窮人與富人距離拉大。這種失衡常引發失業、高房價及青貧等社會問題，令基層民眾生活更顯艱難。以下是金融發展導致貧富差距惡化的主要原因：

·       資本回報率高於經濟成長率： 金融市場使得擁有資本的人（投資者）能透過股權、房地產等獲得遠超勞動收入的財富，使富者愈富。

·       低息環境與量化寬鬆： 金融危機後，長期低利率和寬鬆貨幣政策通常會推升資產價格（如房價、股價），擁有資產的人財富增值，而無資產的低收入者卻面臨生活成本上升。

·       薪資成長兩極化： 金融業及‘相關’金融高科技產業發展吸納高技術人才，薪資極高；但傳統服務業或基層勞動力工資成長緩慢，加劇貧富差距。

·       財富過度集中： 金融化經濟使得資金傾向於集中在大型企業和富裕階層，降低了財富流向基層的可能性。

·       系統性風險： 金融機構追求高風險高回報，若發生危機，往往由社會整體承擔，特別是基層民眾的就業和資產更容易受到重創。

國策‘共同富裕’完全不存在於香港。那他們所謂‘配合國家政策’及‘改革’到底是什麼意思？從市民的眼光來看，實屬空洞無物。本港絲毫也不在解決上述結構性問題（深層次矛盾）。一切流於騙人的口號，公關和擺態。本港的所謂安全的概念與委內瑞拉不同的是馬杜羅是維護國家主權和貧民民生的，他政權的堅持和對抗導致了美國欲求石油資源的政治/軍事行動。那麼，在正規的政治道德上委內瑞拉的立場是遠高於香港的，是因為香港金融結構本身就是向美國朝貢，也早就是在經濟結構上永續政治投降的狀態。這跟對抗而被打敗的委內瑞拉政府截然不同。從此可看出，北部都會區只會淪為擴大金融業版圖的貨色而已。

Is the Hong Kong government widening or narrowing the wealth gap? One of the government's success narratives involves family offices offering private banking services. However, people often interpret an increase in family offices as meaning the wealth gap is widening. The number of family offices, both globally and in Hong Kong, is increasing rapidly. Due to wealth intergenerational transfer, diversified investment demands, and tax incentives, Hong Kong's single-family offices surpassed 3,380 by the end of 2025—a 25% increase in two years—reflecting its status as a premier global wealth management hub. The Hong Kong government has introduced tax incentives and expedited licensing approvals and is committed to building a comprehensive ecosystem to attract more family offices to establish operations between 2026 and 2028. The global number of single-family offices is projected to rise from 6,130 in 2019 to 10,720 by 2030. Hong Kong's wealth gap is extremely wide and continues to widen. According to an Oxfam report from October 2024, the median monthly income gap between the richest and poorest households widened to 81.9 times in the first quarter of 2024. This indicates polarization between high- and low-income households, with over 1.39 million people living in poverty. In short, the Hong Kong government is not narrowing the wealth gap, but rather, actively widening it. This disparity lies at the core of social welfare issues. Hong Kong's financial sector does not generate intrinsic value; rather, it parasitizes manufacturing industries and the overall surplus value of other countries and regions. How does Hong Kong's financial sector extract value? The structure below illustrates how the financial sector "parasitizes" the productive value of other economies:

Cross-border lending and financing: Financial institutions (such as those in Hong Kong) extend loans to mainland China and other regions around the world. Overseas branches and subsidiaries within the banking system generate substantial net interest income.

Fund and asset management: As an offshore RMB hub and international asset management center, Hong Kong provides wealth management services to overseas enterprises and individuals. This attracts massive capital and yields commission and service fees.

Financial services export: Multinational banks and financial institutions establish branches in specific regions, "exporting" services to other areas by providing specialized financial services (e.g., investment banking and risk management).

Investment and capital appreciation: Financial institutions earn interest and share in the economic growth gains of the invested nation (e.g., substantial corporate dividends and stock appreciation) by investing in enterprises of other countries.

These structures are considered typical of financial centers characterized by high incomes, low tax rates, a robust rule of law, and free capital mobility. The high value added is statistically attributed to the GDP of these financial centers rather than the regions where productive activities actually occur. In other words, Hong Kong's financial sector relies on the productive capacity of other countries and regions. Hong Kong's financial industry is highly dependent on external productive capacity. Its financial sector (banking, capital markets, and asset management) primarily serves the financing needs of mainland enterprises and the capital requirements of international investors entering China. Regarding mainland China's economic growth in particular, as an international financial center, Hong Kong primarily functions as a platform for capital allocation, wealth management, and financing, connecting the mainland's real economy with global capital. By the end of 2023, mainland investment accounted for approximately 31.1% of Hong Kong's total foreign direct investment stock, serving as a core driving force.

