top of page

Hong Kong Intelligence Report #54 From Colour Politics to Full Expansion of Corporatist Politics

Updated: Oct 31, 2023

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

FILE PHOTO: Corporatists © WiX
FILE PHOTO: Corporatists © WiX

"False narrative to threaten the top and bottom, establish the theory of cronyism to detain the faithful."
- Zhao Yushi "Bintui Lu" Volume 7 (1)


a. After the handover (although Hong Kong has been returned to China, it has not yet been liberated by the Chinese Communist Party, so Hong Kong is still in the pre-liberation capitalist world), the vested interests in Hong Kong (the so-called Chinese monopoly capitalist groups that replaced the British monopoly capital are just another kind of colonial power that the British Hong Kong Government has cultivated; the real estate hegemony and its monopoly of all kinds of enterprises, chambers of commerce, societies, trade unions, think tanks, media, statutory bodies, political parties, the Administrative Officers of the Hong Kong Government, etc.; e.g. the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Our Hong Kong Foundation, VISION2047, etc.) have always had the primary political objective of creating a 'crony alliance that the Central Government/Chinese Communist Party must rely on'. In other words, it is always to create a political situation in which 'the Central Government/Chinese Communist Party must rely on their crony alliance' to safeguard their own vested interests continued from the British Hong Kong colonial era. In order to do so, the vested interest groups need to routinely exclude and eliminate any individual and any force independent of their cronies. It is to force the central government to rely only on their cronies, not on any forces not controlled by their cronies. On the positive side, it is the simplest and least complicated to use only this single crony party, to listen only to the crony coalition with vested interests, and to ask the crony coalition with vested interests to act only. For example, the Occupy Central and the colour riots of 2019 also happened in this context, which is why a group of protesters directed by the US government at the behest of the oligarchs did not even take a shot at the vested interests in Hong Kong.

The underlying purpose of these political theater activities is always to prove that 'the central government can only rely on their cronies with vested interests in Hong Kong, and no one else', i.e. that Hong Kong's real estate oligarchy is untouchable.

b. The "Western democratic system" is a false issue because the political system adopted in Hong Kong is also derived from the Western political system. There are two major political systems of bourgeois dictatorship in capitalist societies, namely parliamentary democracy with alternating ruling/opposition parties, and corporatism (commonly known as elitism; the opposite of scientific socialism, including one-party dictatorship or bureaucratic domination, such as Mussolini's Fascist Italy, PAP's one-party dictatorship in Singapore, and Salazar's National Union in Portugal). "Democracy with Hong Kong Characteristics" is only an import from the West, a cover for this.

Elitism is inevitably based on the concept of foolishness of masses, and therefore elitist politics is crony dictatorship.

However, for the bourgeoisie as a whole, both types of bourgeois dictatorship are "democratic" systems of capitalist society. That is, the capitalists' own democracy, freedom, human rights, and welfare.

In fact, it is all about one social class's own democracy, thus there is only the question of whose democracy.

c. The class basis/necessity of corporatism lies in labor unions (union federations) joining a crony coalition, which is why collective bargaining rights and their independent unions are never allowed under the corporatist system. In other words,

Each union in Hong Kong should be truly independent of any corporatist labor group in order to pursue purely the class interests of its own class. For example, the 2018 KMB pay adjustment strike and the 2021 Foodpanda strike. In recent years, there have been successful examples of labour movements in Hong Kong that are in line with the social conditions and the times. All of these good examples have been characterized by independent unions pursuing collective bargaining rights and an anti-corporatist tendency to break away from the dictatorship of the corporatists. The class base of the corporatist elite dictatorship is the labor unions controlled by the labor aristocracy.

Workers should not unite under corporatists.

