Hong Kong Intelligence Report #171 宏福苑大火的消防處問責始末

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】宏福苑大火的消防處問責始末

■ 我的結論：

宏福苑大火的消防處問責始末

在宏福苑大火，此一香港史上第三大人災事件上，（A）消防處拒絕國家救援大隊一事以及 （B）其監管責任問題此兩件事都是重中之重。但社會的批判和輿論都極度萎縮，十分被動。好像交給安全的所謂‘建制派’媒體和網紅處理似的。這種僵化狀態本身是個大問題所在。我們在極度有限的輿論和聽證會的‘爭論’上，不能被媒體牽著鼻子走，只需要弄清重點，就好了。

（A）消防處拒絕國家救援大隊一事以及 （B）其監管責任問題此兩件事都是互相滲透的內在關係。從後者可以反過來證實前者，從前者也可證實後者。一旦將此兩者分離，就會失去整體觀。在請不請求，或拒不拒絕國家消防大隊趕赴大埔救火的判斷前，已經有僵化的監管問題始終貫穿。這一直存在的僵化的監管問題反過來影射前者。後者的存在肯定會導致前者。

按人為因素造成的災難死亡人數統計，以下為香港歷史上嚴重的人災： 

1. 第一名：1918年跑馬地馬場大火 (逾600人死亡)

2. 第二名：2025年宏福苑大火 (截至11月28日報導，造成128人死亡、200人失聯，傷亡人數仍可能上升)

3. 第三名：1948年永安公司倉庫大火 (造成超過176人死亡)

關於大埔宏福苑五級大火及其後續聽證會，消防處的責任爭議主要集中於監管權責以及承辦商匯報機制。

消防處的責任定義

根據 2026 年 4 月最新的聽證會進展：

• 最終把關人：消防處長楊恩健承認，消防處在保護生命財產及防火上具「最終責任」與「最後把關責任」。

• 執法權限擴大：處方一改先前「只管消防系統」的立場，承認對發泡膠板、棚網、後樓梯「生口」等火警隱患亦有執法權。

• 跨部門分工：雖然涉及結構問題需與屋宇署溝通，但處長同意不能因屬「被動裝置」就推卸責任。

承辦商與設備的匯報責任

聽證會揭露了大火前消防設備失效的問題：

• 匯報義務：消防處強調，註冊承辦商只要發現消防系統損壞（如警鐘失效、水缸缺水），便有責任向處方匯報。

• 刑事責任：警方已就大火拘捕多人，部分涉嫌向消防訛稱維修期間不會關閉警鐘。

• 制度修訂：消防處計劃加大對延誤申報消防設備損壞的罰則。

事件關鍵事實

• 火災規模：2025 年 11 月發生的五級大火，火勢迅速蔓延至 7 座大廈，焚燒超過 43 小時。

• 失效主因：維修期間消防水缸被放水、消防泵總電掣被關閉，導致警鐘及自動灑水系統失效。

• 外部因素：消防處長表示，由於先前疫情及社會事件影響，通訊系統升級延誤，導致火災時未能及時處理大量求助。

根據最新調查與聽證會進展，答案是：並非全都不屬於消防處範疇。

雖然消防處在火災初期曾表示部分問題涉及物業管理或承辦商，但隨著調查深入，處長已公開承認消防處在多個層面具備監管與執法的法定責任。

以下是權責歸屬的詳細拆解：

1. 消防處「必須承擔」的範疇

• 系統損壞的最終監管：雖然維修是由承辦商（如宏泰）執行，但消防處負責監管這些承辦商。處長承認，若承辦商長期未修好設備且未如實申報，消防處有責任主動巡查及執法。

• 火警隱患的執法權：針對火場中常見的發泡膠板、棚網、後樓梯開口，消防處長在 2026 年 4 月的聽證會上承認，這些都屬於《消防條例》下的「火警隱患」，處方具備直接執法權。

