Hong Kong Intelligence Report #34 How to Win The 2021 Hong Kong Legislative Council Election?
Updated: Aug 1, 2021
#HongKong #Intelligence #Report #香港情報分析 #OSINT
IMPORTANT
About 58% (2016 legislative council election) to 71% (2019 district council election) of Hong Kong voters vote for every election held in Hong Kong. The total amount of voters is 4,132,977 in 2019 according to Voter Registration Statistic. The number is almost equal with the number of the workers (labor force) in Hong Kong, 3,861,100 workers in April-June 2020 calculated by census and statistics department.
The main issue of opposition camp is that they are always divided into too many parties on the legislative council election not the total amount of votes. The election method of the legislative council is Proportional Representation thus the tactic of opposition does not fit the election as long as they maintain too many parties instead of forming one or a few parties. This will depend on the will of their masterminds. Remember all major structural changes were done via so called ''pro-establishment''.
In the last legislative council election 2016, there were 58.28 % (2,202,283 voters) of 3,779,085 voters voted. The victory of so called ''pro-establishment'' camp was due to internal division among opposition parties. In that election, total votes for ''pro-establishment'' was 871,016, 40.17% of the effective votes, 2,167,411. Opposition ''pan-democrats'' got 781,168, 36.02%. And opposition ''localists'' gained 411,893, 19.00%. Other opposition or centrist parties received 103,334, 4.81%. If they unified their candidates and parties into one opposition party, the entire Hong Kong opposition exceeds ''pro-establishment'' enormously. The total could have been 1,296,395 votes (about 59.83% of the effective votes, 2,167,411) for opposition camp. It means opposition camp is in fact the majority of the society of Hong Kong. Furthermore, the society is definitely divided into two camps politically.
The majority of the Hong Kong voters still is opposition. Unlike their complaints, pro-establishment stably mobilised their 40% organised voters in the 2019 district council election, however their main issue still is that they did not gain any new voters. This tendency will continue.
In other words, at least 40.17% of effective voters decide the majority in the legislative council of Hong Kong. This number is higher than Japan's 25% thus Hong Kong citizens of both camps are politically more conscious than Japanese voters. For the district council election, opposition united and occupied the vast majority of seats with 1,677,040 effective votes, 57.44% of the total effective votes, 2,919,622 contrary to pro-establishment's 41.32% (1,206,645 effective votes; they failed to get new voters; maintaining the 40% line is not adequate to be the majority of the council anymore). The opposition camp set the new hurdle to be the majority in the district councils of Hong Kong but also it will be the hurdle for the electoral victory of the upcoming legislative council election of 2021.
FACTS
1. The most important political issue between China and US is undoubtedly the upcoming 2021 Hong Kong Legislative Council Election. Repetitive mishandling of the third wave of COVID-19 (Hong Kong is the only place where still has been under the severe epidemic among all other Chinese cities since July 1, 2020; neoliberalism in Hong Kong showed its total incompetence and anti-intellectualism on national security issues not limited in the epidemic) and opportunistic zig-zags of Hong Kong SAR government will be ultimately compensated by an inevitable electorate failure of ''pro-establishment'' camp. It can be called a nightmare for China. It's more serious and critically important than any other topics of July like HSBC collusion with US DOJ on Huawei or closures of US bank accounts of SAR bureaucrats (The convenor of unofficial members of Executive Council Bernard Charnwut Chan claimed that an American bank informed him the closure of his bank account in US in March and refunded his deposits in April thus it is no threat to both bureaucrats and citizens at all) or closures of consulates of both sides. Other topics are more like deflective tricks by US mainstream media and its administration. The core of the anti-China target is the upcoming election in Hong Kong.
The vast majorities of citizens who are part of ruling class colour politics of Hong Kong automatically link so called ''pro-establishment'' figures with Hong Kong SAR government bureaucrats. Thus ideologically voters of both camps blindly see misdeeds of Hong Kong SAR government bureaucrats as misdeeds of ''pro-establishment'' candidates. The 2019 Hong Kong District Council Election was held on time under the harassing and violence from the black shirted mobs due to SAR government's surrender to the political pressure from local vested interests which it represents. This time, again, despite of the ongoing colour revolution and COVID-19 epidemic, Carrie Lam insisted on July 19 , 2020 that the 2020 Hong Kong Legislative Council Election is going to be held on time (September 6, 2020).
It highly reflected the political scheme of the local vested interests behind her. There was some speculation that the SAR government would re-evaluate the possibility of postponement of the election at the end of July or early August. (That was right.) (1) One of the main considerations is Hong Kong voters in mainland China and other countries. There are at least 155,400 Hong Kong voters (above 18 years old) living in mainland according to the survey ''Hong Kong Residents’ Experience of and Aspiration for Taking Up Residence in the Mainland of China'' in 2009. (2)
Also this is why opposition parties still require lockdown of the border with mainland while the mainland successfully contained the epidemic, and Hong Kong evacuators to mainland via Shenzhen Bay Port (the second largest border control facility next to the Hong Kong international airport) have been increasing, especially reported 30 % increase from July 5 to July 11(total 2017 people which are the largest number since lockdown of the border in March). (3) It makes the slogan of ''lockdown of borders'' with mainland an electoral public stunt.
The third wave of COVID-19 and its mishandling by SAR government will determine the fate of ''pro-establishment'' camp in the upcoming election in September 5, 2021. It is quite grim for them due to broadly criticised incompetence of the SAR bureaucrats (symbolised by the salary of Chief Executive; 5 million 210 thousand HKD) who are higher earners among all countries besides Singapore in 2019. (4)
Hong Kong film imagery of its bureaucrats is totally falsified and purely fictional in comparison to the reality. They are enjoying only annually increasing salaries while the working class people of Hong Kong are laid off massively and easily during the colour riots and epidemic. The salary of Hong Kong bureaucrats is not determined systematically it depends solely on their free will if they decide freezing raising salaries or cut salaries according to social pressures. The society has been requiring them a kind of salary system which strictly based on their performance since 2002.
Unfortunately the SAR bureaucrats are no heroes, zeroes in the eyes of the working class people. For the conditions of the working class of Hong Kong, Australian JobsDB's census report on Hong Kong workers showed there was only average 5.1% increase of salaries specifically in PR/ clerk, digital marketing/e-commerce, and insurance companies, obviously salaries of those hot jobs are based on commissions not basic salaries. Furthermore 50% of job seekers who are under 25 yo nakedly quitted their jobs in 2019. It's no better than 2018. (5)
The unemployment rate hit the highest in a decade since 2005, 6.2% with approximately 240 thousand unemployed workers in 2019. (6)
Mishandling of the third wave of COVID-19 by the Hong Kong SAR government is mainly due to ''Exemption from Compulsory Quarantine Arrangement for inbound travellers from Foreign Places.'' The test-exempted inbound workers are proven to be the origins of the third wave of COVID-19 that SAR government distracted the attentions of citizens before a vessel MSC Flavia's nine foreign seamen (total 24 crew members and 11 crew members of the vessel infected the virus; this cluster was confirmed in Ningbo on June 26, 2020) who exempted from PCR tests got diagnosed as positive after they entered mainland on June 26, 2020 according to report from mainland custom. This was the beginning of the third wave of COVID-19.
The nine foreign seamen had stayed at Dorsett Tsuen Wan Hong Kong in Hong Kong from June 21 to 23. Centre for Health Protection did not raise alarm of the public about the loopholes of the test exemption arrangement on 33 kinds of categories of people. Furthermore, Dorsett Tsuen Wan Hong Kong is very closed to the previous outbreak point, Kerry Logistics warehouse in Kwai Chung in where four staffs infected the virus.
Hong Kong Seamen's Union claimed that no local workers employed by MSC Flavis thus nine seamen were shifted by exactly the same number of foreign seamen who had flied to Hong Kong two or three days ago then after the shift change in Hong Kong, the previous seamen took an airplane to fly back to their home country. (7)
Origins of the third wave of COVID-19 were not natural causes at all. It was mainly due to the loopholes of the SAR establishment itself.