In reality, cronies are only networks of oligarchic mutual aid organizations, intended to more steadily squeeze the working class and defend vested interests. For example, Labour Advisory Board, which always betrays and disregards the interests of the working class, is a typical mechanism of class coordination (anti-class struggle, anti-Marxism) of corporatism. Its class-political basis is the corporatist network of trade unions. Its negativeness is also its positiveness ('efficiency'?) That is, the entire working class is 'forcibly represented by the labor aristocracy of the trade unions'.

d. What is the significance of the 7th Legislative Council Election on December 19, 2021? In terms of institutional design, the real voters of the Legislative Council election are the real voters of the NPC/CE election, i.e. the members of the Election Committee. 1,448 members of the Election Committee of the bourgeoisie are the real voters (it is extremely ironic that the representatives of the so-called grassroots organizations and the representatives of the labor sector are at least the petty Bourgeois! The labor aristocracy ''represents'' the real working class but it is a different class). According to the Companies Registry's statistics on the number of registered companies in November 2021, the number of ruling classes in Hong Kong is at least 1,376,265, plus 14,302 for non-Hong Kong companies, i.e. 1,390,567 for all registered companies in Hong Kong at present (the minimum value for the number of ruling classes in Hong Kong). (2) (3) Therefore,

"Democracy with Hong Kong Characteristics" (bourgeois democracy enjoyed by 0.1%): Only about 0.1% of all Hong Kong's bourgeoisie (1,448 members of the Election Committee; the 28 functional constituency statutory interest groups are roughly in line with the five major constituencies of the Election Committee) control and monopolize the entire political lifeline of Hong Kong. Moreover, even 99.99% of Hong Kong's bourgeoisie is excluded. What about the working class? Of course there is no representation (don't forget that the so-called "grassroots" groups and the "labor sector" are basically represented by the petty Bourgeois).

The 1448 EC vested interest groups are the real voters because they not only directly elect the Chief Executive, the Hong Kong NPC representatives, but also send representatives of their own specific interest groups of functional constituencies as stipulated in the Legislative Council Ordinance, and nominate candidates for direct election as representatives of their own interest groups. From the beginning to the end, only 1,448 people actually enjoy and exercise the real right to vote. Hong Kong elections are a game in the hands of their cronies.

From the perspective of class analysis, this first "post-perfection" Legislative Council election is still an one-man show for the oligarchs. The three seats in the labor sector of the functional constituencies are all held by members of their own corporatist labor groups.


Contrary to the analysis of the foreign and Western official mainstream media, the only thing the local oligarchs fear is an increase in the number of seats for the working class, which would mean real weakening of the oligarchs' power. The political solution to poverty is to give power to the working class.

For the cronies, politics only means "how to defend vested interests" and "how to take into account the interests of all parties" (by parties, it means the members of the cronies, not the working class). In other words, they consolidate each other's vested interests (the consequence of this is the so-called "stalemate").

So, will such a large and ever-expanding coalition of vested interests (only 1,448 people actually hold power despite the extensive network of organizations) solve the social problems caused by the profit-making behavior of their vested interests? Of course not, because the elimination of aftermath of vested interests is the same as the elimination of vested interests themselves. In other words, solving the social problems caused by the profit-seeking of vested interests means inevitably solving the vested interests themselves.

e. The fact that the 12 "non-pro-establishment" candidates (the runners-up roles) were all nominated by the "pro-establishment" members of the election committee is a clear indication of the fact that the crony coalition runs blue and yellow politics of the city from the beginning. For example, the nomination of the black-shirted Hong Kong pro-independence activist Mandy Tam Heung-man by the NPC representative Maggie Chan Man-ki, as reported in the news on November 1, 2021, is a typical incident that exposes the operation of the crony party. In terms of color politics, the blue and yellow masterminds are all the same group of vested interests (i.e., a large coalition of cronies in Hong Kong, including the Five Eyes). (4)


f. In the case of the Legislative Council election, the nomination given by the EC members is a transfer of interest. Therefore, the nomination of a member of the EC who is a representative of a particular interest group is sufficient for the candidate to become a direct representative of that group's interests. This time, the hegemonic oligarchs of the real estate sector successfully fielded both "pro-establishment" and "non-pro-establishment" candidates, and most of them were elected. That is, the ''New Real Estate Party'' (the red letters below are the representatives of the hegemonic interests who were nominated and finally elected). It is true that the hegemonic property oligarchs assigned blue and yellow. In other words, color politics is just a tool of the oligarchy's political game. The general public should never fall into the trap of color politics again.

