Hong Kong Intelligence Report #174 重啟逃犯條例修訂案的必要性
- Ryota Nakanishi
- 1 day ago
- 11 min read
Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】重啟逃犯條例修訂案的必要性
▪️我的結論：重啟逃犯條例修訂案的必要性。只有真愛國者才能夠重新推動逃犯條例修訂案。理由簡單明瞭，香港與內地，香港與台灣，香港與澳門之間互相仍缺乏引渡法。不能無限期不面對這個最大司法漏洞。其實，香港的‘逃犯條例修訂案’也是澳門的課題，即與香港同樣，澳門與內地也沒有引渡法架構，何況澳門與香港，澳門與台灣都沒有引渡法。因此之故，‘逃犯條例或修訂案問題’原來絕非只有香港的課題。這才是新觀點。
澳門沒有類似香港2019年引發爭議的《逃犯條例》（即允許與內地進行移交的修訂），但澳門有與部分國家簽署獨立的「移交逃犯協定」。澳門與中國內地、香港目前並未簽署專門的移交逃犯協議，主要依靠《刑事司法互助》相關規定運作。
My conclusion: Only true patriots can revive the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance amendment. The reason is simple and clear: there are still no extradition treaties in place between Hong Kong and the Mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan, or Hong Kong and Macau. We cannot indefinitely avoid addressing this major loophole in our legal system. In fact, the Fugitive Offenders Bill amendment is also an issue for Macau; just as with Hong Kong, there is no extradition framework between Macau and the Mainland, let alone between Macau and Hong Kong, or between Macau and Taiwan. For this reason, the Fugitive Offenders Bill amendment is by no means solely a Hong Kong issue. This is the new perspective.
"In contrast to the controversies that arose in Hong Kong concerning the proposed 'Fugitive Offenders Ordinance' (the amendment that would have permitted extraditions to mainland China) in 2019, Macau did not experience similar controversies. However, Macau has signed independent "Surrender of Fugitive Offenders" agreements with several specific countries. Presently, there is no specialized extradition or fugitive transfer agreement between Macau and mainland China or Hong Kong; instead, these matters are primarily handled under the framework of "Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters" (MLAs).
當時的《2019年逃犯及刑事事宜相互法律協助法例（修訂）條例草案》主要針對現行法律中的兩大限制進行了關鍵修改：
1. 移除「地理限制」
• 修訂內容：刪除原條例中移交安排不適用於「中央人民政府或中華人民共和國的任何其他部分」的條文。
• 目的：使香港能夠與中國內地、台灣及澳門進行法律上的個案移交。 [1, 2, 3, 4]
2. 建立「個案移交」機制（不需長期協議）
• 修訂內容：賦予行政長官簽發「證明書」的權力，以啟動單一案件的移交程序。
• 原有程序：過去若要與某地移交逃犯，通常需先與該地簽署長期的相互法律協助協定，並由立法會通過。
• 新建議：在沒有長期協議的情況下，可透過行政長官授權，再交由香港法庭進行形式審查（不涉及實體審判，僅確認是否符合罪名及相關人權保障），決定是否移交。 [1, 5, 6]
3. 限定移交罪行的類別
為了緩解商界及市民的憂慮，政府在草案提交及審議期間曾兩度進行修改：
• 罪行門檻：最初建議可移交判監 3 年或以上的罪行，後提高至 7 年或以上。
• 罪行種類：從最初建議的 46 項罪行縮減至 37 項。
• 剔除的罪行：主要與破壞環境、非法使用電腦、稅務、涉及商業秘密、版權及專利等 9 項經濟罪行。
• 保留的罪行：包括謀殺、誤殺、賄賂、詐騙、性犯罪等嚴重刑事罪行。 [1, 5, 7, 8]
4. 人權保障條款
草案重申了現有條例中的保障原則：