''Exemption from Compulsory Quarantine Arrangement for inbound travellers from Foreign Places'' (On July 15, 2020 updated)
Under section 4(1) of the Compulsory Quarantine of Persons Arriving at Hong Kong from Foreign Places Regulation (Cap. 599E) (the Regulation), made under the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance (Cap. 599), the Chief Secretary for Administration may designate any person or category of persons fulfilling certain criteria for exemption that –
the person’s or persons’ entry into Hong Kong –
is necessary for the supply of goods or services required for the normal operation of Hong Kong or the daily needs of the people of Hong Kong;
is necessary for governmental operation;
is necessary for the protection of the safety or health of the people of Hong Kong or the handling of the public health emergency within the meaning of section 8(5) of the Ordinance concerning the specified disease; or
because of the exceptional circumstances of the case, otherwise serves the public interest of Hong Kong; or
the person’s or persons’ travelling is necessary for purposes relating to manufacturing operations, business activities or the provision of professional services in the interest of Hong Kong’s economic development.
In accordance with section 4(1) of the Regulation, the Chief Secretary for Administration has exempted the following categories of persons from the compulsory quarantine requirement.
Category of persons
#2. Crew members of goods vessels
READ MORE:
Exemption from Compulsory Quarantine Arrangement for inbound travellers from Foreign Places
On July 26, 2020, eight seamen from UK, Switzerland, the Philippines and India diagnosed as positive, SAR government finally announced temporary suspension of cruises and change of shift of none-goods loading or uploading seamen in Hong Kong from July 29, 2020. And seamen must remain in vessels. Foreign seamen also must submit negative PCR test results that done within 48 hours before the departure. However if they need a change of shift, they still can arrange point to point transportation for the seamen. It includes pilots. (8)
The reaction of the SAR government was extremely late. It's been a month since the report from mainland custom on MSC Flavia cluster case on June 26, 2020. Thus high efficiency of SAR bureaucrats is purely a hoax. Their score is the worse than any other third world countries they disdain.
The total number of Hong Kong's first（Approximately from January 28 to February 12） and the second （Approximately from March 14 to April 11）waves were 1259 cases but the third wave (July 1-) was 1375 cases on July 26, 2020. (9) In fact, there is no objective time consensus on the definition of the three waves but the point is that the total amount of the first and second waves must be less than the third one. It proved that the crappy SAR government is completely out of control thus they officially asked mainland for help on July 27, 2020.
READ MORE:
Latest local situation of COVID-19 (Chinese ver. provides holistic view)
SAR government's anti-epidemic policy has a common flaw that they always set unnecessarily too long buffer period before enforcing forcible measures which immediately needed under the extreme circumstances. For instance,
the suspension of cruises and unnecessary shift of foreign seamen has to wait for more four days at the time of writing. They can spread viruses during the buffer period freely like before. It even will accelerate the shift changes during these days, intensifying the work load before the due date. In other words, it will help rapidly spreading the virus in this way. For Specified conditions imposed on inbound travellers who have visited specified high risk places (Cap.599H), it has to take a week to be effective. They set ''one week'' buffer period thus those virus carriers can spread virus during the period as same as other buffer periods on anti-epidemic measures. (10) It was announced on July 18, 2020 and has been effective from July 25, 2020. Undeniably one-week delay unnecessarily accelerated the contagion within the city. For Kazakhstan where recently reported outbreak of unknown pneumonia (later the health ministry of Kazakhstan government denied it, BBC reported on July 10, 2020. WHO considers those are undiagnosed cases of COVID-19 not something new due to low-quality testing or no testing) and the world's top number one infected country USA, it had been postponed for 11 days to forcibly restrict the inbound travellers and take their sputum samples.
Under Prevention and Control of Disease (Regulation of Cross-boundary Conveyances and Travellers) Regulation (Cap.599H), an inbound traveller who, on the day on which the traveller boarded a civil aviation aircraft that arrives at, or is about to arrive at Hong Kong (specified aircraft), or during the 14 days before that day, has stayed in any specified place (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines and South Africa starting 0.00am on 25 July 2020; and Kazakhstan and the United States of America as additional specified places with effect from 0.00am on 29 July 2020), must provide the following documents: (11)
READ MORE:
How SAR government deflects attentions of people from their own mistake ''test-exemption''? That is done by proactively tightening the restriction of gathering to only two people, banning eat-in at restaurants, forcing citizens to wear facial masks in interior and exterior outer spaces (the harsher measures also have its two day buffer period before enforcement) . It means that they have scapegoated its citizens during protecting 33 categories of privileged people who enjoying test-exemption and also are origins of the third wave of COVID-19. (12)
The BBC interview of a medical worker in Kazakhstan also perfectly grabbed the common phenomenon among impotent crony capitalist bureaucrats like in Hong Kong and Japan.
"They do it [to lower the total coronavirus figures] because they don't want to be in the first place for this disease," she said. "It's much easier to change statistics than to fight coronavirus." - An anonymous medical worker to BBC (13)
PCR testing is expanding recently and it's improved as experts suggesting everyday should conduct at least 7,500 tests for citizens. From July 1 to July 21, SAR government did 177,535 tests, approximately 8,454 tests per day. (14)
However the worst thing is that the originally highly fragile public medical facilities of Hong Kong are almost running out of capacities for COVID-19 patients and others. It means that none-COVID-19 patients are also dangerously excluded from the adequate medical service. The health care system is like US where drastically weakened by neoliberalism before the pandemic. There is no sizable proportion of medical facilities for ordinary people of Hong Kong. As the result, there are more than a hundred COVID-19 patients are staying at home with their families due to lack of capacities at hospitals. (15)
People's discontent on the mishandling of COVID-19 epidemic by SAR government reached the high point recently. One of the US state propaganda machine VOA (Voice of America) reported:
據統計3至5月包括海員、航空公司機組人員等，有超過20萬人次獲豁免檢疫入境香港。最新民意調查顯示，64%受訪者認為，新一波疫情爆發，是港府入境檢疫政策失誤所致。......
據香港保安局7月公佈的統計，今年3至5月包括海員、航空公司機組人員等，有接近21萬人次獲豁免檢疫入境香港。
(16)
NDI-backed Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute did take a census on SAR government's handling of COVID-19 epidemic during July 20 to 23 by online method, inquired about nine thousand Hong Kong citizens (the majorities of them were pro-opposition but it still reflects common discontent among pro-establishment supporters). As the result, average 64% of citizens in both political camps think that the mishandling of COVID-19 by SAR government is critically responsible for the third wave of epidemic. Moreover, the SAR government who presided over the COVID-19-infested city stealthily had exempted nearly 210 thousand seamen and pilots since March to May 2020 alone. This is the true background of being the hotbed of the epidemic.
This census outcome will be potentially seen as an equivalent with the electoral result of the upcoming 2021 Hong Kong Legislative Council Election on September 5, 2021. It means that opposition will win the vast majority of seats at the legislative council because 64% of voters including opposition cabals automatically link the incompetent SAR government with so called 'pro-establishment' camp on the election. Besides this, what 'pro-establishment' camp did during the epidemic period? Almost nothing at all. People only remember Finance Committee's irresponsible decision of funding 5.4 billion HKD for almost debunked Ocean Park's developers and corrupted management on May 29, 2020 and enforcement of National Anthem Ordinance since June 12, 2020. Both of them have nothing to do with workers' economic lives and its improvement. Only beneficial for the ruling class. Pro-China forces can't win opposition in this way because SAR government and so called 'pro-establishment' camp are self-destabilising and diminishing trust of the citizens.
Note: No one noticed the origin of the third wave of epidemic and the test-exemption list until the MSC Flavia incident on June 26, 2020. Also readers must realise that there are two kinds of statistical calculation categories, such as imported cases and local cases in Chinese. SARS-COV2 is purely imported outside of Hong Kong, China. In general, all cases are imported cases. Therefore, the beginning of the COVID-19 epidemic in Hong Kong was and still is the first imported case on January 18, 2020. On the contrary, January 23, 2020 was just the day when the first local resident case was confirmed. We should not be confused by their statistical trick used by SAR bureaucrats.
The census above can be seen as NDI-VOA propaganda yet it is confirmed and backed by scientific research later. RTHK reported,
根據《預防及控制疾病條例》，政府如信納某類別人士符合特定條件，可豁免他們抵港後強制檢疫14日，衞生署會發出醫學監察通知書。本台向衞生署查詢後，當局提供資料顯示，署方6月於各出入境管制站，發出45953份醫學監察通知書，較5月份多5733份，亦是自3月以來最多的月份。本月截至22日，則發出39584份通知書。
保安局本月8日書面回覆立法會議員提問時透露，政府由2月至5月一共發出逾20萬份醫學監察通知書。換言之，由2月至前日，有超過29萬人次入境後毋須接受強制檢疫，但要接受14天醫學監察，期間須佩戴口罩和每天量度體溫兩次。(17)
First, SAR government has exempted more than 290 thousand inbound personals from PCR tests and quarantine since February to July 8, 2020. This number is higher than what VOA reported and confirmed by the government itself later.