傳統地產商提名名單(a list of nominations by traditional developers):

國泰航空(Cathay Pacific Airways Limited)主席賀以禮 (Patrick Healy):工聯會 (HKFTU) 麥美娟(Alice Mak Mei-kuen)

國泰(Cathay Pacific Airways Limited)策略關係拓展總監李世華(Lee, Bruce Sai Wah; 曾任工聯會陳婉嫻助理):馮煒光(Andrew Fung Wai-kwong; 選委會)、新方向 (NPHK) 張欣宇(Zhang Xinyu; 新界北)及工聯會 (HKFTU) 郭偉強(Kwok Wai-keung; 勞工界)

太古地產(Swire Properties Limited) 白德利 (Guy Bradley):霍啟剛Kenneth Fok Kai-kong; 演藝文出)

國泰(Cathay Pacific Airways Limited)企業事務總經理黃文傑 (Wong, Anson Man Kit):黃梓謙(Wong, Gary Chi Him; 選委會)及陳澤斌(Chan, Benny Chak Bun; 建築測量)

太古(Swire Group)公共事務部董事唐偉邦 (James TONG):經民聯 (BPA) 陸瀚民Luk, Benson Hon Man; 選委會)、中旅 (Ctshk) 姚柏良Yiu, Perry Pak Leung; 旅遊界)

國泰航空(Cathay Pacific Airways Limited)人事總經理王舜義 (Wong, Albert Shun Yee):勞聯 (FLU) 林振昇Lam, Chun Sing; 勞工界)

新世界發展(New World Development)主席鄭志剛 (Cheng, Adrian Chi Kong):科大 (HKUST) 吳宏偉(Ng, Charles Wang Wai; 選委會)

新世界(New World Development)執董鄭志雯 (Cheng, Sonia Chi Man):工聯會 (HKFTU) 蔡永強(Cai Yongqiang; 選委會)、民建聯 (DAB) 梁熙Leung, Edward Hei; 港島東)、陳曉鋒(Chen, Louis Xiaofeng; 法律界)

富通保險 (FTLife) 財務總監徐志堅 (Tsui, Ellick Chi Kin):洪雯(選委會)、游偉光(Yau, Tony Wai Kwong; 商界三)

新創建(NWS Holdings Limited)行政總裁馬紹祥 (Ma, Eric Siu Cheung):林筱魯Lam, Andrew Siu Lo; 選委會)、自由黨 (Liberal Party) 易志明Yick, Frankie Chi Ming; 航運交通)

新創建(NWS Holdings Limited)非執董杜家駒 (Doo, William Junior Guilherme):龍漢標(VISION2047; Loong, Louis Hon Biu; 地產界)

周大福珠寶集團(Chow Tai Fook)董事總經理黃紹基 (Kent Wong Siu Kee):林哲玄Lam, David Tzit Yuen; 醫學界)

長實(Cheung Kong)趙國雄 (Chiu, Justin Kwok Hung):陳凱欣Chan, Polly Hoi Yan; 選委會)、張欣宇(Zhang Xinyu; 新界北)

長實(Cheung Kong)執董周偉淦 (Chow, Raymond Wai Kam):潘焯鴻(Jason Chuk-Hung Poon; 港島東)

恆基(Henderson Land Development Company Limited)主席李家誠 (Lee, Martin Ka Shing):田北辰Tien, Michael Puk Sun; 新界西北)、陳宗彝(Chan, Alan Chung Yee; 航運交通)

恆基(Henderson Land Development Company Limited)執董黃浩明 (Wong, Augustine Ho Ming) :龍漢標(VISION2047; Loong, Louis Hon Biu; 地產界)、中電 (CLP Group) 陳紹雄Chan, Siu Hung; 選委會)

美麗華酒店(The Mira Hong Kong)非執董鄭家安 (Cheng, Dominic Ka On):何君堯(Ho, Junius Kwan Yiu; 選委會)、民主思路 (Path of Democracy) 陳進雄(Chen Jinxing; 九龍東)、工聯會 (HKFTU) 梁子穎Leung, Dennis Tsz Wing; 勞工界)

美麗華集團(Miramar Group)餐飲拓展顧問楊位醒 (Yeung Wai Sing):青聯 (HKUYA) 梁毓偉Leung, Kenneth Yuk Wai; 選委會)、民建聯 (DAB) 陳學鋒Chan, Hok Fung; 港島西)、霍啟剛Kenneth Fok Kai-kong; 演藝文出)、徐汶緯(Chui, Rayman Man Wai; 飲食界)

新鴻基(Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd.)主席郭炳聯 (Kwok, Raymond Ping Luen):龍漢標(VISION2047; Loong, Louis Hon Biu; 地產界)、人大 (NPC) 林順潮Lam, Dennis Shun Chiu; 選委會)

