Hong Kong Intelligence Report #173 Hong Kong has imposed sanctions on Chinese state allies
- Ryota Nakanishi
- 2 days ago
- 10 min read
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】Hong Kong has imposed sanctions on Chinese state allies
▪️ My conclusion: Hong Kong has imposed sanctions on Chinese state allies
Hong Kong has imposed sanctions on China's allies, despite the fact that the two parties are operating under the same UN sanctions rhetoric. The most salient contrast that elucidates the distinction between Hong Kong and the Chinese central government is the disparity in their respective handling of North Korea and Guinea-Bissau. In essence, this accurately reflects the reality that Hong Kong's political landscape is shaped by localist vested interests who exercise independent oversight over the state partner. This phenomenon transpired even in circumstances where the diplomatic apparatus was overseen by the central government. This is the true aspect of Hong Kong politics.
▪️ Hong Kong does not possess an autonomous sanctions regime; it merely enforces sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). These sanctions are implemented at the local level through the United Nations Sanctions Ordinance (Cap. 537).
List of Countries Subject to Sanctions in Hong Kong
As of late 2025/early 2026, the following countries were subject to UN-mandated sanctions implemented in Hong Kong:
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
The Central African Republic is a country in the heart of the African continent.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a country in Africa.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau are two nations that have been identified as participants in the global political landscape.
* Haiti
* Libya
* Somalia
* South Sudan
* Sudan
* Yemen
It is important to note that sanctions also apply to non-state entities, such as ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qaida.
The list includes countries that are often considered Chinese allies, most notably North Korea. However, given that the imposition of any new UN sanctions necessitates the approval of the five permanent members of the Security Council (including China), Hong Kong refrains from implementing unilateral sanctions against major Chinese partners if such measures have been vetoed at the UN level.
The following text is intended to provide a brief overview of the subject matter.
It does not enforce the unilateral sanctions imposed by Western nations (the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom) following the conflict in Ukraine.
The following text is intended to provide a brief overview of the subject matter.
Iran
The Legal Status of Foreign Sanctions
Sanctions that are imposed unilaterally by foreign governments (e.g., the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control) are not accorded legal status in Hong Kong law. According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), local banks are not legally obligated to comply with foreign unilateral sanctions; however, they may choose to do so based on their own commercial risk assessments.
[3] https://www.kingandwood.com/hk/en/insights/latest-thinking/sanctions_the_impact_in_hong_kong.html
[12] https://www.tid.gov.hk/en/our_work/import_export_licensing_control/united_nations_sanctions.html
[17] https://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/en/Support-Members/Professional-Support/AML/Targeted-Financial-Sanctions
With respect to the business environment in Hong Kong involving countries such as Russia and Iran, the situation can be categorized into two distinct aspects: legal obligations and commercial risk management.
1. Legal Level: The Implementation of United Nations Sanctions
In accordance with Hong Kong's legal framework, sanctions that have been authorized by the United Nations Security Council are the only ones that carry legal weight.
Russia: Given Russia's status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, with the authority to exercise the veto, the UN has not imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against the nation. Consequently, under Hong Kong law, there is no explicit legal prohibition against general business dealings with Russian entities. In contrast, Iran has taken a different legislative approach. According to Hong Kong law (Cap. 537), certain UN-mandated restrictions against Iran are enforced, primarily with regard to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the freezing of specific assets.
2. Financial Practice: The Impact of "Secondary Sanctions" In the legal framework of Hong Kong, there is a lack of recognition of unilateral foreign sanctions, such as those imposed by the United States or the European Union. However, in practice, businesses and banks in Hong Kong are significantly impacted by these sanctions. Bank Due Diligence: The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) mandates that banking institutions implement and maintain comprehensive screening mechanisms. While not legally obligated to enforce foreign sanctions, most banks adopt an extremely cautious stance toward Russia- or Iran-related transactions to maintain their access to the global financial system (especially US dollar clearing). In the event that a payment is refused or an account is closed, the associated region may be identified as a potential source of secondary sanctions risk. The US Secondary Sanctions Risk: The US Treasury (OFAC) issues frequent warnings regarding the potential consequences of providing "significant support" to sanctioned Russian or Iranian entities, particularly in the domains of oil, military technology, or "shadow banking" networks. This support could result in the isolation of the institution from the US financial system. Blacklist Risks: In recent developments, several Hong Kong-based shell companies and shipping entities have been added to the US SDN List (Specially Designated Nationals) for their alleged assistance in Iran's efforts to evade sanctions or transport oil.
3. Recent Developments (May 2026) Oil Trade Blocks: In May 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce prohibited recognizing or implementing unilateral U.S. sanctions after several Chinese firms were targeted for Iranian oil trades.