Although SAR government diagnosed more than 100 cases per day since July 19 till July 28, 2020 (it still continues at the time of writing on August 2, 2020), and 16 deaths from July 13, they still have insisted the 33 categories of test exemption no matter how many infected or deceased. Moreover, on July 19, 2020, SAR government once stubbornly denied any notion stating that the third wave of COVID-19 epidemic originated in test-quarantine exemption policy arrangement.
In the article, ''Government clarifies on necessity of quarantine exemption arrangement'', the SAR government wrote:
With regard to criticisms that the quarantine exemption arrangement has brought about loopholes in the quarantine regime and that the latest wave of epidemic was attributable to the prevailing quarantine exemption arrangement, a Government spokesman emphasised today (July 19) that this is a misunderstanding.
The spokesman explained that the existing exemption arrangement under the compulsory quarantine regime is essential to maintain the necessary operation of the society and the economy, and to ensure an uninterrupted supply of all daily necessities to the public. The Government has been closely monitoring the risk and pressure on public health brought about by imported cases and would continue to adopt relevant coping measures in a resolute manner as necessary. ......
In addition, for the categories of exempted persons arriving Hong Kong from the Mainland, regular COVID-19 testing arrangement has been put in place for cross-boundary goods vehicle drivers and cross-boundary students which form the two largest exemption categories.
(18)
VOA did not blindly demonise all test-quarantine exempted people, especially people arriving from mainland China this time because the main virus vendors are proven to be foreign seamen and pilots not any mainlanders objectively.
On July 28, 2020, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University research team revealed that the SARS-COV2 virus strain of GR type caused the third wave of epidemic and originated in Republic of the Philippines and Republic of Kazakhstan. TVB made a comprehensive coverage on this,
研究指，新冠病毒在八個月內演變成6種不同病毒株，第一波疫情一月由內地輸入，屬於S或L型病毒株；到二月演變成V型，引發多個本地群組，包括北角佛堂、長康邨等；到三月爆發第二波疫情，確診者都帶有歐洲等地演變出的G型病毒株，傳播力加強至少3倍以上，當時的愉景灣婚禮群組就是這類患者。 至於七月的第三波疫情，病毒株已變成GR型，當中又可分開兩個群組，當中港島禮頓山的個案，基因排序與哈薩克機組人員基因排序相同；至於慈雲山、水泉澳邨等個案，則與菲律賓輸入個案相同。 理大醫療科技及資訊學系副教授蕭傑恒說：「同之前第一波及第二波的病毒株已經是非常不同，例如最初期的新發(茶餐廳)、彬記群組、港泰護老中心，他們的基因是完全一樣，即是說一隻病毒株，導致這些人受感染。」 團隊指病毒本來會不停演變，但六月底變為GR型後就再無變。 蕭傑恒表示：「物競天擇，再加一些可能有新藥時，它都會出現突變，但它現在取得一個平衡，病毒和人之間取得一個平衡，令它的傳播更有效率。」 (19)
According to the PolyU research, there are total six kinds of SARS-COV2 strains developed and found by scientists until July 2020 that S, L, V, G and GR types. In the first wave of epidemic from January 28 to February 12, S and L type strains mutated into V type strain which was confirmed at North Point Buddhist shrine, Cheung Hong Estate and Hotpot meal cluster etc.. Then, the second wave of the epidemic (March 14 to April 11) came with G type strain which is typical in Europe and confirmed on the Auberge Discovery Bay Hong Kong cases. G type's infectious rate is three times larger than the original strains. Finally, the July's third wave of the epidemic with GR type strain arrived. This time, it was completely imported via Kazakhstan pilots and Filipino seamen who exempted from PCR tests and quarantine due to the existing exemption arrangement under the compulsory quarantine regime. The Leighton Hill cluster in Hong Kong island is matched with the strain of Kazakhstan pilots; the strain of Tsz Wan Shan and Shui Chuen O Estate matched with Filipino seamen.
Mingpao provided more details on the issue that there three chains of contagion, one is Kazakhstan pilots; the one is Filipino seamen and the third one Sheung Sze Wan Village (Sai Kung) cluster's origin of GR type strain is still unknown. To make matters worse, GR type is deadlier and more contagious than previous types of SARS-COV2. (20)
On July 29, 2020, there is news (later confirmed) that the SAR government would announce one year postponement of the 2020 Hong Kong Legislative Council Election at the end of the nomination period this Friday (July 31, 2020) by applying Emergency Regulations Ordinance (1922). Opposition media Hong Kong Economic Times reported,
本月初起，香港爆發新一波2019冠狀病毒疾病（COVID-19，武漢肺炎）疫情，疫情較之前更為嚴峻，最近一週每天都新增超過百宗病例，社會上開始有人建議推遲議會選舉，以免人群密集投票時傳播病毒。
就黨派陣營而言，泛民主派對政府推遲選舉的立場不是很明確，只有個別人士指出，推遲選舉可能會產生政治風險；親政府的建制派則支持延期，立法會前主席曾鈺成上週就公開呼籲政府當機立斷，推遲選舉一年。
網上傳出，除了疫情外，建制派支持推遲選舉的另一個原因，是因為疫情之下，陣營的許多支持者還在中國大陸，未能回港投票。(21)
Postponement of the election will be correct and necessary for ''pro-establishment'' camp however new voters won't support them because they did nothing for the lives of the working class people pf Hong Kong during anti-extradition bill riots and COVID-19 epidemic. What they did were all PR stunts, foul plays with opposition, authorising billions of bailouts for corporate giants and commencement of The National Anthem Ordinance on June 12, 2020 etc.. All in an attempt to serve the ruling class in the name of citizens. For instance,
On October 16, 2019, Carri Lam published the third policy address and promised that she and her 'pro-establishment' camp are going to use Lands Resumption Ordinance to retrieve wasted lands from hands of private owners in order to develop public housing for workers. It's about both land supply and housing of the workers of Hong Kong. The lands of Hong Kong ultimately belong to the central government yet monopoly capitalist oligarchs are enjoying their hegemony and brutally exploiting workers on land and housing issues. Their astronomically huge fortunes were made out of the poor workers who desperately need housing.
19. 我提出的土地供應施政方針是由政府主導用地和基建的規劃，並為確立的公共用途收回所需的私人土地，讓市民看到不論是 短、中、長期開拓的土地，政府會全力以赴，讓土地為民所用。具體來說，我們會加快規劃，然後運用《收回土地條例》和其他適用條例，收回以下三類私人土地作百分百公營房屋(包括公屋、「綠置居」、居屋)及「首置」和相關設施發展:
(1) 可能具發展潛力，但未納入新發展區或其他發展項目， 大部分屬私人擁有的新界棕地，估計約 450 公頃，這些土地較接近現有新市鎮和主要公路及面積較大，包括位於屏山及藍地一帶棕地。規劃署會優先檢視當中的 160公頃較接近現有基建設施的棕地可否作公營房屋發展，以便於今年年底開展進一步的技術評估。改劃政府用地作房屋用途是近年房屋土地供應的主要來源之一，但我今次提出的是更聚焦地改劃私人土地作公營房屋發展，繼而行使公權收回私人土地作公共用途，是突破思維;
(2) 收回位於各區法定分區計劃大綱圖上已規劃作高密度房屋發展，但因為各種原因(例如業權分散或基建限制)仍未有發展計劃，而評估後認為適合作公營房屋發展的私人土地;及
(3) 收回位於市區並適合作高密度房屋發展的茶果嶺村、 牛池灣村和竹園聯合村寮屋區的私人土地，以加快發展這些合共七公頃的市區用地，重建為以公營房屋為主的新社區，並透過按政策的補償安置，改善寮屋居民的居住環境。(22)
The point is that this policy was originally suggested by opposition and denied by so called ''pro-establishment' and SAR government in 2018. Their policy change was made on September 13, 2019 by chairperson of the largest ''pro-establishment'' party Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong, Starry Lee and followed by Carrie Lam on October 16, 2019. (23)
Although the policy direction is right and precise under the circumstances, the problem was realised at that time that retrieving altogether 700 hectors of lands is not only a small amount of lands but also it will take twelve months to eight years to retrieve lands thus it won't relieve political tensions and urgent needs for housing immediately.