• 通訊與調配責任：火災期間通訊系統癱瘓、未能及時處理求助電話，這屬於消防處內部的行政與技術更新責任。

  
  

2. 與其他部門「共同承擔」的範疇

• 建築結構安全（與屋宇署）：大廈的防煙門、耐火結構屬於「被動消防裝置」。雖然主要由屋宇署監管，但消防處在發現問題時有通報及建議改善的職責，不能完全排除在責任之外。

  
  

3. 屬於「外部第三方」的責任（非消防處直接負責）

• 虛報維修狀況：若承辦商刻意隱瞞已關閉消防泵或警鐘，消防處在收到虛假報告的情況下，初期責任在於承辦商的誠信與刑事過失（這也是目前多名承辦商人員被捕的原因）。

• 物管現場管理：物業管理公司在火警發生時的疏散指引、保安員的反應速度，屬於民事管理責任，而非消防處的執法範疇。

⚠️ 輿論與法庭爭論點

目前最受關注的爭論點在於：「消防處是否因行政怠慢而錯失阻止慘劇的機會？」

• 處方立場：強調是承辦商「隱瞞」了系統失效。

• 受害者/法官立場：質疑消防處作為監管者，為何能容許重要消防設備（如水缸、警鐘）長期處於停用狀態而毫不知情。

  
  

總結： 消防處已無法再以「純屬私人屋苑維修」為由推卸責任。目前最新的定調是：承辦商有申報責任，但消防處有最終的監管與執法責任。

屈穎妍對大埔宏福苑五級大火事件的評論非常犀利，她將此定義為一場「徹頭徹尾的人禍」，並多次發文直指政府官僚制度的崩壞。

以下是她評論的核心觀點：

1. 批評部門「互拉架子」與「唔關我事」

屈穎妍在最新的評論中（2026年4月）指出，聽證會揭露了政府部門最醜陋的一面——推卸責任。

• 拒絕承擔：她直斥消防處等多個部門在聽證會上頻繁使用「不屬其管轄」作為藉口。

• 有權不用：她引用過往案例（如2020年迷你倉大火裁決）指出，法律早已確認消防處有廣泛權力處理火警隱患，但官員卻寧願以「分工」為由視而不見。

  
  

2. 「投訴無門」導致市民報《東張》

她特別提到宏福苑大維修的問題曾被《東張西望》報導：

• 政府失能：她認為市民「報東張」是政府部門、議員及傳統媒體的集體失敗。

• 小事變大事：如果民生小事（如非法發泡膠、消防設備損壞）能透過正常投訴管道火速處理，市民何須向娛樂節目求助？這種「小事無人理」最終醞釀成了幾百條人命的悲劇。

3. 官僚架構與「歌舞昇平」

她在火災後初期的文章《先治好惹來蒼蠅的腐爛》中提到：

• 重表忠輕民生：批評過去幾年社會只重「政治表忠」與「歌舞昇平」，要掌聲不要批評，導致議員和傳媒失去監察作用。

• 學費沈重：她形容這場火是「用幾百條人命來交學費」，若不撼動官僚制度，由治及興只是口號。

  
  

4. 引用《焚城》金句

屈穎妍多次引用電影《焚城》的對白：「人禍，有時比天災更可怕！」。她強調「蒼蠅不叮無縫的蛋」，政府必須先治好內部的「腐爛」（官僚文化），才能真正保障市民安全。

🚨 值得注意的爭議：

屈穎妍的相關文章在《大公報》Facebook發布後，曾被發現遭七度修改並最終刪帖。據報修改內容主要是刪除了她對政府官員「只重表忠、不理民生」的直接抨擊。她隨後回應稱，那是「人家的自由」，但原文仍保留在她個人的社交專頁。 

在 2025 年 11 月 26 日發生的大埔宏福苑五級大火中，消防處確實在火災期間表示沒有要求內地支援，隨後在 2026 年 4 月的獨立調查委員會聽證會中解釋了當時未有引進內地消防隊的技術與操作考量。