• 政治不移交：不會因政治性質的罪行而移交，或因某人的政治意見、宗教、種族等原因而進行移交。
• 雙重犯罪原則：有關行為在香港及請求方兩地都必須構成刑事罪行。
• 死刑不移交：如果請求方可能判處死刑，香港可要求保證不執行死刑，否則不予移交。 [5, 7, 8, 9]
雖然草案最終因引發巨大的社會爭議及抗爭而於 2019 年 10 月正式撤回，但其修訂重點始終環繞在填補港台、港內地之間法律真空的嘗試上。 [10, 11]
既然您關心條文細節，是否也想了解在草案撤回後，像陳同佳這類案件目前在法律上如何處理？
在現行法律框架下，若沒有《逃犯條例》修訂，香港與中國內地、台灣及澳門之間確實無法進行法律意義上的「引渡」（移交逃犯）。 [1, 2]
以下是核心原因與現狀分析：
1. 法律上的「地理限制」 [3]
香港目前的《逃犯條例》（第503章）明確訂明，該條例不適用於香港與「中央人民政府或中華人民共和國的任何其他部分」之間的移交安排。 [2, 3, 4]
• 涵蓋地區：此限制直接導致香港無法將嫌犯移交至中國內地、台灣或澳門。
• 現有機制：香港目前僅與約20個國家（如英、美、加、澳等）簽有長期移交逃犯協議。 [2, 5, 6, 7]
2. 為何無法處理特定案件？
2018年發生的「陳同佳案」（潘曉穎命案）是修例的導火線。由於港台之間沒有引渡協議，且《逃犯條例》存在上述地理限制： [8, 9]
• 無法引渡：台灣政府無法合法要求香港將嫌犯陳同佳送回台灣受審。
• 管轄權限制：香港法院對港人在境外犯下的謀殺罪通常沒有司法管轄權，因此只能以盜竊或洗黑錢等罪名在港判刑，無法就殺人罪直接審理。 [1, 8, 10]
3. 現狀與替代做法
• 修例狀態：2019年提出的《逃犯條例》修訂草案引發社會大規模抗爭（反修例風波），最終香港政府於2019年10月正式撤回該條例草案。
• 非正式合作：在缺乏正式引渡條約的情況下，內地與香港過去曾通過不定期、非對等的「行政安排」移交部分嫌犯（通常是內地將逃往香港的疑犯交還內地，但香港極少移交逃犯至內地），但這並非正式法律程序，且不適用於台灣。 [2, 11, 12, 13, 14]
總結來說，法律漏洞依然存在，在不修改現行法律或建立新的專案司法互助機制前，香港與內地、台灣之間仍無法進行法定的逃犯移交。 [1, 6]
[3] https://hkba.org
當然，這是 2019 年香港政界和法律界討論非常激烈的議題。在《逃犯條例》修訂草案（即「引渡法案」）引發巨大爭議後，多方曾提出替代方案，試圖在不涉及移交大陸的前提下解決當時觸發修例的「台灣殺人案」。 [1, 2]
這些法律替代方案主要包括：
• 域外司法管轄權（Extra-territorial Jurisdiction）：
o 核心內容：由多位法律學者和議員（如楊岳橋、田北辰等）提出。建議修訂香港現行的《侵害人身罪條例》，賦予香港法院權力，審理香港居民在境外涉嫌謀殺、誤殺或意圖謀殺的案件。
o 政府回應：時任律政司司長鄭若驊拒絕了這一提議，認為這會從根本上改變香港法院通常只處理本地罪行的「屬地原則」（Territoriality Principle），並可能涉及追溯力等複雜的法律問題。
• 「日落條款」單次修例（Sunset Clause）：
o 核心內容：泛民主派曾提議進行一次性的「日落條款」修例，僅針對當時的台灣案件進行特殊處理，一旦嫌犯陳同佳完成移交程序，該修例即告失效。
o 政府回應：政府認為這種方式無法從長遠解決「法律漏洞」，堅持要建立一套長期的個案移交機制。
• 「港人港審」（Trial in Hong Kong for Hong Kong Residents）：
o 核心內容：提議修改法律，允許香港居民如果在其他司法管轄區（如中國大陸、台灣、澳門）犯罪後返回香港，可以直接在香港接受審判，而不是被引渡。
o 政府回應：政府同樣以違反屬地原則和調查取證困難（證據都在境外）為由否決了此方案。 [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]
最終，隨著法案在 2019 年 10 月 23 日被正式撤回，這些替代方案也未能進入實質的立法階段。 [1, 10]
[9] https://qz.com
[10] https://www.scmp.com
自 2020 年《港區國安法》實施以來，多個西方國家先後中止或暫停了與香港的移交逃犯（引渡）協議。
目前（截至 2026 年初），香港原有的 20 份雙邊移交逃犯協定中，約有一半仍處於生效狀態，而另一半則已被暫停/中止。 [1, 2, 3]
1. 目前仍然有效的引渡協定名單 [2]
以下國家與香港的移交逃犯協定目前仍被視為有效運作：
亞洲：新加坡、韓國、印度、印度尼西亞、馬來西亞、菲律賓、斯里蘭卡
歐洲：葡萄牙、捷克
非洲：南非 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
2. 已被暫停/中止的引渡協定名單 [2]
以下國家在 2020 年後單方面宣布暫停與香港的引渡安排，香港隨後也根據中央政府指示暫停了與這些國家的協定：
「五眼聯盟」國家：英國、美國、加拿大、澳洲、紐西蘭
部分歐盟及歐洲國家：德國、法國（擱置生效）、愛爾蘭、荷蘭、芬蘭 [6, 7, 8, 9]
3. 最新動態與趨勢
個案處理機制：英國政府在 2025 年提出修例，計畫雖然不恢復正式引渡條約，但允許以「個案方式」（case-by-case basis）處理引渡請求。
新簽署協議：香港近年持續拓展非西方國家的法律合作，例如在 2025 年 9 月與贊比亞（Zambia）簽署了包括移交逃犯在內的司法合作協定。
多邊公約：除了雙邊協定外，香港仍可根據多項國際多邊公約（如打擊劫機、販毒、恐怖主義等公約）與其他成員國進行特定罪行的逃犯移交合作。 [10, 11, 12, 13]