Hong Kong's housing and land supply issues are the most important ones but it needs transformation of entire economy and adjustment of population policy as many intelligentsia think. It can be summed below:
市民收入增長追不上樓價及租金升幅；
樓市受制於聯繫匯率制度與可發展的土地不足。
2006至2011年間，樓價上升100%，租金上升50%，而家庭收入卻上升不足25%。這現象有兩個解讀。從投資角度看是好事，業主可賺取物業升值，或享受租金回報，收入可能比正職還要好。但作為無樓一族，不但要捱貴租、抗通脹，即使節衣縮食也儲不夠首期，置業可謂天方夜譚。因此，社會怨氣矛盾日漸加劇，年青人買不起樓要起義，劏房、屏風樓愈來愈多要反對，政府和商家成為發洩的最好對象，任何房屋問題都可歸咎於地產霸權、官商勾結或政府無能。然而，這些指控立成立與否，是法律或政治的問題，本文希望從經濟學角度，剖析香港房屋問題的成因，並指出在可發展土地不變化的情況下，任何試圖解決現時房屋問題的政策最多只能舒緩一時之痛，但長遠來說代價可能十分大，亦非治本之方。 (24)
First, the raising rate of median monthly household income (家庭住戶每月入息中位數) can't catch up with rising private housing price and rent for years. For understanding economic situation of the housing and land supply issues, we must read several data below:
(1) Hong Kong Property Review 2020
a. PRIVATE DOMESTIC - RENTAL INDICES BY CLASS ( TERRITORY-WIDE )
b. PRIVATE DOMESTIC - PRICE INDICES BY CLASS ( TERRITORY-WIDE )
(2) Quarterly Report on General Household Survey
a. Median monthly household income (HK$)
The latest data of May 2020 show that private rental indices of housing increased 77% since 1990; private price indices of housing raised 284.8% since 1990 and median monthly household income only gained 28,200 HKD which compared to 24,500 HKD in 2011. About 15% increase of household income in nine years. Moreover median monthly household income of 1990 was about 24,000 HKD. In other words, there is only approximately 15% increase in median monthly household income since 1990 till 2020. (25) Unbalance among the three indices indicates systematically broadening inequalities are real and almost unstoppable without thorough reforms. It's only good and prosperous for capitalists who own properties.
Second, linked exchange rate system in Hong Kong (1983) has been fixed in 7.80 HKD to 1 USD since 1990 which only slightly ups and downs between 7.75 to 7.85 HKD in relation to USD. As the result, when the exchange value of USD declines, it causes inflation in HKD side.
在2006-2011年間，當美元匯價下跌，利率亦降至接近零，但香港的通脹率卻大幅急升，銀紙瞬間貶值，存款又沒有息收，資金只有流向磚頭保值，引致樓宇的租金回報率不斷向下，現已處於接近2%的歷史低點。這樣低的租金回報率一直依賴美國超低長債息率維持。當美息上升，再加上中國經濟又放緩時，業主隨時血本無歸。 (26)
Hong Kong is still in inflation under the ongoing anti-extradition bill colour revolution and COVID-19 pandemic. CPI (Consumer Price Index) of 2019 was 2.86% which means about 3%. In general, above 3% is seen as inflation. This is similar with mainland China in 2019. (27)
This is the mechanism of endlessly broadening inequalities among the working class in Hong Kong. A systematic class oppression against workers by oligarchs and its bureaucrats. It proved that Carrie Lam's third policy address was just a PR stunt. Not only it did not relieve tensions among population but it also caused the world's highest housing price and top #3 high rent city records in the entire world in 2020 according to Global Living published by CBRE Group, Inc. in June 2020.
報告顯示，綜合2019年數據，雖然香港經濟面對衰退，但樓價不跌反升，攀升近5%，而整體住宅成交量則下跌3%。而在住宅價格方面，香港以125.4萬元（美元‧下同）（約978.1萬港元）的住宅均價繼續高居全球之首；第二位則是德國城市慕尼黑，住宅均價為100萬元（約780萬港元）；新加坡則以91.5萬元（713.7萬港元）排第三。 ......
既然入市所費不菲，租樓便成為另一個選擇。雖然香港並非全球住宅租金最貴的城市，但仍為三甲之內。報告指出，紐約是全球住宅租金最費的城市，以平均月租2,870元（22,386港元）排於首位；阿布扎比則以2,838元（22,136港元）排第二；香港以2,682元（20,919港元）的平均租金排第三。十大房租最貴城市排行榜中有四席是中東城市，主要受外籍租戶支持。(28)
Thus the PR stunt by SAR government and DAB did change nothing, and the situation is now even worse than October 16, 2019. Oligarchs successfully maintained the skyrocketing housing prices and rent in 2019 even though there was some political friction with the central government in September 2019.
In general, they did nothing for workers in 2019. They did not improve lives of the working class. So called ''pro-establishment'' won't win the upcoming election without decent policies to improve lives of workers even under peaceful political situations after the end of anti-extradition bill colour revolution and COVID-19 pandemic.
.................................................
2. In general, the intelligentsia of Hong Kong predicted the landslide failure of so called ''pro-establishment'' camp in the Legislative Council election of September 6, 2020. And they predict that ''pro-establishment'' camp will still be in crisis. The main reason is that judge Barnabus Fung's Electoral Affairs Commission insists exactly the same problematic stance and policy with the 2019 Hong Kong District Council Election (November 24, 2019). The 2019 Hong Kong District Council Election (opposition won the vast majority 389 seats; on the contrary, pro-establishment got only 86 seats) was unfairly held during the ongoing anti-extradition bill colour revolution and strongly supported by ''establishment'' figures who represent the vested interests of colonial British Hong Kong. For instance, 125 ''establishment'' figures signed a declaration to require the election being held on time even though there are black-shirted mobs still engaging in endless colour riots. November was the peak of the violence. As the result, voters got psychologically terrorised by it. This election campaign was led by ex-Financial Secretary in the Special Administrative Region ''opposition'' John Tsang Chun-wah who was defeated by Carrie Lam in the 2017 Hong Kong Chief Executive election; the 1st. Secretary for Security of Hong Kong Peter Lai; and ''Godfather of Lan Kwai Fong'' Allan Zeman who appointed Carrie Lam as Chief Executive of Hong Kong. (29)
On November 11, 2019(US time), ''opposition'' John Tsang Chun-wah shared the statement below at Facebook to threat the SAR government and ''pro-establishment'' camp from ''establishment'' side. He urged the SAR government to surrender to ongoing violence in order to end the colour riots. His anti-violence stance was disguised as ''pro-establishment'', on the contrary, it actually opposed the use of force by police, and threatened the public by more possible violent aftermath if they postpone the district council election under the unfair conditions for pro-establishment camp. His contradicted narrative belongs to pro US, anti-China opposition camp but the campaign was initiated and managed from the ''establishment'' side. This is a typical and treacherous Hong Kong political feature that never correctly understood by any mainland right wings and mainstream media.
I denounce violence. The Hong Kong Government must lead the way in de-escalating the use of force and resist postponing the District Council Elections on 24 November. Any attempt to delay the election would only prolong and escalate further violence resulting in unnecessary injuries . END VIOLENCE NOW.
我痛斥暴力。香港政府有必要帶頭讓暴力降溫，不應推遲11月24日區議會選舉，因為拖延選舉，只會進一步延長和提升暴力，造成更多不必要的傷亡。立即停止暴力。J
http://bit.ly/VoteOnNov24 (30)
For English version of the statement, please visit :
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1reVRo1nETAwJ3dufsQ2yCWDkyGqUl2nfGjZMZ54Y8Sw/edit?usp=sharing
PROCEED WITH THE DISTRICT COUNCIL POLL
LET THE PEOPLE’S VOICE BE HEARD
As members from different segments of the civil society, we watch with anguish and apprehension the development in our city during the last few months – the Hong Kong society has been severely torn apart and our values being eroded day by day. It is a society urgently in need of reconciliation and the Government is duty-bound to lead us out of the deepening rift.
We consider that:
The Government must strive its utmost to ensure the smooth running of the District Council elections. There is no way the election should be interrupted or called off due to the interference of forces with ulterior motive.
A peaceful, fair and just election that abides by procedural justice principles is the entitlement of every citizen. It is also a tenable route to resolving the on-going social conflict. We call on all sectors of the community to work together to enable a smooth election.
Hong Kong is in a critical situation now. The casting of the ballot – and the electioneering activities leading up to it – is a form of civic participation that will channel the thoughts of the citizens to the Government.
A high voter turnout is of immense importance to the upcoming election. We hereby call upon the people to actively take part in the vote. This will be an important step toward resolving the predicament of Hong Kong.
Vote for Hong Kong on Nov 24!