Financial Security Warnings: In early May 2026, the HKMA noted that, while Middle Eastern tensions persist, Hong Kong’s foreign exchange market remains stable. However, they advised firms to be mindful of exchange rate volatility and potential settlement delays caused by geopolitical shifts.
Summary advice
If you plan to conduct trade with entities in these countries, the primary challenge is usually not "legality" but banking and payment processing. It is highly recommended that you consult your bank before signing any contracts to confirm whether they will accept or process funds from these sources.
As of May 2026, the relationship between China and these two countries regarding sanctions is as follows:
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereinafter "North Korea") is subject to sanctions imposed by China, but China does not impose unilateral "China-only" sanctions on North Korea. Instead, its actions are defined by a complex balance of enforcement and diplomatic protection.
The implementation of United Nations sanctions is a subject that merits close examination. China, in its capacity as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has consistently demonstrated its commitment to the implementation of UN-mandated sanctions, casting its vote in favor of such measures and ensuring their official execution. These restrictions encompass limitations on the importation of coal, iron, and seafood, in addition to the imposition of export quotas on petroleum.
Recent Protections: In recent years, particularly in May 2026, China has taken measures to increase its protection of North Korea. The People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation have utilized their veto power to block new United States-led proposals for more stringent sanctions at the United Nations, asserting that current measures are counterproductive.
* Bilateral Support: China continues to be North Korea's primary trading partner, and it has recently augmented its economic ties. For instance, China has implemented zero-tariff treatment for certain goods to promote regional stability and avert regime collapse. The sequence in question is expressed as follows:
The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is not subject to any unilateral sanctions imposed by China. Indeed, the two countries have cultivated a robust strategic partnership:
The subject of trade incentives is of particular relevance in this context. As of May 1, 2026, China has expanded its zero-tariff treatment to include 53 African countries, including Guinea-Bissau. The objective of this policy is to enhance the export of Guinea-Bissau's primary products, including cashew nuts, fishery items, and sesame, to the Chinese market.
* UN Context: Although there have been limited UN-mandated sanctions related to past political instability in Guinea-Bissau (which Hong Kong and China are technically required to observe), China's foreign policy has historically prioritized development aid and infrastructure, rather than the implementation of punitive economic measures against the country.
The following is a summary comparison of the two subjects.
Feature: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereinafter "North Korea") and the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.
Legal Basis: Strictly UN-mandated only. There are no active economic sanctions in place.
China's Stance: China advocates for the easing of sanctions. It is a strong trade partner, offering zero tariffs.
Current Status: Officially restricted, but China "enables" trade. It is fully open for trade.
[1] (https://www.diis.dk/en/research/sanctions-are-an-important-tool-in-chinas-north-korea-diplomacy)
[3] [https://en.wikipedia.org] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_against_North_Korea)
[6] (https://www.donga.com)
[7] [https://globalsanctions.com] (https://globalsanctions.com/2026/04/china-to-implement-zero-tariff-measures-for-20-african-countries-from-1-may-2026/#:~:text=China%20to%20implement%20zero%20tariff%20measures%20for%2020%20African%20countries%20from%201%20May%202026.&text=China%20has%20announced%20that%20it%20will%20fully,%20Countries%2C%20between%20the%201%20May%202026%20and)
As of May 2026, Guinea-Bissau is considered a close strategic partner and key political ally of China. The relationship was formally upgraded to a Strategic Partnership in July 2024 during a state visit by President Umaro Sissoco Embaló to Beijing.
Key Aspects of the Relationship
Political Support: Guinea-Bissau consistently supports China's core interests in international forums like the United Nations. It adheres to the "One China" policy and was one of 53 countries that backed the Hong Kong National Security Law at the UN in 2020.
Economic Ties: China is Guinea-Bissau's most significant partner in infrastructure and development. Major Chinese-funded projects include the National Parliament building, the Presidential Palace, the National Stadium, and various hospitals and roads.
Zero-Tariff Treatment: Starting May 1, 2026, China expanded its zero-tariff policy to include 53 African nations with which it has diplomatic ties. Guinea-Bissau, as a strategic partner, benefits from this, allowing it to export agricultural and fishery products (such as cashew nuts and peanuts) to the Chinese market duty-free.
Geostrategic Value: While Guinea-Bissau is a small nation, it serves as an important gateway for China into West Africa and the Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) world through platforms like Forum Macao.