以下為消防處在聽證會及火災期間提供的詳細理據：

1. 行動兼容性與通訊障礙

• 語言與指令差異：副消防總長黃思律指出，兩地消防員在通訊指令上存在差異，例如求救訊號「Mayday」，內地消防員可能會用普通話喊「呼救呼救」，在現場嘈雜環境下，香港消防員未必能即時識別。

• 裝備不相容：中港兩地使用的呼吸輔助器型號不同，內地隊伍的裝備未必能與香港系統對接，影響協同作戰的安全。

  
  

2. 現場空間與人手調配

• 現場飽和：聽證會透露火災當日現場已有約 980 名消防員（為一般五級火的 8 倍人手），且現場泊滿了消防車。消防處認為當時「再多的人手都未必能上樓」，且調度過多人員可能造成現場混亂。

• 不熟悉系統：內地救援隊並不熟悉香港的建築消防系統及具體的行動指引。

  
  

3. 機制尚未完全對接

• 協定範圍限制：當時粵港澳三方救援行動協定仍處於首階段，主要針對天然災害。對於火警救援的對接工作當時尚未完全兼容，因此未能在該次行動中即時實行。

  
  

事件背景

• 火災規模：大火焚燒超過 43 小時，共造成 65 人死亡（包括一名殉職消防員）及多人失蹤、受傷。

• 內地待命情況：火災期間，深圳市消防局車隊曾在蓮塘口岸集結待命，但需獲香港方面同意並完成審批程序方可過境，最終消防處回覆稱「目前沒有要求支援」。

  
  

目前，大埔宏福苑大火獨立委員會正持續進行聽證，以檢討消防通訊系統、疏散指引及應急聯動機制等問題。 

The following is the conclusion that was reached:

In the case of the Wang Fuk Court fire, the third-largest man-made disaster in Hong Kong's history, two issues are of paramount importance: Two issues are being discussed in this paper: first, the Fire Services Department's (FSD) refusal to accept assistance from the National Fire and Rescue Administration, and second, questions regarding the FSD's regulatory responsibilities. Nevertheless, public criticism and discourse have diminished to a negligible level, remaining persistently passive. It appears that the issue has been delegated exclusively to the so-called "pro-establishment" media and online influencers. This state of stagnation, in and of itself, constitutes a significant problem. Given the paucity of public discourse and the superficial nature of the "debates" that have transpired during the hearings, it is imperative that we, the public, do not allow the media to mislead us. It is essential that we elucidate the key issues.

The Fire Services Department's (FSD) decision not to deploy the National Rescue Brigade is inherently intertwined with its regulatory responsibilities. The latter serves as evidence for the former, and the former serves as evidence for the latter. The dissociation of these two elements would result in a loss of perspective, thereby compromising the ability to understand the broader context. Prior to the decision regarding the request or refusal of assistance from the National Fire Brigade in combating the fire in Tai Po, a long-standing issue of rigid regulatory oversight had already been present throughout. This persistent problem of rigid oversight, in turn, reflects the former issue. The existence of the latter is predicated on the existence of the former.

The following is a list of the three most devastating fire disasters in Hong Kong's history, ranked according to the number of lives lost:

Happy Valley Racecourse Fire (February 26, 1918): 614 Deaths

The most lethal conflagration in Hong Kong's history transpired when a makeshift bamboo grandstand gave way, collapsing onto culinary stalls during a race meeting. The collapse ignited cooking fires that rapidly consumed the flammable structures, trapping thousands of spectators.

On September 22, 1948, a warehouse fire in Hong Kong resulted in 176 fatalities. The conflagration originated from an explosion on the ground floor of the Wing On warehouse, located on Des Voeux Road West. The facility contained "dangerous goods" that fueled an intense blaze, resulting in 176 fatalities and 69 injuries.