新鴻基(Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd.)執董郭基泓 (Kwok, Christopher Kai Wang):聖公會 (Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui) 管浩鳴Koon, Peter Douglas Ho Ming; 選委會)

新鴻基(Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd.)執董郭基煇 (Kwok, Adam Kai Fai):青聯 (HKUYA) 梁毓偉(Leung, Kenneth Yuk Wai)霍啟剛Kenneth Fok Kai-kong; 體藝文出)

新地(Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd.)公共事務總監李鑾輝 (Lee, William Luen Fai):新民黨 (New People's Party) 黎棟國Lai, Tung Kwok; 選委會)

新地保險 (SUN HUNG KAI PROPERTIES INSURANCE LIMITED) 黃貴泉 (Wong, Andrew Kwai Chuen):陳健波(Chan, Kin Por ; 保險界)

新地酒店(ROYAL PLAZA HOTEL MANAGEMENT LIMITED)業務部高級副總裁黃澤峰 (Wong, Peter Chak Fung):林新強(Lam, Ambrose San Keung; 法律界)

新地廣東省地產發展(HONG YIP SERVICE COMPANY LIMITED)業務鄺正煒 (Kwong, Alkin Ching Wai):謝偉銓Tse, Tony Wai Chuen, 建築測量)

會德豐(Wheelock and Company Limited.)主席吳宗權 (Woo, Douglas Chun Kuen):管浩鳴Koon, Peter Douglas Ho Ming; 選委會)、經民聯 (BPA) 林健鋒Lam, Jeffrey Kin Fung; 商界一)

會德豐(Wheelock and Company Limited.)副主席梁志堅 (Leung, Stewart Chi Kin):林順潮Lam, Dennis Shun Chiu; 選委會)、龍漢標(VISION2047; Loong, Louis Hon Biu; 地產界)

九龍倉(The Wharf(Holdings)Limited)執董凌緣庭 (Leng, Yen Thean):自由黨 (Liberal Party) 李鎮強Lee, Michael Chun Keung; 選委會)、前區議會馬軼超(Ma, Marco Yat Chiu; 旅遊界)

地產(WHEELOCK PROPERTIES LIMITED)常務董事黃光耀 (Wong, Ricky Kwong Yiu):自由黨 (Liberal Party) 李鎮強Lee, Michael Chun Keung; 選委會)

九龍倉(The Wharf(Holdings)Limited)財務總監徐耀祥 (Tsui, Paul Yiu Cheung):自由黨 (Liberal Party) 易志明Yick, Frankie Chi Ming; 航運交通界)

信和(Sino Group)副主席黃永光 (Ng, Daryl Win Kong):盛智文(Zeman, Allan; 選委會)、霍啟剛Kenneth Fok Kai-kong; 體藝文出)、李嘉欣(Lee, Judith Kar Yan; 九龍東)

信和酒店(Sino Hotels)聯席董事王德賢 (Wong, Johnson Tak Yin):工聯會 (HKFTU) 陸頌雄Michael Luk Chung-hung; 選委會)、前民協 (ex-ADPL) 馮檢基(Frederick Fung Kin-kee; 九龍西)、丁健華(Ting, Kin Wa; 教育界)

合和(Hopewell Holdings Limited)主席胡應湘 (Wu, Gordon Ying Sheung):吳宏偉(Ng, Charles Wang Wai; 選委會)、龍漢標(VISION2047; Loong, Louis Hon Biu; 地產界)

合和(Hopewell Holdings Limited)顧問胡文新 (Wu, Thomas Jefferson Man Sun):田北辰Tien, Michael Puk Sun; 新界西北)

嘉里(Kerry Properties)董事長郭孔丞 (Kuok, Beau Khoon Chen):盛智文(Zeman, Allan; 選委會)、龍漢標(VISION2047; Loong, Louis Hon Biu; 地產界)

香格里拉集團(SHANGRI-LA ASIA LIMITED)董事長郭惠光 (Kuok, Hui Kwong):潘焯鴻(Jason Chuk-Hung Poon; 港島東)、丁健華(Ting, Kin Wa; 教育界)(5)

g. The improved electoral system also has positive aspects, i.e. it eliminates the superficial stage of blue and yellow politics, it completely liquidates the automatically-elected perpetual members of the Legislative Council, it is expected that the budget and 'government motions' of the Hong Kong government will all be passed smoothly (to the real legislator, the Hong Kong government, only these two points are important; the legislators themselves have no real power anyway), and most importantly, it eliminates the whole opposition camp from the Legislative Council. From their standpoint, these are its positive sides.