需注意，即使存有引渡協議，根據國際法和香港法律，政治罪行通常不在引渡範圍之內。 [14]
[12] https://www.scmp.com
[14] https://www.rfa.org
Here are the English versions of the previous two responses regarding the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance(FOO) and the 2019 amendment bill.
Part 1: Current Legal Status Between Hong Kong and Mainland/Taiwan
Currently, no formal extradition mechanism exists between Hong Kong and Mainland China, Taiwan, or Macau, largely due to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (Cap. 503) excluding the rest of China. This legal gap was highlighted by the 2018 Taiwan murder case, where the suspect could not be extradited. Furthermore, Hong Kong courts generally lack extraterritorial jurisdiction to try residents for crimes committed elsewhere, complicating prosecutions. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Part 2: Key Amendments in the 2019 Bill
The 2019 amendment bill aimed to address these issues by: [6, 7]
• Removing Restrictions: Allowing for the surrender of fugitives to the Mainland, Taiwan, and Macau.
• Ad-hoc Mechanism: Introducing case-based, special surrender arrangements authorized by the Chief Executive.
• Refining Crimes: Limiting applications to 37 categories of serious crimes (e.g., murder) with a maximum sentence threshold of 7 years or more.
• Safeguards: Including protections against political surrender, ensuring double criminality, and prohibiting extradition where the death penalty may be imposed. [2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]
Following significant public opposition, the bill was formally withdrawn in October 2019. [14, 15]
Would you like to know more about the legal alternatives proposed by various parties after the bill's withdrawal, such as "extra-territorial jurisdiction"?
[14] https://www.bbc.com
The debate over legal alternatives was a pivotal moment in the 2019 unrest, as experts tried to find a way to handle the "Taiwan homicide case" (the initial trigger for the bill) without opening the door to extraditions to mainland China.
Here is a breakdown of those proposed alternatives:
1. Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction (ETJ)
The Idea: Proposed by lawmakers like Alvin Yeung and Michael Tien, this involved amending the Offences against the Person Ordinance. It would have granted Hong Kong courts the power to try Hong Kong residents for serious crimes (like murder) committed outside the city.