我們是一群來自公民社會不同界別的朋友。大家面對目前社會撕裂嚴重，香港社會一向珍視的價值不斷被侵蝕，感到憂心痛心。早日找到與社會修復的出路，政府責無旁貸。
我們認為：
1) 政府需盡最大努力，確保區議會選舉順利進行，不可因別有用心人士的干擾而取消，否則會做成更大的社會不穩及撕裂。
2) 一場和平、公平公正、合乎程序公義的選舉，不但是市民應有的公民權利，同時也是以和平理性解決社會爭議的有效方法。我們呼籲，社會各方讓選舉順利進行。
3) 在當前香港的嚴峻環境下，透過選舉過程廣泛辯論，市民參與投票，讓執政者了解他們的所思所想。
投票率越高，意義就越大。我們謹此呼籲廣大市民踴躍投票，為解決香港當前困局邁出重要一步。
請你為香港，投下你手中的一票！
聯署人（以個人名義，並按其英文姓氏字母排序）
楊區麗潔 (Project manager and public policy consultant; Hong Kong University Centre for Civil Society and Governance)
歐耀佳（Paul; ex-chairman; The Hong Kong Medical Association）
碧樺依 （Raees Begum Baig; social worker; assistant professor at CUHK）
卜約翰 （John P Burns; American; former chief of Faculty of Social Sciences, HKU）
陳智遠 (Paul Chan; ex-political assistant at Food and Health Bureau)
陳祖為 （Joseph Chan Cho Wai; a founding member of Civic Party; a professor at Department of Politics and Public Administration, HKU）
陳彩英 (social worker)
陳秀慧 (Cora Chan; Associate Professor; Deputy Head, Department of Law;
Programme Director, Bachelor of Laws at HKU)
陳葒 (founder of Principal Chan Free Tutorial World)
陳文敏 (Prof Johannes Chan Man-mun at Department of Law, HKU; being supportive of Benny Tai Yiu-ting)
陳韜文 (CHAN, Joseph Man; Emeritus Professor of Journalism and Communication at CUHK)
陳麗雲 (Chan Lai-wun; former actress at ATV and TVB)
陳龍生 (Prof. Chan, Lung Sang; Deputy Director & College Principal, HKU SPACE)
陳文剛 (Rensen Chan Man-Kong; a theatre worker)
陳茂峰 (expert of investment and financial management)
陳志雲 (Stephen Chan Chi Wan; Commercial Radio Hong Kong)
陳慧 (author; screenplay writer)
陳恩明 (pastor)
陳耀華 (MC at RTHK)
趙維生 (Sammy Chiu; professor at CUHK in social work)
蔡海偉 (Hoi-Wai Chua; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF) ; the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Council of Social Service (HKCSS))
鄭維志 (Cheng Wai-chee, Christopher; former chairman of The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce; chairman of Wing Tai Properties Limited)
張燦輝 (Prof CHEUNG Chan Fai at University General Education, CUHK)
張楚勇 (Dr. Cheung Chor Yung; Senior Teaching Fellow at Department of Public Policy, City University of Hong Kong)
張益麟 (ex-vice chairman of Hong Kong Young Industrialists Council)
張炳良 (Prof Anthony Cheung Bing-leung; ex-chief of Transport and Housing Bureau)
張達明 (Eric Cheung; a senior lecturer at Department of Law, HKU)
張瑞霖 (Patrick Cheung; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
張達棠 (CHEUNG Tat-tong; Housing Authority member)
張玉堂 (lawyer)
張宗永 (Author)
蔡玉萍 (CHOI Yuk-ping Susanne; professor at Communications and Public Relations Office, CUHK)
蔡甘銓 (a guest lecturer at Academy of Film, HKBU)
蔡堅 (head of The Hong Kong Medical Association)
莊陳有 (Chong Chan Yau; a founding member of Civic Party)
莊耀洸 (CHONG, Yiu Kwong; lawyer; an ex-assistant of Szeto Wah)
蔡子強 (CHOY, Chi-keung Ivan; a senior lecturer at Department of Government and Public Administration, CUHK)
崔允信 (CHUI Vincent; filmmaker)
鍾劍華 (Vice President at Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (HKPORI))
范寧 (John Flint; ex-CEO of HSBC)
方敏生 (ex-CEO of The Hong Kong Council of Social Service)
方保僑 (Francis Fong; pundit)
方健僑 (ex-chairman of Hong Kong Wireless Technology Industry Association (WTIA))
何卓彥 (musician)
黃岳永 (Erwin Huang; IT educator at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
許天福 (lawyer)
葉劍青 (Ip Kim Ching; psychiatrist)
江丕盛 (Chairman of Quest Institute)
關焯照 (Andy Cheuk-Chiu Kwan; chief of ACE Centre for Business and Economic Research)
郭國全 (ex-economic consultant for SAR government)
郭倩雯 (ex-journalist at TVB and Wharf Cable Television)
黎慶寧 (Peter Lai; ex-chief of Security Bureau)
黎蕭寶珍 (former-inspector general of Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance Corporation)
賴錦璋 (ex-part time member of Central Policy Unit)
林漢明 (Professor LAM Hon Ming at School of Life Sciences, CUHK)
林健枝 (LAM Kin Che: Adjunct Professor at Communications and Public Relations Office, CUHK)
林本利 (LAM Pun Lee; used to join Central Policy Unit)
林筱魯 (Urban planner who closely worked for Leung Chun-ying)
林崇智 (The Rev LAM Sung-che; pastor)
林蔚文 (Dr. Lam Wai Man at School of Arts and Social Sciences, The Open University of Hong Kong)
林維峰 (Wai-Fung (Danny) Lam; Director of the Centre for Civil Society and Governance (CCSG))
劉慧瑩 (student?)
羅淑敏 (associate professor at Department of Visual Studies, Lingnan University)
羅永聰 (Julian Law Wing Chung; PR brain for John Tsang Chun-wah in the failed 2017 SAR Chief Executive Election)
李俊亮 (chief of CPAR at The Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts)
李少南 (ex-professor at School of Journalism and Communication, CUHK)
李淑儀 (Sandra Birch Lee Suk-yee; ex-Permanent Secretary of Food and Health Bureau)
李詠怡 (Professor Eliza W. Y. LEE; The Department of Politics and Public Administration, HKU)
李盈姿 (Dr. Lee Ying Chi: dentist)
李慧雯 (journalist?)
李韡玲 (columnist)
梁淑儀 (Irene Leung; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
梁文俊 (football player?)
梁萬福 (Dr. LEUNG Man Fuk, Edward)
梁敬國 (Godfrey Leung; ex-undersecretary of Commerce and Economic Development Bureau)
梁栢賢 (Dr Pak-yin Leung; ex-general administrator of Hospital Authority)
梁佩瑤 (Dr. LEUNG PUI YIU, VIVIAN)
梁崇任 (art educator)
林雲峯 (Lim Wan Fung, Bernard Vincent; former member of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference)
盧子健 (public affair consultant)
羅慶才 (chairman of The Baptist Convention of Hong Kong)
盧龍光 (Rev. Dr. Lo Lung-kwong; ex-director of Divinity School of Chung Chi College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
盧偉力 (Dr. LO Wai Luk; Honorary Resident Writer at Academy of Film, HKBU)
林一星 (Professor Terry Lum; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
馬仲儀 (chairman of Hong Kong Public Doctors' Association [HKPDA])
馬傑偉 (ex-professor at School of Journalism and Communication, CUHK)
莫宜端 (Zandra Mok; ex-political assistant at Labour and Welfare Bureau)
梅卓燕 (dancer)
吳俊雄 (honorary associate professor at Department of Sociology, HKU)
吳宗鑾 (one of convenors of Progressive Lawyers Group)
伍美琴 (Professor NG Mee Kam at Department of Geography and Resource Management(GEO), CUHK)
吳明德 (Victor, Ming tak NG; Adjunct Associate Professor at Hong Kong Baptist University; Senior Vice President at China Construction Bank (Asia) Corporation Ltd.)