The so-called "pro-establishment" media claimed that they "broke the golden 6:4 ratio", "the 'pro-establishment' camp increased 20,000 votes", "the 'pro-establishment' camp increased its own turnout rate to 90%", etc. These are all one-sided words that "look at the trees but not the forest". First of all, they ignore the macro meaning of the historical 40% benchmark of the ''pro-establishment'' camp and the decisive factors of judgment such as the total number of all voters in Hong Kong. Therefore, their "marketing staff" only based on the actual number of votes while deceptively excluding all the total number of voters to make it up.

However, there are also positive aspects of this election for the democratic camp and its citizens. In other words, excluding all past by-elections, the turnout rate was the lowest in history and the largest number of invalid votes (1841-2021),

The truth of the "great victory" of the main camp: the so-called pro-establishment camp always could mobilize about 40% of the electoral votes (organizational votes), but they did not add new voters this time. This tendency has been a characteristic since the 2019 district elections. Only 30.2% (1,350,680) of all voters in Hong Kong voted this time, and 6.62% of them voted for the "non-pro-establishment camp", so only about 23.58% of the 4,472,863 voters in Hong Kong were mobilized by the "pro-establishment camp" (organizational votes), and only 1 in 4 voters voted for it. This is an indirect proof that the vast majority of voters in Hong Kong are still democrats. Unless 0.1% of the bourgeoisie or 23.58% of the voters mean "all people", this can never be called "democracy for all", because 3 out of 4 of the public in Hong Kong abstained from voting. (6) (7)

h. Under full-blown crony politics, were the external forces really defeated in this election? Take the example of Japan, the most anti-China and anti-communist country in the world is Japan, but the Japanese rightwing and its plutocrats have a very interesting political characteristic, the so-called 'separation of the 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism. Before the war, during the war, and after the defeat, Japan has always sought the Chinese market, not the U.S. or Southeast Asian markets, and even its diplomatic attitude toward China has always been the most decisive Japan-U.S. political issue.

The Japanese anti-Chinese rightists and their plutocrats, who only want to consolidate their vested interests at home, are advocating anti-China and anti-communism in Japan, while they themselves are monopolizing trade with China behind their backs. In other words, the Japanese anti-China rightists and their economic base plutocrats (e.g. Keidanren, Dentsu, etc.) are all ''eating Chinese rice and smashing Chinese pots.'' When will the Chinese Communist Party sanction the Japanese anti-China right-wing forces and their Japanese plutocrats?

Unlike the ''politically correct'' news reports of the Japanese media or other foreign mainstream media, representatives of Japanese economic interests in Hong Kong were successfully elected in this election. The Japanese enterprises' bodyguards, namely Regina Ip and Jeffrey Lam (e.g. members of the Hong Kong Japanese Club of the Hong Kong Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which is closely assisted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and it includes even Yau, Edward Tang Wah and Nip, Patrick Tak Kuen). The ''anti-China and anti-communist'' Japanese supporters in Hong Kong are in fact the "pro-establishment" faction, which the Japanese media have routinely and deceptively labeled as "pro-China"camp. This is the only point that highlights the 'political and economic separation' (double standard; two-faced people) of the so-called anti-China and anti-communist Japanese rightists and their plutocrats. As far as the Japanese side is concerned, the representatives of Japan's interests in the Legislative Council elections in Hong Kong all won, so where was the defeat of external forces?


More simply, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (the traditional Western Chamber of Commerce), which represented by Jeffrey Lam FC(I), which also includes Japanese corporate members. It is only logical that FC1 represents the interests of all multinational corporate members of the chamber.

Beneath the superficial ''anti-China and anti-communist'' narrative and bombardment of the Western mainstream media against China, there is a deeper level of intrinsic interest between the "pro-establishment" and external forces.


Note: The Hong Kong Japanese Club was and still is the largest body representing the interests of the Japanese ruling class in Hong Kong (an interest group in Hong Kong closely assisted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The Hong Kong Japanese Club is not a trade union, nor is it an association(registered society), but a profit-making company. The Hong Kong Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (HKJCCI), originally the economic department of the Hong Kong Japanese Club, which became independent from it in 1955, is also not a society, nor a registered trade union, but a company. Therefore, they are two sides of the same coin.