The specific dependencies are as follows:

Mainland real economy demand: Hong Kong's financial sector (banking, capital markets, and asset management) serves the financing needs of mainland enterprises and the capital requirements of international investors entering China.

Capital-productivity linkage: By the end of 2023, mainland Chinese investment accounted for HK$5,167.6 billion of Hong Kong's total stock of inward foreign direct investment.

Wealth Management Foundation: As mainland China's economy has developed, the total assets under management in Hong Kong have grown steadily, reaching HK$35.1 trillion by the end of 2024.

Geographical Advantage: Serving as a bridge between China and the rest of the world, Hong Kong combines the rule of law with its financial system. This enables foreign capital to efficiently leverage the value-added potential of mainland productivity.

Finance is essentially unearned income, and no other region undervalues the working class as much as Hong Kong does, especially local laborers. This distorted industrial structure naturally generates Hong Kong's political landscape and narrative. The true nature of Hong Kong's real estate and so-called technology sectors can only be fully understood within this broader financial context, to which they are inextricably linked. Here, so-called livelihood issues and their core problem, the wealth gap, can only worsen systematically. The more the financial sector develops, the more the wealth gap deteriorates. This requires national intervention and correction. Without adequate redistribution policies, the rapid expansion of the financial sector readily exacerbates wealth inequality. Capital holders achieve high returns through investments, while those who rely solely on labor income experience slow asset growth. Coupled with low-interest environments and wealth concentration, this widens the gap between the poor and the wealthy. These imbalances often lead to social issues such as unemployment, high housing costs, and youth poverty, which makes life increasingly difficult for grassroots communities. The primary reasons financial development exacerbates wealth inequality are as follows:

Capital returns exceed economic growth rates. Financial markets allow capital holders (investors) to amass wealth that far exceeds labor income through equity, real estate, and other assets, thereby making the wealthy even wealthier.

Low interest rates and quantitative easing: Following financial crises, prolonged low interest rates and loose monetary policies tend to drive up asset prices (e.g., housing and stock prices). This increases the wealth of asset owners while low-income individuals without assets face rising living costs.

Wage growth polarization: The financial sector and related fintech industries attract highly skilled talent with exceptional salaries. However, wages in traditional service industries and for low-skilled labor grow slowly. This exacerbates income inequality.

Excessive Wealth Concentration: The financialization of the economy causes capital to concentrate in large corporations and affluent groups, reducing the likelihood that wealth will trickle down to the general population.

Systemic Risk: Financial institutions pursue high-risk, high-return strategies. When crises occur, society as a whole often bears the burden, and the employment and assets of grassroots citizens are particularly vulnerable to severe damage.

Hong Kong's national policy of "common prosperity" is entirely absent. So, what exactly do they mean by "aligning with national policies" and "reform"? From the public's perspective, these terms are utterly hollow. Hong Kong is making no effort whatsoever to address these deep-seated contradictions. Everything devolves into deceptive slogans, public relations stunts, and posturing. The difference between Hong Kong's and Venezuela's concepts of "security" lies in Maduro's defense of national sovereignty and the livelihoods of the poor. His regime's persistence and resistance provoked U.S. political and military actions, driven by the U.S.'s desire for oil resources. Thus, in terms of legitimate political morality, Venezuela's stance far surpasses Hong Kong's. Hong Kong's financial structure inherently functions as tribute to the United States, perpetuating a state of economic and political capitulation. This is in stark contrast to the Venezuelan government, which resisted and was defeated. Clearly, the Northern Metropolis will merely serve as a tool to expand the financial sector's territory.