魏綺珊 (Jo Ngai; ex-TVB journalist)
鮑藹倫 (Ellen PAU; Member of M+ Acquisitions Committee at West Kowloon)
蒲錦昌 (pastor)
成名 (Dixon Ming SING; Associate Professor at division of social science, HKUST)
蘇鑰機 (SO, Clement Y. K.; Professor, Associate Dean (Student Affairs), Faculty of Social Science, CUHK)
孫勵生 (social worker; attended the anti-extradition bill movement)
蕭偉強 (Stephen Sui Wai-keung; ex-director at Labour and Welfare Bureau))
沈祖堯 (Joseph Sung Jao-Yiu; ex-principal at CUHK)
宋陳寶蓮 (ex-director of Path of Democracy)
宋恩榮 (Prof. SUNG Yun Wing at Department of Economics, CUHK)
戴健文 (ex-associate director of broadcasting of RTHK)
戴德正 (principal of Sheng Kung Hui Tang Shiu Kin Secondary School)
鄧振強 (chairman of HKAHSS)
曾嘉燕 (author)
曾俊華 (John Tsang Chun-wah; 4th Financial Secretary of Hong Kong; a member of ''centrist'' Hope for Hong Kong)
曾潔雯 (Dr. Sandra Tsang; Associate Professor at Department of Social Work and Social Administration, HKU)
謝家駒 (Dr. K K Tse; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
黃家正 (actor)
王永平 (Joseph Wong; ex-secretary for Commerce, Industry and Technology; ex-secretary for the Civil Service)
黃英琦 (Ada WONG, JP; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
王維基 (Ricky Wong Wai-kay; Chairman of Hong Kong Television Network Limited; ex-member of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference of Zhejiang)
甄拔濤 (theatre worker)
邱祖淇 (Dr. YAU, Joe Cho Ki; Lecturer, Department of Computer Science, HKBU)
邱誠武 (Yau Shing Mu; ex-undersecretary of Transport and Housing Bureau)
葉健民 (Professor YEP, Ray Kin-man at Department of Public Policy, CityU)
楊瓞仁 (Dit Yan YEUNG; Head and Chair Professor, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, HKU)
邢福增 (Deputy Chairperson, Department of Cultural and Religious Studies, CUHK)
余俊豪 (Dr. YU CHUN HO)
余達心 (Carver Yu; ex-principal of China Graduate School of Theology)
袁莎妮 (Shirley Yuen; wife of Ricky Wong Wai-kay; former CEO of The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce)
袁天佑 (Rev. YUEN Tin-Yau; ex-chairman of The Methodist Church, Hong Kong)
容蔡美碧 (Rebecca Yung; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
盛智文 (Allan Zeman; ex-chairman of Ocean Park; member of New People's Party)
(31)
The two-faced reactionaries above listed clearly knew not only the district council election of November 24, 2019 was unfair for pro-establishment camp but also this year's (originally scheduled) legislative council election of September 6, 2020 should be postponed under the circumstances (due to the ongoing colour revolution and COVID-19 pandemic) as it will be fair for so called ''pro-establishment'' camp. Indeed, those two-faced opportunists in Hong Kong local ruling class are going to launch the similar election campaign at the end of August 2021 or near the election date as part of lobbying activities if the cooler revolution will still have its momentum at that time. Strangely ''no criticism'' against their pseudo-''pro-establishment'' PR stunt is a proof of fatal misunderstanding among ''pro-China'' forces about the nature of their political roles, and it also shows dismal degree of infiltration by anti-China reactionaries in the establishment including media outlets, churches, hospitals, social working NGOs (''social workers'' mean NGOs) and schools (the major film-related departments like Academy of Film, HKBU, CPAR at The Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts and Department of Visual Studies, Lingnan University). They are all ''contacts'' in terms of intelligence. Opposition contacts mainly infiltrated especially social working NGOs, media and media education, laws and religion.
''Pro-Establishment'' figures and groups act as anti-China opposition in order to protect their vested interests and provide ruling classes political protection. This is the typical and opportunistic nature of Hong Kong ruling class. Among them, citizens must focus on those treacherous ''pro-establishment'' figures in untrustworthy ''pro-establishment'' lobbying groups such as,
''Pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF)
蔡海偉 (Hoi-Wai Chua; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF) ;the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Council of Social Service (HKCSS))
張瑞霖 (Patrick Cheung; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
梁淑儀 (Irene Leung; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
林一星 (Professor Terry Lum; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
謝家駒 (Dr. K K Tse; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
黃英琦 (Ada WONG, JP; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
容蔡美碧 (Rebecca Yung; Member of ''pro-establishment'' Our Hong Kong Foundation (OHKF))
''Pro-establishment'' The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce
鄭維志 (Cheng Wai-chee, Christopher; former chairman of The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce; chairman of Wing Tai Properties Limited)
袁莎妮 (Shirley Yuen; wife of Ricky Wong Wai-kay; former CEO of The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce)
Although those ''opposition'' bureaucrats self-exposed their own treason against the central government by publicly coming out to support this opposition campaign, politically an alarming fact is the dual identity of so called ''pro-establishment'' figures and lobbying groups. This is why citizens can't blindly play colour politics in the framework of blue and yellow camps. As we saw, the ''pro-establishment'' is filled with the highest treason and fundamentally different from pro-China or patriotism. The political term ''pro-establishment'' is poison because it automatically links everything done by the incompetent SAR government with ''pro-establishment'' parties and the central government.
On July 31, 2020, SAR government correctly decided postponement of The 2020 Hong Kong Legislative Council Election, and originally scheduled election is going to be held on September 5, 2021. Pro-KMT media Oriental Daily News reported,
林鄭月娥指因新一波疫情很大可能持續數星期或更長時間，社會需要時間復原；立法會有立法、修例、審批、通過年度財政預算案等實質職能，認為不能因換屆選舉不確定而長期停擺或真空期；又指重新啟動選舉需至少3至4個月，以及選民登記工作；因此決定將選舉押後1年。
她續稱，立法會選舉規模大，涉及440萬登記選民，70個議席，615個投票站、34000選舉人員，又指原定於亞洲博覽館設中央點票站和傳媒中心，但因亞博館成為臨時社區治療中心而需另覓地方。林鄭月娥又指，根據國際選舉制度基金會，截至7月中，有62個國家和8個屬地因疫情押後選舉，包括英國和澳洲。
由於現有立法會條例無法將選舉押後1年，林鄭月娥指，因疫情屬危害公眾安全的緊急情況，因此決定引用《緊急情況規例條例》，訂明新一屆立法會換屆選舉為2021年9月5日，撤銷2020年9月6日換屆選舉的公告，選舉程序即告終結，政府會向已招致選舉開支的候選人，按申索指引支付款項和退回按金，選舉主任和候選人仍須履責任。......
今次立法會選舉投票日原定9月6日進行，超過440萬名合資格選民將會選出70名議員，包括5個地方選區及功能界別各35席。提名期今日下午5時結束，暫時共接獲150份提名表格，當中區議會(第一)界別競爭最激烈，8人爭一席位；另有12位參選人被取消資格。(32)
Carrie Lam rarely got more proactive on the now postponed legislative counsel election and made the politically precise decision this time. She pointed out that several important inner and outer factors and aspects of the election.
a. More than 4.4 million voters (a half of entire Hong Kong population) vote for 34,000 candidates for 70 seats at the legislative counsel via 615 polling stations across the city.
b. According to International Foundation for Electoral Systems, there are 62 countries and 8 regions postponed elections including UK and Australia.
c. During the nomination period which ended on July 31, the government received 150 nomination applications.
d. 12 opposition candidates disqualified.
e. Technically it caused one year ''vacuum period'' which needs an explain by the people's congress in order to avoid judicial review by local court.
Two important political incidents recently happened, one is DQ of 12 opposition nominees (such as Alvin Yeung, Joshua Wong, Dennis Kwok and Gwyneth Ho)who admitted opposition to the national security law in response to inquiries from the chairman of Electoral Affairs Commission Barnabas Fung, and this is totally reasonable under the circumstances, furthermore it relieved the burden of the postponement-related electoral compensations for qualified nominees by the SAR government.
公民黨: Civic Party
郭榮鏗 Dennis Kwok Wing-hang
郭家麒 Dr Kwok Ka-ki
楊岳橋 Alvin Yeung
鄭達鴻 Tat Cheng
專業議政: The Professionals Guild (part of Civic Party; led by Dennis Kwok Wing-hang)
梁繼昌 Kenneth Leung
熱血公民: Civic Passion
鄭錦滿 Alvin Cheng Kam-mun
袁嘉蔚 Tiffany Yuen Ka Wai
梁晃維 Fergus Leung
黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Chi-fung
劉頴匡 Ventus LAU Wing-hong
何桂藍 Gwyneth Ho Kwai-lam
岑敖暉 Lester Shum
(33)
However this is just part of DQ campaign against opposition. In addition to the already disqualified twelve nominees, there are also eight potential targets of DQ. Oriental Daily News reported on August 1, 2020,
9月6日立法會換屆選舉的提名期昨日結束，雖然換屆選舉已押後，外界仍在解讀《港區國安法》生效後，首次大型選舉提名期的現象，當局連同最後1日收到34份提名表格，合共接獲184份提名表格，當中包括來自5大地方選區的99份報名，以及來自29個功能界別的85份報名，最終12名泛民參選人被取消參選資格（DQ），包括4名公民黨參選人；值得留意的是，泛民8人包括社民連岑子杰、人民力量陳志全被選舉主任查問後，提名是否有效仍然懸而未決。(34)
This means there will be more opposition nominees disqualified later. Their nomination applications were not qualified and confirmed yet. No completion of the inquiry process for qualification of nomination applications means that they are still not legitimised as effective candidates for the upcoming election.