On November 26, 2025, a conflagration occurred in the Wang Fuk Court, resulting in 161 fatalities. This incident has been identified as the most lethal building fire in Hong Kong for over 75 years. The conflagration occurred in a residential complex in Tai Po that was undergoing renovations. The conflagration rapidly propagated through highly flammable bamboo scaffolding and safety mesh, encompassing seven residential blocks and resulting in approximately 5,000 individuals becoming homeless.

With respect to the Grade 5 fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po and the subsequent public hearings, the controversy over the Fire Services Department's (FSD) responsibilities is primarily centered on regulatory authority and contractor reporting mechanisms.

A Definition of the Fire Services Department's Responsibilities

According to the latest progress from the public hearings in April 2026:

Ultimate Gatekeeper: FSD Commissioner Yeung Yan-kin acknowledged that the FSD bears "ultimate responsibility" and "final gatekeeping responsibility" for the protection of life and property, as well as for the prevention of fires.

The present study explores the concept of Expanded Enforcement Authority. The Department has shifted from its previous stance of exclusively overseeing fire protection systems. It now acknowledges that it also has enforcement authority over fire hazards such as foam board panels, scaffolding netting, and "open openings" in rear stairwells.

The following section delineates the interdepartmental division of responsibilities. While acknowledging the need for coordination with the Buildings Department regarding structural concerns, the Director firmly asserted that responsibility cannot be evaded merely because these are considered "passive installations."

Reporting Responsibilities of Contractors and Equipment

The hearing revealed issues with fire safety equipment malfunctions prior to the fire.

Reporting Obligations: The Fire Services Department has underscored the responsibility of registered contractors to promptly report any damage to fire safety systems, including malfunctioning alarms and empty water tanks, to the Department.

Criminal Liability: Law enforcement officials have apprehended multiple individuals in relation to the conflagration. Some of these individuals are suspected of providing false assurances to the Fire Services Department regarding the maintenance of operational alarms.

Systemic Reforms: The Fire Services Department has announced its intention to impose heightened penalties for the delayed reporting of fire equipment damage.

The following are the salient facts of the incident:

Scale of the Fire: In November 2025, a fire of Grade 5 intensity rapidly spread to seven buildings, burning for over 43 hours.

The primary factors contributing to the observed failure are as follows: During the maintenance process, water was drained from the fire water tanks, and the main circuit breaker for the fire pumps was deactivated. This resulted in the failure of the fire alarm and automatic sprinkler systems.

The following section will address external factors. The Director of Fire Services has indicated that the delayed implementation of upgrades to the communication system was precipitated by the repercussions of the preceding pandemic and social unrest. This delay has led to a situation in which the system is incapable of efficiently managing a substantial volume of distress calls during a fire event.

In light of the most recent investigative findings and recent hearing developments, it can be concluded that not all matters fall outside the jurisdiction of the Fire Services Department.

While the Fire Services Department initially indicated that the issues in question pertained to property management or contractors, as the investigation progressed, the Commissioner has publicly acknowledged that the department holds statutory responsibilities for supervision and enforcement at multiple levels.

The subsequent section delineates the allocation of responsibilities in greater detail.

1. The Fire Services Department is obligated to assume responsibility in the following areas:

Oversight of system failures: Although maintenance is carried out by contractors such as Hong Tai, the Fire Services Department is responsible for supervising these contractors. The Commissioner acknowledged that in the event that contractors demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance, including, but not limited to, failure to repair equipment for an extended period and failure to report issues truthfully, the Fire Services Department is obligated to conduct proactive inspections and enforce applicable regulations.

The following institution has been designated as the Enforcement Authority with regard to fire hazards: In reference to the prevalence of common fire hazards observed at fire scenes, including foam boards, scaffolding netting, and rear stairwell openings, the Director of the Fire Services Department acknowledged during the April 2026 hearing that these elements are classified as "fire hazards" under the provisions of the Fire Services Ordinance. The Department is vested with direct enforcement authority in this regard.

Communication and Dispatch Responsibilities: The Fire Services Department has been entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing the internal administrative and technical aspects of communication systems during fire events. This includes the management of emergency calls and the facilitation of prompt responses to address the needs of individuals in crisis.