1.Pro-Beijing candidates have claimed a victory in Hong Kong's Legislative Council (LegCo) election, as the city saw its lowest-ever voter turnout.

It was the first LegCo election since China made sweeping controversial changes to the city's electoral system. Officials argue the changes were needed to ensure stability, but critics say they weakened democracy. On Monday, Beijing also unveiled a statement outlining "democracy with Hong Kong characteristics". In a white paper released hours after election results were announced, China said Hong Kong was now entering a new stage of "restored order" as a result of these Beijing-introduced changes. […] One analysis by local news outlet HK01 found that 82 of the 90 seats were won by members from pro-establishment and pro-Beijing camp. Only one candidate was from a non-establishment camp, and the rest had unknown political backgrounds. Government officials had urged the city's 4.5 million registered voters to take part in the election, and had made public transport on Sunday free as well as sent out mass texts to encourage a higher turnout. (8)

2.被押後一年的立法會選舉,在中央「完善」選舉制度後,今(19 日)舉行。153 名參選人將競逐 90 議席,包括選委界別 40 席、功能組別 30 席及地方直選 20 席。投票時間較上屆縮短一小時,由早上 7 時 30 分改為 8 時 30 分開始,至晚上 10 時 30 分結束。

投票率成為今屆選舉其一中個焦點,政府高官連日催票,市民更可在選舉日免費乘搭交通工具,惟本屆選舉各時段投票率,都較上屆(2016 年)選舉低。全港投票率最後只錄得 30.2%,較上屆低 28.08% ,參考 2016 年立法會選舉投票率為 58.282019 年區議會選舉投票率更高達 71.23%。「完善」後的功能組別由 35 席減至30 席,當中部分界別亦被重設或合併,例如醫學界及衞生服務界合併為醫療衞生界,本身為個人票制的資訊科技界,改為團體票的科技創新界等。亦有一些新設的組別,如由「香港中國企業協會」會員組成的商界(三)等。

值得注意的是,過往由民主派主導的界別,如法律界、教育界等,今屆都沒有民主派人士出選。該幾個界別投票率亦明顯低落。截至晚上九時半,功能組別的總投票率只有 30.92%,但其實當中大部分功能組別投票率都近九成,甚至超過九成,但人數眾多的幾個界別投票率低下,如佔 85,117 人的教育界,只有 23,749 人投票,令投票率被大幅拉低。(9)

3.地區直選 10 區中,11 名「非建制派」候選人全部落敗,包括潘焯鴻、方龍飛、陳進雄、馮檢基、譚香文、蔡明禧、曾麗文、黃俊瑯、劉卓裕、黃成智及黃頴灝,其中最高票數的是出戰 九龍西、民協前主席馮檢基的 15,961 票。11 人總票數加起來有 87,540 票,僅佔總票數的 6.62%。另外,當中更有 3 人因未能得到有效票數的 3 %,而在落敗後無法取回 5 萬元的保證金,包括以 2,999 票包尾九龍東的民主思路陳進雄、出戰 新界北僅獲 3,498 票的前人民力量秘書長曾麗文,及出戰新界西北獲 4,066 票的新思維秘書長黃俊瑯。

出戰九龍西落敗的老將馮檢基,2015 年至今,已連輸 5 次選舉,明言對選舉感失望,認為敗因是投票率太低,又否認自己是陪跑。(另見報道)(10)




7.今屆立法會,新增的選委界別 40 1448 名選委全票選出;反觀地方直選,則由比例代表制選出 35 席,改為以雙議席單票制,在新劃的十個選區每區選出兩席、共 20 席,由逾 447 萬登記選民選出。至於功能組別三十席,涵蓋 28 個界別,登記選民為 219,254 ,由區議員競爭的 5 個俗稱「超區」議席取消。(14)