Hong Kong currently enforces targeted sanctions relating to Guinea-Bissau, but these are limited to individual travel bans imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Chinese Version (中文版)
截至2026年5月，幾內亞比紹被視為中國在西非的重要戰略夥伴和政治盟友。兩國關係於 2024 年 7 月正式提升為戰略夥伴關係。
政治支持： 幾內亞比紹在國際場合（如聯合國）一貫支持中國的核心利益。該國堅定奉行**「一個中國」原則**，並曾在聯合國支持香港國安法。
經濟合作： 中國是該國最重要的基礎設施合作夥伴，援建了國民議會大樓、總統府、國家體育場以及多所醫院和道路。
零關稅政策： 自 2026 年 5 月 1 日起，中國對包括幾內亞比紹在內的 53 個建交非洲國家實施全面零關稅待遇。這極大地促進了該國腰果、漁產品等特色商品對華出口。
地緣戰略： 對中國而言，幾內亞比紹是進入西非及葡語國家共同體（CPLP）的重要門戶。
[10] https://www.dw.com
[12] https://www.scmp.com
香港不實施自主的單邊制裁，僅執行由**聯合國安全理事會（UNSC）**強制實施的制裁。這些制裁透過香港法例第537章《聯合國制裁條例》在本地實施。
香港目前實施制裁的國家名單
阿富汗 (Afghanistan)
中非共和國 (Central African Republic)
剛果民主共和國 (Democratic Republic of the Congo)
朝鮮民主主義人民共和國 (North Korea)
幾內亞比紹 (Guinea-Bissau)
海地 (Haiti)
利比亞 (Libya)
索馬里 (Somalia)
南蘇丹 (South Sudan)
蘇丹 (Sudan)
也門 (Yemen)
此外，制裁對象也包括伊黎伊斯蘭國 (Da'esh) 及 基地組織 (Al-Qaida) 等非國家實體。
關於中國盟友
該名單確實包含了一些通常被視為中國盟友或夥伴的國家，最顯著的是北韓。然而，由於任何新的聯合國制裁都必須經過安全理事會五個常任理事國（包括中國）一致通過，因此香港不會對在聯合國層面被中國否決的國家實施單邊制裁。
針對俄羅斯及伊朗等特定國家的營商限制，在香港主要分為法律義務與商業實務風險兩個層次：
1. 法律層面：僅執行聯合國制裁
在香港法律框架下，只有聯合國安理會授權的制裁才具有法律效力。
俄羅斯： 由於俄羅斯是聯合國安理會常任理事國並擁有否決權，因此聯合國並未對其施加廣泛經濟制裁。香港法律目前並無禁止與俄羅斯實體進行一般商業往來。
伊朗： 香港法例第537章及其附屬規例僅執行聯合國針對伊朗的特定限制（如核不擴散相關的禁運項目、特定資產凍結）。
2. 金融實務層面：二級制裁的「連帶影響」
雖然香港法律不承認外國（如美、歐）的單邊制裁，但在實務操作中，香港企業與銀行仍受以下限制影響：
銀行盡職審查 (Due Diligence)： 香港金融管理局（HKMA）要求銀行具備有效的制裁篩查系統。雖然銀行沒有法律義務執行外國制裁，但為了維持全球金融系統（特別是美元結算系統）的連接，多數銀行會對涉及俄羅斯或伊朗的交易採取極為審慎的態度，甚至可能拒絕處理相關結算。
美國二級制裁風險： 美國財政部（OFAC）多次警告，若外國金融機構為受制裁的俄羅斯或伊朗實體（特別是涉及石油、軍事技術或影子銀行網絡）提供重大金融支持，可能面臨被切斷與美元系統聯繫的「二級制裁」。
黑名單風險： 多家香港空殼公司及航運實體因被指控協助伊朗規避制裁或運送石油，已被列入美國的 SDN 清單。
3. 最新動態（2026年5月）
石油交易阻斷： 中國商務部於 2026 年 5 月對美國因伊朗石油交易而制裁 5 家中國企業的行為發布禁令，要求不得承認或執行此類單邊制裁措施。
資金安全提醒： 香港金管局在 2026 年 5 月初指出，雖然中東局勢動盪，但香港外匯市場保持穩定。企業應留意地緣政治引發的匯率波動及結算延遲風險。
總結和建議：如果您打算與這些國家的實體開展貿易，最大的挑戰通常不在於「違法」，而是在於銀行開戶與收付款。建議在簽署合同前，先諮詢您的往來銀行是否接受相關來源的資金。
截至 2026 年 5 月，中國對北韓採取執行聯合國義務與外交保護並行的政策，強調維持地區穩定；而對幾內亞比紹則採取深化合作的貿易優惠政策，並無單邊制裁。整體而言，兩國在中國外交與經濟版圖中處於完全不同的定位，前者受限於聯合國制裁，後者為免關稅貿易夥伴。
我的結論是：儘管雙方都以聯合國制裁的論調為依據，香港卻對中國的盟友實施了制裁。最能闡明香港與中國中央政府之間差異的鮮明對比，在於雙方處理北韓與幾內亞比索問題時的迥異做法。本質上，這準確反映了香港政治格局是由地方既得利益集團所塑造的現實，這些集團對國家夥伴行使獨立監督權。即使在外交體系由中央政府監督的情況下，這種現象依然存在。這才是香港政治的真實面貌。
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