2. The following areas are considered to be under the purview of "Joint Responsibility" in conjunction with other departments:

Building Structural Safety (in conjunction with the Buildings Department): Smoke-proof doors and fire-resistant structures in buildings are classified as "passive fire protection systems." While the primary regulatory authority for these matters is the Buildings Department, the Fire Services Department is nevertheless charged with the responsibility of reporting any issues that come to its attention and recommending improvements upon discovery. It therefore cannot be considered entirely exempt from responsibility.

3. A discussion of the responsibilities of "external third parties" is warranted, given that these entities do not fall under the direct jurisdiction of the Fire Services Department.

Falsifying maintenance reports is a particular concern. In the event that contractors deliberately conceal the shutdown of fire pumps or alarms, resulting in the Fire Services Department receiving false reports, the initial responsibility falls upon the contractors themselves, as well as their integrity and criminal negligence. This has led to the arrest of multiple contractor personnel.

On-site Property Management: The evacuation procedures implemented by property management companies during a fire, as well as the response speed of security guards, fall under civil management responsibilities. These responsibilities do not fall within the Fire Services Department's enforcement jurisdiction.

⚠️ Points of Controversy in Public Opinion and the Court

The most closely watched point of contention currently is as follows: The central question of this inquiry is whether the Fire Services Department missed an opportunity to avert the tragedy due to administrative negligence.

The Position of the Fire Services Department: The contractor's actions, or lack thereof, in disclosing the system failure, are of particular concern.

The Victims'/Judges' Position: The following inquiries are posited: For what reason did the Fire Services Department, in its capacity as the regulatory authority, permit critical fire safety equipment—namely, water tanks and fire alarms—to remain deactivated for an extended period without having any awareness of the circumstances?

In summary, the Fire Services Department is no longer able to evade its responsibilities by asserting that the matter at hand is "merely a matter of private estate maintenance." The prevailing consensus among relevant parties is that contractors are obligated to submit reports; however, the Fire Services Department retains the ultimate responsibility for oversight and enforcement.

Chris Wat's commentary on the Grade 5 fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po was particularly critical, characterizing the incident as a "complete and utter man-made disaster." She repeatedly emphasized the perceived failure of government bureaucracy in her subsequent posts.

The following are the primary points of her commentary:

1. A critique of government departments' tendency to evade responsibility and adopt a "not my problem" attitude

In her latest commentary (April 2026), Chris Wat observed that the hearing exposed the most egregious aspect of government departments—the practice of deflecting responsibility.

Refusal to assume responsibility: During the hearing, she directly criticized the Fire Services Department and other agencies for frequently using the "not within their jurisdiction" excuse.

Power Unused: Citing previous cases, including the 2020 mini-storage fire ruling, she observed that the law has long acknowledged the Fire Services Department's extensive authority to address fire hazards. However, officials often opt to disregard this authority under the guise of "division of labor."

2. The article "No Place to Complain" has prompted citizens to report to "Scoop." The author specifically mentioned that the major renovation issues at Wang Fuk Court had previously been reported by "Scoop."

Government Incompetence: It is her conviction that the phenomenon of citizens gravitating toward Scoop can be interpreted as a systemic failure, encompassing government departments, legislators, and traditional media entities.

Minor Matters Evolving into Significant Concerns: If minor livelihood issues (e.g., illegal foam insulation or damaged fire safety equipment) could be expeditiously resolved through conventional complaint channels, it would be necessary to examine why citizens would need to seek assistance from an entertainment program. This "neglect of small matters" ultimately culminated in a tragedy that claimed hundreds of lives.

3. Bureaucratic Structure and the Phrase "All Is Well"

In her early post-fire article, "First Cure the Rottenness That Attracts Flies," she noted:

Prioritizing Loyalty Over Livelihoods: In recent years, she has been critical of society's prioritization of "political loyalty" and the maintenance of a "positive facade," which she contends has led to a shift in which legislators and the media are increasingly expected to provide applause rather than criticism. This, she argues, has resulted in a loss of their oversight functions.