Here some details must be clarified, such as so called ''vacuum period'' and specialty of the legislative counsel election.
(a) One year ''vacuum period'' :
It's simple that using Emergency Regulations Ordinance to postpone the legislative council election one year in order to avoid judicial reviews. However the anti-mask law was judicially reviewed in this way.
SAR government evaluated the potential risks of being criticised as abuse of power if they use several ordinances, such as Legislative Council Ordinance which allows the chief executive to postpone elections for 14 days once for each action. It must be inevitably repetitive to use the article in a very abusive way. Technically unacceptable for anyone.
Legislative Council Ordinance
44.
When general election can be postponed or adjourned
(1) The Chief Executive may, by order, direct the postponement of a general election if, before the holding of the election, the Chief Executive is of the opinion that the election is likely to be obstructed, disrupted, undermined or seriously affected by riot or open violence or any danger to public health or safety.
(2) The Chief Executive may, by order, direct the adjournment of the polling or counting of votes in respect of a general election if, during the polling or counting of votes in respect of the election, the Chief Executive is of the opinion that the polling or counting of votes is likely to be or is being obstructed, disrupted, undermined or seriously affected by riot or open violence or any danger to public health or safety.
(3) The Returning Officers concerned must give effect to a direction under this section as soon as practicable after being notified of it.
(4) If a general election, or the polling or counting of votes at a general election, is directed to be postponed or adjourned under this section, the Chief Executive must specify a date for the holding of an election, or a poll or the counting of votes, in place of the postponed election or the adjourned polling or counting. The Chief Executive must give notice of that date in the Gazette. That date must not be later than 14 days after the date on which the election, poll or count would have taken place but for the direction. (Amended 48 of 1999 s. 28)
(Amended 12 of 2014 s. 90)
(35)
Another ordinance was also considered by SAR government yet they did not use on the election. That is Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance. In the TVB report, Carrie Lam's announcement was seen as more concerned about anti-epidemic. Their editing made audiences think as if it is purely for preventing the further explosive contagions among voters. In fact, Carrie Lam put emphasis on the fair election politically under the general circumstances. This is her wise and correct decision making.
Oriental Daily News unmistakably mentioned this point on August 1, 2020.
去年爆發反修例風波一發不可收拾，港府在十月首度引用緊急法訂立《禁止蒙面規例》。事隔八個月後，港府再引用該法押後立法會選舉。面對被指濫用緊急法，行政長官林鄭月娥解釋，《立法會條例》（第五百四十二章）第四十四（一）條授權行政長官，如在換屆選舉舉行前認為該選舉可能受騷亂，或公開暴力及任何危害公眾健康或安全的事故妨礙、破壞或嚴重影響，可指示將選舉押後，但她若一而再、再而三援引此權力推遲換屆選舉，或被視為濫權，必定引起法律挑戰。
用《防控疾病例》與選舉目的不符
她續指，若利用《立法會條例》第四（二）條把第七屆立法會任期定於一年後，並取消早前按第六（二）條訂明九月六日為選舉日期，再利用第十一（一）及（二）條在第六屆立法會任期完結後，要求第六屆立法會主席召開緊急會議，第六屆全體立法會議員繼續議事，亦可能被視為不適當地行使權力，或同受法律挑戰。至於引用《預防及控制疾病條例》，她指，由於押後選舉的主要目的包括要確保選舉公平、公開，而非只處理公共衞生，故未必適用。(36)
Thus so called one year ''vacuum period'' means that one year postponement by Emergency Regulations Ordinance not based on articles of Legislative Council Ordinance. The continuation of the de facto lawmakers for one more year legislative term will be a theoretical vacuum period. A pure political move from outside of operative system, which not defined by Legislative Council Ordinance itself.
(b) Specialty of Legislative Council Election:
Its specialty is Proportional Representation system. On the contrary, Regional Council Election system is based on Single-seat, single-vote system / Small constituency system.
Legislative Council Secretariat wrote:
比例代表制的目的在於根據各政黨或候選人的得票多少，分配代議組織的議席。以一個有5個議席的選區為例，某政黨在該選區如 獲得選票總數的五分之三，便可在5個議席中取得3席;另一政黨如獲得 選票總數的五分之二，便可取得兩個議席。因此，代議組織內的政黨組 合在相當程度上能夠準確反映該選區的選民對政黨的選擇取向。表1以 某個代議組織為例，說明一個選區所設5個議席的分配情況。 (37)
The two voting systems are about how certain amount of votes decide seat allocation at the council. And it is also applied in Japanese elections. In Proportional Representation system, limited number of seats at council will be allocated according to designated proportion of total amount of votes gained in the electorate area by party candidates or their parties. The opposite is Single-seat, single-vote system / Small constituency system in which the number one vote-winner will get the only seat at the council membership designated for the electorate district.
2020 Hong Kong pro-democracy primaries (July 11-12) was not prevented or punished by the law enforcement even though it obviously violated anti-epidemic restrictions on Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance, such as a ban on public gathering of more than four people at the time of primaries (now more than two since July 29, 2020). Both central and SAR government condemned 35+ primaries as something illegal which possibly violate the national security law yet it was not charged by the law enforcement. The result was seemed successful that it gained 583,180 votes from E-voting; and the final voting result was total 604,660 votes. However it still can't exceed the 2016 voting records of ''pro-establishment'' and even opposition themselves. That is not a threat for ''pro-establishment'' as long as opposition camp is fractured in tiny parties because ''pro-establishment'' received 871,016 votes, 40.17% in the last 2016 election. (38)
Although an important solution of ani-epidemic is testing everyone (all citizens) for COVID-19 with public assistance from mainland China, it will be materialised as SAR government finally requested it and responded by the central government, it will work if testing for all citizens is firmly backed by medical support from mainland and construction of mobile cabin hospitals (the first one will be built at AsiaWorld-Expo) designed by mainland specialists, the most important thing among all is not the technical postponement of the grim legislative council election to September 5, 2021, it is just a temporary relief for ''pro-establishment'' camp. They still totally lack any concrete and specific policy to improve lives of the working class people and reform the loopholes in establishment. In fact, ''pro-establishment'' camp did noting during anti-extradition bill riots and COVID-19 epidemic. At least they should clean up their own political camp by purging infiltrators during the vacuum period, meanwhile continue disqualifying opposition in the legislative council. We could not see any superiority of extremely westernized Hong Kong on handling the anti-extradition bill colour revolution (6/12/2019-) and COVID-19 pandemic (1/21/2019-).
Anyway we still don't know if opposition will lose veto at the council when they lose one third of the seats (24 seats in total 70 seats).
.................................................
3. Fraudulent Election Tactics
Hong Kong
US backed opposition used modi operandi which similar to US-meddled El Salvador elections of 1994 in the 2019 Hong Kong District Council Election (November 24, 2019) with calculation of inactiveness of SAR government and Barnabus Fung, chairman of Electoral Affairs Commission. The latter can be seen as an accomplice of opposition due to its negligence and postponement of necessary polling system reform that has been required for years before that election. Oriental Daily News reported on August 1, 2020,
議員葛珮帆(EQ)坦言，其實關愛隊同電子投票嘅建議都提出咗好多年，只係選管會一直以來，連丁點改革都唔願做，炮轟馮驊「唔好同我講唔夠時間」，如果依家畀多成年時間都唔做就係失職塞責。EQ又指，近年愈嚟愈多港人長駐內地工作或者長居養老，加上政府喺押後選舉嘅記者會上都有講香港嘅投票方式落後，覺得選管會都要研究下點樣畀選民喺內地投票嘅方法。......