▪️日本眾議院選舉2026年：此次選舉標誌了日本反對派，左派的最終徹底潰敗。從2009年民主黨取得超逾三百席大勝轉為2026年的自民黨取得超逾三百席徹底大勝。物極必反。我關注的是中道改革聯盟和公民黨，後者透過組織票支撐了立憲民主黨，公民黨同時增加了議席。但有趣的是他們都對國安政策和對美關係與自民黨無差別。改憲問題，讓日本恢復戰爭權被中國和五大國視為日本挑戰二戰秩序是難免的。日本要的重歸國際聯盟時的常任理事國地位是要透過戰爭才能取得的。因此，中國所指摘的動機的確存在。如何描述這個傾向是中方的政宣。當考慮中日關係時，中國和整個聯合國五大國地位就是絕對的中美方利益所在。目前所謂和平委員會也不敢取代聯合國，是因為美國絕不會主動放棄二戰的戰利品，即聯合國常任理事國地位。日方估錯的往往是聯合國五大國的共同利益關係高過所謂一段歷史時期的意識形態對抗。中美戰爭論的荒誕之處在於估錯了二戰秩序的堅定性，因此中美恆常處於可合作的狀態。即維護二戰秩序仍是無法推翻的國際政治所在。有個嚴重的衝突點可能只會是當中國首次軍事封鎖美國對台軍援運送的動作上。有趣的一點是中美媒體不報導美國過往如何運送武器到台灣此一關鍵細節。換言之，中國會否採取行動攔截美國對台運送武器是個重點。中國一直以來都沒有實際阻止過美國運送武器到台灣。

The 2026 Japanese House of Representatives election: This election marked the final collapse of Japan's opposition and left-wing forces. The Democratic Party secured over 300 seats in 2009, but the Liberal Democratic Party overwhelmingly triumphed in 2026, also capturing over 300 seats. What goes up must come down. My focus is on the Centrist Reform Alliance and Komeito. The latter bolstered the Constitutional Democratic Party through organized voting blocs, while also increasing its own seats. Intriguingly, however, both parties align with the LDP on national security policy and U.S. relations. The constitutional revision issue—restoring Japan's right to wage war—inevitably leads China and the five major powers to view Japan as challenging the post-WWII order. Japan's aspiration to regain its pre-League of Nations status as a permanent UN Security Council member can only be achieved through war. Thus, China's accusations of such motives are valid. How this tendency is framed is a matter of Chinese political propaganda. When considering Sino-Japanese relations, China's position alongside the other four major UN powers is an absolute core interest for both China and the United States. The so-called Peace Council does not dare replace the UN because the United States will never voluntarily relinquish its WWII spoils, namely its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Japan often miscalculates, unaware that the shared interests of the five major UN powers outweigh the ideological conflicts of a particular historical period.  Sino-American war theories are absurd because they underestimate the resilience of the post-WWII order, which keeps China and the US in a perpetual state of potential cooperation. Preserving this order is a pillar of international politics that remains unshakable. A potential flashpoint may only arise if China were to conduct its first military blockade against U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan. It is intriguing that both Chinese and American media lack coverage of how the U.S. historically transported weapons to Taiwan. In other words, the key question is whether China would take action to intercept U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan. Historically, China has never prevented the U.S. from delivering weapons to Taiwan.

The U.S. sends military packages to Taiwan primarily through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) to bolster Taipei's defense capabilities. PDA allows for fast-tracking weapons directly from U.S. stockpiles, while FMS involves authorized, long-term sales, often focusing on asymmetric, unmanned, and defensive systems like drones, missiles, and artillery.

2009 Election: The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a landslide victory, taking 308 seats out of 480 and ending the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) nearly unbroken half-century rule. 

2026 Election: The LDP achieved its best performance in the postwar era under Prime Minister Takaichi (Japan's first female leader), surpassing the 310-seat threshold for a two-thirds "supermajority" on its own.

Significance of 2026: The LDP's 316 seats constitute a "supermajority" that allows the party to push through legislation and constitutional amendments, even if opposed in the Upper House. This victory followed a period where the LDP had lost its majority in the 2024 general election and the 2025 Upper House election.

The 2026 victory was driven by the LDP's popularity under Takaichi, contrasting with the collapse of the newly formed "Centrist Reform Alliance" (a merger of the Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito).

Based on the 2026 Japanese snap election, 

Komeito increased its seat count as part of the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA). 

• Seat Increase: Komeito increased its representation in the Lower House from 24 to 28 seats.

• Strategy: Komeito performed well under the proportional representation system after reaching an agreement to support Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) candidates in single-seat districts, which saw them receive favorable placement in the proportional representation (PR) segment.

• Context: While Komeito increased its seats within its new alliance, the Centrist Reform Alliance as a whole suffered a significant defeat in the overall election, with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) securing a two-thirds majority.

• Previous Coalition: Previously, Komeito ended its 26-year ruling coalition with the LDP in October 2025 due to funding scandals and policy disagreements. 

Despite the overall defeat of the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), individual former Komeito lawmakers strengthened their position within that alliance. 

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