A Heavy Price Paid: The speaker characterized the conflagration as "a lesson paid for with hundreds of lives," emphasizing that unless the bureaucratic system is fundamentally altered, the slogan of "reforming to prosper" will remain mere rhetoric.

4. As indicated by Chris Wat's repeated citation of a line from the film Cesium Fallout (2024), the following assertion is made: The assertion that man-made disasters are more terrifying than natural disasters is not without merit. . She underscored the notion that "flies don't land on seamless eggs," thereby implying that the government must first address its internal "rot," namely its bureaucratic culture, in order to ensure public safety. It is worthy of note that a controversy ensued following the publication of Chris Wat's article on the Facebook page of the Ta Kung Pao newspaper. It was subsequently revealed that the article had undergone seven edits prior to its ultimate deletion. According to reports, the edits primarily entailed the removal of her direct criticism of government officials for prioritizing loyalty over the people's livelihood. In her subsequent response, she acknowledged the prerogative of the aforementioned parties, yet the original text remains conspicuously present on her personal social media page.

During the conflagration classified as a Category 5, which occurred at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po on November 26, 2025, the Fire Services Department initially asserted that it had not requested assistance from mainland China during the aforementioned fire. The department subsequently elucidated the technical and operational considerations that informed its decision not to deploy mainland fire crews at the Independent Commission of Inquiry hearing in April 2026.

The following are the detailed justifications provided by the Fire Services Department during the hearing and at the time of the fire:

1. Operational Compatibility and Communication Barriers

Language and Command Differences: Deputy Fire Commissioner Wong Sze-lut has noted that there are discrepancies in the communication protocols employed by firefighters from the two regions. For instance, in the context of a distress signal, such as "Mayday," mainland firefighters might respond with a cry of "Help!" In the context of a noisy environment such as the scene of an emergency, firefighters from Hong Kong might face challenges in immediately recognizing the phrase "Help!" in Mandarin.

The following is a list of equipment that is not compatible with the aforementioned equipment. The fire departments on the mainland and in Hong Kong utilize divergent models of breathing apparatus. The potential incompatibility of mainland teams' equipment with Hong Kong's systems has the potential to compromise safety during joint operations.

2. The allocation of on-site resources and personnel is determined by the on-site saturation level. The hearing revealed that on the day of the fire, there were already approximately 980 firefighters on site (eight times the standard staffing level for a Class 5 fire), and the area was filled with fire trucks. The Fire Services Department hypothesized that, at that time, "even more personnel might not have been able to enter the building," and that dispatching too many personnel could have caused chaos at the scene.

Lack of Familiarity with Systems: It was observed that mainland rescue teams lacked familiarity with Hong Kong's building fire safety systems and the specific operational guidelines that govern them.

3. The present analysis indicates that the mechanisms have not been fully integrated.

The limitations of the agreement are as follows: At that time, the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao trilateral rescue cooperation agreement was still in its nascent phase, with its primary focus being on addressing natural disasters. The coordination mechanisms for fire rescue operations had not yet achieved full compatibility, thus hindering their immediate implementation during this incident.

Incident Background and Fire Scale

The conflagration persisted for a duration exceeding 43 hours, culminating in a total of 65 fatalities, including one firefighter who perished while engaged in active firefighting operations. In addition to these casualties, the incident also resulted in numerous missing and injured individuals.

Mainland Standby Status: During the aforementioned conflagration, a fleet of vehicles from the Shenzhen Fire Department had assembled at the Liantang Port of Entry to stand by, but they required approval from Hong Kong authorities and had to complete the necessary clearance procedures before crossing the border. In their response, the Fire Services Department stated that "there is currently no request for assistance."

Presently, the Independent Commission on the Tai Po Wang Fuk Court Fire is conducting hearings to address issues such as the fire service communication system, evacuation guidelines, and emergency coordination mechanisms.

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