議員陳凱欣(阿欣)就覺得，今次選舉延期某程度上同投票方法落後有關，加上舊年區選的確出現好多未成年人士干擾排隊嘅情況，促請馮驊要把握呢年時間，至少做到設立關愛隊同電子發票，而電子投票同點票等難度較高嘅項目，都應該開始研究，斥馮驊唔好話難就放軟手腳唔做啊。
除咗關愛隊同電子投票之外，議員麥美娟就補充，選舉尾段嘅保安安排都要做好，因為上次區選就有唔少人衝入票站，阻礙點票同監票程序，嚴重干擾選舉嘅公平性，敦促馮驊唔好諗住仲有1年先選舉就偷懶啊。(39)
''Pro-establishment'' lawmakers already concluded that so called ''community care unit'' and ''electric-voting'' are solutions to the fraudulent modi operandi successfully used by opposition in the 2019 Hong Kong District Council Election. Additionally, labor lawmaker Alice Mak Mei-kuen pointed out that vote counting and scrutinising ballots were sabotaged by assaults from opposition.
Several major electorate tricks used in the 2019 Hong Kong District Council Election (November 24, 2019) below:
(1) Slowdown of voting process. Preventing elderly people's votes by repetitively getting back in line and pretending that plotters lost ID cards, then conducted search and caused fuss at polling stations. This is why majority of ''pro-establishment'' camp required arrangement of ''community care unit'' to let elderly people smoothly finish their votes in short time without interruptions from politically motivated saboteurs. Mingpao reported on November 24, 2019,
【17:57】馮驊下午5時半再會見記者，表示截至今午3時，選管會共接獲3638宗投訴，主要和投票安排有關。
對於有指有人在票站重複排隊，阻礙其他人投票，馮驊稱故意阻礙他人投票屬選舉舞弊，性質嚴重，如有切實證據會有執法行動。若是影響選舉公平，候選人或選民都可提出選舉呈請，如獲法庭接納，法庭可宣告該區當選者並非妥為選出，有權取消選舉結果。
(40)
(2) Identity theft to boost voting results. Although Barnabus Fung stated that stealing ID to make multiplying votes was not a major complaint among 6540 electoral complaints received at the time of election, however this kind of case was broadly heard at the time of election from SNS.
Mingpao reported on November 25, 2019,
今屆區選不但投票人數創新高，選管會接獲的投訴數字亦大增，選管會主席馮驊表示，選管會收到6540宗投訴，較2015年投票當日的2429宗上升1.7倍，主要涉及投票安排及選舉廣告；有選民投訴投票時發現自己的身分證已被登記，選票被視作無效，馮驊稱有關個案佔整體非常少，相信不影響投票，但並非可容許，選管會會將相關個案轉介執法機關跟進調查。(41)
NowTV interviewed two victims of the fraudulent trick on November 24, 2019,
有九龍塘選民指，今早打算到九龍塘的票站投票，職員核對身份證的時候發現她的資料已被劃線，代表已有人用她的資料領取選票。職員反問她是否已投票，她否認。
票站職員叫她用一張寫上「重覆」的選票投票，表明不會計算結果，又表示職員劃錯名的機會很低。該名選民隨即作出投訴，並擔心身分證被人盜用，會報警處理。
另外，在沙田廣源邨一個票站，有選民前往投票時發現身份證已被登記，職員指她再投票都不會被計算，吳女士指感到十分憤怒，亦即場作投訴並保留追究權利。
In Hong Kong elections, ID card check at polling stations is required since December 10, 2018. Like any other capitalist democratic societies , voters have to receive their ballots at polling stations from their staffs. Many complained that their ID information was used to get ballots anonymously and mysteriously before the voters arrived at polling stations. Thus, some ''pro-establishment'' lawmakers and media are still highly suspicious about the politically biased staffs at polling stations. No one was arrested or charged for the fraud.
(3) Vote Counting Fraud & Monitoring Negligence in Scrutinising Ballots. Phantom votes were detected at Kwai Fong district. It turned out that there were 60 votes counted contrary to the originally recorded 30 votes. There is still no investigative result on this. Some polling station staff deleted voted opposition supporters' names on the name list in order to let them vote twice.
去年區選中，葵芳選區票站點票被揭發出現嚴重問題，經選舉事務處初步調查，實際點算的選票數比應該點算的選票數多60票，然而原本的票數記錄只是相差30票，令人懷疑是否有人企圖淡化問題，更令人質疑是否有人刻意製造錯誤。
至於多出的60張「幽靈票」是外來假票還是有人刻意派票，至今亦無調查結果。
此外，有網民透露，見到有票站人員刻意「遺忘」在選民名單上刪去已投票攬炒派選民的姓名，讓該支持者可以一人投兩票；亦有票站職員在完成點票後，向當選者鼓掌歡呼，或者向當選者「畀Like」。
票站監票亦存在不公，點票時票站被大批黑衣人包圍，有些更撐開黑傘遮擋，建制派候選人和監票人擔心安全而無法進入票站監察，而選舉主任就允許在沒有建制派代表的情況下開箱。
根據選管會報告，去年區選與投票安排相關的投訴攀升約23倍、對點票安排的投訴更由1宗暴增至逾2.1萬宗。(42)
The news media reported what the labor lawmaker Alice Mak Mei-kuen mentioned above. That is the critical blow to the fairness and legitimacy of the entire election. Black-shirted mobs assaulted the polling stations and blocked pro-establishment parties to monitor the scrutinising ballots. Furthermore, chairman of Electoral Affairs Commission Barnabus Fung allowed surrounded polling stations to open ballot boxes without attendance of ''pro-establishment'' side. Thus, many claimed that the election was unfairly proceeded under negligence and inactiveness of SAR government to prevent modi operandi of opposition during the still ongoing colour revolution.
On July 24, 2020, Wenweipo summed up seven chaotic situations, unfairness occurred in the catastrophic 2019 Hong Kong District Council Election.
READ MORE:
(4) Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (synthesis of fraudulent tricks)
According to Report on the 2019 District Council Ordinary Election, there were 27 categories of electorate complaints, total 36,221 cases confirmed.
The worst case category was ''arrangement of vote counting'' with 21,345 complaints placed. The second one was electorate ads (4344 complaints) ; the third one was electorate frauds (2599 complaints) ; the forth one was voting arrangement (1732 complaints) ; the fifth one was criminal destruction and violence (1158 complaints) and the sixth one was violations within polling stations (1089 complaints). (43)
READ MORE:
Outcome of Complaint Cases Investigated
The worst category ''arrangement of vote counting'' complaints skyrocketed, it's about 23 times larger than the previous election. Electorate ads complaints are more about disinformation ops. Spreading false voting date; discouraging pro-establishment voters from voting by false optimism on the electorate result; announcing false candidate numbers etc. Electorate frauds complaints include opposition supporters in families hid ID cards of their pro-establishment family members, even stole their identities to conduct plural voting. Other kind of electorate fraud method was not used in the 2019 election but used in the 2020 Hong Kong pro-democracy primaries. In which, opposition finalised their candidates and seat allocation plan in the upcoming legislative Council election in 2021, for Functional constituency voting, EAC strangely authorised more than 199 susceptive voter registration applications especially in sports, performance, culture and publication fields. It turned out that Five Metals shops, car, timber shops, laundries, and even Owners' Corporation falsely but successfully registered as effective voters.
EAC refused all suggestions from pro-establishment and did not properly handled any complaint from voters until today. The worst situation for pro-establishment is in fact preserved in the middle of recent political incidents and mainstream news. EAC can be seen as an accomplice of US-backed opposition. People must disqualify Barnabus Fung ASAP.
COMMENT
How honest and fair had the actual voting been? And we also have to ask the upcoming election will be honest and fair?
It's undoubtedly not optimistic for ''pro-establishment'' camp due to their inaction and lack of actual policies to improve lives of the working class people. Instead, what they more or only concerned now is reform of electoral system itself but not about social system at all.
The 1994 national election in El Salvador is a mirror to Hong Kong elections. In which, the large number of registered voters in working class and peasants were unable to do so because they simply did not receive voting cards. In Hong Kong, it's the ballot. Although transportation from distanced communities to polling stations nearby is not a problem in Hong Kong, slowdown in bus service to prevent pro-establishment supporters to arrive at polling stations is still possible in Hong Kong.
The exactly common phenomenon between El Salvador and Hong Kong elections is that many potential voters left the polling stations without casting their ballots due to extremely long lines, snail-paced voting system, the great inconvenience and threats from opposition. US-backed opposition and international mainstream media instilled fear in the electorate, and must have scared the large number of ''pro-establishment'' voters into staying home on the day of the 2019 Hong Kong District Council Election.
There was and will be frightening mismanagement of the elections by the incompetent SAR government and totally inactive 'pro-establishment' camp beyond our worst expectations.NOTES
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