10.立法會選舉塵埃落定,建制政黨包括民建聯、工聯會及新民黨等議席均有進帳,但事實上,有逾30名議員沒有任何政黨背景。而立法會議員在面對不同議題時,按慣例各黨派會先行開會,然後尋求共識等,在議會單打獨鬥,影響力有限,故獨立議員也需要「埋堆」。 據了解,各政黨或組織預料陸續展開「搶人潮」,以擴充政治版圖及能量,而選委會界別中無黨派人士最多,亦成為各政黨的「相標」,原本由6名建制派功能界別議員組成的「六人組(G6)」聯盟,已準備倍增至「G十幾」,而經民聯、自由黨亦會「搶人」,以增加在議會內的影響力。在選舉結束後,據聞有政黨或組織已開始「搶人」。G6召集人廖長江指在今次選舉後,議會內出現不少新面孔,當中不少是無黨派背景的專業人士,部分或許無意加入政黨,故並非政黨的G6會接觸相關人士,相信會找到意見、看法相近的議員加入聯盟。他指接任旅遊界議員姚思榮的姚柏良同為中旅社背景,如無意外將「接棒」加入G6。(17)


In a nutshell, the crony coalition of internal and external vested interests in Hong Kong also won a steady victory in the seventh general election of the Legislative Council. The fully developed corporatist political system in Hong Kong actually represents only 1,448 of the 1,390,567 bourgeoisie (both domestic and foreign capitalists operating in Hong Kong), or 0.1% of the entire ruling class. In the context of the two major forms of capitalist dictatorship of capitalist society (parliamentary democracy and corporatism), this HK political ''system'' is the kind of colorful "democracy" that the only 0.1% of the ruling class really enjoy.


1., Baidu, (October 2, 2020) '脅持.' Available at脅持/8240496

2., CR, (December 16, 2021) '仍在公司登記冊上註冊的本地公司.' Available at

3., CR, (December 16, 2021) '二零二一年註冊非香港公司.' Available at

4., StandNews, (November 1, 2021) '【立法會爭位】「非建制派」參選提名曝光 管浩鳴提名方龍飛 陳曼琪提名譚香文.' Available at立法會爭位非建制派參選提名曝光-管浩鳴提名方龍飛-陳曼琪提名譚香文

5., CitizenNews, (December 18, 2021) '新選制度構造新金權網絡 內房富豪冒起提名建制 傳統地產商多邊落注.' Available at立法會選舉-地產商-建制派-49287/新選制度構造新金權網絡-內房富豪冒起提名建制-傳統地產商多邊落注

6., HKSAR, (October 29, 2021) '選民登記數字.' Available at

7., ON.CC, (December 20, 2021) '立會地區直選投票率僅30.2% 創歷年新低 無效選票佔2%.' Available at

8., BBC, (December 20, 2021) 'Hong Kong: Pro-Beijing candidates sweep controversial LegCo election.' Available at

9., StandNews, (December 20, 2021) '【立法會爭位 ‧ 不斷更新】功能組別結果公布 鍾國斌、張華峰連任失敗 社福界狄志遠暫成唯一當選「非建制」.' Available at立法會爭位-不斷更新功能組別結果陸續公布-僅社福工程有非建制參與成焦點

10., StandNews, (December 20, 2021) '【立法會爭位.地區直選】無效票比率創歷屆新高 11「非建制派」僅取 6.6% 選票全敗 民建聯 10 區全勝.' Available at立法會爭位地區直選無效票比率創歷屆新高-11非建制派僅取-66-選票全敗-民建聯-10-區全勝

11., ON.CC, (December 20, 2021) '地方選區結果全數出爐 非建制派12人全軍覆沒.' Available at

12., ON.CC, (December 20, 2021) '選委會結果揭盅 梁美芬張國鈞得票最多 盛智文盧維思出局.' Available at

13., ON.CC, (December 20, 2021) '立會地區直選投票率僅30.2% 創歷年新低 無效選票佔2%.' Available at

14., StandNews, (December 19, 2020) '【立法會爭位.不斷更新】全港投票率 30.2 % 1997年以後最低 新界西南投票率最高逾 31 %.' Available at立法會爭位不斷更新不足-1500-選委選-40-席-地區直選削至-20-席-高官連日催票

15., ON.CC, (December 20, 2021) '建制陣營整體票數有增長 多區打破六四比.' Available at

16., ON.CC, (December 20, 2021) '立會地區直選投票率僅30.2% 創歷年新低 無效選票佔2%.' Available at

17., ON.CC, (December 21, 2021) '立會選舉完結 各政黨及組織料展開「搶人潮」.' Available at


Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favour of fair use.


bottom of page