The Logic: This would allow the suspect in the Taiwan case to be tried in a Hong Kong court using evidence provided by Taiwanese authorities, fulfilling the goal of justice without sending him across the border.
The Rejection: The government argued this would violate the territoriality principle (the idea that courts only handle crimes committed on their own soil) and cited immense difficulty in gathering overseas evidence that would meet Hong Kong's high threshold for admissibility.
2. "Hong Kong People, Hong Kong Trial" (港人港审)
The Idea: A variation of ETJ, this specifically proposed that Hong Kong citizens who commit crimes in jurisdictions without an extradition treaty (like Mainland China, Taiwan, or Macau) should be tried at home in Hong Kong.
The Logic: It aimed to protect citizens from being sent to legal systems that critics argued lacked fair trial guarantees, while still ensuring they faced consequences for their actions.
The Rejection: Officials claimed this would turn Hong Kong into a "shelter" for criminals if overseas authorities refused to share evidence or if the crimes didn't exist in Hong Kong law.
3. "Sunset Clause" or One-Off Amendment
The Idea: Proponents suggested a narrow, time-limited amendment designed specifically and only for the Taiwan murder case. Once that suspect was dealt with, the law would expire.
The Logic: This addressed the immediate "humanitarian crisis" of the murder case without creating a permanent mechanism for extradition to the mainland.
The Rejection: The government insisted on a permanent solution to fix what they called a "legal loophole," arguing that a one-off fix was inefficient and didn't solve the long-term issue.
4. Special Agency or "Special Case" Handling
The Idea: Some legal experts suggested creating a special judicial committee to vet any extradition requests on a case-by-case basis with much higher transparency and human rights safeguards than the bill originally offered.
Why they didn't happen:The Hong Kong government, led by Carrie Lam, maintained that these alternatives were legally unfeasible or didn't address the core problem. The refusal to adopt these middle-ground solutions was one of the primary reasons the protests escalated, as many felt the government was prioritizing the political goal of mainland extradition over a practical legal solution for the Taiwan case.
As of May 2026, Hong Kong's network of extradition treaties (officially termed Surrender of Fugitive Offenders or SFO agreements) remains divided. While several Western nations suspended their agreements following the 2020 National Security Law, many others—primarily in Asia and Africa—remain active.
1. Active Extradition Agreements
The following countries currently have operational extradition treaties with Hong Kong: [1]
Asia: Singapore, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka
Europe: Portugal, Czech Republic
Africa: South Africa [2, 3, 4, 5]
2. Suspended or Shelved Agreements
Since 2020, approximately 10 jurisdictions have suspended their extradition arrangements with Hong Kong. These suspensions are mutual, as Hong Kong subsequently suspended cooperation with these nations at the instruction of the Central People’s Government: [1, 6]
Five Eyes Alliance: United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
European Nations: Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Finland
Shelved (Signed but not in force): France [2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
3. Recent Developments (2025–2026)
New Agreements: In September 2025, Hong Kong signed a new SFO agreement with Zambia to enhance legal cooperation in combating transnational crime. Other agreements with Russia, Vietnam, and Argentina have been signed but are awaiting full entry into force.
UK "Case-by-Case" Shift: In late 2025, the United Kingdom amended its laws to redesignate Hong Kong as a "non-treaty state." This allows the UK to consider extradition requests from Hong Kong on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis under higher judicial scrutiny, rather than through a permanent treaty mechanism.
Multilateral Cooperation: Beyond bilateral treaties, Hong Kong continues to cooperate on specific international crimes (e.g., terrorism, drug trafficking) through various multilateral conventions that include extradition clauses. [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]
For official updates and the latest legal statuses, you can consult the HKSAR Department of Justice (DoJ) or the Security Bureau.
Would you like to explore the specific legal safeguards (such as the "political offense" exception) that apply even when an extradition treaty is active?
[15] https://www.scmp.com
[16] https://www.hkba.org
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